Norwood

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DENORVAL RODEL NORWOOD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-25-961-JD

)

JOHN MASQUELIER, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Denorval Rodel Norwood, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1.1 United States District Judge

Jodi W. Dishman referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for

proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 4.

Respondent filed a response, in which he attached the opinion of the

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA), the appellate briefs, portions of

state-court transcripts, and portions of the appellate record. Doc. 14.

Respondent also provided to the Court complete copies of the original state-

court record for Pottawatomie County Case No. CF-2020-243, trial transcript,

1 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation

and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless

otherwise indicated.

and trial exhibits. Docs. 15 & 16. Respondent also conventionally filed exhibits

that could not be filed electronically. Doc. 18. And Petitioner replied. See Doc.

20. So, the matter is at issue.

For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court deny

Petitioner habeas corpus relief.

I. Petitioner’s conviction and grounds for relief.

On September 25, 2023, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted

in the Pottawatomie County District Court on one count of rape by

instrumentation (Count I) and two counts of rape in the first degree of S.H

(Counts II & III). Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 14, Ex. 5, at 6-8. On January 26, 2024, the

state court sentenced Petitioner to ten years’ imprisonment on Count I, five

years’ imprisonment on Count II, and ten years’ imprisonment on Count III, to

be served consecutively. Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 14, Ex. 1, at 1-2; Doc. 15, Att. 1, at

981-83.

At trial, the jury heard evidence that the victim, S.H.,2 was 31 years’ old

on June 14, 2016, when she met Petitioner, and the events leading to

Petitioner’s arrest transpired. Doc. 15, Att. 1, at 633, 656. S.H.’s mother

2 The undersigned uses the same initials for S.H. as Respondent. Doc. 14,

at 3 n.4.

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testified that S.H. was diagnosed with Down’s Syndrome as an infant and

possesses the understanding and comprehension level of a child in second

grade. Id. at 555. S.H.’s mother testified she allowed S.H. to have a cellphone

with internet access but monitored S.H.’s internet usage due to concerns about

sexual predators. Id. at 564-66. However, S.H. was allowed to use a “karaoke”

application. Id. at 565.

In the early morning hours of June 14, 2016, S.H. accessed her karaoke

application, and an advertisement for the “MeetMe app” popped up. Id. at 268-

69. S.H. clicked on the advertisement and began exchanging messages with an

individual named Chop Norwood, who was identified as Petitioner by law

enforcement through the cell phone number he provided to S.H. and a

Facebook photo. Id. at 579, 619-634, 784-86; Doc. 16, Att. 2. at 38. In the text

messages, Petitioner offered to bring S.H. something to smoke or drink, asked

for her address and a photo, and wrote “‘I want to make love. Ok[.]’” Doc. 15,

Att. 1, at 619-634; Doc. 16, Att. 2, at 41-48.

S.H. testified that on the night of her assault, a man with “brown or

black” skin picked her up in a white car and took her to a white house where

all the furniture was pushed to the middle. Doc. 15, Att. 1, at 683-90. S.H.’s

mother testified that S.H. told her that the man “put her on the car and raped

her in the middle of the street[]” with “his fingers, she believed[,]” then “he

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brought her in the house” where “[h]e took her to a couch and . . . did it to her

again.” Id. at 580; see also id. at 688-698. The jury heard specific testimony

that S.H. had indicated to her mother and others that the man who raped S.H.

used his fingers and his penis. Id. at 580, 688-94, 750. However, S.H. could not

specifically identify Petitioner as her assailant. Id. at 703.

S.H. reported her assault to her mother the same morning during a

physical therapy appointment. Id. at 576-81. S.H.’s mother drove S.H. to the

Shawnee Police Department, which referred S.H. to a clinic for a sexual assault

nurse examination. Id. at 619, 642, 748-54. The nurse noted areas of deep

redness to the hymenal folds and a general redness in the anal area consistent

with sexual trauma, although she could not specifically state in what manner

the trauma was inflicted. Id. at 754-57. The nurse also collected swabs from

S.H. for DNA analysis, which revealed that Petitioner was a potential source

of DNA, although the results were inconclusive and included “[a] minimum of

two males[.]” Id. at 760-62, 807, 824-25.

Petitioner did not testify at trial. Id. at 916-17. However, the jury viewed

a portion of a video of a police interview of Petitioner. Id. at 784; see Doc. 18

(June 16, 2016 police interview of Petitioner). In the interview, Petitioner

acknowledged messaging with S.H. on the “MeetMe” app and meeting S.H. at

her house with the intention of having sex with her. Doc. 18, at 4:30-4:43, 5:54,

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10:21-10:23. Petitioner said he thought S.H. was intoxicated, so they sat in his

car at the front of S.H.’s driveway and briefly talked. Id. at 4:48-5:35, 11:23-

11:33, 11:38-11:45. Petitioner said he had no idea S.H. had Down’s Syndrome.

Id. at 5:10, 10:45-11:02. He said he hugged her and S.H. kissed him on the

cheek. Id. at 8:38-8:47.

Petitioner timely filed a direct appeal, Doc. 14, Ex. 2, and the OCCA

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Doc. 14, Ex. 1, at 4.

On August 25, 2025, Petitioner filed this action, raising a single ground

for relief: insufficiency of the evidence. Doc. 1, at 3-9. Respondent concedes

Petitioner exhausted this claim on appeal. Doc. 14, at 2.

II. Standard of review for habeas relief.

“The standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (‘AEDPA’) guide [this Court’s] review of 28 U.S.C. § 2254

applications.” Wellmon v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 952 F.3d 1242, 1245 (10th Cir.

2020). A petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if the state court’s

adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claim “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Petitioner bears the “burden to make this showing and it is a burden

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intentionally designed to be ‘difficult to meet.’” Owens v. Trammell, 792 F.3d

1234, 1242 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181

(2011)). This standard “reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against

extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute

for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

86, 102-03 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 335 n.5 (1979)

(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).

This Court first determines “whether the petitioner’s claim is based on

clearly established federal law.” Hanson v. Sherrod, 797 F.3d 810, 824 (10th

Cir. 2015); see also Menzies v. Powell, 52 F.4th 1178, 1195 (10th Cir. 2022) (“We

first determine whether the Supreme Court has clearly established the

pertinent constitutional protection.”). Clearly established federal law consists

of Supreme Court holdings in cases with facts much like those in the

petitioner’s case. See House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008). If

clearly established federal law exists, this Court then considers whether the

state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that

clearly established federal law. See Owens, 792 F.3d at 1242.

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law ‘if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

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the Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’” Id. (quoting Dodd

v. Trammell, 753 F.3d 971, 982 (10th Cir. 2013)). “It is not enough that the

state court decided an issue contrary to a lower federal court’s conception of

how the rule should be applied; the state court decision must be ‘diametrically

different’ and ‘mutually opposed’ to the Supreme Court decision itself.” Bland

v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)).

“The unreasonable application prong requires [the petitioner to prove]

that the state court identified the correct governing legal principle from

Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case.” Owens, 792 F.3d at 1242 (alterations incorporated and

internal quotation marks omitted). On this point, “the relevant inquiry is not

whether the state court’s application of federal law was incorrect, but whether

it was objectively unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “In

other words, ‘so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of

the state court’s decision,’ habeas relief is unavailable.” Id. at 1243 (quoting

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101).

III. Analysis.

Petitioner argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to

convict him, because “the witness testimony [was] incredible, contradictory

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and unsubstantiated.” Doc. 1, at 3. Petitioner presented this claim on direct

appeal, and the OCCA rejected the claim. Doc. 14, Ex. 1, at 2-4. Respondent

argues that the OCCA’s ruling was a reasonable application of clearly

established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts. Doc. 14, at 14-29. The undersigned agrees.

A. The OCCA’s ruling.

Reviewing Petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim on appeal, the OCCA

held:

The ultimate question of sufficiency of the evidence should be

resolved with deference to the fact finder and in a light most

favorable to the State. Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31, ¶ 80, 100

P.3d 1017, 1041; see also Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, ¶ 7,

709 P.2d 202, 203-04 (finding that viewing evidence in light most

favorable to the State, a verdict will not be overturned if any

rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime to

exist beyond a reasonable doubt). We also accept all reasonable

inferences and credibility choices that tend to support the verdict.

Coddington v. State, 2006 OK CR 34, ¶ 70, 142 P.3d 437, 456.

In order to sustain a conviction of rape by instrumentation, the

State was required to prove that the defendant penetrated the

vagina of the victim with a part of his body other than his penis,

without her consent, resulting in bodily harm, where force or fear

was used or threatened, with apparent power of execution to the

victim, or where the victim was incapable through mental illness

or any other unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or

permanent, of giving legal consent. 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 1111.1; 21

O.S.Supp.2015, §§ 1111(A)(2)-(3); see also OUJI-CR(2d) (2012

Supp.) 4-125. In order to sustain a conviction of first degree rape,

the State must prove that the defendant had sexual intercourse

with a person who was not his spouse, where force/violence was

used against the person and the defendant had the apparent power

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to carry out the threat/violence, or where the victim was incapable

through mental illness or any other unsoundness of mind, whether

temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent. 21

O.S.Supp.2015, §§ 1111(A)(2) or (3); see also OUJI-CR(2d) (2012

Supp.) 4-120.

Review of the entire record, viewed in the light most favorable to

the State, shows sufficient evidence was provided to support

finding Appellant guilty of all three counts. Proposition I is denied.

Doc. 14, Ex. 1, at 2-4.

B. Clearly established law.

A petitioner “is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon

the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324.

Jackson requires that a habeas court review the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the prosecution.” Id. at 319. “Expressed more fully, this means a

reviewing court ‘faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting

inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the

record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S.

120, 133 (2010) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). Finally, “[s]tate law

determines the parameters of the offense and its elements and a federal court

may not reinterpret state law.” Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1131-32 (10th

Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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C. The OCCA’s decision was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Jackson.

Based on a review of the testimony and other evidence presented at trial,

the jury’s verdict was “‘within the bounds of reason.’” Messer v. Roberts, 74 F.3d

1009, 1013 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1487

(10th Cir. 1993)); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Moreover, this Court’s

Jackson review is “‘sharply limited[,]’ and a court ‘faced with a record of

historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it

does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any

such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’”

Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1197 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Messer, 74

F.3d at 1013).

Petitioner fails to meet his burden under Jackson. He asks this Court to

re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and re-weigh the evidence, Doc. 1,

at 6-9, which, as set forth above, is not the role of this Court on habeas review.

Because the OCCA reasonably applied Jackson, the undersigned recommends

denying habeas corpus relief on Ground One.

D. Actual innocence.

In one line of the petition, Petitioner asserts he is “actually innocent.”

See Doc. 1, at 9. The undersigned declines to construe the petition as raising a

freestanding habeas claim based on actual innocence. And Petitioner

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acknowledges in his reply that such a claim would be unexhausted, see Doc.

20, at 16, and that he did not intend to raise an actual innocence claim. Id.

IV. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

deny the petition for habeas corpus relief, Doc. 1.

The undersigned advises Petitioner of his right to file an objection to this

report and recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before July

21, 2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Petitioner that failure to

make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives the right to

appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v.

United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).

This report and recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.

ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2026.

hea “tered _

SUZANNE MITCHELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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