Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

RUSSEL J. GANNARD, II CASE NO. 6:23-CV-00993

VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS

ISLAND OPERATING CO INC ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID J. AYO

RULING

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 37] filed by Quality

Production Management, LLC (“QPM”) and a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 44] filed

by REC Marine Logistics, LLC (“REC Marine’). For the reasons that follow, QPM’s summary

judgment motion [ECF No. 37] is DENIED and REC Marine’s summary judgment motion [ECF

No. 44] is DENIED.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Russel Gannard (“Gannard”) was employed by Quality Construction and

Production, LLC (“QCP”) as a fitter and was assigned to perform construction work aboard a

platform (“the Platform”) owned by Arena Offshore, LP (“Arena”).! REC Marine owned and

operated the M/V GOL FORCE (“the Vessel”) which housed QCP employees during the Platform

construction work.” Gannard alleges that he was injured on April 28, 2023, while being transferred

from the deck the Vessel to the Platform, by way of a crane on the Platform.’ Gannard claims that

while he was attempting to enter the “lift basket” to be transferred from the Vessel to the Platform,

_ the basket briefly lost contact with the surface of the Vessel and then slammed back down onto the

' ECF No. 37-2 at 10-12; ECF No. 39-1 at 15.

ECF No. 37-2 at 10.

3 ECF No. 19 at 3-4.

deck, causing Gannard’s leg to jam against the deck of the Vessel and resulting in an injury to his

right knee.* Two prior personnel transfers were made successfully under the same conditions.”

After filing suit, Gannard learned in discovery that the crane operator, who he originally

alleged was a co-employee of QCP, was actually an employee of a related entity named Quality

Production Management, LLC (“QPM™”).° On June 2, 2025, Gannard filed a Second Amending

and Supplemental Complaint, naming QPM as a defendant in addition to REC Marine.’

Gannard alleges that the loss of contact between the deck of the Vessel and the lift basket

could only have occurred as the result of one of three possible actions: 1) the deckhand on duty,

employed by REC Marine, failed to communicate to the crane operator, employed by QPM, the

appropriate amount of slack needed in the line to account for sea conditions at the time of the

incident, 2) the deckhand on duty failed to communicate to personnel, including Gannard, that the

sea conditions rendered it unsafe to board the basket, or 3) the crane operator prematurely lifted

the basket off of the Vessel before Gannard had fully boarded and then dropped the basket back

down.* QPM and REC Marine have separately moved for summary judgment, each claiming that

there is no evidence of negligence.

Il.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part

of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” “The court shall grant summary

“Td.

> ECF No. 37-2 at 13-14.

See ECF No. 17 at 1.

7 ECF No. 19.

8 Td. at 2.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”!° “A genuine issue of material fact exists when

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”!' As

summarized by the Fifth Circuit:

When seeking summary judgment, the movant bears the initial responsibility of

demonstrating the absence of an issue of material fact with respect to those issues

on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial. However, where the

nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an

absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating

by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact

warranting trial.'*

When reviewing evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment, “the court

must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe,

and should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as that evidence

supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached.”' “Credibility

determinations are not part of the summary judgment analysis.”'4 Rule 56 “mandates the entry of

summary judgment .. . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof.”!5

Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Service Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010).

Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (Sth Cir.1994) (internal citations omitted).

8 Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., 266 F.3d 368, 373 (Sth Cir.2001); see also Feist v. Louisiana, Dept. of Justice,

Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (the court must view all facts and evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party).

4 Quorum Health Resources, L.L.C. v. Maverick County Hosp. Dist., 308 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2002).

© Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

QPM’s MOTION cor SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Applicable Law.

Gannard’s complaint alleges that QPM was negligent under both general maritime law and

Louisiana law. QPM argues that Gannard’s claims against it are governed by Louisiana law

because the Platform is located on the outer continental shelf (“OCS”) and Louisiana is the state

adjacent to the Platform. REC Marine does not argue choice of law and Gannard does not oppose

the motion.

In determining which law governs the claims, the Court must first determine whether the

claims “arise under OCSLA.”!° If that threshold is met, the court must employ OCSLA’s choice

of law test to determine whether adjacent state law applies as “surrogate federal law,” or whether

maritime law “applies of its own force.”!”

The Fifth Circuit applies a three-element “but for” analysis to determine if a tort cause of

action arises under OCSLA: “(1) the facts underlying the complaint occurred on the proper situs;

(2) the plaintiff’s employment furthered mineral development on the OCS; and (3) the plaintiff's

injury would not have occurred but for his employment.”!® Gannard was injured during a personnel

basket transfer from a vessel to an offshore platform located on the OCS adjacent to the coast of

Louisiana. Because OCSLA expressly applies to “artificial islands and fixed structures erected”

on the OCS,'° the first element is satisfied.2? The second and third elements are also satisfied

16 See Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 2013).

'7 See Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng'g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th Cir. 1990).

'8 Barker, 713 F.3d at 213.

19 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A).

2° Gannard was in physical contact with the personnel basket attached to a crane on the Platform. See

Champagne v. Tetra Applied Techs. Inc., No. 05-299, 2006 WL 287985, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2006)

(concluding that an accident occurred on an OCSLA situs where the injured platform worker “was

because Gannard’s employment as a fitter furthered mineral development on the OCS and but for

his employment with QCP to work on the Platform, he would not have been aboard the Vessel

where the injury occurred.”! Thus, Gannard’s claims arise under OCSLA.

OCSLA “extends federal law to the subsoil and seabed of the [OCS] and all attachments

thereon,” and it adopts the adjacent state’s laws as “surrogate federal law,” to the extent the state’s

laws ““are applicable and not inconsistent with’ other federal law.””? For a state’s laws to apply to

a dispute arising under OCSLA, “(1) [t]he controversy must arise on a situs covered by OCSLA

(i.e., the subsoil seabed, or artificial structure permanently or temporarily attached thereto);” “(2)

[f]ederal maritime law must not apply of its own force;” and “(3) [t]he state law must not be

inconsistent with federal law.””? The first and third parts of this test are satisfied because the

Platform is located in Louisiana’s territorial waters and no party argues that Louisiana law is

inconsistent with federal law. The only remaining question is whether maritime law applies of its

own force.

For maritime law to apply in an OCSLA tort action, “an incident must have both a maritime

situs and a connection to traditional maritime activity.”** Assuming, arguendo, that the maritime

situs requirement is met, the Court turns to the maritime connection requirement. A court must first

connected to the personnel basket at the time of the alleged injury and [ ] through the basket [ ] was

physically connected to the crane and Exxon’s platform”); see also Hicks v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 308 F.

Supp. 3d 878, 884 (E.D. La. 2018).

*! See Hicks v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 3d 878, 884 (E.D. La. 2018) (holding that “Hicks would

not have suffered his alleged injury but for his employment on the offshore platform.”); see also

Debellefeuille v. Vastar Offshore, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 821 (S.D. Tex. 2001).

22 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1); Kennedy v. Shell USA, Inc., No. CV 22-4591, 2024 WL 2863381, at *3 (E.D. La.

June 6, 2024) (citing Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U.S. 601, 604, 139 S. Ct. 1881,

1886, 204 L. Ed. 2d 165 (2019)).

3 Grand Isle Shipyard Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 784 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing

Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Engineering, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th Cir. 1990)).

4 Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 351 (5th Cir. 1999).

“assess the general features of the type of incident involved,’ to determine whether the incident

has ‘a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce,’” and then must “determine whether

‘the general character’ of the ‘activity giving rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship

to traditional maritime activity.’”*°

In Hicks, the Eastern District of Louisiana held that an injury to a platform worker during

a personnel basket transfer between an offshore platform and a vessel in navigable waters did not

satisfy the traditional maritime activity prong.*° Because the kind of activities performed on

offshore platforms by platform workers fell “outside the purview of maritime navigational or

commercial activities,” the injuries to platform workers during personnel basket transfers on

offshore platforms did not relate to traditional maritime activity.”” Additionally, Fifth Circuit cases

have applied adjacent state law to tort claims against platform owners involving personnel basket

transfers between offshore platforms and vessels in the Gulf of Mexico.”®

Because Gannard’s tort claims against QPM as the employer of the crane operator similarly

involve injuries to a platform worker during a personnel basket transfer between an offshore

platform and a vessel, Gannard’s claims against QPM are not maritime in nature and federal

5 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1048,

130 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (1995) (internal citation omitted).

Hicks, 308 F. Supp. 3d at 890. The Court notes, however, that the court in Hicks only addressed the

defendant’s potential liability as the owner of the offshore platform, specifically declining to address the

defendant’s potential liability as a time charterer of the vessel at issue. Jd. at 881 n. 1.

Td.; see also Willis v. Barry Graham Oil Serv. LLC, 636 F. Supp. 3d 684, 695 (W.D. La. 2022).

See Davis v. Dynamic Offshore Res., L.L.C., 865 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying Louisiana law in a

case where a contractor was allegedly injured during a basket transfer between an offshore platform and a

vessel); Zepherin v. Conoco Oil Co., 884 F.2d 212 (Sth Cir. 1989) (concluding that Louisiana's independent

contractor defense shielded an offshore platform owner from liability where the contractor was allegedly

injured during a personnel basket transfer between an offshore platform affixed to the Gulf of Mexico and

a vessel).

maritime law does not govern them. Therefore, the Court concludes that Louisiana law, adopted

as surrogate federal law under OCSLA, governs Gannard’s tort claims against QPM.

B. Whether QPM Breached a Duty Owed to Gannard.

Under Louisiana law, negligence cases are resolved by employing a duty/risk analysis,

which entails five separate elements:

(1) whether the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard

(the duty element); 2) whether the defendant’s conduct failed to conform to the

appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) whether the defendant's substandard

conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injures (the cause-in-fact element); (4)

whether the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's

injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and (5) whether the

plaintiff was damaged (the damages element).”?

QPM contends that there is no evidence that it breached the duty of reasonable care owed to

Gannard. Specifically, QPM argues that there is no evidence that the crane operator prematurely

lifted and then dropped the personnel basket before Gannard had fully boarded. QPM also argues

that the crane operator did not have a duty to anticipate or account for unpredictable wave

conditions and that there is no evidence that the crane operator acted unreasonably in executing

the personnel basket transfer.

The Court finds that there are at least two triable issues precluding summary judgment.

First, there is a triable issue as to whether the QPM crane operator breached the duty of care by

lifting and then dropping the personnel basket before Gannard had fully boarded. QPM and REC

Marine dispute whether an email from Gannard’s supervisor explaining that “the crane came up

with the personnel basket off the boat when Russel wasn’t 100% ready to go up’? can be

?° Hanks v. Entergy Corp., 944 So.2d 564, 579 (La. 2006).

30 ECF No. 39-1 at 9.

considered as evidence for purposes of this motion because it was not based on the supervisor’s

personal knowledge. Even without this email, however, there is evidence in the summary judgment

record establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Specifically, Gannard’s witness statement

written the day of the alleged accident states that the personnel basket “rose about 3’ in the air and

basket came slamming down jamming right knee. I was not all the way in the basket before it was

lifted, was not fully boarded yet befor[e] it left the deck.”?! Based on this statement, a reasonable

jury could determine that the QPM crane operator breached the duty of care by prematurely lifting

and dropping the personnel basket before Gannard had fully boarded and that this action was the

cause of Gannard’s injuries. While Gannard later testified in his deposition that he did not think

the crane operator prematurely lifted the basket,** the jury is tasked with determining credibility

and weighing the evidence.

Second, there is a triable issue as to whether the QPM crane operator breached the duty of

care by failing to leave adequate slack in the crane line to account for sea conditions. In his

deposition testimony, the crane operator testified that he is required to leave slack in the cable

attachment when placing the personnel basket down’ and described the process for measuring the

proper amount of slack to leave in the line.** While there is evidence that the general sea conditions

on the day of the alleged incident were safe for a personnel basket transfer,*> there is also evidence

that the amount of slack in the crane line was insufficient to account for wave action at the time of

Gannard’s personnel basket transfer. The crane operator’s deposition testimony indicates that when

he accounted for slack on the day of the incident he may have only accounted for one to two foot

3! Td. at 46.

32 ECF No. 37-2 at 17-20.

33 ECF No. 39-1 at 28-29.

34 ECF No. 37-4 at 4.

35 See ECF No. 37-2 at 14-15.

seas.°° The Job Safety Environmental Analysis conducted prior to the operation, however, states

that the seas were in the range of two to four feet.?” A supervising operator, Harold Stutes, also

testified that the seas were “a little rough that day.’”°* Gannard testified that his best explanation of

the incident is that “the boat came out from underneath us. A swell... . [W]e stayed stationary.

The boat is the one that took off.” *? Other witnesses also testified to feeling a swell bring the

Vessel downward.*” Additionally, the Arena Report of Injury Evacuation states that the “Root

Cause” of the incident was “[s]ea state and marine vessel movement (pitch, heave, and roll). The

depth subsided by the M /V exceeded the excess wire rope offered to the transfer operation from

the crane.”“! Based on this evidence, there is a triable issue as to whether Gannard’s injuries

resulted from the crane line having inadequate slack to account for wave action and that the crane

operator bears responsibility in failing to leave sufficient slack.

In sum, there are triable issues as to whether the QPM crane operator breached the duty of

care either by prematurely lifting and dropping the personnel basket before Gannard had fully

boarded or by failing to leave adequate slack in the crane line to account for sea conditions. Thus,

QPM’s motion for summary judgment must be denied.

36 ECF No. 39-1 at 32.

37 Td. at 51.

38 ECF No. 47-4 at 11-12.

3° ECF No. 37-2 at 17-18.

40 ECF No. 47-5 at 8; ECF No. 39-1 at 49-50.

“1 ECF No. 47-1 at 4.

IV.

REC MARINE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Applicable Law.

In his complaint, Gannard asserts negligence claims under general maritime law and

Section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. Both Gannard and REC

Marine argue that general maritime tort law is applicable to the negligence claim against REC

Marine, regardless of whether the claim is governed by maritime law or by Section 905(b).** While

Gannard’s claims against QPM as the employer of the crane operator are governed by Louisiana

law (adopted as surrogate federal law under OCSLA), Gannard’s claims against REC Marine as

the owner of the Vessel are not necessarily governed by the same law.? The Court finds that, for

purposes of resolving this motion, it is not necessary to determine which law applies. Specifically,

whether the alleged incident occurred as a result of REC Marine’s breach of a duty owed to

Gannard is a threshold issue under either regime.“

See Stevenson v. Point Marie, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. La. 1988) (§ 905(b) claims arise under general

maritime law).

‘3 See Solet v. CNG Producing Co., 908 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. La. 1995) (finding that, in a case in which the

plaintiff was injured during a personnel basket transfer, the plaintiff’s claims against the owner of the fixed

platform and employer of the crane operator were governed by OCSLA, whereas the claims against the

vessel entities were governed by maritime law); Henson v. Odyssea Vessels, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

25221, 2008 AMC 2496 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2008) (reaching the same conclusion).

“4 See Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2000) (“To establish maritime

negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, breach

of that duty, injury sustained by [the] plaintiff, and a causal connection between the defendant's conduct

and the plaintiff's injury.”); Hanks, 944 So.2d at 579 (“Under Louisiana jurisprudence, most negligence

cases are resolved by employing a duty/risk analysis, which entails five separate elements: (1) whether the

defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); 2) whether the

defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) whether the

defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injures (the cause-in-fact element);

(4) whether the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of

liability or scope of protection element); and (5) whether the plaintiff was damaged (the damages

element).”).

10

B. Whether REC Marine Breached a Duty Owed to Gannard.

REC Marine argues that it did not owe Gannard a duty to warn him about a “rogue wave”

and that Gannard has failed to come forward with evidence that REC Marine breached any duty

owed to Gannard. Gannard argues, however, that REC Marine breached its duty of reasonable care

when the REC Marine deckhand failed to instruct the crane operator to give more slack in the

crane line to account for sea conditions and when he failed to inform personnel, including Gannard,

that it was unsafe to board the personnel basket. It is undisputed that REC Marine owed Gannard

a duty to exercise reasonable care.*> The issue to be decided is whether a reasonable jury could

find that the conduct of the REC Marine deckhand breached the duty of reasonable care and that

this breach was a cause of Gannard’s injuries.

The Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact warranting trial. As discussed

in the previous section, a reasonable jury could find that the wave action at the time of Gannard’s

personnel basket transfer, paired with inadequate slack in the crane line, rendered the transfer

unsafe. There is also evidence showing that the deckhand is responsible for communicating with

the crane operator when more slack is needed in the crane line to account for sea conditions. The.

deckhand testified that part of his job is making sure that the crane line has the proper amount of

slack** and that he uses hand signals to tell the crane operator if more or less slack is needed.*”

Harold Stutes testified that it is the responsibility of the deckhand to “flag or give hand signals to

the crane operator in correspondence to the lift on the boat because he can see better than anyone

“8 Both Gannard and REC Marine agree that “a shipowner owes the duty of exercising reasonable care

towards those lawfully aboard the vessel who are not members of the crew.” Kermarec v. Compagnie

Generate Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630, 79 S.Ct. 406, 409, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959).

46 ECF No, 47-3 at 12.

47 Td. at 8.

11

else.”*® The deckhand’s testimony indicates that the crane line would have insufficient slack only

if he failed to communicate that more slack was needed:

Q: Now for that to happen, for the vessel to drop away and come back up and hit

the bottom of a personnel carrier—personnel basket—I’m gonna ask you if these

things would be the only way it would happen: number one, the crane operator did

not have enough slack in the line; am I correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And number two, you didn’t tell the crane operator that he needed more slack in

the line; am I correct?

A: Yes.””

The deckhand also confirmed that he is responsible for informing basket passengers to wait

if it is not safe to board the basket.°° Gannard testified that during a transfer, “[y]ou depend on

your deckhand to be your eyes and ears.”°! The deckhand explained that he is accustomed to the

action of the waves and admitted that he is “in a superior position to have awareness of any danger

in a lift more than a simple passenger.”°* He also testified that if someone was trying to get on the

personnel basket before he wanted them to, he would stop them.® There is also evidence that the

deckhand did not tell Gannard to wait before boarding the basket at the time of the incident. Harold

Stutes testified that he witnessed the deckhand giving the personnel hand signals telling them to

board the basket at the time of the incident™ and the crane operator testified that he did not see

Gannard rushing to board the basket.°°

48 ECF No. 47-4 at 7-8.

ECF No. 47-3 at 14.

°0 Td. at 7 (“I tell them when to get on or when it's -- when they need to wait a minute.”).

5! ECF No. 44-3 at 21.

°° ECF No. 47-3 at 9, 18.

%3 Td. at 16.

4 ECF No. 47-4 at 8.

°° ECF No. 47-5 at 7.

12

REC Marine argues, however, that there is no evidence that the deckhand could have

detected dangerous wave action before the transfer began.*° It contends that the deckhand cannot

be expected to identify a dangerous wave condition when Gannard himself looked out over the

water and did not see any rogue waves or swells before boarding.°’ The Court finds, however, that

there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could determine that the deckhand could have taken

action to prevent the dangerous transfer. The deckhand admitted that he is “in a superior position

to have awareness of any danger in a lift more than a simple passenger.”°® The Quality Incident

Investigation Report notes under “Communication” that “personnel basket transfer expectations

could have been verbally communicated between the Crane Operator, Captain, and Deckhand ...

Ex. Verify the Crane Operator adjusts the slack in the line enough to compensate for the sea

conditions and that the boat will hold position, prior to signaling the personnel to board the

basket.”°? It also notes under “Stop Work Authority” that the deckhand “could have used SWA

when the personnel rushed to board the basket.”

Further, there is evidence indicating that the deckhand was inexperienced at the time of the

alleged incident. Gannard testified that “word gets around about this guy that—green hands...

why wasn’t he more active in his role, in his job. That’s what I was thinking. Why didn’t he let us

°° See Southard v. Paul Lester & Oregon Inlet Fishing Ctr, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-47-F(2), 2006 WL 8449039,

at *5 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2006), aff'd sub nom. Southard v. Lester, 260 F. App’x 611 (4th Cir. 2008) (granting

summary judgment when the plaintiff relied only on “sheer speculation and conjectural hypothesizing” to

conclude that a vessel captain could have seen a “rogue wave” in advance of it colliding with the vessel);

Irwin v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 912, 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd sub nom. Irwin v. United States, 236

F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1956) (finding that the ship was not at fault for an accident caused by an unpredictable

“freak swell” of the sea); see also Hardy v. Wood Grp. PSN, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-00775, 2014 WL 1652530,

at *3 (W.D. La. Apr. 24, 2014).

57 ECF No. 44-3 at 21.

8 ECF No. 47-3 at 9, 18.

Td. at 4.

6 Td.

13

know something?”*! He continued, “I feel it was the—the deckhand’s—it was his job. He—he just

wasn’t qualified, I think. He was just green... .”°* Gannard also explained that he had “been

working with him all week and seeing he was green.”*’ The deckhand also testified that “nowadays

when J—with more experience now, I—I try to be a little better at looking at my surroundings.”™

In sum, there is a triable issue as to whether Gannard’s alleged injuries were caused by

inadequate slack in the crane line and that the deckhand bears responsibility for these injuries.

Specifically, a reasonable jury could find that the REC Marine deckhand breached the duty of

reasonable care by 1) failing to communicate to the crane operator that more slack was needed in

the crane line to account for sea conditions and/or 2) failing to inform personnel, including

Gannard, that wave action rendered the personnel basket transfer unsafe. REC Marine’s motion

for summary judgment is therefore denied.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, QPM’s motion [ECF No. 37] is DENIED and REC

Marine’s motion [ECF No. 44] is DENIED.

THUS DONE in Chambers on this Ms day of June, 2026.

ROBERT R. SUMMER JAYS]

UNITED STATES DISTRICKJUBGE

6! ECF No. 44-3 at 25.

8 Td. at 26.

63 Td.

64 ECF No. 47-3 at 23.

14