Greenroyd

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ALLYSON GREENROYD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. CIV-25-1299-R

)

MICHELLE SHELTON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Michelle Shelton,

Christal Thompkins, Andrea Williams, Abigale Davis, and Cecil Boydston [Doc. Nos. 33,

34, 35, 36, 37]. Plaintiff Allyson Greenroyd, proceeding pro se, filed Responses [Doc. Nos.

38, 39, 40, 41, 42] and Defendants did not reply. The matter is now at issue.

BACKGROUND1

This action arises from circumstances related to the juvenile deprived case of

Plaintiff’s great-niece, L.W., in the District Court of Stephens County, Oklahoma. Doc.

No. 33, at pp. 9-10.2 L.W. was born addicted to drugs on or around May 31, 2025, and on

June 9, 2025, the Stephens County District Attorney’s petition for emergency custody of

1 When reviewing a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the Court “take[s] the facts in the complaint as true . . . and [ ] views such

facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” Knellinger v. Young, 134 F.4th 1034,

1042 (10th Cir. 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2 While providing Plaintiff the full benefit of a liberal construction of her allegations and

filings due to her pro se status, the Court relies on the facts alleged in Defendants’ filings

to fill the gaps left by the Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 30]. Plaintiff does not dispute

Defendants’ factual statements.

L.W. was granted. Id. The D.A. thereafter filed an allegedly ongoing juvenile deprived case

concerning L.W. Id. at p. 10. L.W.’s biological parents identified Plaintiff as a preferred

caregiver, and Defendant Michelle Shelton, a child welfare investigator for the Oklahoma

Department of Human Services, contacted Plaintiff regarding the potential kinship

placement of L.W with Plaintiff. Am. Compl., at pp. 1-2. Plaintiff agreed to a kinship

evaluation. Id. at p. 2. Defendant Christal Thompkins, a DHS child welfare specialist,

assessed Plaintiff’s home on June 16, 2025. Id. at pp. 1-2. The following day, Thompkins

verbally notified Plaintiff she would not receive placement of L.W. Id. at p. 2.

Plaintiff asserts that, in denying her consideration for the placement of L.W.,

Defendants Shelton, Thompkins, Andrea Williams (a DHS permanency worker), and

Abigale Davis (a DHS supervisor) relied on the alleged criminal history of another

occupant of Plaintiff’s household. Id. at pp. 1-2. However, Plaintiff asserts Defendants

improperly relied on (1) a criminal charge to which the other household member did not

plead guilty and (2) an offense that fell outside the applicable five-year exclusion period.

Id. at p. 2.

Plaintiff alleges that, prior to being excluded from placement consideration, she did

not receive, amongst other procedural protections, written factual findings, written notice

of denial, a written waiver eligibility notice, an administrative review procedure, or notice

or opportunity to respond. Id. at pp. 2-3. She requested written documentation of the denial

of her placement consideration between June 17 and September 22, 2025, but never

received one. Id. She alleges a written denial was not generated or issued until September

23, 2025, the day before a scheduled court hearing. Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff asserts the timing

of the written denial deprived her of the chance to seek waiver review or to administratively

appeal the denial prior to the hearing. Id. Nevertheless, the presiding judge at the hearing

relied on the allegedly deficient denial when denying Plaintiff intervention and placement

consideration. Id. Plaintiff communicated her concerns regarding the generation and

presentation of the denial document, and asserts Defendant Cecil Boydston, the DHS

District Director, acknowledged no written denial had been issued prior to September 22.

Id. at pp. 1, 3. She asserts Boydston had authority to direct corrective action related to the

denial prior to the hearing but failed to do so. Id. at p. 3.

Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the five DHS Defendants in both

their individual and official capacities, arguing some or all the Defendants violated her

Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process and First Amendment rights. Defendants

move to dismiss each of her claims, either for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or failure

to state a claim.

LEGAL STANDARDS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). To hear a given case, a federal court must possess

subject-matter jurisdiction. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009).

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) takes

one of two forms: (1) a facial attack; or (2) a factual attack. Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley,

979 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 2020). “A facial attack assumes the allegations in the

complaint are true and argues they fail to establish jurisdiction,” whereas, “[a] factual

attack goes beyond the allegations in the complaint and adduces evidence to contest

jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted). Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion takes the form of a facial

attack because it assumes allegations in the Complaint are true and does not challenge the

facts upon which subject-matter jurisdiction depends by offering evidence. See Paper,

Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285,

1292 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, the Court accepts the allegations in the Complaint as true. Id.

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when a complaint fails “to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, the complaint ‘must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Brown v. City of Tulsa, 124 F.4th 1251, 1263

(10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). And while the Court

“must accept the truth of all properly alleged facts and draw all reasonable inferences in

the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff still ‘must nudge the claim across the line from

conceivable or speculative to plausible.’” Id. (quoting Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC,

985 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2021)). “Mere ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ will not suffice.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Where, as here, a litigant is proceeding pro se, the “pleadings are to be construed

liberally.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But it is not “the proper

function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.” Id. “The

broad reading of the plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of

alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. The Eleventh Amendment and Younger Abstention

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims against them in their official capacities are

essentially claims against the State of Oklahoma and its agency, DHS, and thus are

jurisdictionally barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment, with

certain exceptions, prohibits citizens from filing suit against a state, an arm of the state, or

a state official in her official capacity. Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir.

2002); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citations omitted) (“Suits against state

officials in their official capacity [] should be treated as suits against the State. . . . [T]he

only immunities available to the defendant in an official-capacity action are those that the

governmental entity possesses.”). “DHS is an ‘arm’ of the State of Oklahoma.” Miller v.

Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. CIV-22-507-D, 2022 WL 16541217, at *2 (Oct. 28, 2022)

(citing McKinney v. State of Okla., Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir.

1991)) (holding the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiff from seeking monetary damages

from DHS). Plaintiff does not dispute that her official capacity claims, to the extent they

seek monetary damages, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, to the extent

Plaintiff asserts claims for monetary relief against the Defendants in their official

capacities, such claims are DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.3

3 Defendants also assert Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are subject to dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6) because the Defendants are not “persons” under § 1983. Section 1983

provides for a federal cause of action against persons who, under color of state law, deprive

others of their federally protected rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “But a [§ 1983] suit against a

state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a

suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)

But Plaintiff also seeks prospective relief against Defendants in their official

capacities, and argues such claims fall within the Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)

exception. “[U]nder the Ex parte Young doctrine, ‘the Eleventh Amendment generally does

not bar a suit against a state official in federal court which seeks only prospective equitable

relief for violations of federal law, even if the state is immune.’” Muscogee (Creek) Nation

v. Okla. Tax. Comm’n, No. 09-CV-285-TCK-TLW, 2009 WL 10695365, at *3 (N.D. Okla.

Aug. 10, 2009) (quoting J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1286 (10th Cir. 1999)).4

Defendants do not dispute or discuss the exception for prospective relief under the Eleventh

Amendment. But even if this exception applies, Younger abstention doctrine dictates this

Court should decline to consider any of Plaintiff’s claims.

The Younger abstention doctrine “‘provides that a federal court must abstain from

deciding a case otherwise within the scope of its jurisdiction in certain instances in which

the prospect of undue interference with state proceedings counsels against federal relief.’”

Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., 98 F.4th 1307, 1317 (10th Cir.

2024) (quoting Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 669-70

(10th Cir. 2020)) (quotation marks omitted). However, the doctrine only applies when “the

(citation omitted). Thus, at least to the extent a plaintiff seeks money damages, “neither a

State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id. at

71, 71 n.10 (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not dispute that her official capacity claims,

to the extent they seek monetary damages, fail because Defendants cannot be considered

“persons” under § 1983 in that context. Thus, her claims against Defendants in their official

capacities seeking monetary damages are also subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

4 See also Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14

(1985)) (“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive

relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official capacity actions for prospective

relief are not treated as actions against the State.’”).

state proceeding falls into one of the following [Sprint] categories: ‘(1) state criminal

prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings that take on a quasi-criminal shape, and

(3) civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state

courts’ ability to perform their judicial function.’” Id. (quoting Graff v. Aberdeen

Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023)); (also citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.

v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 79 (2013)) (brackets omitted).

If the state proceeding falls into one of the Sprint categories outlined above, then a

federal court must abstain from hearing the case when the following conditions are met:

(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2)

the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the

federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state

interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or

implicate separately articulated state policies.

Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “When these

conditions are met, the application of Younger is mandatory.” Morkel v. Davis, 513 F.

App’x 724, 727 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (citing Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational &

Pro. Licensing of the Dep’t of Com., 240 F.3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001)).

The state proceedings cited by Plaintiff—namely the juvenile deprived case

involving the custody of J.W. (JD-25-4)—fit into a Sprint category. Specifically, the state

juvenile deprived proceeding is “a ‘pending civil proceeding[ ] involving’ a domestic-

relations proceeding that is ‘uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform

their judicial functions.’” Wright v. Okla. Cnty., No. CIV-20-346-JD, 2020 WL 8335672,

at *8 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2020) (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78) (analyzing the Sprint

categories and applying Younger to an on-going state divorce proceeding). And as noted

by then-Judge Neil Gorsuch in Wyttenbach v. Parrish, 496 F. App’x 796 (10th Cir. 2012)

(unpublished), “[f]ederal courts have long disclaimed responsibility for domestic relations

cases, leaving the power to issue and enforce ‘divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees’

to the states.” Wyttenbach, 496 F. App’x at 796 (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504

U.S. 689, 703 (1992)). The Tenth Circuit and “other circuits have consistently applied

Younger to child custody cases.” Morkel, 513 F. App’x at 728 (collecting cases). So the

Court finds that the child custody proceeding forming the basis of Plaintiff’s Complaint

fits into a Sprint category sufficient to trigger a Younger analysis.

First, Defendant represents, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the juvenile deprived

case is ongoing in Stephens County. Second, Plaintiff has not alleged, and does not argue,

that Oklahoma “state courts are an inadequate forum for raising her constitutional claims .

. . . [Furthermore,] [s]tate courts are generally equally [as] capable of enforcing federal

constitutional rights as federal courts.” Id. (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden

State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing “state

law prevents her from presenting her federal claims in the state proceedings,” but she has

failed to do so. Id. at 728-29 (citation omitted). In fact, she only states that Younger doesn’t

apply because she is asserting independent claims5 for constitutional violations by the

5 The Court questions this characterization. Plaintiff does not explicitly ask this Court to

declare as void or improperly decided the state court’s denial of consideration of Plaintiff

for placement of L.W. However, Plaintiff does ask the Court to provide prospective

injunctive relief in the form of written notice of kinship placement denials, a meaningful

opportunity for administrative review prior to court reliance, prohibition of reliance upon

materially inaccurate or unauthorized criminal history information, and correction of

inaccurate records relied on in the denial of Plaintiff’s consideration. This implicates the

concern that, were the Court to afford Plaintiff her requested relief, Plaintiff could then

Defendants—not because state law prevents her from raising these issues or because

Oklahoma state courts are incapable of hearing her claims. Finally, “the resolution of child

custody matters has been acknowledged as an important state interest.” Id. at 729 (citation

omitted); see also Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1393 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation and

quotations omitted) (finding abstention was appropriate and stating “adoption and child

custody proceedings are an especially delicate subject of state policy” and a “traditional

area of state concern”). Because Plaintiff’s claims focus on actions taken by DHS and other

state and county entities affecting those proceedings, the final Younger condition is

satisfied. Finding all three Younger conditions met, and no extraordinary circumstances

present, the Court is required to abstain from hearing Plaintiff’s claims to the extent the

state-court proceedings are ongoing.

But even if Younger does not apply, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to “include sufficient

factual allegations to state a claim for” First or Fourteenth Amendment violations. Abu-

Fakher v. Bode, 175 Fed. App’x 179, 181 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished).

II. Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Pass Rule 12(b)(6) Muster.

a. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff alleges Oklahoma law and DHS policy establish a state-created entitlement

to procedural safeguards governing kinship placement evaluations such as written notice

of her denial for kinship consideration and its underlying factual basis, waiver eligibility

“take [her] federal judgment to the state court and attempt to enjoin, interfere with, or use

the judgment for its purported preclusive effect in the state proceedings.” Wright, 2020 WL

8335672, at *7 (quoting D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir.

2004)).

notice, and administrative review procedures. She states Defendants Shelton, Thompkins,

Williams, and Davis denied her these procedural safeguards and Defendant Boydston

failed to correct such deficiencies before a court could rely on DHS’s denial of Plaintiff for

placement of L.W.

“To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [Plaintiff] must

establish that [she was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). The Tenth Circuit uses a “‘two-step

inquiry in determining whether an individual’s procedural-due-process rights were

violated: (1) Did the individual possess a protected property interest to which due process

protection was applicable? (2) Was the individual afforded an appropriate level of

process?’” Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Clark v. City of Draper, 168 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999)) (brackets omitted).

Defendant argues Plaintiff lacks a protected liberty or property interest in being a

foster care placement and thus has failed to allege a due process violation. Plaintiff

contends she is not claiming a generalized right to foster placement but rather a state-

created entitlement to the mandatory procedures of the kinship placement process.

“[W]hen state law creates a mandatory procedure but does not guarantee a particular

substantive outcome, it does not confer a protective liberty interest.” Elwell v. Byers, 699

F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “[T]he protected interests are

substantive rights, not rights to procedure.” Elliott v. Martinez, 675 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th

Cir. 2012). “‘Thus, an entitlement to nothing but procedure cannot be the basis for a liberty

or property interest.’” Clark v. Okla. Pardon & Parole Bd., No. 21-6079, 2022 WL 130000,

at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 14, 2022) (unpublished) (quoting Elliott, 675 F.3d at 1245). Plaintiff

herself admits she is not claiming a “unilateral expectation of placement” but rather an

“entitlement to . . . required procedural safeguards.” Plaintiff does not assert that she has a

constitutional interest in becoming a foster parent, or that properly carried-out state kinship

placement procedures would have mandated the placement of L.W. with her. She is

asserting only a right to procedure, not a right to a particular substantive outcome.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants for violation of her 14th Amendment

rights (Claim One) are therefore subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

b. Fourteenth-Amendment Stigma-Plus Due Process

Plaintiff asserts Defendants Shelton, Williams, and Davis committed a Stigma-Plus

Due Process violation by relying on inaccurate criminal history information as a basis for

denial of her consideration for kinship placement of L.W., and that the state court relied on

this false report when denying her standing and placement consideration. Under the stigma-

plus theory, “governmental defamation, coupled with an alteration in legal status, violates

a liberty interest that triggers procedural due process protection.” Brown v. Montoya, 662

F.3d 1152, 1167 (10th Cir. 2011). To succeed on a stigma-plus claim, a plaintiff must show:

(1) the government made a statement about him or her that is sufficiently

derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable of being proved

false, and that he or she asserts is false, and (2) the plaintiff experienced some

governmentally imposed burden that “significantly altered [his or] her status

as a matter of state law.”

Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.

693, 710-11 (1976)).

But with respect to government defamation, “‘intra-government dissemination [of

a defamatory statement], by itself, falls short of the Supreme Court’s notion of

publication.’” Sky Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v. Reams, 491 F. App’x 875, 886 (10th Cir. 2012)

(unpublished) (quoting Asbill v. Hous. Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1503 (10th

Cir. 1984)). To the extent Plaintiff asserts communication of the allegedly false report

between DHS officials was defamatory, it simply cannot be considered published for

Fourteenth Amendment purposes. See Alcorn v. La Barge, WY, 784 F. App’x 614, 619-20

(10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (finding internal communications of the same unit of

government, such as a state, city, or agency, are not published for Fourteenth Amendment

purposes, and applying such a rule to communications between a municipal government

and a state agency or between units of government (e.g., between a city and county or a

state and its sub-units)).

With respect to the filing of the written denial in the juvenile-deprived case, such a

communication falls under Oklahoma’s litigation privilege.6 See Springer v. Richardson

Law Firm, 239 P.3d 473, 475 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (quoting Samson Inv. Co. v.

Chevaillier, 988 P.2d 327, 329-30 (Okla. 1999)) (“The ‘litigation privilege’ . . . ‘accords

attorneys, parties, jurors and witnesses immunity for comments or writings made during

the course of or preliminary to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.’ . . . It applies

‘regardless of whether [the communications] are true or false.’”). Plaintiff represents that

the DHS officials generated the report prior to and for the purpose of the juvenile-deprived

6 Plaintiff does not dispute, and indeed does not address at all, Defendant’s assertions that

such a report is privileged.

proceedings in Stephens County District Court. It would thus appear such a report is

privileged and cannot be considered defamatory for the purposes of Plaintiff’s stigma-plus

claim. Accordingly, and without persuasive argument or authority to the contrary,

Plaintiff’s stigma-plus due process claims (Claim Three) are DISMISSED.

III. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff also alleges a First Amendment Retaliation claim against Defendants

Williams and Davis.

Government retaliation against a plaintiff for exercising his or her First

Amendment rights may be shown by proving the following elements: (1) that

the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the

defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a

person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and

(3) that the defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a

response to the plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. Id.

(quotations omitted).

Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Plaintiff

claims she was engaged in the constitutionally protected activity of petitioning the

government for redress. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . .

abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of

grievances.”). Plaintiff appears to claim her right to petition was violated by Defendants’

continued refusal to provide her with procedural safeguards after she requested

documentation and review of the placement denial.

“‘The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to

their government and their elected representatives.’” Nunley v. Goldey, No. 23-6164, 2024

WL 2014307, at *2 (10th Cir. May 7, 2024) (unpublished) (quoting Santa Fe All. for Pub.

Health & Safety v. City of Santa Fe, 993 F.3d 802, 819 (10th Cir. 2021)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “But the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment does

not obligate the government to consider, respond to, or grant any relief on a citizen’s

petition for redress of grievances.” Id. (citing Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local

1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979)). See also HRH, LLC v. Teton Cnty., No. 18-CV-104-SWS,

2020 WL 13430352, at *4 (D. Wyo. Feb. 13, 2020) (noting the county did not prevent the

plaintiff from filing a zoning application and stating the right to petition did not confer a

right “to have the government expeditiously process or approve its application once filed”);

Santa Fe All., 993 F.3d at 819 (quotation omitted) (“But the text of the First Amendment

does not speak in terms of successful petitioning—it speaks simply of the right of the

people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). Assuming Plaintiff’s

requests for documentation and review were petitions to the government, she has not

asserted that she was prevented from filing these requests or airing these complaints, but

only that despite those petitions, the Defendants continued to refuse to provide her the

requested procedures. “[T]he case law uniformly rejects the contention that the First

Amendment guarantees any success when petitioning,” thus “rendering [Plaintiff’s] claim

frivolous.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation

claims are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

IV. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff also brings a supervisory liability claim against Boydston, arguing he knew

she had been denied procedural safeguards, could have directed corrective action, and yet

failed to intervene, contributing directly to the alleged constitutional violations. “‘To

impose § 1983 liability [on a supervisor,] the plaintiff first ha[s] to establish the

supervisor’s subordinates violated the [C]onstitution.’” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960,

993-94 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1194-95 (10th Cir.

2010)). As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to plead any of Defendant Boydston’s

alleged subordinates violated either her First or Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim against Defendant Boydston is subject

to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss [Doc. Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] are GRANTED.

This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 1* day of July, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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