The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LISA JACOBS,
Plaintiff, 1:22-cv-1184
(ECC/PJE)
v.
HUDSON VALLEY FAMILY PHYSICIANS,
PLLC, AMIN ELASHKER, D.O., in his
individual capacity also known as Amen
Elashker, D.O., and FRANCESCA HILMI,
D.O., in her individual capacity,
Defendants.
Russell G. Wheeler, Esq., for Plaintiff
Brooke D. Youngwirth-Bodin, Esq., for Defendants
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lisa Jacobs brings this action against Defendants Hudson Valley Family
Physicians, PLLC (HVFP), Amin Elashker, and Francesca Hilmi, asserting claims under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII) and the New York State
Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (NYSHRL) arising out of her former
employment at HVFP. See Dkt. No. 1. Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Dkt. No. 44. The motion is
fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is
denied.
I. BACKGROUND1
A. The Parties
Defendant HVFP is a professional limited liability corporation which operated medical
practice offices at 117 Mary’s Avenue and 1089 New York Highway 32 in Kingston, New York.
Dkt. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 2-3; Dkt. No. 48 ¶¶ 2-3. Defendants Amin Elashker, D.O. and Francesca Hilmi,
D.O. are both physicians of osteopathic medicine and, at all relevant times, were principals and
co-owners of HVFP. Dkt. No. 44-2 ¶¶ 5-8; Dkt. No. 48 ¶¶ 5-8.
Plaintiff was employed by HVFP from September 2008 until July 15, 2020. See Dkt. No.
44-2 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 48 ¶ 4. Over the course of her employment, Plaintiff held the positions of special
projects person, assistant manager, and practice manager. Dkt. No. 44-10 at 21, 24, 30; see also
Dkt. No. 48 ¶¶ 59-61; Dkt. No. 51 ¶¶ 59-61. This case arises out of alleged sexual harassment and
retaliation Plaintiff suffered when she was employed at HVFP on the part of Dr. Elashker.
B. Physical Contact
Plaintiff testified that Dr. Elashker forcibly kissed her at work, in the elevator, parking
garage, office, and exam room. Dkt. No. 44-10 at 94-95. “Every time” Dr. Elashker would kiss
her, Plaintiff would “push him back” and tell him to stop. Id. at 97. Dr. Elashker would also touch
her breasts, although Plaintiff could not identify how many times or recall specifically when this
occurred. Id. at 103-04. Plaintiff used Dr. Elashker as her personal physician. Id. at 100. Plaintiff
asserts that, once the sexual harassment started, she “no longer saw him as a patient in the exam
1 The following facts are drawn from Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Dkt.
No. 44-2, Plaintiff’s Rule 56 Statement in Response and Opposition to Defendants’ Statement of
Material Facts, Dkt. No. 48, and Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts,
Dkt. No. 51, to the extent those facts are well-supported by pinpoint citations to the record, and
the exhibits the parties have submitted. Disputed facts are noted. The facts are construed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 243 (2d
Cir. 2007).
room,” although Dr. Elashker continued to order labs and prescribe medications for her. Id. at 100-
01.
Plaintiff also testified that Dr. Elashker would “show up” to parties after work, “forcibly
kiss” and touch her, and “follow [them] around.” Id. at 109; see id. at 187-200 (describing one
such incident). At Christmas parties, Dr. Elashker would “try to catch [Plaintiff] in a room by
[her]self, or afterwards.” Id. at 109. For one Christmas party, he bought Plaintiff jewelry and “made
[her] wear the necklace to the party.” Id. at 111.
Plaintiff generally testified that she is “sure” that the claimed sexual harassment “happened
[her] entire employment” at HVFP. Id. at 105; see id. at 211 (testifying that the events were
“ongoing” and there was “no end date to his harassment”). Dr. Elashker would say things to her
like “I’ll take you to the right places” or “[r]emember who always has your back.” Id. at 184-85.
Plaintiff understood Dr. Elashker to mean that if she “put up with” and “continued with” the
touching, kissing, and gifts, that she would “advance” and “go great places.” Id. at 186-87. Plaintiff
also testified that there “were many repercussions if [she] didn’t do or act how [Dr. Elashker]
wanted.” Id. at 112. If Plaintiff refused to do as he wanted, Dr. Elashker would make comments
like “we have a problem here” and “we can end this real quick,” in essence “remind[ing] [Plaintiff]
how much [she] needed this job.” Id. at 112-13. Dr. Elashker “made numerous comments
throughout the years that [Plaintiff was] only employed because of him.” Id. at 114.
Dr. Elashker, by contrast, denies ever subjecting Plaintiff to physical advances, sexual
commentary, or sexual harassment. Dkt. No. 44-8 at 183. Dr. Elashker asserts that he never
forcibly kissed Plaintiff or kissed her in a romantic way. Id. at 180. He denies ever touching
Plaintiff’s breast or genitals and asserts that Plaintiff never touched his genitals. Id. Dr. Elashker
testified that he never made inappropriate comments of a sexual nature to Plaintiff and denies
advising Plaintiff that she would be able to advance at HVFP by tolerating inappropriate conduct.
Id. at 181-82.
C. Gifts
Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Elashker “sporadic[ally]” gave her money in addition to her
compensation from HVFP. Dkt. No. 44-10 at 40-41. Dr. Elashker gave her this money for
“working beyond [her] job duties,” to “buy something for [her]self,” or “because he felt bad for
acting a certain way.” Id. at 42-43. Some of the things Dr. Elashker told Plaintiff to buy with the
money were a “bottle of wine,” “some nice lingerie,” “nice underwear,” and “nice jewelry.” Id. at
45. Dr. Elashker gave Plaintiff these payments throughout her employment. Id. at 44. Dr. Elashker
also “left lingerie in [her] drawer one time from Victoria’s Secret” with a “little note . . . that was
signed by him.” Id. at 51. Every time Dr. Elashker left her something, “there was a conversation”
and Plaintiff asked him not to leave her things. Id. at 51-52.
Dr. Elashker denies giving Plaintiff lingerie or any “gifts of a sexual or romantic nature.”
Dkt. No. 44-8 at 184.
D. Text Messages
According to Plaintiff, Dr. Elashker sent her inappropriate photographs by text message,
including pictures of himself without a shirt on and of his genitals. Dkt. No. 44-10 at 128.
Beginning in the late spring and early summer of 2020, Dr. Elashker also sent photographs of
himself at hotels and restaurants. Id. at 216. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Elashker also sent messages
with these pictures suggesting that, had she “played her cards right,” Plaintiff could have been
enjoying such experiences with him. Id. at 219.
Dr. Elashker testified that he never sent Plaintiff sexually explicit text messages, pictures
of his genitals, or other inappropriate messages. Dkt. No. 44-8 at 180, 183-84. He also asserts that
he did not text Plaintiff pictures of himself at hotels and restaurants in New York City or pictures
of himself in “relaxed and suggest[ive] poses.” Id. at 187.
Defendants submitted with their motion the text messages between Plaintiff and Dr.
Elashker that Plaintiff produced during discovery. See Dkt. No. 46-1. The text messages produced
are from April 2018 to July 2020 and span more than 600 pages. See id. On April 15, 2020, Dr.
Elashker sent Plaintiff a picture of a Corona beer. Id. at 475. The text messages produced otherwise
contain no pictures of Dr. Elashker in hotels or restaurants or in relaxing or suggestive poses, or
other inappropriate photographs. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that “[t]here were a lot more
text messages” that she no longer has, because they were deleted or lost. See Dkt. No. 44-10 at 65.
For example, Plaintiff testified that her ex-boyfriend deleted certain text messages because “he is
a very jealous, controlling person.” Id. at 67-68. She also testified that she may have deleted certain
text messages “if it was something truly inappropriate.” Id. at 70.
Plaintiff also testified that she sent Melissa Moore, a former HVFP employee, “copies of
text messages and asked her to save them.” Id. at 60; see id. at 72, 181-82. When deposed, Ms.
Moore, who worked at HVFP between 2011 and 2015, testified that she could not say “one way
or another” whether she ever had possession of text messages between Plaintiff and Dr. Elashker
that had been shared with her. Dkt. No. 44-11 at 43-44.2
E. Conversation with Dr. Hilmi
Plaintiff testified that she and Dr. Hilmi had a conversation in 2018 or 2019 about Dr.
Elashker’s conduct. Dkt. No. 44-10 at 60-61. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Hilmi said that she “saw
2 Ms. Moore generally testified that Plaintiff and Dr. Elashker were “good friends” and that she
never “saw anything that made [Plaintiff] uncomfortable” while Ms. Moore worked at HVFP. Dkt.
No. 44-11 at 37-38. She stated that she had no knowledge of the conduct complained of by
Plaintiff. See id. at 76-81.
all of the [text] messages from Melissa [Moore]” and “felt bad” for Plaintiff for having to “live
like this, and work like this, with the harassment from Dr. Elashker.” Id. at 62. Plaintiff told Dr.
Hilmi that Dr. Elashker “would force [her] to kiss him” or “kiss [her] in the elevator, in an exam
room, any chance he had.” Id. at 93. Plaintiff also told Dr. Hilmi that Dr. Elashker would touch
her breast or leg and buy her unwanted gifts. Id. They had a “continued conversation, with Dr.
Elashker present sometimes, about the whole thing” over the next few weeks. Id. at 62.
Dr. Hilmi testified that Plaintiff never made a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination to her. Dkt. No. 44-9 at 61-62. According to Dr. Hilmi, she and Plaintiff never met
regarding text messages between Dr. Elashker and Plaintiff. Id. at 62. Dr. Hilmi generally
disclaims any knowledge of inappropriate conduct on Dr. Elashker’s part toward Plaintiff. Id. at
62-64.
F. Plaintiff’s Separation from Employment
It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s employment with HVFP ended on July 15, 2020. Plaintiff
testified that, leading up to that day, she and Dr. Elashker had a “few conversations” about his
“sexual harassment, his innuendos, his controlling me.” Dkt. No. 44-10 at 75. A few weeks before
July 15, 2020, Plaintiff told Dr. Elashker that she “wasn’t happy with the way things were going”
and “wasn’t going to continue that any longer.” Id. Dr. Elashker replied that he “would accept
[her] resignation at any time.” Id. at 76. It is unclear if Plaintiff’s testimony refers to a text message
conversation with Dr. Elashker on June 14, 2020 in which Plaintiff denied disrespecting Dr.
Elashker, stated “I have had your back since day one,” and “informally” tendered her resignation.
Dkt. No. 46-1 at 1-2. Dr. Elashker responded, in part: “If this is how my manager is behaving then
I no longer want her to have MY BACK.” Id. at 2; see also id. at 3 (“I[’]m selling the practice[. ]
No one will have a job as soon as it’s sold.”).
Plaintiff testified that, on July 15, 2020, she and Dr. Elashker had a “quick conversation”
during which Plaintiff said that she was “only an employee” moving forward and that she did not
“want to hear any of [Dr. Elashker’s] personal life” or be subject to “any more sexual comments,
touches, gifts, [or] anything of that nature.” Dkt. No. 44-10 at 76. Dr. Elashker denies having a
meeting with Plaintiff on or before this date where Plaintiff complained of sexual harassment. Dkt.
No. 44-8 at 188.
Later in the day on July 15, Drs. Elashker and Hilmi met with Plaintiff and her daughter,
Breanna Jacobs, who also worked at HVFP. See Dkt. No. 44-10 at 81. It is undisputed that Dr.
Elashker recorded the meeting on his cell phone. Dkt. No. 44-6 (audio recording of meeting). Dr.
Elashker stated that the meeting had to do with Drs. Elashker and Hilmi “thinking very seriously
about selling the business.” Id. at 2:52-2:58. Dr. Elashker stated that a “broker” had mandated
certain changes prior to selling the business. Id. at 3:21-3:29. Among those changes, which were
listed on a written memorandum that Dr. Elashker gave Plaintiff, was the elimination of Plaintiff’s
and her daughter’s positions. Id. at 7:13-7:45; see also Dkt. No. 44-5 (July 15, 2020 memorandum
stating that HVFP had approved “[e]liminating the position of General Practice Manager
(Currently held by Lisa Jacobs)” and “[e]liminating [t]he position of Assistant Manager (Currently
held by Brean[n]a Jacobs)” as part of a “major restructuring”). Dr. Elashker informed Plaintiff and
her daughter that HVFP was hoping to implement the changes by August 10, 2020, and then stated:
“I would like you to tell me whether you are interested in staying until then or . . . think about it.
Sleep on it and see what you want to do.” Dkt. No. 44-6 at 10:09-10:23. Dr. Elashker then asked
if there were any questions and concluded the meeting. Id. at 10:30-10:40.
Dr. Elashker testified at his deposition that Plaintiff would still have a job at HVFP after
the elimination of her position, and that it was “understood” that there would be further meetings
or discussion regarding what her new role might be. See Dkt. No. 44-8 at 32-34; see id. at 151 (“I
wanted to hear it from them. I wanted to hear what their ideas are, what their thoughts are.”).
Plaintiff believed, based on the conversation at the meeting and the memorandum which indicated
that her position was being eliminated, that she was being terminated. Dkt. No. 44-10 at 83.
Plaintiff believed she had been given a choice whether to leave that day or on August 10. See id.
at 89. Plaintiff emailed Drs. Elashker and Hilmi that evening: “As a result of our meeting today as
well as the letter you provided regarding the termination of my employment with Hudson Valley
Family Physicians as of today (verbally) or August 10, 2020 ([a]s stated on paper) I would like to
inform you that today July 15, 2020 will be my last day.” Dkt. No. 44-7.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56(a), summary judgment may be granted only if all the submissions taken
together “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see
also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears the
initial burden of demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 323. A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,”
and is genuinely in dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d
549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson). The movant may meet this burden by showing that the
nonmoving party has “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322; see also Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013)
(explaining that summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party fails to “‘come forth
with evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to return a verdict in his or her favor on’ an
essential element of a claim” (quoting In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d
Cir. 2010))).
If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see also Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323-24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). “When ruling on a
summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against
the movant.” Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). Still, the
nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and
cannot rely on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a
motion for summary judgment,” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986)
(quoting Quarles v. Gen. Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, “[m]ere
conclusory allegations or denials . . . cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact
where none would otherwise exist.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995)).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL for sex-based hostile work
environment, quid pro quo sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. See Dkt. No. 1
¶¶ 63-111 (first through eighth causes of action).3 Defendants move for summary judgment on all
of Plaintiff’s claims. Dkt. No. 44.
3 By Decision and Order dated March 20, 2024, District Judge David N. Hurd dismissed all claims
brought by Plaintiff’s daughter, Breanna Jacobs. See Dkt. No. 27.
A. Timeliness
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment, quid pro quo harassment,
and discrimination4 claims are time-barred because Plaintiff cannot point to evidence of actionable
conduct occurring within the relevant limitations periods. Dkt. No. 44-16 at 6-8. Plaintiff responds
that the record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the conduct she
complains of continued throughout her employment and that the continuing violation doctrine
applies to her claims. Dkt. No. 49 at 9-10. Both parties assert that the limitations period for
Plaintiff’s Title VII claims extends from June 24, 2020 until her termination on July 15, 2020 (i.e.,
300 days before Plaintiff mailed her charge of discrimination to the EEOC) and that the time period
for her NYSHRL claims extends from April 20, 2018 until her termination.5
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has “no evidence” other than her own “self-serving
testimony” that Defendants engaged in any inappropriate conduct during the limitations period.
Dkt. No. 44-16 at 7. Defendants have cited no authority to support the argument that a plaintiff
must have evidence corroborating her testimony to survive summary judgment. Indeed, at
summary judgment, a plaintiff is “entitled to rely on [her] own testimony to establish [her] claim.”
4 It is unclear how, if at all, Plaintiff’s discrimination claims (third and seventh causes of action)
differ from her hostile work environment and/or quid pro quo claims. The parties do not address
the discrimination claims independently, so neither does the Court.
5 These are the dates calculated by Judge Hurd in his Decision and Order on Defendants’ motion
to dismiss. Dkt. No. 27 at 8. It appears that Judge Hurd, in calculating the three-year limitations
period for Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims, looked back three years from the date Plaintiff mailed her
EEOC charge. Although courts in this Circuit have concluded the limitations period for NYSHRL
claims is tolled during the pendency of a complaint filed with the EEOC, see Schneider v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 16-cv-2010, 2019 WL 294309, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019), this
calculation does not account for the time period between the EEOC’s issuance of a right-to-sue
letter on August 12, 2022 and the filing of the complaint on November 10, 2022, when the
limitations period is not tolled. The parties do not address tolling. Because the exact date of the
limitations period for Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims is not dispositive on Defendants’ motion, the
Court assumes without deciding that April 20, 2018 is the correct date.
Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co., 134 F.4th 39, 48 (2d Cir. 2025) (citations and ellipsis omitted). To hold
that a nonmovant’s “allegations of fact are (because ‘self-serving’) insufficient to fend off
summary judgment would be to thrust the courts—at an inappropriate stage—into an adjudication
of the merits.” Id. at 49 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court will not reject Plaintiff’s sworn
deposition testimony just because it is self-serving, and her testimony may be sufficient to defend
against Defendants’ motion.
Plaintiff testified at her deposition that Dr. Elashker’s “unwanted kissing, touching, making
[her] touch him, sending [her] photos, you know, inappropriate text messages, things like that”
“all occurred [during her] entire employment.” Dk. No. 44-10 at 216; see also id. at 105, 211
(describing the events as “ongoing” with “no end date to his harassment”). This sworn testimony
is evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the alleged unwanted kissing,
physical contact, and inappropriate text messages occurred after April 2018. To the extent
Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s testimony as insufficiently specific, the Second Circuit has held
that “specific descriptions of each instance of harassment—which, if harassment occurred daily,
could be difficult to provide—are unnecessary for a plaintiff to defeat summary judgment.” Knox,
134 F.4th at 52 n.5 (noting that a jury “could reasonably find pervasive harassment, even in the
absence of specific details about each incident”).
The Court also concludes that disregarding Plaintiff’s deposition testimony on the ground
that it is contradicted by the text messages produced, as Defendants argue, is not warranted. See
Dkt. No. 44-16 at 8, 11-12; Dkt. No. 50 at 6-7. Defendants rely primarily on Bentley v. AutoZoners,
LLC, where the Second Circuit noted that “in the rare circumstance where the plaintiff relies almost
exclusively on her own testimony, much of which is contradictory and incomplete, to establish a
triable issue of fact, it may well be impossible for the court to determine whether the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff, and thus whether there are any genuine issues of material fact,
without making some assessment of the plaintiff’s account.” 935 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). A court must find the “record contradictions with [the plaintiff’s] testimony
‘inescapable and unequivocal’ to find that her testimony raised only ‘a sham issue of fact.’” Id.
(citation omitted). Where, however, “there is a plausible explanation for discrepancies in a
witness’s testimony, the court considering a summary judgment motion should not disregard the
later testimony because of an earlier account that was ambiguous, confusing, or simply
incomplete.” Frost v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation and
brackets omitted).
Here, the Court concludes that the absence of inappropriate texts from Dr. Elashker in the
text messages Plaintiff disclosed does not warrant disregarding Plaintiff’s testimony that she
received such text messages as a matter of law. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that her ex-
boyfriend deleted certain text messages and that she deleted text messages if it was “something
truly inappropriate.” Dkt. No. 44-10 at 65-68, 70. Plaintiff has therefore provided a plausible
explanation for the absence of inappropriate text messages in her possession which a jury could
reasonably credit. See Frost, 980 F.3d at 247-48 (“There are any number of benign or malign
explanations for the purported deficiencies raised by defendants, and it is not the role of the district
court to choose among them at the summary judgment stage.”); see also Burns v. Primary
PartnerCare Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 23-cv-6312, 2026 WL 693507, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12,
2026) (distinguishing the “rare circumstance” to which Jeffrey applies and noting that the
defendants’ arguments as to the plaintiff’s “credibility problems . . . only underscore the reasons
why summary judgment is inappropriate”).
Under the continuing violation doctrine, if a plaintiff files a charge “that is timely as to any
incident of discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims of acts
of discrimination under that policy will be timely even if they would be untimely standing alone.”
Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Because Plaintiff has
proffered evidence of actionable conduct within the limitations period, her hostile work
environment claim is actionable even to events falling outside the limitations period. The parties
disagree about whether the continuing violation doctrine applies to Plaintiff’s quid pro quo claims.
Because the Court understands Plaintiff’s quid pro quo claims to be premised on the adverse action
she allegedly suffered when she rejected Dr. Elashker’s conduct in July 2020, see infra Section
III.B, Plaintiff’s quid pro quo is timely and the continuing violation doctrine has no application.
Accordingly, Defendant’ motion for summary judgment on the ground of untimeliness is
denied.
B. Harassment Claims
Plaintiff’s harassment claims invoke both quid pro quo sexual harassment and sex-based
hostile work environment theories. “Although the terms ‘quid pro quo’ and ‘hostile work
environment’ do not appear in the text of Title VII, they are useful to distinguish between ‘cases
involving a threat which is carried out and [cases involving] offensive conduct in general.’”
Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Mormol v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2004)). Thus, when a plaintiff “proves that a tangible
employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she
establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of
employment that is actionable under Title VII.” Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998)). Where a claim is premised on “unfulfilled threats,” however, “it should
be categorized as a hostile work environment claim which requires a showing of severe or
pervasive conduct.” Id. (“The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful,
perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and those
where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility.”) (citations
omitted).
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment and quid
pro quo claims. Although the parties’ briefing does not always clearly distinguish between these
two theories of liability, based on the conceptualization outlined in Schiano, the Court understands
Plaintiff’s quid pro quo claim to be based on her alleged termination after she told Dr. Elashker to
cease his inappropriate conduct and her hostile work environment claim to be based on all other
alleged inappropriate conduct, including unfulfilled threats.
1. Hostile Work Environment
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims,
arguing that (1) any gifts from Dr. Elashker do not support a hostile work environment claim, and
(2) Plaintiff has no evidence to support her claim other than her own testimony, which is
contradicted by the text messages. Dkt. No. 44-16 at 9-12.
To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must demonstrate
harassment on the basis of a protected characteristic, and that her “workplace was ‘so severely
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that the terms and conditions of
. . . her employment were thereby altered.’” Agosto v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 101
(2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Desardouin v. City of Rochester, 708 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2013)).6 The
6 Although the parties state that this standard also applies to hostile work environment claims under
the NYSHRL, that is no longer the case. The NYSHRL was amended in 2019 to remove the
“severe or pervasive” requirement for discrimination claims. See Smith v. Nat’l Grid USA, No. 21-
cv-6899, 2025 WL 1248676, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2025). The NYSHRL prohibits
“harassment” because of an individual’s sex “regardless of whether such harassment would be
considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims,” and such
hostile work environment standard includes “both objective and subjective components: the
conduct complained of must be severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable person would find it
hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively perceive the work environment to be abusive.”
Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2014). To determine whether conduct is “severe
or pervasive,” courts review “the totality of the circumstances,” including “‘the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.’” Banks v. General Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 262 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). Moreover, there must be a “specific basis for
imputing the conduct creating the hostile work environment to the employer.” Bentley, 935 F.3d
at 90-91.
As set forth above, supra Section III.A, the Court rejects Defendants’ arguments that
Plaintiff necessarily needs evidence other than her own sworn testimony to survive summary
judgment and that her testimony that Dr. Elashker sent her inappropriate text messages should be
disregarded as a matter of law. Although Defendants also argue that the gifts Plaintiff claims Dr.
Elashker gave her were not sexual in nature and do not support a hostile work environment, see
Dkt. No. 44-1-6 at 9-11, this argument ignores portions of Plaintiff’s testimony. For example,
Plaintiff testified that Dr. Elashker—her supervisor who undisputedly had the power to fire her—
gave her Victoria’s Secret lingerie and would also give her money, telling her to buy herself “some
harassment is unlawful “when it subjects an individual to inferior terms, conditions or privileges
of employment” because of a protected characteristic. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h) (“It shall be an
affirmative defense to liability under this subdivision that the harassing conduct does not rise above
the level of what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic . . .
would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences.”). Because the Court concludes that
Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment
claim, they are also not entitled to summary judgment under the NYSHRL’s more liberal standard.
nice lingerie” or “nice underwear.” Dkt. No. 44-10 at 45, 51. Thus, at a minimum there are
questions of fact as to whether the gifts were related to Plaintiff’s sex.
Further, as Plaintiff points out in opposition, she testified to additional conduct on Dr.
Elashker’s part over the course of her employment at HVFP, including unwanted and forcible
kissing, unwanted touching of Plaintiff’s breasts, and inappropriate and sexually explicit text
messages. See supra Section I. Plaintiff also testified that she subjectively suffered emotionally
due to this conduct. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 44-10 at 120, 157, 159-60. According to Plaintiff, Dr.
Elashker’s conduct was accompanied by insinuations that he would help her career if she went
along with his conduct and potentially fire her if she did not. See id. at 112-13, 184-87. Defendants
do not address this alleged conduct, other than to argue that Plaintiff does not have evidence
corroborating her testimony. Defendants therefore have not demonstrated that they are entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. See, e.g.,
E.E.O.C. v. Suffolk Laundry Servs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 497, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that the
law “deems unwanted touching to be a highly significant factor contributing to a hostile work
environment”) (citation omitted); Conlan v. Liberty Mutual Grp., Inc., No. 23-cv-8947, 2024 WL
4792112, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2024) (“The Second Circuit has held that direct contact with
an intimate body part constitutes one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment.”) (collecting
cases).
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
hostile work environment claim.
2. Quid Pro Quo
It appears that Plaintiff’s quid pro quo claim is based on the allegation that Dr. Elashker
“used Plaintiff’s July 2020 ultimatum that his conduct cease as the basis for the decision to
terminate her.” Dkt. No. 49 at 13. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on
this claim because they have proffered a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the July 15,
2020 meeting and Plaintiff cannot establish pretext. See Dkt. No. 50 at 8-11; Dkt. No. 44-16 at 10-
11.
To establish a quid pro quo claim, a plaintiff “must show a ‘tangible employment action,’
i.e., that an ‘explicit . . . alteration[] in the terms of conditions of employment’ resulted from her
refusal to submit” to unwanted sexual advances. Schiano, 445 F.3d at 604 (citation omitted); see
also Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]o establish a prima facie
case of quid pro quo harassment, a plaintiff must present evidence that she was subject to
unwelcome sexual conduct, and that her reaction to that conduct was then used as the basis for
decisions affecting the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of her employment.”). A
tangible employment action “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits.” Mormol, 364 F.3d at 57 (citation omitted). A tangible
employment action “in most cases inflicts direct economic harm,” but “there is no requirement
that it must always do so.” Id. (citations omitted).
To succeed on a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must prove “discrimination
either by direct evidence of intent to discriminate or, more commonly, by indirectly showing
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Bart v. Golub Corp., 96 F.4th 566,
569 (2d Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When only circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory intent is available, courts use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework to assess whether the plaintiff has shown sufficient evidence of discrimination to
survive summary judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). At the first step of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, a plaintiff must meet the “not onerous” burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. See id. at 570. Once the plaintiff has done so, the “burden shifts to the employer to
‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its adverse action.” Id. (citation
omitted). If the employer does so, the burden then “shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the
employer’s stated reason was pretext for discrimination.” Id. (citations omitted).
Importantly, a plaintiff can establish an unlawful employment practice under Title VII by
demonstrating that the plaintiff’s protected characteristic “was a motivating factor” for an
employment practice, “even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. at 571 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). Thus:
To satisfy the third-stage burden under McDonnell Douglas and
survive summary judgment in a Title VII disparate treatment case, a
plaintiff may, but need not, show that the employer’s stated reason
was false, and merely a pretext for discrimination; a plaintiff may
also satisfy this burden by producing other evidence indicating that
the employer’s adverse action was motivated at least in part by the
plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.
Id. at 576; see id. at 575 (noting that a plaintiff may “show that the employer’s stated reason—
even if true or factually accurate—was not the ‘real reason,’ in the sense that it was not the entire
reason due to a coexisting impermissible consideration”).
It is unclear whether Plaintiff is pursuing a traditional single-motive, pretext theory of
liability for her quid pro quo claim or a “mixed-motives” theory, and the parties do not address the
appropriate causation standard for Plaintiff’s quid pro quo claim. In any event, the Court concludes
that there is evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff’s sex, and more
specifically her rejection of Dr. Elashker’s alleged inappropriate sexual conduct, was a motivating
factor for the July 15, 2020 meeting and the elimination of Plaintiff’s position at HVFP. Plaintiff
testified that she and Dr. Elashker had a “few conversations” about his alleged harassment in the
weeks leading up to the meeting in which Plaintiff expressed her dissatisfaction with the status
quo and that she “wasn’t going to continue that any longer.” Dkt. No. 44-10 at 75-76. According
to Plaintiff, she and Dr. Elashker had a conversation the morning of July 15, 2020 in which she
said she was “only an employee” moving forward and personal conversations, sexual comments,
touches, and gifts had to cease. Id. Given the extremely close temporal proximity between
Plaintiff’s rejection of Dr. Elasherk’s sex-related conduct and advances, a jury could reasonably
conclude that Plaintiff’s sex played a motivating factor in the decision to eliminate her position,
even if other factors also motivated the decision. See Bart, 96 F.4th at 576 (noting that although
“the plaintiff’s ultimate burden may be carried by the presentation of additional evidence showing
that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence, it may often be carried by
reliance on the evidence comprising the prima facie case, without more, if that evidence is
independently sufficient under step three of McDonnell Douglas”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Accordingly, Defendants have not demonstrated their entitlement to summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s quid pro quo claims.
C. Retaliation Claims
Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. To establish
a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must show “(1)
participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an
adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted);
see also Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 312-13 (2004).
1. Protected Activity
Defendants appear to argue that Plaintiff did not engage in any protected activity because
the conversation between Dr. Elashker and Plaintiff “was not regarding a sexual or romantic
context.” See Dkt. No. 44-16 at 13. Plaintiff responds that her refusal of Dr. Elashker’s alleged
sexual harassment constitutes protected activity. Dkt. No. 49 at 14.
The Second Circuit has not yet ruled on whether “merely rejecting a sexual advance is
cognizable” as protected activity under Title VII (or the NYSHRL). See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole
Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 115 n.12 (2d Cir. 2013). Other Circuit courts and district
courts within this Circuit are split on the issue, although it appears that the majority view is that
resisting sexual advances is protected activity. See Huang v. Ohio State Univ., 116 F.4th 541, 562
(6th Cir. 2024) (describing a circuit split and “tak[ing] the majority view” that “[r]ejecting sexual
advances—using words or actions—is within the scope of conduct Title VII protects”); Fay v. City
of Newburgh, No. 21-cv-3140, 2024 WL 4169552, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2024) (collecting
cases). Defendants have provided no argument or authority to conclude that resisting sexual
advances is not protected activity, and the Court finds no reason to depart from the majority view.
Moreover, there is evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff
engaged in protected activity by telling Dr. Elashker on July 15, 2020 that she was “only an
employee” moving forward and did not want to be subjected to “any more sexual comments,
touches, gifts, [or] anything of that nature.” Dkt. No. 44-10 at 76. Thus, contrary to Defendants’
argument, the jury could find that a “conversation regarding Dr. Elashker’s conduct toward
Plaintiff took place.” Dkt. No. 44-16 at 13.
2. Adverse Employment Action
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff did not suffer any retaliatory adverse employment
action because she was not terminated but rather resigned voluntarily upon learning that HVFP
was restructuring. Dkt. No. 44-16 at 13, 16. Defendants point to Dr. Elashker’s deposition
testimony that HVFP was open to retaining Plaintiff in a different role and that he intended there
to be further discussions about what that role might be. See id.; Dkt. No. 50 at 14; Dkt. No. 44-8
at 32-34, 151. Plaintiff responds that her separation from employment was an involuntary
termination. Dkt. No. 49 at 16-17. Relying on the recording of the July 15, 2020 meeting, Plaintiff
argues that Defendants expressly told Plaintiff her position was being eliminated, that neither Dr.
Elashker nor Dr. Hilmi invited discussion about an alternative role, and that Dr. Elashker ended
the meeting. Id.
The Court concludes that, at a minimum, there is a genuine question of fact as to whether
Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on July 15, 2020 and whether Plaintiff reasonably
understood it to have been terminated. Although Dr. Elashker stated at the meeting “I would like
you to tell me whether you are interested in staying until then or . . . think about it. Sleep on it and
see what you want to do,” this statement came directly after advising Plaintiff that HVFP wanted
to implement the restructuring changes, including the elimination of Plaintiff’s position, by August
10, 2020. Dkt. No. 44-6 at 10:09-10:23. Furthermore, when Plaintiff emailed Drs. Elashker and
Hilmi on the evening of July 15 referencing “the termination of [her] employment” and electing
July 15 as her last day, neither Dr. Elashker nor Dr. Hilmi corrected Plaintiff’s apparent
misunderstanding that she was not being terminated or invited further discussion about alternative
roles. Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was involuntarily terminated from her
employment at HVFP and suffered an adverse employment action.7
3. Causation
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are subject to the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework outlined above. See supra Section III.B.2. However, unlike Plaintiff’s harassment
claims, her retaliation claims “must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for
7 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff “cannot demonstrate constructive discharge to the extent
same is being alleged.” Dkt. No. 44-16 at 14. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument, and the
Court does not understand Plaintiff to be asserting a claim for constructive discharge.
causation, not the lessened [motivating factor] causation test stated in § 2000e-2(m).” Univ. of Tex.
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013). “[B]ut-for causation does not require proof
that retaliation was the only cause of the employer’s action, but only that the adverse action would
not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.” Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737
F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013).
Here, Defendants have articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the elimination
of Plaintiff’s position and her termination from HVFP—a restructuring intended to put the
company in a position to be sold. Thus, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to prove that Defendants’
stated reason is pretextual and that, absent Defendants’ retaliatory motive, her employment would
not have ended.
A plaintiff “may prove that retaliation was a but-for cause of an adverse employment action
by demonstrating weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its action.” Id. “From such
discrepancies, a reasonable juror could conclude that the explanations were a pretext for a
prohibited reason.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff argues that the “record is replete with discrepancies from which a reasonable
[juror] could conclude that Defendants’ proffered reason” for the elimination of Plaintiff’s
position, which led to her separation from employment, was pretext. Dkt. No. 49 at 18-23. First,
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ stated reasons for the restructuring have shifted over time. The
July 15, 2020 memorandum stated that the restructuring was “[i]n response to the major and
unprecedented circumstances and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health care
industry” and “due to the prohibitive cost of operation.” Dkt. No. 44-5. At the July 15, 2020
meeting, however, Dr. Elashker focused on his and Dr. Hilmi’s desire to sell HVFP, an idea which
they had been thinking about since at least the previous year but which came into focus when Dr.
Hilmi got sick with COVID-19. See generally Dkt. No. 44-6. Furthermore, both Dr. Elashker and
Dr. Hilmi testified at their depositions that the restructuring was not driven by financial concerns.
See Dkt. No. 44-8 at 42 (Dr. Elashker denying that “achieving a cost savings was the primary
objective of implementing the changes set forth in the July 15th, 2020 memo”); Dkt. No. 44-9 at
45-46 (Dr. Hilmi denying that there was “any financial rationale for the changes that are listed” in
the July 15, 2020 memo).
Second, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Elashker’s statements to Plaintiff that they were working
with a broker to sell the business and that the broker had mandated certain changes were false. At
his deposition, Dr. Elashker testified that the broker was someone with whom he had a 45-minute
virtual conversation and that the broker only “suggested” certain changes. See Dkt. No. 44-8 at
122-25. Dr. Elashker also testified that the broker did not “suggest eliminating the position of
general practice manager.” Id. at 131.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants had listed the second-floor office space at HVFP’s
Mary’s Avenue location before the pandemic and that a reasonable factfinder could infer pretext
from Defendants’ decision to record the July 15, 2020 meeting because there is a question of fact
as to whether it was their usual policy to record such events. Dkt. No. 49 at 21-23.
Defendants generally respond that the record evidence “shows that the decision to
restructure was motivated by the combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, Dr. Hilmi’s illness,
and the partners’ pre-existing plan to sell the practice, not by any retaliatory motive.” Dkt. No. 50
at 11-14. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s theory requires the factfinder to “believe that
Defendants orchestrated an elaborate, multi-year conspiracy . . . all to terminate one employee.”
Id. at 12.
Viewing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that there is evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that Defendants’ stated reason for the elimination of Plaintiff’s position was
pretextual and that retaliatory motive was a but-for cause of the decision. Specifically, Plaintiff
has proffered evidence that (1) Defendants’ stated justification for the restructuring changes varied,
including relative to whether the changes were due to financial constraints; (2) the unidentified
broker Dr. Elashker met with did not “mandate” any specific personnel changes and did not
specifically suggest that Plaintiff’s position be eliminated; (3) the only positions to be eliminated
were those of Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s daughter, and a nurse who had already left HVFP; and (4) as of
November 2025, HVFP had not been sold. This evidence, coupled with the extremely close
temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s alleged protected conduct and the elimination of her
position, could reasonably allow a jury to infer pretext. See Winslow v. Pulaski Academy, 448 F.
Supp. 3d 197, 214-15 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding question of fact on retaliation claim where the
plaintiff proffered evidence that, inter alia, there was “close temporal proximity,” the defendants
acted inconsistently with claimed “‘budgetary reductions’ for abolishing her position,” the “nature
and amount of [the employer’s] work” did not change after her position was abolished, and she
was “the only administrative employee to have her position abolished during the . . . school year”).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims
is denied.
D. Individual Defendants’ Liability Under NYSHRL
Finally, Defendants argue that neither Dr. Elashker nor Dr. Hilmi can be held personally
liable under the NYSHRL. Dkt. No. 44-16 at 16-17.8 Defendants argue that Dr. Elashker “cannot
8 Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims to the extent they are asserted
against Drs. Elashker and Hilmi. Id. In opposition, Plaintiff confirms that she “does not plead or
be held liable as an aider and abettor of his own actions” and that there is no record evidence
showing that either Dr. Elashker or Dr. Hilmi “engaged in sexual harassment or that any actionable
conduct is imputable to them.” Id.9 Plaintiff responds that Drs. Elashker and Hilmi may be held
liable for their own conduct because they had an ownership interest in HVFP and sufficient control
to make personnel decisions. Dkt. No. 49 at 24.
Neither proposition advanced by the parties appears to be an accurate or complete
statement of law. First, Plaintiff cites Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 542 (1984), as
standing for the proposition that an individual with ownership interest in the employing entity and
control over personnel decisions may be held liable for their own violative conduct under the
NYSHRL. However, the New York Court of Appeals clarified Patrowich’s holding in Doe v.
Bloomberg L.P., 36 N.Y.3d 450 (2021). The Court of Appeals in Doe noted that “a corporate
employee simply does not qualify as an ‘employer’” under the NYSHRL, “regardless of the
employee’s position or relationship to the employer.” Id. at 458-59. Thus, regardless of Drs.
Elashker and Hilmi’s ownership status of HVFP, they cannot be held liable as employers under
the NYSHRL. See, e.g., Kim v. Regeneron Pharms., Inc., No. 24-cv-5234, 2026 WL 820603, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2026) (noting that “shareholders, agents, limited partners, and employees”
are “not employers” for purposes of the NYSHRL) (quoting Doe, 36 N.Y.3d at 459).
seek to hold the individual defendants liable under [Title VII].” Dkt. No. 49 at 23. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Title VII claims are asserted only against HVFP.
9 As set forth above, the Court has rejected Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has not proffered
evidence of actionable conduct. The Court also declines to consider Defendants’ conclusory
assertion that Plaintiff did not follow the complaint procedure set forth in HVFP’s employee
handbook. In any event, the “Hudson Valley Family Physician Policies and Operations Manual”
submitted by Defendants is dated December 8, 2019 and indicates that it is a “Draft copy,” Dkt.
No. 44-14, and it is therefore unclear when or whether the handbook was ever in effect.
Second, Defendants’ argument that an individual cannot be liable for aiding and abetting
his own wrongful conduct does not account for Second Circuit precedent holding that such
individuals can be held liable for “aiding and abetting allegedly unlawful discrimination by [an]
employer even where [an individual defendant’s] actions serve as the predicate for the employer’s
vicarious liability, so long as the employer’s conduct has also been found to be discriminatory
under the NYSHRL.” McHenry v. Fox News Network, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 51, 73 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (citations and emphasis omitted); see Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir.
2004). Thus, to the extent HVFP is liable under the NYSHRL, the individual defendants could be
held liable under an aiding and abetting theory if they participated in the employer’s unlawful
discrimination.
Thus, in the absence of more helpful briefing, Defendants have not demonstrated their
entitlement to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs NYSHRL claims against Drs.
Elashker and Hilmi.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 44, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 26, 2026
bien
Elizabeth C. Coombe
U.S. District Judge
26