Habtemariam-Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SABA HABTEMARIAM-BROWN, :

et al., :

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:24-cv-4052

:

v. : Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

:

MICHAEL CHRISTENSEN, : Magistrate Judge S. Courter Shimeall

et al., :

:

Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter comes before this Court on the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation regarding Plaintiff Saba Habtemariam-Brown’s Amended Complaint (ECF

No. 5). (ECF No. 6). In her Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended

that this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in its entirety. (Id.). Plaintiff has filed

Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 9). For the reasons

that follow, this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No.

6) and OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 5) is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding in forma pauperis and pro se, filed her complaint on November 14,

2024. (ECF No. 5). In November 2014, Plaintiff and her son were involved in an automobile

accident with Defendant Mohamed Roble. (Id. at 3). In November 2016, Plaintiff, represented by

Jeffrey Kluesener of Michael D. Christensen Law Offices, sued Defendant Roble and State Farm

Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”), Plaintiff’s insurer. In May 2018, however, Kluesener

dismissed the initial action without prejudice. (Id.). Thereafter, in May 2019, Plaintiff filed a

second lawsuit against Defendants Roble and the Ohio Department of Medicaid stemming from

the same accident. (Id.). The second case was ultimately dismissed in April 2020 following

Roble’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. (Id.). Subsequently in July 2021, Plaintiff,

proceeding pro se, filed a third lawsuit against Roble, State Farm, and Nationwide Insurance

Company (“Nationwide”), another insurer involved in the litigation, for her personal injuries

stemming from the accident, and additionally against Michael Christensen alleging legal and

medical malpractice stemming from inadequate representation in the prior cases. (Id. at 4). On

July 25, 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment in Defendant Christensen’s favor and

dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Roble, State Farm, and Nationwide. (Id. at 5).

Now, Plaintiff brings claims in this instant litigation against the same defendants and various

other individuals.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the named defendants, via their direct or indirect

actions, discriminated against her under 42 U.S.C §1983 on the basis of her race, national origin,

ethnicity and pro se status. (Id. at 5–7). Plaintiff contends this discrimination was a factor in the

adverse rulings in her prior lawsuits. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Christensen

owed Plaintiff a duty of care to provide competent, diligent, and professional legal representation

in accordance with the standards of practice expected of attorneys in the State of Ohio and

violated said duty. Id. at 9–12. Additionally, she alleges Defendant Christensen breached their

contract by failing to act honestly, fairly, and in a manner consistent with Plaintiff's interests

throughout the course of his legal representation. Id. at 12–14. Finally, she alleges Defendants

Christensen and Burgess conspired to harm Plaintiff intentionally and wrongfully by neglecting

her legal case, concealing material information, and sabotaging her claims. Id. 14–16.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre-

and post-judgment interest in amount to be determined at trial by way of relief. (ECF No. 5).

Additionally, she requests “injunctive relief, including an order directing this Court state court to

vacate the dismissals of her claims and remand the cases for proper consideration, free of bias

and discrimination.” Id. at ⁋ 48.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a party’s objections to a Report and Recommendation, “[t]he district

judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been

properly objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). In so doing, “[t]he district judge may accept, reject,

or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the

magistrate judge with instruction.” Id.

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss” their complaint or

any portion of it that “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a

plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a)

“imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship

v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a

host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court

holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”

Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April

1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however,

has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v.

Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,

594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Thus, to survive screening, a complaint must contain sufficient facts which,

if accepted as true, would plausibly state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Magistrate Judge issued her Report and Recommendation on November 14, 2024,

determining that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted with

respect to the named Defendants. (ECF No. 6 at 5–7). Additionally, the Magistrate Judge

recommended that this Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

law claims and dismiss the state law claims without prejudice. (Id. at 7). The Plaintiff has

objected to this recommendation with arguments of her own. (ECF No. 9). Each of these

objections are discussed and analyzed in turn.

First, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing claims against the Defendants under

42 U.S.C §1983 because the Defendants are not state actors. (ECF No. 6 at 6). Plaintiff objects to

the dismissal of her claims under the statute because she argues the Report and Recommendation

failed to consider that private individuals and entities may act under the color of state law when

their actions are closely intertwined with state officials or institutions under the joint action

theory. (ECF No. 9 at 2). She also alleges Ohio Department of Job and Family Services

(“ODJFS”) and Ohio Department of Medicaid (“ODM”) colluded with private actors to deny her

rights, which establishes a sufficient nexus under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922,

937 (1982). (Id.).

Plaintiff, however, fails to allege with sufficient specificity that the Defendants colluded

under the joint action theory. Although conspiring with the government to deprive federal rights

can subject a private actor to liability (see Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1985),

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege any facts to satisfy this requirement. Id. at 943–44 (“All

that must be shown is that there was a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the

general conspiratorial objective, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the

conspiracy that caused injury to the complainant.”). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific

facts supporting that there was a plan or a shared conspiratorial objective between the insurers,

her attorney, Roble, and ODJFS or ODM.

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Christensen, as an officer of the court, acted

under the color of law in representing her, but this idea has already been rejected by courts. (ECF

No. 6); Otworth v. Vanderploeg, 61 F. App'x 163, 165 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A lawyer representing a

client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law

within the meaning of § 1983.”). Further, neither the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family

Services nor the Ohio Department of Medicaid qualify as “person” for purposes of liability under

§1983. See Collins v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Services, 2007 WL 2783661, at *5 (S.D. Ohio

Sept. 24, 2007); Reese v. Indus. Com'n of Ohio, 3 Fed. App’x. 340, 342 (6th Cir. 2001). Finally,

the State of Ohio has not consented to be sued, and Congress has not abrogated Ohio’s sovereign

immunity to be sued in such a suit in federal court. See S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d

500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, any claim against the ODJFS or ODM is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. As such, this objection is overruled.

Second, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the Plaintiff’s §1981

discrimination claims because the Magistrate Judge did not find Plaintiff’s “passing reference to

42 U.S.C. §1981” to be sufficient to state a claim under that statute. (ECF No. 6 at 7). Plaintiff

appears to allege her “race, ethnicity, national origin, and pro se status influenced adverse

judicial rulings and the conduct of defendants” deprived her of right to due process. (ECF No. 5

at 5). But her objection points to no set of facts to conceive that her allegations are “plausible.”

Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 678. Her complaint only provides labels, conclusions, formulaic assertions,

and generalities that do not state a claim for relief. Twombly, 550 U. S. at 555. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be provided for. Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2).

Third, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the Plaintiff’s request for relief

from any state court rulings because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff objects because

she asserts the Magistrate Judge misapplied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (ECF No. 9 at 3). She

notes she is not asking for appellate review but is challenging the process by which the judgment

was obtained. (Id.) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 284

(2005)). Additionally, she claims that even if her claims should be rejected under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, her “claims of racial and ethnic discrimination implicate fundamental

constitutional rights” warrant “exceptions to the general prohibition against interference with

state court decisions.” (ECF No. 9 at 3).

The Magistrate Judge did not misapply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the claims

should be dismissed. The doctrine applies to cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil

Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. Here, the Magistrate Judge merely noted that to the extent Plaintiff

attempted to seek relief from a state court judgment, this Court was barred from granting such

relief. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983).

Regardless of Plaintiff’s framing, she specifically requests this Court issue “an order

directing the state court to vacate the dismissals of her claims and remand the cases for proper

consideration, free of bias and discrimination.” (ECF No. 5 at 8). Further, Plaintiff has not made

a showing that this is an extraordinary circumstance where an exception applies. As such, her

requested relief is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Fourth, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s state law claims

because when federal claims are at an end, the court should decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. Buntura v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:24-CV-1313, 2024 WL 4451264, at *5 (N.D.

Ohio Oct. 9, 2024). Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation alleging that the

Magistrate Judge did not consider supplemental jurisdiction. This is not the case. The Magistrate

Judge did consider supplemental jurisdiction but decided it was not warranted due to the general

tule stated in Buntura. (ECF No. 6 at 7).

Accordingly, this Court finds the Plaintiff's Objection to the Report & Recommendation

is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation (ECF No. 9) is OVERRULED. This Court hereby ADOPTS the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 6). This case is hereby DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ALGENON/L. MARBLEY:

DATED: April 7, 2026 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE