Turlip

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PARIS WILLIAMS, : Civil No. 3:26-CV-374

:

Plaintiff, :

: (Judge Mehalchick)

v. :

: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)

LAURA TURLIP, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Factual Background

This case comes before us for a screening review of the

prisoner-plaintiff’s civil complaint.1 The plaintiff, Paris Williams, is an

inmate incarcerated in the Lackawanna County Prison in Scranton,

Pennsylvania. Williams filed this action against Magisterial District

Judges (“MDJs”) Laura Turlip and Alyce Farrell, Public Defender

Bernard Brown, and Assistant District Attorney Danielle Guari.

Williams’ complaint arises from his ongoing criminal prosecution for

aggravated assault, criminal trespass, and resisting arrest.2 He claims

1 Doc. 1.

2 , No. CP-35-CR-0002108-2025. We may

take judicial notice of the public docket in Williams’ underlying state

MDJs Turlip and Farrell improperly denied his bail and continuously

denied his submitted motions.3 Williams further claims Defendant

Brown rendered ineffective assistance of counsel throughout the criminal

matter and that MDJ Farrell and Defendant Guari improperly altered

the charges brought against him.4 Williams asserts their conduct

violates his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As relief,

Williams seeks $700,000,000 in compensatory damages.5

Along with the complaint, Williams filed a motion for leave to

proceed .6 We will conditionally grant Williams’ motion

to proceed in forma pauperis for screening purposes only, but after a

screening review, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.

criminal case. , 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014)

(“We may take judicial notice of the contents of another Court’s docket.”).

3 Doc. 1 at 4–5.

4 at 5–6.

5 at 7.

6 Doc. 2.

II. Discussion

A. Screening of Complaints – Standard of Review

We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review

complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed

.7 We review such complaints to determine whether there are

frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.8 This statutory preliminary screening

mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”9

With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading

standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”10 In

determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this

pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the

complaint as true,11 and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be

7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

8

9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

11 , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the

non-movant.”12 However, a court is not required to accept legal

conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.”13

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:

[A]fter , when presented with a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-

part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim

should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any

legal conclusions. , 129 S. Ct. at 1949 Second, a District

Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the

complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a

“plausible claim for relief.” at 1950. In other words, a

complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement

to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with

its facts. , 515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme

Court instructed in , “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do

not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” , 129

S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw

on its judicial experience and common sense.” 14

12 , 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d

Cir. 1994).

13 ; , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice”).

14 , 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).

Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on

the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public

record.15 A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]

that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the

plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”16 Additionally,

if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically

attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the

court may consider such document in its determination.17 However, the

court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion

to dismiss.18

Finally, when reviewing a complaint, we are reminded that

such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial

15 , 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).

16 , 998 F.2d 1192,

1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

17 , 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002).

18 , 20 F.3d at 1261.

justice.’”19 We must apply the relevant law even if the plaintiff

does not mention it by name.20

B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May

be Granted.

It is well settled that state judges are entitled to immunity from

civil liability for claims arising out of acts taken in their official

capacities. As the Third Circuit has explained, “[a] judicial officer in the

performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit.”21

Here, Williams’ complaint asserts that MDJs Turlip and Farrell

improperly denied him bail and his submitted motions in the underlying

criminal matter. Thus, these allegations plainly arise out of their role in

the criminal judicial process against Williams. Accordingly, MDJs Turlip

and Farrell are entitled to absolute immunity from the claims against

them.

Similarly, Defendant Guari would be entitled to immunity from the

claims against her arising out of her prosecution of the plaintiff’s criminal

19 , 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(f)).

20 , 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing

, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).

21 , 228 F. App’x 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing

, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)).

case. It is well settled that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity

from claims involving their activities that are “intimately associated with

the judicial phase of the criminal process.”22 Again, to the extent

Williams’ claims arise out of his state criminal prosecution, Defendant

Guari would be entitled to immunity.

Williams also appears to assert that his public defender is providing

ineffective assistance of counsel in his ongoing state criminal proceeding.

Civil rights claims brought under Section 1983 require a plaintiff to show

that the alleged constitutional violation “was committed by a person

acting under color of state law.”23 However, it is well settled that “a

public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to

a defendant is not acting under color of state law.”24 Further, “ineffective

assistance of appointed counsel in representing a defendant is not

actionable under § 1983.”25 Here, Williams’ claims against Defendant

Brown clearly arise out of his involvement in representing Williams.

22 , 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).

23 , 733 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation

omitted).

24 , 288 F. App’x 47, 49 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing

, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)).

25 , 338 F. App’x 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing ,

454 U.S. at 324–25).

Accordingly, any Section 1983 claims against this defendant fail as a

matter of law.

Lastly, to the extent Williams invites us to intervene in his state

criminal case, which appears to be ongoing, this claim runs afoul of the

abstention doctrine and should be dismissed. As the Third

Circuit has explained, “ abstention is a legal doctrine granting

federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a

claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state

proceeding.”26 The doctrine contemplates three legal requirements that

must be met before a court exercises its discretion to abstain: “(1) there

are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state

proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state

proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.”27

Courts have frequently abstained from hearing claims that necessarily

interfere with ongoing state criminal cases.28

26 , 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing

, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)).

27 at 131 (citing , 545 F.3d

241, 248 (3d Cir. 2008)).

28 , 369 F.3d 319 (3d Cir.

2004); , 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).

Here, Williams’ claims arise out of his criminal matter that is

ongoing in Lackawanna County. Thus, the requirements for

abstention—ongoing state proceedings that implicate important state

interests and give the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his

claims—are met here. Given the paramount importance to the state of

the enforcement and resolution of state criminal proceedings, we believe

that we should exercise our discretion to abstain from any claims

involving Williams’ ongoing state criminal matters.

Thus, because we have concluded that we should abstain from

considering the merits of the plaintiff’s claims under , we

recommend that these claims be dismissed without prejudice. As the

Third Circuit has explained:

[W]here abstention is appropriate, federal courts

“have no occasion to address the merits” of the plaintiff’s

federal claims. [ , 369 F.3d at 328]. And without a merits-

based decision, the dismissal of his federal case does not

implicate claim preclusion or otherwise prevent Eldakroury

from returning to federal court if his ongoing state

prosecution concludes without a resolution of his federal

claims.29

29 , 601 F. App’x 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2015);

, 655 F. App’x 66, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2016).

Accordingly, we recommend these claims be dismissed without

prejudice to the plaintiff re-asserting these constitutional claims at the

conclusion of his state court case, should he choose to do so.

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED

that the plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to

the plaintiff reasserting his claims at the conclusion of his state court

proceedings.

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule

72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed

findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or

matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a

recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a

habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk

of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,

written objections which shall specifically identify the

portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report

to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.

The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall

apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,

however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her

discretion or where required by law, and may consider the

record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or

her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge

may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or

recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions.

Submitted this 30th day of March 2026.

Daryl F. Bloom

Chief United States Magistrate Judge