Mendoza-Barrera

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSUE MENDOZA-BARRERA,

Plaintiff,

V. No. 25 CV 464

THOMAS J. DART, in his capacity as Judge Manish S. Shah

Cook County Sheriff, ALEJANDRO

PENA, BOBBY CLARK, MARQUETTA

REED, and SAINT ANTHONY HOSPITAL,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Josue Mendoza-Barrera experienced a medical emergency while incarcerated

at the Cook County Jail. He was restrained with handcuffs and leg shackles before

being transported to Saint Anthony Hospital. There, Cook County Sheriff Officers

escorted Mendoza-Barrera to undergo an MRI. Despite hospital technicians twice

telling the officers that Mendoza-Barrera could not have any metal on his body, the

officers did not remove the shackles. When the technicians started the MRI, powerful

magnets pulled Mendoza-Barrera’s feet to the top of the machine, twisting his body

and causing immense pain. Mendoza-Barrera sued the officers he alleged to be

involved in his hospital escort, the Cook County Sheriff, and Saint Anthony Hospital

for deliberate indifference to his health and safety, deprivation of medical care, and

medical malpractice, respectively. Defendants Sheriff Dart, and Officers Alejandro

Pena, Bobby Clark, and Marquetta Reed now move to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons discussed

below, the motion is granted in part.

I. Legal Standards

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). When analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint, I construe it in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all

inferences in his favor. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 164 F.4th 1038,

1046 (7th Cir. 2026).

Rule 8(a) “does not demand detailed factual allegations, but it does require

more than mere ‘labels and conclusions,’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action.’” Wertymer v. Walmart, Inc., 142 F.4th 491, 494–95 (7th Cir. 2025)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.” Id. at 495 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Put another way, the complaint must “present a story that holds together.” Swanson

v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).

When, as here, a plaintiff sues an officer for money damages under § 1983 and

the officer invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff must “plead facts showing

(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right

was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Sabo v. Erickson,

128 F.4th 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 735 (2011)) (cleaned up). “Simply put, a plaintiff can plead himself out of court

on qualified immunity grounds.” Sabo, 128 F.4th at 842. Dismissal on qualified

immunity grounds “is appropriate if, taking the facts alleged in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter

of law.” Id.

II. Facts

Josue Mendoza-Barrera was detained at the Cook County Jail. [44] ¶ 19.1 On

September 20, 2023, Mendoza-Barrera lost consciousness during a medical

emergency. [44] ¶¶ 19–20. Unknown jail officials placed Mendoza-Barrera on a

gurney, attached shackles to his ankles and handcuffs to his wrists, and transported

him to Saint Anthony Hospital. [44] ¶¶ 22–26. While en route, he became semi-

conscious, but had no feeling in either of his legs, and felt pain in his head and neck

area. [44] ¶¶ 27–28.

Upon arrival, still disoriented and in pain, Mendoza-Barrera was taken to the

emergency room, where Saint Anthony medical staff cut off his uniform and assisted

him into a hospital gown. [44] ¶¶ 29–32. While changing, Mendoza-Barrera’s feet

remained shackled together, and afterwards he was handcuffed to the hospital bed.

[44] ¶¶ 33–34. Mendoza-Barrera was then wheeled to a separate medical bay where

he was met by officers Pena and Reed.2 [44] ¶¶ 37–38.

1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings. The facts are taken from the

operative Second Amended Complaint, [44].

2 The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Mendoza-Barrera was met, and later

accompanied, by “Officers Pena, Clark, and/or Reed.” See [44]. As Mendoza-Barrera clarifies

in his response to the motion to dismiss, however, records indicate that only officers Pena

Due to the extent of his injuries, medical staff ordered a Magnetic Resonance

Imaging procedure for Mendoza-Barrera. [44] ¶ 39. Pena and Reed, along with two

MRI technicians, escorted Mendoza-Barrera to the MRI room. [44] ¶¶ 40–42. Once

there, Pena and Reed removed the handcuffs—but left the shackles on his legs—and

assisted the technicians with transferring Mendoza-Barrera to the MRI bed. [44]

¶¶ 44–47. One of the technicians then said to the officers: “I need all metal off of his

body.” [44] ¶ 48. The officers checked Mendoza-Barrera’s hands and responded:

“Yeah.” [44] ¶¶ 49–50. A second time, the technician verbally informed the officers

that Mendoza-Barrera should not have any metal on his body. [44] ¶ 51. Again, the

officers responded affirmatively. [44] ¶ 52. Despite those two express warnings,

Mendoza-Barrera’s legs remained shackled together. [44] ¶ 53.

The MRI technicians, who also did not ensure that the shackles were removed,

then ordered the officers to leave the room for the procedure. [44] ¶¶ 55–56. When

the MRI machine turned on, the magnetic coils suddenly and violently pulled

Mendoza-Barrera’s feet to the top of the machine. [44] ¶¶ 58–60. His feet were

slammed against the machine, causing immense pain in his legs from his knees down

to his ankles. [44] ¶¶ 60–61. Mendoza-Barrera’s body was gradually twisted and

pulled for approximately 25 to 30 seconds. [44] ¶ 62. He screamed for help, and the

MRI technician turned off the machine. [44] ¶¶ 63–65. As a result of the MRI,

Mendoza-Barrera sustained severe bruising, swelling, discoloration, and discomfort

and Reed were assigned to that shift at Saint Anthony Hospital on the day of the incident.

See [55] at 12.

in his lower body, and was unable to walk or stand for moderate periods of time

following the incident. [44] ¶ 65.

III. Analysis

Mendoza-Barrera brings three claims against three different sets of

defendants in his Second Amended Complaint: he sues officers Pena, Clark, and Reed

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his health and safety in violation

of his Eighth Amendment rights; he sues Sheriff Dart and unknown Cook County

Department of Corrections officers under § 1983 for unconstitutional deprivation of

medical care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; and he sues Saint Anthony

Hospital for medical malpractice. [44]. The medical malpractice claim against Saint

Anthony Hospital is not at issue here.

In the Second Amended Complaint, Mendoza-Barrera alleges violations of his

Eighth Amendment rights. [44] ¶¶ 73, 81, 93 & 97. But Mendoza-Barrera was a

pretrial detainee at the time of the incident. [55] at 3 n.1. Pretrial detainees, as

contrasted to those serving prison sentences after a finding of guilt, “remain entitled

to the presumption of innocence, and so the Constitution protects them from any

punishment for the acts that led to their detention.” Kemp v. Fulton Cnty., 27 F.4th

491, 495 (7th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, a pretrial detainee’s

claim “arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is

governed by an objective standard.” Id. Defendants—using it themselves—do not

contest applying the Fourteenth Amendment, so I apply an objective standard. See

also Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Madison Cnty., Ill., 108 F.4th 561, 570 (7th Cir. 2024)

(applying the Fourteenth Amendment to a pretrial detainee alleging deliberate

indifference to medical needs).

Plaintiff must allege, in addition to causation and harm, “that the defendants

did not take reasonable available measures to abate the risk of serious harm to

[Mendoza-Barrera], even though reasonable officers under the circumstances would

have understood the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of the

defendants’ conduct obvious.” Id. at 572 (emphasis in original); Zemlick v. Burkhart,

164 F.4th 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 2026). In other words, I ask whether the allegations

support a reasonable inference “that the officers recklessly disregarded a risk so

obvious that they either knew or should have known of it.” Lawler ex rel. Lawler v.

Hardeman Cnty., Tenn., 93 F.4th 919, 927 (6th Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original).

The facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint support such an inference.

The officers not only escorted Mendoza-Barrera to the MRI room, but also assisted

the technicians in physically moving him from his gurney to the MRI bed. It is

improbable that they were unaware that Mendoza-Barrera still had metal shackles

attached to his legs after the MRI technicians twice asked them to remove all metal

from his body. Any reasonable officer would have understood the danger of leaving

metal shackles attached to a detainee during an MRI. The officers recklessly

disregarded that danger, and it caused substantial injury to Mendoza-Barrera.

The Second Amended Complaint therefore adequately alleges that the officers’

conduct violated a constitutional right, but since defendants have raised qualified

immunity as a defense, the burden rests on Mendoza-Barrera to also establish that

the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the officers’ alleged

misconduct. Tousis v. Billiot, 84 F.4th 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2023). “Qualified immunity

is an affirmative defense, but once the defendant raises it, ‘the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to defeat it.’” Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 806 (7th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2019)).

A constitutional right is “clearly established” when the law is “‘sufficiently

clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’ is

unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting al-Kidd,

563 U.S. at 741). “In other words, to clearly establish a right, existing precedent must

place the constitutional or statutory question ‘beyond debate.’” Sabo v. Erickson,

128 F.4th at 844 (citation omitted). “Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit

when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v.

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, (2004) (per curiam). But it does not protect conduct that,

even if not specifically addressed in precedent, is obviously prohibited by a

constitutional rule already identified in decisional law. Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7,

8–9 (2020).

Any reasonable officer should have realized that leaving leg shackles attached

to a pretrial detainee undergoing an MRI creates a severe risk of bodily harm.

Defendants argue that the MRI technicians were the ones with the ultimate

responsibility for the procedure, but “correctional staff can escape liability only when

they reasonably defer to the judgment of medical professionals.” Smith v. Whitsel,

134 F.4th 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2025). There is nothing in the Second Amended

Complaint—nor logic—to indicate that the MRI technicians exercised their medical

judgment when leaving the shackles attached to Mendoza-Barrera’s legs. To the

contrary, the reasonable inference to draw from the facts alleged is that the officers

were the only ones with the means to remove the shackles at all. On a motion to

dismiss, Mendoza-Barrera has pled sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity.

Lacking allegations of personal involvement by Cook County Sheriff Thomas

Dart and the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, Mendoza-Barrera’s second claim must

satisfy the requirements of Monell. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658

(1978). To state a Monell claim, the plaintiff must allege “that he was deprived of a

federal right” and that he can “trace the deprivation to some municipal action (i.e., a

‘policy or custom’), such that the challenged conduct is ‘properly attributable to the

municipality itself.’” Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir.

2021) (quoting First Midwest Bank ex rel. LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978,

986–87 (7th Cir. 2021)). “There are at least three types of municipal action that may

give rise to municipal liability under § 1983: ‘(1) an express policy that causes a

constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so

permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an

allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final

policymaking authority.’” Dean, 18 F.4th at 235 (quoting LaPorta, 988 F.3d at 986).

Then the plaintiff must also allege “municipal fault” and that the municipal action

was the “moving force” behind the federal-rights violation, but Mendoza-Barrera’s

Monell claim fails because he has failed to allege a municipal action.

The Second Amended Complaint includes the conclusory allegation that

“written policies and training established and/or approved by Defendant Dart and

the Cook County Sheriff’s Office [] constitute the official policy of [the Cook County

Department of Corrections] and were the moving force behind and caused Mr.

Mendoza-Barrera’s injuries.” [44] ¶ 87. Those conclusory words strung together to

parrot the legal standard are neither owed the presumption of truth nor sufficient to

make a favorable inference that an express policy existed that caused a constitutional

deprivation. Mendoza-Barrera does not allege that similar deprivations have

happened to other detainees, so there is no basis for claiming a widespread practice.

And the injury was not directly caused by Dart. Mendoza-Barrera’s Monell claim thus

fails.

Ordinarily, a plaintiff whose claim is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) is given at

least one opportunity to amend. Ryder v. Hyles, 27 F.4th 1253, 1258 (7th Cir. 2022).

But leave to amend need not be granted when doing so would be futile. Id. (citing

Loja v. Main St. Acquisition Corp., 906 F.3d 680, 684–84 (7th Cir. 2018)). Mendoza-

Barrera has already amended his complaint twice, both with the assistance of

counsel, and there is no indication that further amendment would provide sufficient

allegations of a policy, pattern, or practice to maintain a Monell claim.

Officer Reed also argues that any claims against him are barred by the

applicable two-year statute of limitations. While the relevant events occurred on

September 20, 2023, the Second Amended Complaint—the first to name Reed—was

not filed until October 29, 2025. See [44] ¶ 1. Since the amendment naming Reed was

not filed until after September 20, 2025, it would need to relate back to the date of an

older pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) to avoid the time bar.

Rule 15(c)(1)(C) allows relation back of amendments when:

the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against

whom a claim is asserted, if [the amendment asserts a claim that arose

out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original

pleading] and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the

summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:

(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in

defending on the merits; and

(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been

brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s

identity.

The “mistake” requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is satisfied by “any

erroneous belief.” Rodriguez v. McCloughen, 49 F.4th 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 2022)

(citing Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010)). That’s distinct

from ignorance, like cases where the plaintiff names a “John Doe” or “unknown

agents.” See Herrera v. Cleveland, 8 F.4th 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2021); LJM Partners,

Ltd. v. Barclays Cap., Inc., 165 F.4th 552, 570 (7th Cir. 2026) (“When an initial

complaint only names Doe defendants, amended complaints that add the names of

defendants do not relate back to the date of the earlier complaint under Rule

15(c)(1)(C).”). Mendoza-Barrera only named Clark, and not Reed, because he

erroneously believed that Clark was the other officer with Pena on the day of his

MRI—that is a “mistake concerning the proper party’s identity” sufficient to fulfill

the requirement of the rule.3

The remainder of the Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requirements are met because Reed

actually received notice within the time allowed by Rule 4(m), and Reed would not be

prejudiced in defending on the merits. Defendants must be “served within 90 days

after the complaint is filed” unless the plaintiff “shows good cause for the failure,” in

which case “the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Accordingly, “the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the

summons and complaint” includes any court-ordered extensions. 6A Wright &

Miller’s Fed. Prac. And Proc. § 1498.1 (observing that, since Rule 15(c) was amended

in 1991, “the notice required under the rule no longer is tied to the governing

limitations period, but is linked to the federal service period of 90 days or any

additional time resulting from a court-ordered extension”); Williams v. Kincaid,

45 F.4th 759, 775 (4th Cir. 2022) (Rule 15(c)’s notice period incorporates any court-

ordered extension of the 90-day deadline).

Mendoza-Barrera filed his First Amended Complaint on June 13, 2025. [18].

He later moved for an extension of time to serve the First Amended complaint, and I

granted that motion, extending the deadline to serve defendants until November 10,

2025. [35]; [36]. Reed returned an executed waiver of service on November 7, 2025,

3 Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that Reed was not named—and accordingly Clark was only

named—because of mistaken identity indicates that there is no case or controversy between

Mendoza-Barrera and Clark. Mendoza-Barrera should inform the court whether he intends

to pursue any claims against Clark going forward in the parties’ next status report.

within the period allowed by Rule 4(m). [49]. Relation back of the Second Amended

Complaint to the First Amended Complaint’s filing date, June 13, 2025, is therefore

appropriate, and the statute of limitations does not bar Mendoza-Barrera’s claim

against Reed.

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [52], is granted in part. Count IT against Dart

is dismissed with prejudice. Count I may proceed against Pena, Clark, and Reed. The

stay on discovery is lifted, the defendant officers must answer the complaint by June

9, 2026, and the parties shall file a joint status report by June 16, 2026, proposing a

case schedule and stating plaintiff's decision whether to pursue a claim against

defendant Clark.

ENTER:

fs SAA

Manish 8. Shah

United States District Judge

Date: May 19, 2026

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