Ico-Choc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

EDDIN DANIEL ICO-CHOC, ) Case No. 4:26-cv-1042

)

Petitioner, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Carmen E. Henderson

KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Detroit Field )

Office Director, Immigration and )

Customs Enforcement and Removal )

Operations, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

)

ORDER

On May 5, 2026, Petitioner Eddin Daniel Ico-Choc, a citizen and national of

Guatemala who is a member of the indigenous Maya K’iche’ Christian community,

petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to prevent his removal to the United

States. Mr. Ico-Choc fled Guatemala after the Mara 18 gang murdered his

grandfather and entered the United States at the end of 2018. In March 2026, the

immigration authorities took Mr. Ico-Choc into custody and ordered removed from

the United States. For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES the petition

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

According to Petitioner, Mr. Ico-Choc fled Guatemala after members of the

Mara 18 gang killed his grandfather. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 2, PageID #10.) Following his

killing, gang members reportedly sought out Mr. Ico-Choc and threatened his life.

(Id.) These events caused Mr. Ico-Choc to flee Guatemala, and he entered the United

States illegally on December 20, 2018. (Id.)

On March 17, 2026, Mr. Ico-Choc was a passenger with three co-workers in a

vehicle traveling through Seneca County, Ohio to Michigan. (Id., ¶ 26, PageID #14;

id., ¶ 3, PageID #10.) At a gas station, a sheriff’s deputy allegedly stopped the vehicle

without reasonable suspicion and ordered the driver out of the vehicle. (Id., ¶ 26,

PageID #14.) Agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrived a short

time later and arrested Mr. Ico-Choc and others. (Id.; id., ¶ 4, PageID #10–11.)

Mr. Ico-Choc has been detained in the Northern District of Ohio pending his removal

from the United States. (Id., ¶ 5, PageID #11; id., ¶ 28, PageID #14.) On April 21,

2026, an immigration judge ordered the removal of Mr. Ico-Choc from the United

States. (Id., ¶ 30, PageID #15.) He is pursuing relief with the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (Id.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 5, 2026, with the assistance of counsel (who is not admitted to practice

in the Northern District of Ohio), Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) He alleges that his arrest violates the

Fourth Amendment and exceeds the statutory and regulatory authority for civil

immigration arrests. Also, he challenges his detention without an individualized

bond hearing under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and alleges that it

violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.

ANALYSIS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a court shall forthwith issue a writ or order the

respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue, “unless it appears from the

application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled” to a writ of habeas

corpus. This statute requires an initial screening of a petition. See Alexander v.

Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). At this stage of

the proceedings, a court accepts as true the allegations in the petition and construes

them in favor of the petitioner. Id. “If it plainly appears from the petition and any

attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the

judge must dismiss the petition.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

(applicable to petitions under Section 2241 through Rule 1(b)).

I. Prudential Exhaustion

“When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court

ordinarily should either dismiss the [habeas] petition without prejudice or stay the

proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is

excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations

omitted). In Leonardo, the petitioner pursued habeas review of the Immigration

Court’s adverse bond determination before he appealed to the Board of Immigration

Appeals. Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that filing a habeas petition in federal

district court was improper because the petitioner “should have exhausted

administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district

court to review the IJ’s decision.” Id. (citing Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814,

819 (9th Cir. 2003)).

The Sixth Circuit has endorsed this procedure for challenging bond

determinations, albeit in a short, unpublished order. See Rabi v. Sessions, No. 19-

3249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at *1–2 (6th Cir. July 16, 2018) (citing Leonardo,

646 F.3d at 1160); see also Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (applying

the Ninth Circuit’s test for prudential exhaustion). Previously, the Court has done

so as well. See Tecum Pastor v. Director of Detroit Field Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs

Enf’t, 814 F. Supp. 3d 875, 881 (N.D. Ohio 2025); Monroy Villalta v. Greene, 794 F.

Supp. 3d 528, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2025); Laguna Espinoza v. Director of Detroit Field Off.,

U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 4:25-cv-02107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2 (N.D. Ohio

Oct. 9, 2025); Ba, 2025 WL 2977712, at *2.

In this case, Mr. Ico-Choc has available to him an appeal to the Board of

Immigration Appeals. As in Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160, prudential principles of

exhaustion counsel that Petitioner pursue his administrative remedies to a final

judgment from the Board of Immigration Appeals before seeking a writ of habeas

corpus. In his petition, Mr. Ico-Choc alleges violations of the Immigration and

Nationality Act. Though couched in the language of due process under the Fifth

Amendment, it also invites review of the process due under the statute and its

associated procedures. In other words, any determination regarding detention here

turns on interpretation and application of the governing removal regime.

In the first instance, such review should proceed before the Board of

Immigration Appeals to “apply its experience and expertise without judicial

interference.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other

grounds); see also Rojas-Garcia , 39 F.3d at 819 (acknowledging that a “petitioner

must exhaust administrative remedies before raising the constitutional claims in a

habeas petition when those claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal”); Monroy

Villalta, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 531; Laguna Espinoza, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2; Ba, 2025

WL 2977712, at *2.

II. Futility

Petitioner makes no argument that exhaustion of his appeals through the

administrative process is futile. And for good reason. Courts in this Circuit have

determined that even where there is a “high probability of denial” of a petitioner’s

appeal of an Immigration Judge’s bond decision, such a probability “does not weigh

in favor of waiving exhaustion.” Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *11.

Indeed, the acting Attorney General remains free to exercise his discretion to use an

appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals to change or modify the policies about

which Petitioner complains.

In Hernandez Torrealba, the petitioner sought relief from the exhaustion

requirement based on a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the

denial of bond. But the court was “not certain how the BIA will rule on Petitioner’s

appeal given the particular circumstances of her case, and it would be presumptuous

of this Court to simply assume that the BIA will rule against Petitioner.” Id. So too

here. Petitioner presents relevant background of Mr. Ico-Choc that appears

particularly sympathetic. For this reason, his case might well prove to be one in

which the agency changes or refines its policies through agency adjudication. That

prerogative belongs in the first instance to the agency, which also has the knowledge

and ability and to adopt policies that are more tailored to the statutory scheme it is

tasked with implementing in a way that courts are not.

“[M]any of the purposes for requiring exhaustion’ may be served by permitting

agency review in the first instance.’” Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *11

(quoting Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62). Indeed, courts outside this Circuit acknowledge

that the purposes of requiring exhaustion in the immigration context “include

protecting the authority of administrative agencies, limiting interference in agency

affairs, developing the factual record to make judicial review more efficient, and

resolving issues to render judicial review unnecessary.” Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62

(citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992); McKart v. United States, 395

U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969)).

For these reasons, the Court cannot say that exhaustion is futile or a waste of

time or that prudential reasons apply for excusing it. To the contrary, it promotes

judicial restraint, separates the powers and proper roles of the agency and the courts

in the administrative regime Congress created, and reserves judicial review from

decisions of the agency for the Sixth Circuit.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 24, 2026

J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio