Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

SRP ENVIRONMENTAL CO. CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-1475

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

CLAREMONT PROPERTY CO. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff SRP Environmental, LLC’s (“SRP”) Motion to Strike

and/or Disregard Inadmissible Summary Judgment Evidence. See Record Document

179. Defendant Claremont Property Company (“Claremont”) opposed the Motion to

Strike and SRP replied. See Record Documents 194 and 206.

This case relates to Claremont’s nonpayment of invoices for work SRP performed

as a subcontractor on three projects. SRP contends Claremont has no defense to its

nonpayment under the governing terms of the Master Services Agreement (“MSA”).

Conversely, Claremont submits that the agreement between the parties includes not only

the MSA, but also oral agreements, course of conduct, and industry practice and usage.

This Court denied cross-motions for partial summary judgment on SRP’s breach of

contract claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact exist as to the terms of the

agreement between SRP and Claremont. See Record Documents 330 and 331. SRP’s

breach of contract claim will proceed to trial. See id.

In addition to the argument set forth above, Claremont further contends that SRP

breached its duty to perform the contractual services in good faith by improperly

submitting unreasonable, excessive, and inaccurate invoices. Claremont retained an

expert, Michael Eddings (“Eddings”) of JS Held consulting firm, to review SRP’s invoices

and supporting documentation for the purpose of determining whether SRP billed an

accurate, fair, and reasonable sum for the work it performed, accompanied by appropriate

supporting data, consistent with generally accepted industry standards. Eddings

submitted his report in November 2024 and opined that there were many areas in which

SRP’s invoices fell well below reasonable industry standards. In connection with the

extensive motion practice in this case, Eddings has also submitted several declarations.

Claremont filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Record Document 159)

seeking dismissal of SRP’s Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act claim. As part of its

opposition, Claremont submitted declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 from Eddings (“the

Eddings Declaration”). In the instant Motion to Strike and/or Disregard Inadmissible

Summary Judgment Evidence, SRP challenges two third-party reports (Record

Documents 159-6 and 159-8) attached to Eddings Declaration (Record Document 159-

3); the Envista Email (Record Document 159-7) attached to the Eddings Declaration;

Paragraphs 10-12 of the Eddings Declaration (Record Document 159-3); portions of the

J.S. Held Report (Record Document 159-5); and portions of Claremont’s memoranda or

oppositions. See Record Document 179-1.

Legal Standard

Motions to strike are governed by Rule 12(f), which authorizes a court to “order

stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED.R.CIV.P. 12(f). “Motions to strike are disfavored

and infrequently granted.” U.S. v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 275 F .Supp.2d 763, 767

(N.D.Tex.2002) (citing Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction of Escambia County,

Florida, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir.1962)). The Fifth Circuit has reasoned:

Partly because of the practical difficulty of deciding cases without a factual

record it is well established that the action of striking a pleading should be

sparingly used by the courts. . . . It is a drastic remedy to be resorted to

only when required for the purpose of justice. . . . The motion to strike

should be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no possible

relation to the controversy.

Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868. “A disputed question of fact cannot be decided on motion to

strike,” and, “... when there is no showing of prejudicial harm to the moving party, the

courts generally are not willing to determine disputed and substantial questions of law

upon a motion to strike.” Id. When questions of fact or law are present, the court should

“. . . defer action on the motion and leave the sufficiency of the allegations for

determination on the merits.” Id.

Analysis

I. McLarens Report (Record Document 159-6), DBI Report (Record

Document 159-8), and the Envista Email (Record Document 159-7)

SRP objects to the reports and email as unauthenticated and inadmissible hearsay.

The Court disagrees. Claremont can use these exhibits because at the summary

judgment stage, evidence does not have to be authenticated or otherwise presented in

admissible form. See F.R.C.P. 56(c); Maurer v. Indep. Town, 870 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir.

2017). Additionally, Eddings relied on these reports and the email in forming his expert

opinion. Under Rule 703, he is permitted to rely upon such hearsay to form his opinion.

See LaCombe v. A-T-O, Inc., 679 F.2d 431, 436 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1982). SRP’s Motion to

Strike and/or Disregard Inadmissible Summary Judgment Evidence on this ground is

DENIED.

II. Paragraphs 10-12 of the Eddings Declaration (Record Document 159-3)

SRP submits that in paragraphs 10-12 of his declaration, Eddings attempts to

certify that the aforementioned reports and emails are “true and correct copies” and that

he “agree[s] with most of the information included.” Record Document 159-3 at 6-7. SRP

argues these statements provide no foundation, are improper bolstering, and attempt to

authenticate/vouch for the truth of the reports and email.

The Court has reviewed the briefing on this issue and finds that while Eddings

choice of wording was inept, it is clear Eddings was simply certifying the specified exhibits

as true and correct copies of what he was provided to review for the purpose of rendering

his expert opinion. Additionally, his statements regarding his agreement with the

information is further explanation that he consulted these sources and then used the

information together with his own professional knowledge and experience to reach his

expert opinion. SRP’s Motion to Strike and/or Disregard Inadmissible Summary

Judgment Evidence on this argument is DENIED.

III. Portions of the J.S. Held Report (Record Document 159-5)

SRP moves to strike portions of the J.S. Held Report because it “quote[s] directly

from the narratives and summaries of the Third Party Reports.” Record Document 179-

1 at 7. SRP contends this is improper hearsay and bolstering. Again, Eddings was

allowed to consult the McLarens Report, the DBI Report, and the Envista Email and rely

on the facts and data contained therein to form his expert opinion. SRP’s Motion to Strike

and/or Disregard Inadmissible Summary Judgment Evidence on this basis is DENIED.

IV. Portions of Claremont’s Memoranda or Oppositions

Claremont uses the Eddings Declaration and the exhibits to same to support its

arguments in relation to other pending dispositive motions. Thus, SRP maintains that

these portions of Claremont’s memoranda and oppositions should be stricken or

disregarded. Because the Court has found all of SRP’s challenges to the reports and

email to be meritless, this portion of SRP’s motion is likewise DENIED.

IT 1S SO ORDERED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 4th day of June, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE