Arron

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SHELBY ARRON,

:

:

Plaintiff,

:

: Case No. 2:26-cv-390

v.

: Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison

: Magistrate Judge S. Courter M. Shimeall

:

BRANDI CUSTER, et al.,

:

:

Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Shelby Arron, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel,

filed this action against Brandi Custer, Laura Martin, and Coshocton County Children Services,

asserting federal constitutional violations and seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”).

(ECF Nos. 1-1 and 1-2.) She also submitted a request to proceed in forma pauperis.1 (ECF No.

1.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers

who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), this matter is also before the Court for the initial screen

of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF Nos. 1-1) to identify cognizable claims and/or to recommend

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, and

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff did not use the correct form; however, her motion contained sufficient

information for the Court to assess her financial status.

for the reasons below, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action

under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against Defendants Custer and Martin in their official capacities

as child protective services employees, and against the Coshocton County Children Services

agency (“CCCS”), generally alleging that Defendants unlawfully removed her children from her

custody on June 13, 2025. (ECF No. 1-1.) She further alleges that Court hearings occurred without

her presence or a meaningful opportunity to participate. Plaintiff asserts violations of the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments, Monell liability, and interference with parental rights. For relief,

she seeks injunctive relief in the form of immediate reunification with her children, compensatory

and punitive damages, and declaratory relief.

In her Emergency Motion for a TRO, she alleges that her children were removed from her

without a warrant or due process, and seeks immediate return of her children. (ECF No. 1-2.)

II. STANDARD

The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, was enacted to “lower judicial

access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). However, Congress

tried to strike a balance, recognizing that “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). To address this

concern, Congress included subsection (e):

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); see Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua

sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or

malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

“Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under . . . 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue

from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).

Permitting the ability for a Court to recommend dismissal as frivolous gives “judges not only the

authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual

power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose

factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal

pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill, 630 F.3d at

470–71 (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus,

Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield

Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does

demand “more than [] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, a complaint that

asserts only “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,”

or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” will be insufficient Id. (cleaned

up). Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (citations and

quotations omitted). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including

common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar

Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

Further, although the Court is to liberally construe pro se complaints “and hold such

complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings prepared by attorneys . . . this lenient

treatment has limits.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting

in part Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). The Court “should not have to guess

at the nature of the claim asserted.” Wells, 891 F.2d at 594.

Finally, “[w]hen the face of the complaint provides no basis for federal jurisdiction, the

Court may dismiss an action as frivolous and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under both 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).” Chief Ofo on behalf of

Cashbox Tr. Tribal Gov’t v. Hayes, No. 2:24-CV-3492, 2024 WL 4679235, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July

1, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-CV-3492, 2024 WL 4444559 (S.D. Ohio

Oct. 8, 2024) (further citations omitted); see also Answers in Genesis, Inc. v. Creation Ministries

Int’l, ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject

matter jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua sponte.”)

III. ANALYSIS

Upon review, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint relates entirely to domestic

relation issues, which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State of Ohio, and thus fall outside

the scope of federal jurisdiction.

Under the judicial doctrine known as the Burrus abstention doctrine, federal courts

generally do not have jurisdiction over cases that involve “the issuance of a divorce, alimony,

or child custody decree.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992). This exception is

a judicially created doctrine dating back to the late eighteen hundreds, where the Supreme Court

of the United States determined that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and

wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the United States.”

In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890). Moreover, although the United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of whether the Burrus abstention doctrine only

applies to diversity jurisdiction or also extends to federal question cases, it has continued to affirm

that the doctrine applies to cases asserting federal causes of action if asserted as “a mere pretense

and the suit is actually concerned with domestic relations issues.” See Edelstein v. Flottman, No.

24-3156, 2025 WL 609487, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025) (quoting in part Danforth v. Celebrezze,

76 F. App’x 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Here, Plaintiff challenges the removal of her children from her custody, and as such, her

claims clearly fall within the scope of the Burrus abstention doctrine. The fact that Plaintiff asserts

federal constitutional violations does not change this determination because they are merely

“pretense” to challenge domestic relations matters. Indeed, the main remedy of both Plaintiff’s

Complaint and TRO is for her children to be immediately returned to her, which is the purview of

the State in the domestic relations context. See, e.g., Chevalier v. Est. of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789,

797 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f the plaintiff requests that a federal court determine who should have care

for and control a child, then that request is outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”).

Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff is challenging the outcome of the state court

proceedings related to the custody of her children, or any alleged lack of due process therein, this

Court likewise lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to review a case that was

litigated in state court—only the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to correct and

review a state court judgment. Danforth, 76 F. App’x at 616 (citing District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 & n. 16 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413, 415–16 (1923)); see also Greenberg v. Slatery, No. 22-5886, 2023 WL 2771640, at *2 (6th

Cir. Mar. 28, 2023) (finding a plaintiff’s complaint challenging a state court custody determination

and in which he alleged that he was denied due process to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine).

Thus, even if the Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true, she has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted because the Court lacks jurisdictional authority to grant any such

relief. See Greenberg, 2023 WL 2771640, at *1 (“A complaint is subject to dismissal on

jurisdictional grounds if the allegations, accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, show that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is

GRANTED. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons above, the Undersigned further RECOMMENDS

that this case be DISMISSED under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to assert any claim over which

this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction.

Finally, because the Undersigned recommends dismissal of this case for lack of

jurisdiction, it is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO be DENIED AS

MOOT.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination

of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ S. Courter M. Shimeall

S. COURTER M. SHIMEALL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE