Figueroa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

NORIANNIS EGLIANY PENA )

REBOLLEDO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-959-SLP

)

FRED FIGUEROA, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Noriannis Egliany Pena Rebolledo, a noncitizen1 and Venezuelan

national proceeding with counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”),

Doc. 1, challenging under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 her detention by U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). United States Chief District Judge Scott L. Palk referred

this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Doc. 3. The undersigned set an expedited briefing schedule, Doc. 6,

and the Petition is at issue. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends

that the Court grant the Petition, Doc. 1, for habeas relief by ordering Respondents to

release Petitioner subject to the conditions of her prior parole.

1 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020)

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).

I. Background

Petitioner, a citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States on January 14, 2025, at

San Ysidro, California, and applied for admission. Pet. at 9; Resp. at 2; Doc. 8-1 at 1

(Notice to Appear). Also on January 14, 2025, ICE formally placed Petitioner into removal

proceedings before the Immigration Court through the issuance of a Notice to Appear, and

charged her with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i) as someone not in

possession of valid entry documents. Resp. at 2-3; Doc. 8-1 at 1, 4. On the same day,

Petitioner was granted humanitarian parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) and released

from ICE custody. Pet. at 9; Resp. at 2-3, 5. Her parole was valid until April 18, 2025.

Pet. at 10; Doc. 1-2 (Petitioner’s Admission Record); Resp. at 3, 5. Petitioner alleges she

complied with all reporting requirements and attended routine ICE check-in appointments

as required. Pet. at 10.

On January 21, 2026, ICE re-detained Petitioner while voluntarily appearing for a

scheduled ICE check-in appointment. Pet. at 10; Resp. at 3; Doc. 8-4 (Petitioner’s Warrant

for Arrest). Respondents contend Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).

Resp. at 2.

On April 14, 2026, Petitioner filed an Application for Asylum and for Withholding

of Removal. Id. at 3; Doc. 8-2 (Petitioner’s Asylum Application). On May 6, 2026, an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s asylum application and ordered her removed.

Resp. at 3; Doc. 8-5 (IJ Order). However, on June 3, 2026, Petitioner appealed the removal

order to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See EOIR, Automated Case Information, at

https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (last accessed June 30, 2026). Therefore, the removal order

is not yet final under 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.

When Petitioner filed her Petition, she was detained at Diamondback Correctional

Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Pet. at 2; Doc. 1-1 at 1 (ICE Locator at the time of filing).

She remains detained there. See ICE Online Detainee Locator System, at

https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited June 30, 2026).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner asserts two counts in her Petition.

• Count I: Violation of the Due Process Clause. Petitioner alleges

her re-detention without an opportunity for custody review or any

meaningful opportunity to be heard deprived her of her protected

liberty interest and violates her due process rights. Pet. at 10-12.

• Count II: Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”). Petitioner alleges her detention under § 1225(b)(2) violates

the INA because that provision does not apply to noncitizens who,

like her, were paroled into the country and later re-detained. Pet. at

12.

She asks the Court to “issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents release

Petitioner immediately, without additional alternatives to detention.” Id. Petitioner also

seeks an award of attorney fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).

Id. at 13.2

2 To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as a prevailing party, she

must seek those separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Thus, the

Court need not address this request at this juncture.

III. Standard of Review

To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that she is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through

habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).

IV. Analysis

A. Petitioner’s re-detention violated ICE regulations.

First, the Court must determine what regulations govern Petitioner’s parole—and

its subsequent revocation—under 8 U.S.C § 1182. Individuals conditionally released from

detention have a protected interest in their “continued liberty.” Young v. Harper, 520 U.S.

143, 147 (1997). “This is true even when the released individual is subject to extensive

conditions of release.” Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025).

When the government promulgates regulations “with the force and effect of law,” agencies

are bound to follow their own “existing valid regulations.” United States ex rel. Accardi

v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265, 268 (1954). Pertinent here, “the statutes and

regulations governing immigration and removal proceedings afford important procedural

safeguards to detainees.” Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 698-99 (citation modified).

Petitioner presented herself for inspection at the border in January 2025, and

immigration officials subsequently paroled her into the United States under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5). Pet. at 5; Resp. at 5. This section grants discretion to DHS officials to

“parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as [the DHS Secretary]

may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant

public benefit any [noncitizen] applying for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5)(A). Humanitarian parole may be terminated in two ways. First, parole

terminates automatically if the noncitizen departs from the United States or “at the

expiration of the time for which parole was authorized.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1). With

automatic termination of parole, no written notice is required. Id. Second, if parole is not

terminated automatically, revocation of parole must be based on a decision by a DHS

official that either “the purpose for which parole was authorized” has been accomplished

or that “neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of

the [noncitizen] in the United States.” Id. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5)(A) (stating the DHS Secretary may revoke parole “when the purposes of such

parole . . . have been served”). And, in this case, parole will only be terminated when

“written notice” of this decision is served on the noncitizen. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i).

Whether automatic or on notice, once a noncitizen’s parole has been terminated,

implementing regulations require that “any order of exclusion, deportation, or removal

previously entered shall be executed.” Id. “If the exclusion, deportation, or removal order

cannot be executed within a reasonable time, the [noncitizen] shall again be released on

parole unless in the opinion of [a DHS official with authority] the public interest requires

that the [noncitizen] be continued in custody.” Id. Accordingly, unless detention is

required for the timely removal of a noncitizen, continued detention following earlier

release on parole must be supported by an individualized assessment by an authorized DHS

official. Otherwise, implementing regulations require that a noncitizen be released again

to humanitarian parole. See, e.g., Erwin M.L. v. Warden of the Mesa Verde ICE Processing

Ctr., No. 26-CV-01049, 2026 WL 1256421, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2026) (“The parole

scheme . . . requires parole to continue after expiration unless there is an executable final

order of removal or an individualized determination justifying a parolee’s detention.”);

Caisa Telenchana v. Hermosillo, No. 26-CV-363, 2026 WL 696806, at *7 (W.D. Wash.

Mar. 12, 2026) (“The applicable regulatory scheme requires that, where parole has

automatically terminated upon expiration and the noncitizen is not returned to custody for

either the timely execution of a removal order or upon an individualized decision by an

authorized DHS official, continuation of humanitarian parole may be implied and,

thereafter, the procedures for on-notice termination apply.”) (citation modified).

Respondents argue 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) governs Petitioner’s detention because

she presented herself at the border and was released on parole, meaning she never “entered”

the country. Resp. at 4-7.3 However, Respondents fail to meaningfully address Petitioner’s

allegations that they revoked her parole without an opportunity for custody review or any

meaningful opportunity to be heard. Further, contrary to Respondents’ assertions, id. at 7,

expiration of Petitioner’s parole does not justify her re-detention because her continued

detention following earlier release on parole, even when expired, must be supported by an

3 While Respondents allege Petitioner remains subject to § 1225(b) after she was released

on parole and more than six months after that parole expired, this Court has held otherwise.

See, e.g., Drozdov v. Lyons, No. CIV-26-365-SLP, 2026 WL 1470929, at *2 (W.D. Okla.

May 26, 2026). To the extent Respondents rely on Baca-Prieto v. Guigni, 95 F.3d 1006,

1011 (10th Cir. 1996), that case is distinguishable and “does not render Petitioner subject

to detention under § 1225(b)(1).” Drozdov, 2026 WL 1470929, at *2.

individualized assessment by an authorized DHS official. See Abdurakhmonov v. Grant,

No. CIV-26-277-SLP, 2026 WL 1166459, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 29, 2026) (R&R)

(concluding respondents “cannot rely on the automatic termination cause to justify

Petitioner’s parole revocation,” and recommending release subject to the conditions of

petitioner’s earlier parole); see also Arce Padilla v. Mullin, No. 26-CV-270, 2026 WL

1245462, at *4 (D. Nev. May 6, 2026) (“Here, DHS’s failure to detain [petitioner] upon

the expiration of her parole effectively continued [petitioner’s] parole status.”). This is

especially true in circumstances, like here, where Petitioner was detained while voluntarily

attending a regularly scheduled ICE check-in appointment on January 21, 2026—more

than six months after her parole initially expired. See Pet. at 10.4

Based on the record evidence, Respondents violated their own regulations when

they revoked Petitioner’s parole without notice of a reasoned decision for the revocation.

See, e.g., Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 804 F. Supp. 3d 395, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)

(“Respondents provide no indication that an individualized determination was made as to

the revocation of [petitioner’s] parole; nor do they articulate, even now, either that the

purpose for which [petitioner’s] parole was authorized has been accomplished, nor that

neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants her continued presence in the

United States.”); Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1137-38 (D. Or. 2025) (“This

4 The undersigned is not persuaded by Respondents’ citation to Board of County

Commissioners of County of Adams v. Isaac, 18 F.3d 1492, 1499 (10th Cir. 1994) for the

proposition that “mere delay or inaction is insufficient to give rise to a claim of estoppel

against the government,” Resp. at 5 n.4, as that case is factually and procedurally

distinguishable.

is a grant of discretionary authority, but it has a mandatory requirement—parole may be

terminated or revoked only when in the Secretary’s opinion the parole’s purposes have

been met.”).

B. Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process by improperly revoking

her parole.

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects all persons within the United

States from being “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.

Const. amend. V. It applies to noncitizens within the United States “whether their presence

here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. In the

civil immigration detention context, courts consistently apply the balancing test set out in

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, (1976), to evaluate the level of process owed a

noncitizen.5 See, e.g., Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27-39 (1st Cir. 2021)

(applying Mathews to due process challenges to prolonged detention under § 1226(a));

Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851-55 (2d Cir. 2020) (same).

The Mathews test includes three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected

by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through

the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

5 Respondents rely on Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) to contend “mandatory

detention pending removal proceedings does not violate due process.” Resp. at 8. The

Supreme Court in Demore, though, did not create a blanket rule permitting detention of

noncitizens without individualized review and left open the question whether detention

violates due process. See Merchan-Pacheo v. Noem, No. 25-CV-03860, 2026 WL 88526,

at *4-6 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2026) (concluding Demore “created a framework that permits

Petitioner’s release” and “in no way suggests that the court should decline to consider the

Mathews factors”).

safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the

fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement

would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

Petitioner has a strong liberty interest in being free from physical detention. This is

“the most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from

imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,

529 (2004)). Because freedom from restraint is “at the core of the liberty interest protected

by the Due Process Clause, commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant

deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.

71, 80 (1992) (citation modified). “Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be

unacceptable if applied to citizens,” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003), but that

power remains subject to “important constitutional limitations,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.

“When the government grants [a noncitizen] parole into the country, it creates a liberty

interest intimately tied to freedom from imprisonment.” Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL

2770629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2025); see also Iza v. Arnott, 2026 WL 67152, at *3

(W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026) (“Individuals released on parole or other forms of conditional

release have a liberty interest in their ‘continued liberty.’” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972))); Sahil v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2026 WL 560216, at *3 (D.N.M.

Feb. 27, 2026) (finding “noncitizens acquire a liberty interest once released from

immigration detention”).6 Upon re-detention, Respondents deprived Petitioner of her

protected status when they revoked her parole and placed her in custody.

All three Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner. First, Petitioner has a

significant private interest in remaining free from detention after spending years on parole.

She was paroled into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) in January

2025. Pet. at 5, 10. During this time, her interest in release grew even stronger as she

worked and presumably “form[ed] the other enduring attachments of normal life.”

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Further, “Petitioner’s liberty interest does not evaporate when

a term of parole expires.” Juan Carlos V.B. v. Chestmut, No. 26-CV-03077, 2026 WL

1224238, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2026); see also Begaliev v. Warden of Otero Cnty.

Processing Ctr., No. 26-CV-00358, 2026 WL 837109, at *5 (D.N.M. Mar. 26, 2026)

(finding a similarly situated petitioner “had a sufficient liberty interest created by the

regulations”). Accordingly, the first Mathews factor favors Petitioner.

Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is

considerable where she has not received any notice of the reason for her parole revocation

and simple procedures exist that would mitigate those risks. “Constitutionally inadequate

notice also often leads to constitutionally inadequate opportunity to be heard, because

6 The Due Process Clause does not provide noncitizens a liberty interest in being released

on parole. See Sierra v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir.

2001). However, noncitizens are entitled to the process provided in a statute and/or

regulations. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). And,

as discussed, Petitioner was entitled to notice and an individualized termination under

ICE’s own regulations when her parole continued after its initial expiration. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 212.5(e).

opportunity to be heard must be meaningful to be constitutionally sufficient.” Saqib v.

Andrews, 2026 WL 350830, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026) (R&R), adopted, 2026 WL

440566 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2026). Petitioner received no procedural safeguards to

determine whether the revocation of her parole and her detention were justified, and thus

Respondents have detained her without any stated cause. This factor also weighs in

Petitioner’s favor. See, e.g., E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D.

Wash. 2025) (“That the Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner

does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with

due process.”).

Finally, the Court must consider the Government’s interest, including any fiscal or

administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. While “the government has an interest

in enforcing immigration laws, the government’s interest in re-detaining petitioner without

adequate notice and an opportunity to challenge the revocation of her release is low.”

Saqib, 2026 WL 350830, at *6; see, e.g., Diaz v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D.

Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T]he Court concludes that the government’s interest in re-detaining

Petitioner . . . is ‘low,’ particularly in light of the fact that Petitioner[] has long complied

with her reporting requirements.”); Khudaev v. Blanche No. 25-CV-01291, 2026 WL

1602029, at *10 (D.N.M. June 4, 2026) (finding “Respondents’ interest in detaining

Petitioner would not be substantively hindered, fiscally or administratively, by simply

providing Petitioner written notice”). And the undersigned can discern no significant

administrative or fiscal burden associated with placing the burden on the government to

follow its own regulations, especially given Petitioner’s detention was not deemed

necessary for more than two years. See, e.g., Iza, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (“An alien’s

opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation of her parole is only meaningful if the

government comports with its own internal standards regarding parole revocation.”).

Accordingly, Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s parole in violation of their

own regulations violates her right to due process.

C. The proper remedy is release.

Consistent with this Court’s recent approach with a similarly situated petitioner, the

undersigned recommends the Court order Petitioner’s release subject to the conditions of

her prior parole under § 1182(d)(5). See Ewere v. Cerna, No. CIV-26-320-SLP, 2026 WL

1207088, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May 4, 2026) (directing respondents “to immediately release

Petitioner, subject to the conditions of her prior parole issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)”

and enjoining respondents “from re-detaining Petitioner unless, prior to such re-detention,

Petitioner is provided with written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral

decision maker”); see also Khudaev, 2026 WL 1602029, at *10 (holding “the appropriate

remedy is release” where petitioner’s due process was violated when her § 1182 parole was

improperly revoked).

D. The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining claims.

Petitioner also alleges her continued detention without a bond hearing violates the

INA. Pet. at 12. If the Court adopts the undersigned’s recommendation that Petitioner be

released because her due process rights were violated when Respondents improperly

revoked her parole, the Court should decline to decide the merits of Petitioner’s remaining

claims because, at most, she would only be entitled to lesser relief in the form of a bond

hearing. Accord Singh v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-601-SLP, 2026 WL 1661971, at *3 (W.D.

Okla. June 9, 2026) (declining to decide the merits of a petitioner’s additional due process

claim when adopting the recommended relief of a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a)).

V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT the

Petition for habeas relief by ordering Respondents to release Petitioner subject to the

conditions of her prior parole. The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report

and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later than

July 8, 2026. See id. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Ifa party wishes to respond to

the other party’s objections, such response must be filed not later than July 13, 2026. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of

the factual and legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. See Moore v.

United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge in this matter.

ENTERED this 30" day of June, 2026.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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