Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

ANTOINE LEE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:25-cv-766

v.

JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

RACHELE SMITH, Magistrate Judge Bowman

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

On November 14, 2025, Magistrate Judge Bowman issued a Report and

Recommendation (R&R, Doc. 6) recommending that the Court dismiss Plaintiff

Antoine Lee’s Complaint (Doc. 5) with prejudice because it fails to state a claim over

which the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff has filed no objections. For

the reasons discussed briefly below, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation regarding dismissal, but concludes that the Court will DISMISS

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 5) WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a “47-year-old African American transgender woman and

recovering addict.” (Doc. 6, #63). Her Complaint alleges that Defendant Rachele

Smith is the owner of We Care, a sober living house at which Lee resided for some

time. (Id.). According to Lee, Smith evicted Lee because she is transgender. (Id.).

Specifically, Lee alleges that she received a message from the manager of We Care

telling her that she “needs to tell everyone in the house [her] other name.” (Id.). Lee

also alleges that another transgender woman accused Lee of taking the other

transgender woman’s hormone medication. (Id.). At some point, We Care’s housing

manager told Lee that she needed to attend a housing orientation meeting, for which

Lee arrived late. (Id.). After that, another We Care resident told Lee that Smith said

Lee was not a good fit for We Care’s program. (Id.). Lee’s belongings were packed up

and placed outside. (Id.). As compensation for this alleged wrong, Lee seeks $25,000

in money damages and requests that We Care be “shut down.” (Id.).

The Magistrate Judge reviewed these allegations under her screening

authority, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and recommended that the Court dismiss Lee’s

Complaint. (Doc. 6 at #61–63, 65). According to the Magistrate Judge, Lee’s

Complaint establishes neither of the two primary bases for subject-matter

jurisdiction—28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1332. (Id. at #64–65). The Magistrate Judge says

that diversity jurisdiction is absent because (1) the Complaint does not allege

complete diversity of citizenship, and (2) Lee seeks only $25,000 in damages. (Id. at

#64). Likewise, she says that federal-question jurisdiction is absent because she

cannot discern from Lee’s alleged facts any “federal statutory or constitutional

provision that applies to give rise to an actionable claim for relief.” (Id. at #65). As a

result, Lee’s claims do not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(Id.).

The Magistrate Judge advised Lee that she had fourteen (14) days to object to

the Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition, and that failing to object “may

forfeit rights on appeal.” (Id. at #66 (citations omitted)). But the time for objections

has long passed, and Lee has filed none. So the matter is ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “district courts review a[]

[report and recommendation] de novo after a party files a timely objection.” Bates v.

Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio

July 5, 2023). But that de novo review requirement extends only to “any portion to

which a proper objection was made.” Id. (citation omitted). For any unobjected

portions of an R&R, by contrast, “the advisory committee notes to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 72(b) suggest that the Court still must ‘satisfy itself that there is no

clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Redmon

v. Noel, No. 1:21-cv-445, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting

cases).

ANALYSIS

Lee has not objected to the R&R, so the Court reviews it for clear error. Id. It

finds none, save with regard to the precise contours of the relief the R&R

recommends, which the Court addresses below.

“With regard to diversity jurisdiction, it is firmly established that parties

attempting to demonstrate that such jurisdiction exists must show that: (1) the

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs; and (2) there is complete diversity of citizenship between the disputing parties.”

Hale v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, 982 F.3d 996, 997 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). But here, the Complaint alleges that both Lee and Smith are

Ohio residents. (Doc. 5, #37–38). And Lee’s $25,000 damages request comes up

$50,000.01 short of the amount-in-controversy threshold. (Id. at #40). So the

Magistrate Judge did not clearly err in finding that jurisdiction does not lie in this

Court under § 1332(a).

Nor did she clearly err in reaching that same conclusion as to § 1331. To

establish federal-question jurisdiction under that provision, “a federal question must

appear on the face of the complaint.” Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland, 695

F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2012). But the Magistrate Judge could discern no such

question here. (See Doc. 6, #65). And she did not clearly err in that determination.

Perhaps Lee could somehow replead the claim she advances under Ohio Revised Code

§ 4112.02 into some kind of Fair Housing Act claim, and thereby invoke federal law.

But the Complaint does not assert a federal claim on its face, and the plaintiff is the

master of her complaint. Accordingly, the Court is not inclined to sua sponte

supplement the Plaintiff’s claims.1

That said, the Court finds that the R&R clearly erred in one regard. It

recommends dismissal with prejudice. But dismissals for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction are without prejudice, as the Court lacks authority to reach the merits of

the claim. See, e.g., Roberts v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 167 F.4th 955, 964 (6th

Cir. 2026) (citation omitted) (“[W]hen a court dismisses for lack of subject-matter

1 Lee’s form Complaint ticks a box indicating that she is also invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3),

the “jurisdictional counterpart” of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hylak v. Bieszk, No. 1:07-cv-421, 2007

WL 3253194, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 2, 2007) (citing Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 265

F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001)). But much like § 1983 itself, § 1343(a)(3) requires that any

“deprivation” of a “right, privilege or immunity” occur “under color of … State law.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343(a)(3). And as the Magistrate Judge concluded when considering whether Lee’s

allegations are sufficient to state a substantive § 1983 claim, there is no basis for inferring

any state action in this case. (See Doc. 6, #65). So Lee may not rely on this provision to

establish subject-matter jurisdiction either.

jurisdiction, it must generally do so without prejudice.”). Moreover, as noted, it is

possible that Lee could cure the jurisdictional defect by amending her claims.

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 6) insofar as it recommends

dismissal, but the Court DISMISSES Lee’s Complaint (Doc. 5), WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. The Court also adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that

it certify under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that any appeal of this Opinion and Order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore denies Lee leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 6) insofar as it

recommends dismissal, but it DISMISSES Lee’s Complaint (Doc. 5), WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Consistent with that, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter

judgment and to terminate this matter on the Court’s docket. The Court further

CERTIFIES under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that any appeal of this Opinion and Order

would not be taken in good faith, and therefore denies Lee leave to appeal in forma

pauperis. Lee is of course free to seek leave to appeal in forma pauperis directly from

that court, should she wish.

SO ORDERED.

April 8, 2026

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE