The opinion
United States District Court
Middle District of Florida
Jacksonville Division
MARK D. SIEVERS,
Plaintiff,
v. NO. 3:26-cv-58-MMH-LLL
CEO STEVEN H. WHEELER, ET AL.,
Defendants.
________________________________________________________________________
Order
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) housed at
Union Correctional Institution (UCI), is proceeding pro se on a complaint for violation
of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, doc. 1. He names ten defendants for an alleged
delay in receiving a functioning CPAP machine, which he requires to treat his
diagnosed sleep apnea. See doc. 1 at 2, 8. Plaintiff alleges that his CPAP machine
“stopped functioning” on September 19, 2023, and he was assured a new machine was
“being ordered and expedited,” but it took nearly two years to receive a properly
functioning one. Id. at 6, 10–11.
Plaintiff claims to have had “over 50 conversations” with UCI staff (medical
and non-medical) over that nearly two-year period about his need for a functioning
machine. Id. at 11. He alleges that his “life was in grave danger [during] those 22
months because [he] did not have . . . a functioning CPAP device[, and] FDC and
Centurion employees alike were well aware of the seriousness of [his] life threatening
situation.” Id. at 13. Because he did not have a functioning CPAP machine, plaintiff
experienced “very irregular sleep patterns,” which caused him to suffer physically and
emotionally. Id. at 12, 14. As relief, plaintiff seeks “proper medical treatment,”
including “timely replacement of the [CPAP] mask as it is to be routinely replaced
throughout the year.” Id. at 16. He also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
The Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to set forth his claims in accordance
with federal pleading standards and, thus, will direct him to amend his complaint. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in pertinent part, “A pleading that states a
claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and “[a] party must state [his]
claims in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
A complaint must allege facts that, accepted as true, state a claim “that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The standard asks for
less than a probability but “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. Although a plaintiff is not required to provide “detailed factual
allegations,” he must offer more than “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint should provide
enough detail to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(alteration in original). One that does not is referred to as a “shotgun pleading.” See
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Weiland v. Palm Bch. Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). A court
must hold a pro se plaintiff to a less stringent standard than a lawyer, Tannenbaum v.
United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but may not rewrite a deficient
complaint for a pro se plaintiff or otherwise serve as his de facto counsel, GJR Invs.,
Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds
by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the conduct complained of
was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and the conduct deprived
the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States. A claim that a prison medical provider was deliberately indifferent
to an inmate’s serious medical needs is cognizable under § 1983 as an Eighth
Amendment violation. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004).
However, when an inmate claims he received inadequate medical care, he must do
more than allege the care provided was “subpar or different from what [he] want[ed].”
Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). Allegations of
medical negligence do not satisfy the stringent deliberate indifference standard. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). See also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (“[D]eliberate
indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.”).
A plausible deliberate indifference claim requires allegations that, accepted as
true, would permit the reasonable inference the defendant knew the plaintiff had a
serious medical need but acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal
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law.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (quoting in part
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). When multiple defendants are alleged to have been
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must explain what each
defendant did or failed to do because “imputed or collective knowledge cannot serve
as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference.” Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325,
1331 (11th Cir. 2008). Rather, “[e]ach individual [d]efendant must be judged
separately and on the basis of what that person [knew at the relevant time].” Id.
Even if an inmate plausibly alleges that a prison medical provider was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, he may not, on that basis alone,
proceed on a claim against the medical provider’s employer because “supervisory
officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates
on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d
1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610
F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). See also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)
(“It is axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more
than a theory of respondeat superior.”). Instead, a supervisor can be liable only when
the supervisor “personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when
there is a causal connection” between the supervisor’s actions and the constitutional
deprivation. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.
Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient in at least the following ways: he does not
describe how each defendant violated his constitutional rights, but rather he seeks to
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hold all defendants jointly liable for the alleged “prolonged denial of the medically
necessary, life affirming prescribed treatment for sleep apnea”; and it appears he seeks
to proceed against some defendants solely on a theory of vicarious liability without
alleging a causal connection between any individual supervisor’s actions and an
alleged constitutional violation (i.e., the CEO of Centurion, the Chief Health Officer,
Directors, Administrators, the Warden, and the Secretary of the FDC). See doc. 1 at
14. Although plaintiff says he had over 50 conversations with UCI or Centurion
employees, he does not say with whom or what was discussed. See id. at 11. In short,
he does not allege what each defendant knew, or how, based on their knowledge, they
acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” See Wade, 106 F.4th
at 1255. To the extent the two-year delay in receiving a functioning CPAP machine
was due to the negligence of various individuals, they cannot be held liable on a theory
of deliberate indifference under § 1983.
If plaintiff wants to proceed, he must file an amended complaint in compliance
with federal pleading standards, using the Court-approved form. He must set forth
factual allegations against the defendants who allegedly denied or delayed necessary
medical care in a manner that can be described as subjectively reckless. At a minimum,
plaintiff must alert the defendants to the claim(s) against them and the factual
allegations supporting the claim(s), so that they can formulate a responsive pleading.
He also must comply with the following instructions:
1. The amended complaint must be marked, “Amended Complaint,” and
include this case number (3:26-cv-58-MMH-LLL).
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2. The amended complaint must name as defendants only those who had
been acting under color of state law and are responsible for the alleged
constitutional violation(s).
3. The amended complaint must state the full names of all defendants (to
the extent plaintiff knows them) in the style of the case on the first page
and in section I.B.
4. The list of defendants named on the first page must match the list of
named defendants in section I.B.
5. In section IV, “Statement of Claim,” there must be a clear description of
how each defendant was involved in the alleged violation(s). The
allegations should be stated in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a
single set of circumstances. Plaintiff should separately explain the facts
giving rise to his individual claims for relief, and he should clearly state
how each defendant is responsible for each alleged violation.1
6. In section V, “Injuries,” there must be a statement concerning how each
defendant’s action(s) or omission(s) injured plaintiff.
7. In section VI, “Relief,” there must be a statement of what plaintiff seeks
through this action, keeping in mind that the Prison Litigation Reform
Act “places substantial restrictions on the judicial relief that prisoners can
seek . . . .” Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011)).
8. In section VII, “Exhaustion,” plaintiff must explain the steps he took to
exhaust his administrative remedies, keeping in mind that “[a] prisoner
must exhaust each claim that he seeks to present in court.” Arias v. Perez,
758 F. App’x 878, 881 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
219–20 (2007)).
Plaintiff must sign and date the amended complaint after the following
statement on the form:
1 Plaintiff may attach additional pages, if necessary, but he should continue to number
the paragraphs for a clear presentation of his factual allegations supporting each claim.
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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, by signing
below, I certify to the best of my knowledge, information,
and belief that this complaint: (1) is not being presented for
an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) is
supported by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law; (3) the
factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and (4) the complaint otherwise
complies with the requirements of Rule 11.
Before signing the amended complaint, plaintiff must ensure his assertions are
truthful and that he has not knowingly made false material declarations. He must
neither exaggerate nor distort the facts but truthfully state the facts underlying his
claims. Knowingly making a false material declaration in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623
is punishable by a fine, imprisonment, or both.
An amended complaint supersedes the filing of the initial complaint and
becomes the operative pleading. Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 654 F.3d 1194, 1202
(11th Cir. 2011). Thus, plaintiff’s amended complaint must be complete, including all
related claims he wishes to raise, and must not refer back to his original complaint.
It is ordered:
1. The Clerk shall send plaintiff a Civil Rights Complaint form.
2. Within thirty days of the date of this order, plaintiff must mail an
amended complaint to the Court for filing. The amended complaint should comply
with the instructions on the form and those provided in this order.
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3. Plaintiffs failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of
this case.
Ordered in Jacksonville, Florida on March 6, 2026.
/s/ Laura Lothman Lambert
Sy United States Magistrate Judge
C:
Mark D. Sievers, #J80689, pro se
Union Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 1000
Raiford, FL 32083