Opinion

Sievers

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Mar 6, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.2%

The opinion

United States District Court

Middle District of Florida

Jacksonville Division

MARK D. SIEVERS,

Plaintiff,

v. NO. 3:26-cv-58-MMH-LLL

CEO STEVEN H. WHEELER, ET AL.,

Defendants.

________________________________________________________________________

Order

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) housed at

Union Correctional Institution (UCI), is proceeding pro se on a complaint for violation

of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, doc. 1. He names ten defendants for an alleged

delay in receiving a functioning CPAP machine, which he requires to treat his

diagnosed sleep apnea. See doc. 1 at 2, 8. Plaintiff alleges that his CPAP machine

“stopped functioning” on September 19, 2023, and he was assured a new machine was

“being ordered and expedited,” but it took nearly two years to receive a properly

functioning one. Id. at 6, 10–11.

Plaintiff claims to have had “over 50 conversations” with UCI staff (medical

and non-medical) over that nearly two-year period about his need for a functioning

machine. Id. at 11. He alleges that his “life was in grave danger [during] those 22

months because [he] did not have . . . a functioning CPAP device[, and] FDC and

Centurion employees alike were well aware of the seriousness of [his] life threatening

situation.” Id. at 13. Because he did not have a functioning CPAP machine, plaintiff

experienced “very irregular sleep patterns,” which caused him to suffer physically and

emotionally. Id. at 12, 14. As relief, plaintiff seeks “proper medical treatment,”

including “timely replacement of the [CPAP] mask as it is to be routinely replaced

throughout the year.” Id. at 16. He also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

The Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to set forth his claims in accordance

with federal pleading standards and, thus, will direct him to amend his complaint. The

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in pertinent part, “A pleading that states a

claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and “[a] party must state [his]

claims in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of

circumstances,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

A complaint must allege facts that, accepted as true, state a claim “that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The standard asks for

less than a probability but “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. Although a plaintiff is not required to provide “detailed factual

allegations,” he must offer more than “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual

enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint should provide

enough detail to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(alteration in original). One that does not is referred to as a “shotgun pleading.” See

2

Weiland v. Palm Bch. Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). A court

must hold a pro se plaintiff to a less stringent standard than a lawyer, Tannenbaum v.

United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but may not rewrite a deficient

complaint for a pro se plaintiff or otherwise serve as his de facto counsel, GJR Invs.,

Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds

by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the conduct complained of

was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and the conduct deprived

the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States. A claim that a prison medical provider was deliberately indifferent

to an inmate’s serious medical needs is cognizable under § 1983 as an Eighth

Amendment violation. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004).

However, when an inmate claims he received inadequate medical care, he must do

more than allege the care provided was “subpar or different from what [he] want[ed].”

Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). Allegations of

medical negligence do not satisfy the stringent deliberate indifference standard. Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). See also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (“[D]eliberate

indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.”).

A plausible deliberate indifference claim requires allegations that, accepted as

true, would permit the reasonable inference the defendant knew the plaintiff had a

serious medical need but acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal

3

law.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (quoting in part

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). When multiple defendants are alleged to have been

deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must explain what each

defendant did or failed to do because “imputed or collective knowledge cannot serve

as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference.” Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325,

1331 (11th Cir. 2008). Rather, “[e]ach individual [d]efendant must be judged

separately and on the basis of what that person [knew at the relevant time].” Id.

Even if an inmate plausibly alleges that a prison medical provider was

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, he may not, on that basis alone,

proceed on a claim against the medical provider’s employer because “supervisory

officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates

on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d

1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610

F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). See also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)

(“It is axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more

than a theory of respondeat superior.”). Instead, a supervisor can be liable only when

the supervisor “personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when

there is a causal connection” between the supervisor’s actions and the constitutional

deprivation. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.

Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient in at least the following ways: he does not

describe how each defendant violated his constitutional rights, but rather he seeks to

4

hold all defendants jointly liable for the alleged “prolonged denial of the medically

necessary, life affirming prescribed treatment for sleep apnea”; and it appears he seeks

to proceed against some defendants solely on a theory of vicarious liability without

alleging a causal connection between any individual supervisor’s actions and an

alleged constitutional violation (i.e., the CEO of Centurion, the Chief Health Officer,

Directors, Administrators, the Warden, and the Secretary of the FDC). See doc. 1 at

14. Although plaintiff says he had over 50 conversations with UCI or Centurion

employees, he does not say with whom or what was discussed. See id. at 11. In short,

he does not allege what each defendant knew, or how, based on their knowledge, they

acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” See Wade, 106 F.4th

at 1255. To the extent the two-year delay in receiving a functioning CPAP machine

was due to the negligence of various individuals, they cannot be held liable on a theory

of deliberate indifference under § 1983.

If plaintiff wants to proceed, he must file an amended complaint in compliance

with federal pleading standards, using the Court-approved form. He must set forth

factual allegations against the defendants who allegedly denied or delayed necessary

medical care in a manner that can be described as subjectively reckless. At a minimum,

plaintiff must alert the defendants to the claim(s) against them and the factual

allegations supporting the claim(s), so that they can formulate a responsive pleading.

He also must comply with the following instructions:

1. The amended complaint must be marked, “Amended Complaint,” and

include this case number (3:26-cv-58-MMH-LLL).

5

2. The amended complaint must name as defendants only those who had

been acting under color of state law and are responsible for the alleged

constitutional violation(s).

3. The amended complaint must state the full names of all defendants (to

the extent plaintiff knows them) in the style of the case on the first page

and in section I.B.

4. The list of defendants named on the first page must match the list of

named defendants in section I.B.

5. In section IV, “Statement of Claim,” there must be a clear description of

how each defendant was involved in the alleged violation(s). The

allegations should be stated in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a

single set of circumstances. Plaintiff should separately explain the facts

giving rise to his individual claims for relief, and he should clearly state

how each defendant is responsible for each alleged violation.1

6. In section V, “Injuries,” there must be a statement concerning how each

defendant’s action(s) or omission(s) injured plaintiff.

7. In section VI, “Relief,” there must be a statement of what plaintiff seeks

through this action, keeping in mind that the Prison Litigation Reform

Act “places substantial restrictions on the judicial relief that prisoners can

seek . . . .” Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011)).

8. In section VII, “Exhaustion,” plaintiff must explain the steps he took to

exhaust his administrative remedies, keeping in mind that “[a] prisoner

must exhaust each claim that he seeks to present in court.” Arias v. Perez,

758 F. App’x 878, 881 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

219–20 (2007)).

Plaintiff must sign and date the amended complaint after the following

statement on the form:

1 Plaintiff may attach additional pages, if necessary, but he should continue to number

the paragraphs for a clear presentation of his factual allegations supporting each claim.

6

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, by signing

below, I certify to the best of my knowledge, information,

and belief that this complaint: (1) is not being presented for

an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary

delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) is

supported by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for

extending, modifying, or reversing existing law; (3) the

factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if

specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary

support after a reasonable opportunity for further

investigation or discovery; and (4) the complaint otherwise

complies with the requirements of Rule 11.

Before signing the amended complaint, plaintiff must ensure his assertions are

truthful and that he has not knowingly made false material declarations. He must

neither exaggerate nor distort the facts but truthfully state the facts underlying his

claims. Knowingly making a false material declaration in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623

is punishable by a fine, imprisonment, or both.

An amended complaint supersedes the filing of the initial complaint and

becomes the operative pleading. Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 654 F.3d 1194, 1202

(11th Cir. 2011). Thus, plaintiff’s amended complaint must be complete, including all

related claims he wishes to raise, and must not refer back to his original complaint.

It is ordered:

1. The Clerk shall send plaintiff a Civil Rights Complaint form.

2. Within thirty days of the date of this order, plaintiff must mail an

amended complaint to the Court for filing. The amended complaint should comply

with the instructions on the form and those provided in this order.

7

3. Plaintiffs failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of

this case.

Ordered in Jacksonville, Florida on March 6, 2026.

/s/ Laura Lothman Lambert

Sy United States Magistrate Judge

C:

Mark D. Sievers, #J80689, pro se

Union Correctional Institution

P.O. Box 1000

Raiford, FL 32083

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.