Bey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MALCOM ALI BEY, Executor/Beneficiary,

ex rel. Tashano Jenkins Estate Trust,

Plaintiff,

V.

No. 1:25-CV-01544

IN-PROGRESS HOUSING (IPH), including (GTS/PJE)

its officers, agents, employees, supervisors,

successors, and assigns,

Defendant(s).

APPEARANCES:

Malcom Ali Bey

_|45 Hudson Avenue

“| General Post Office

Albany, New York 12210

Plaintiff pro se

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION & ORDER

Plaintiff pro se Malcolm Ali Bey commenced this action on November 3, 2025,

against defendant “In-Progress Housing (IPH), 176 Sheridan Avenue, Albany New York

1210 Including its officers, agents, employees, supervisors, successors, and assigns”

with the filing of a complaint, and, in lieu of paying this Court’s filing fee, an application

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 1, Dkt. No.

2. The undersigned has reviewed plaintiff's IFP application and determines he

financially qualifies for leave to proceed IFP.' Accordingly, the undersigned must

1 Plaintiff is advised that he will still be required to pay all costs and fees that may be associated with

this action, including, but not limited to copying fees, witness fees, and transcript fees.

review the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint, sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§1915(e)(2), §1915A.2

ll. Legal Standards

28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, “the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal

(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Thus, it is a court’s responsibility to determine that a plaintiff

may properly maintain his complaint before permitting him to proceed further with his

action.” Praileau v. Fischer, 930 F. Supp. 2d 383, 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2013).

Where, as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, “the court must construe his

_,| submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they

suggest.” Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Second Circuit stated,

our cases have also indicated that we cannot read into pro se

submissions claims that are not consistent with the pro se

litigant’s allegations, or arguments that the submissions

themselves do not suggest, that we should not excuse

frivolous or vexatious filings by pro se litigants, and that pro

se status does not exempt a party from compliance with

relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. . . .

Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks, citations, and footnote omitted); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,

2 Despite the statutory language referring to incarcerated individuals, these requirements apply equally to

non-prisoner pro se litigants seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.3(d) (“Unless

the Court orders otherwise, any civil action that a non-prisoner pro se litigant commences shall be

referred to a Magistrate Judge for the purpose of review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §

1915A when an application to proceed in forma pauperis is filed.”).

537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Although detailed allegations are not required at the

pleading stage, the complaint must still include enough facts to provide the defendants

with notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which these claims are

based. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

“| factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

Further, when reviewing a complaint, a court may look to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P”). See, e.g., Cole v. Smrtic, No. 1:24-CV-00847 (MAD/CFH),

2024 WL 4870495, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2024) (explaining, “special solicitude for pro

se pleadings has its limits, because pro se pleadings still must comply with ... the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure .. . .”) (internal quotations and citation omitted), report and

recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 247901 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2025);° see also Feb. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (providing that a pleading shall contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” “a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction ... and ...a demand for the relief sought... .”). A

complaint that fails to comply with the pleading requirements “presents far too a heavy

mi| burden in terms of defendants’ duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no

meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of their claims.” Gonzales v.

Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). As the Second Circuit has held, “[w]hen a

complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the court has

the power, on its own initiative . . . to dismiss the complaint.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861

3 All unpublished cases cited in this Report-Recommendation and Order, unless otherwise noted, have

been provided to plaintiff. See Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). However, “[d]ismissal . . . is usually

reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or

otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” /d. (citations

omitted).

Ill. Initial Review

A. Complaint

Plaintiff submitted a document entitled “Civil Complaint and Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunction.” Dkt. No. 1. Attached to the

complaint is a document entitled, “Notice of Injunction Affidavit of Fact [:] Notice of

Forced Indoctrination, Violation of Constitutional Rights, and Opportunity to Cure

Defect.” Dkt. No. 1-1 (“Notice of Injunction”).4 The Notice of Injunction is dated

October 18, 2025. In the Complaint itself, plaintiff sets forth almost no facts. In an

introduction section, plaintiff contends that he brought the case pursuant to “Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 65, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 12101-12213, and related constitutional

provisions for the protection of Plaintiff's civil rights, disability accommodations, religious

liberty and trust privacy.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1. Indeed, in the facts section, he provides,

“(As stated in prior sections --- disability, stroke condition, lack of lift access, threats of

m| eviction, forced indoctrination, violation of medical restrictions, and interference with

Plaintiff's ministry and trust.).” Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Within the complaint there is a heading

titled, “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.” /d. Underneath this heading, it states,

inter alia, that he is “suffer[ing] ongoing physical pain, mental distress, and risk of

neurological deterioration from being forced into unsafe physical activity and hostile

4 Ina subtitle under this, he writes “Private & Confidential Non-Domestic/ Without the United States All

Rights Reserved — UCC 1-308 / UCC 1-103[.]” Dkt. No. 101 at 1.

living conditions.” /d. He also states in this section that “Defendants’ actions violate the

Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. 12132), Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983),

and First Amendment protections.” /d.

In a section titled “Relief Requested under TRO,” plaintiff seeks the Court to

order defendants to (1) “cease all retaliation, harassment, or intimidation toward

"| Plaintiff,” (2) “refrain from requiring or compelling Plaintiff to perform employment or job-

search activities against medical orders,” (3) “grant immediate access to the facility lift

and all necessary accommodations for Plaintiff's mobility and safety,” (4) “refrain from

discussing or interfering with Plaintiff's private trust or ministry,” and (5) “maintain and

preserve all written, audio, or video records relevant to Plaintiff's claims[.]” Dkt. No. 1 at

3.

B. Complaint

As noted, plaintiff's complaint is almost entirely devoid of facts. Applying special

solicitude the undersigned read the facts set forth in plaintiff's appended request for a

TRO in an attempt to discern the facts in this case. Plaintiff contends that he was

“directed, coerced, or compelled by staff and administrators of IPH 176, including Karen

[Head Supervisor], to watch specific televised news programming, namely CNN news,

m| during my presence at said facility every morning from 8:30 a.m. — 2:00 a.m. or it gets

turned off.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff contends that “[s]uch compulsion was against my

will, beliefs, and lawful right of conscience, constituting forced indoctrination and

ideological coercion.” /d. Plaintiff contends that “[s]uch actions amount to compelled

speech, psychological coercion, and mental intrusion, infringing upon my divine and

constitutional rights.” /d. Plaintiff contends that there exists “[n]o lawful contract,

consent, or agreement. . . whereby | have consented to be indoctrinated or forced to

view specific media or political narratives.” /d. Plaintiff contends that he served

“[alffidavit(s) of Fact and Notice(s) of Claim” “upon the Respondents, and no verified,

sworn rebuttal was received within the lawful time allowed” making “Respondents” “in

default under both commercial law and international human rights standards.” /d.

Plaintiff also states, “[i]nterference with the occupation of the Estate.” /d. at 2.

Plaintiff contends that “on October 13[,] 2025, 12:30 pm | was forced off IPH

guest wi-fi in retaliation for exercising his rights.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3. Plaintiff contends

that on October 11, 2025, | walked to the front desk and asked Sharon (staff) for a pen.

She made a joke of it.” /d. Plaintiff told Sharon, “would you rather for me to walk up the

stairs, and she giggled. Sharon stated she was joking. | said I’m really Disabled it’s in

_,| my folder ! Then | went and got the Affidavit of Fact and served her with it.” /d. Plaintiff

states on an unidentified date, “Head Supervisor Karen Doe, and four other Counselors

were all in one room waiting for Mr. Jenkins to enter the building.” /d. Upon entering

the building, Karen asked plaintiff, “Can | speak with you?” /d. Plaintiff answered

affirmatively and went to Karen’s office. /d. Karen “began to scream that | was trying to

intimidate her workers.” /d. Plaintiff responded, “if asserting my rights are intimidating

Your workers it’s probably because they are knowingly violating people’s civil-and

Human Rights.” /d. Plaintiff contends that Karen was trying to intimidate him. See id.

Plaintiff further contends, “[o]n the Fourteenth of October,”

staff Counselor Seven” stated that IPH needed to see his “check stubs ,

because | expressed to her that | am a Minister and that my ministry takes

care of all my needs ! The ministry is not at liberty to disclose any of its

financial dealings. Malcolm Ali Bey being a Minister i am a tax free entity

and the ministry only receives Donations not pay. Therefore Malcolm Ali

Bey does not receive checks from the ministry.

Id. Plaintiff states:

[a]sserting or Attempting to Enforce any claim, debt, charge, obligation, or

contractual agreement against the TASHANO MALCOM JENKINS Living

Trust or the Estate of Tashano Malcolm Jenkins (“The Trust/Estate”) without

first providing verified, lawful, wet-ink signed evidence of said claim or

obligation bearing the express consent of the Trustee/Executor, Malcom Ali

Bey.

Imposing, Assessing, or Attempting to Collect any administrative penalty,

fee, unlawful billing, or commercial instrument against the Trust/Estate.

Engaging in any act of Retaliation, Harassment, Intimidation, Unlawful

Removal, Eviction, or Interference with the lawful executorship duties of

Malcom Ali Bey as Trustee/Executor.

Denying or Obstructing the Trustee/Executor’s access to or use of

privileges, including the copy machine and free mailing privileges,

recognized as being derived from the Trust’s status as a living creditor.

Utilizing, reproducing, transmitting, displaying, publishing, or broadcasting

the protected name ‘TASHANO MALCOLM JENKINS’ without the prior

written consent of the Trust.

Trespassing upon or engaging in the Unauthorized Use of any asset, trade

name, copyright, or property belonging to the Trust/Estate.

Id. at 4.

Plaintiff argues that defendant, which runs a shelter for homeless or low-income

individuals,° violated his civil rights, specifically his First Amendment right to free

Speech,® and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which he defines as “due process

5 The undersigned takes judicial notice of the following, on In-Progress Housing (IPH)’s website: “IPH is a

leading provider of services for the homeless and low-income community in the Capital Region and

beyond.” https:/Avww.iphny.org/ (last visited June 22, 2026). The website identifies 176 Sheridan

Avenue, Albany as Sheridan House, “a supportive, transitional setting for adults who are experiencing

homelessness. In this year-round, 30-bed shelter, guests receive individualized, person-centered

services that promote long-term stability and address each person’s self-identified needs and goals.”

https:/Awww.iphny.org/shelters (last visited June 22, 2026).

8 Although it is entirely unclear, arguably plaintiff is contending that the IPH having CNN on the television

forced him to view a television channel or programs with which he does not agree violates the First

Amendment.

and liberty of conscience.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. He states, “[t]he actions of the adverse

party, by issuing commercial instruments or taking administrative actions without full

disclosure, verified consent, or a lawful contract, constitute a breach of fiduciary duty

and a violation of the Due Process of Law guaranteed by the 5!" and 14!" Amendments.”

Id. at4. “The failure to provide lawful notice, an opportunity to respond, or an impartial

hearing before taking action against The Trust/Estate is deemed a willful violation of

constitutional and Indigenous Rights.” /d.

On the civil cover sheet, plaintiff cheeked the boxes for “other personal injury,

“property damage product liability,” and “other civil rights.” Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1.

C. Analysis’

1.42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

On its face, plaintiff's complaint fails to satisfy the pleading standards set forth in

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff's pro se complaint sets forth vague and ambiguous civil rights

claims against IGP and its employees as well as other claims grounded not in any

identifiable federal or state law, including “forced indoctrination,” “compelled speech,”

“psychological coercion,” “mental intrusion.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff does not allege

specific legal causes of action that are tied to specific legal facts supporting those

claims. The complaint fully fails to provide adequate notice of the legal claims plaintiff

seeks to assert against defendant or the facts underlying those claims. To wit, he

makes unexplained references to “commercial law,” “international human rights

standards,” “interference with the occupation of the estate,” “Universal Declaration of

Human Rights Articles 18 & 19,” “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of

The Court has provided plaintiff pro se with copies of any unpublished cases cited within this Report-

Recommendation & Order.

Indigenous Peoples, Article 8, “Common Law and Natural Law rights of free will and

moral agency,” and the “Clearfield Doctrine.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff's complaint fails

to set forth any constitutional violations and plaintiff's unsupported references to various

and broad areas of law also fail to meet Rule 8’s pleading standards.

Plaintiffs complaint and appended TRO are disjointed, factually lacking, and fail

“| to set forth clear claims. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim fails to meet Rule 8’s pleading

standards. See Simmons v. Abuzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A district court may

sua sponte dismiss a complaint that does not comply with Rule 8 if the “complaint is so

confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is

well disguised.”). However, leave to amend is not recommended as to plaintiff's 1983

claims for the reasons that follow.

“Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives

a person ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”

K & A Radiologic Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Health, 189 F.3d 273,

280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)). “A plaintiff

pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus required to

show state action.” Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003)

m| (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)).

“The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the

defendant . . . exercise[ ] power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible

only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Private parties

generally are not state actors; therefore, they are not liable under § 1983. See Sykes v.

Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. &

Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Because the United States Constitution

regulates only the Government, not private parties, [with respect to a claim brought

under § 1983,] a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must

first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes ‘state action.”) (quoting United

“| States v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 941 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1991)).

However, there exist a few limited exceptions. A private party's actions can be

considered state action in three situations:

(1) the private party acts using the coercive power of the state or is

controlled by the state (the “compulsion test’);

(2) the private party willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its

functions are entwined with state policies (the “joint action” or “close nexus”

(3) the state has delegated a public function to the private party (the “public

function” test).

Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012). The fundamental question under

each situation is whether the private party’s challenged actions are fairly attributable to

the State. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).

Insofar as plaintiff names IPH, a nonprofit entity that operates a homeless

shelter, and various unnamed employees and agents of IPH, plaintiff has failed to set

m| forth any state action. “Courts have held that ‘[t]he provision of homeless services by a

private organization, even under contract with the state or where subject to

governmental regulation, does not turn the private organization or its employees into

state actors.” Flores v. Dep’t of Homeless Servs., No. 24-CV-6673 (LLS), 2025 WL

2662514, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2025) (quoting Williams v. B.R.C. of New York, No.

25-CV-0663, 2025 WL 446237, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2025) (internal quotation marks

10

and citation omitted)); see Ballentine v. Barak, No. 25-CV-515 (AT) (BCM), 2026 WL

1024116, at “5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026), report and recommendation adopted as

modified sub nom. Ballentine v. Post Graduate Ctr. for Mental Health, No. 25 CIV. 515

(AT) (BCM), 2026 WL 866846 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026) (“District courts have

consistently declined to find that such conduct [providing supportive housing] qualifies

“las state action.”) (quoting Megginson v. Bridge, Inc., 21-CV-9626 (LTS), 2021 WL

6064409, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2021) (“dismissing § 1983 claims brought by tenant

of supportive housing program alleging abusive conduct by program staff because

‘Plaintiff does not plead facts showing that The Bridge, Inc. acted as a state actor in

providing him with voluntary supportive housing’) (citing Murray v. New York City Dep’t

of Corr., 13 CV 7090 (KAM) (LB), 2016 WL 11395007, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2016)

_,| feport-recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 5928672 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)

(“[T]ransitional housing facilities, and the employees who work for them are not

considered state actors under section 1983.”)).

Here, even if, arquendo, plaintiff were to have argued that the state or

municipality regulated IPH or contracted with IPH to provide homeless or transitional

housing services, “these contracts do not transform the private organizations or their

m| employees into state actors[.]’” Ballentine, 2026 WL 1024116, at *6 (quoting Murray,

2016 WL 11395007, at *10). Accordingly, it is recommended that plaintiff's 1983 claims

must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Although it is generally recommended that courts not dismiss pro se complaints

without granting leave to amend at least once, the undersigned does not recommend

11

affording plaintiff leave to amend on his section 1983 claims against IGP as the problem

with such claims are substantive and would render any amendment futile. See

Ballentine, 2026 WL 1024116, at *6 (denying leave to amend on the plaintiff's section

1983 claim against supportive housing agency and its CEO because there was no state

actor and it is well settled that a private entity providing supportive housing does not

“| render it a state actor); George v. Pathways to Housing, Inc., No. Civ. 9505 (ER), 2012

WL 2512964, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012), affd in relevant part, vacated and

remanded in part on other grounds, 646 F. App’x 40, 41 (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 2016)

(summary order) (affirming District Court's denial of leave to amend against non-for-

profit supportive housing provider due to failure to plead state action).

2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights®

Plaintiff appears to allege, albeit without any explanation, that defendant IPH

violated Articles 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Dkt. No.

1-1 at 2.

Despite the “moral authority” of this document, it does not “impose

obligations as a matter of international law’ nor does it provide a private

right of action. See Sosa v. Alvarez—Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35, 124

S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) (explaining that Universal Declaration

of Human Rights is an international agreement that does not give rise to

legal obligations because it is merely a “statement of principles”); see a/so

tri United States v. Chatman, 351 F. App’x 740, 741 (3d Cir.2009) (“[T]he

8 “Its [the pro se complaint’s] language, and that of Plaintiff's attached filings, to the extent

comprehensible, appears to advance theories attributable to the sovereign citizen movement, ‘a loosely

affiliated group who believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and

therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior.” Steven Joseph Kelly, as Tr./Gen. Ex’r for the

Steven Joseph Kelly MRP Tr., Plaintiff, v. Barclays Capital, Inc., Defendant., No. 26-CV-04105 (JAV),

2026 WL 1745788, at “1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2026) (quoting United States v. Ulloa, 511 F. Appx. 105, 106

n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)). Plaintiff's filings reference the Uniform Commercial Code which is

“commonly used by pro se litigants affiliated with the sovereign citizens movement.” E/-Bey v. D.C., No.

17-CV-6203 (MKB), 2019 WL 13548078, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2019) (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted). Further, his use of the symbols for copyright and registered trademark next to his name

“may indicate his adherence to the sovereign citizens movement... “ Osorio v. Connecticut, No. 3:17-

CV-1210 (CSH), 2018 WL 1440178, at *5 n.3 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2018); see, e.g., dkt. no. 1-1 at 1, 6; dkt.

no.1 at 5.

12

Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a nonbinding declaration that

provides no private rights of action.”); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d

625, 629 (6th Cir.1978) (“[I]t does not appear that the Geneva Convention

or the Declaration of Rights are in fact treaties in force in the United

States.”); Chinloy v. Seabrook, No. 14—CV-—350, 2014 WL 1343023, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Apr.3, 2014) (collecting cases).

Guichardo v. Hanson, No. 15-CV-0585 MKB, 2015 WL 6866308, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6,

2015) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims based on violations of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights for failure to state a claim). Although plaintiff's claim is factually dearth

and, thus, fails to meet Rule 8’s pleading standards, because it is well-settled that the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not set forth any private right of action, it is

recommended that any such claim be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

3. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People

Plaintiff appears to allege, albeit without any explanation or factual support, that

defendant IPH violated Article 8 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of

Indigenous People. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. It is well-settled that United Nations

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People does not create any federal cause of

action. See, e.g., Bey v. Westbury Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 21-CV-2048 (RPK)(Pk),

2022 WL 900615, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (citing cases). Accordingly, it is

" recommended that any claim brought pursuant to United Nations Declaration on the

Rights of Indigenous People be dismissed with prejudice and without opportunity to

amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

4. Clearfield Trust Doctrine

Plaintiff contends that defendant’s “actions are in violation of,” among other

things, “Clearfield Doctrine, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943),

13

establishing that when government acts in commercial capacity, it loses its sovereign

immunity.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. First, plaintiff has provided no factual context for

referencing the United States’ sovereign immunity as he has not named the United

States as a defendant in this action; thus, it is entirely unclear why he has cited this

doctrine. Second, even if he had named the United States as a defendant, the

“| association of the Clearfield Trust Doctrine with a waiver of sovereign immunity — an

argument previously raised by sovereign citizens — has been repeatedly rejected

[T]he Clearfield Trust Doctrine does not constitute a waiver of sovereign

immunity. In Clearfield Trust v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67, 63

S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943), the Supreme Court held that federal law

governs questions concerning the rights of the federal government under

federal programs, such that, in the absence of an act of Congress applicable

to the functioning of such programs, the federal courts may fashion an

appropriate and governing rule of law according to their own standards....

Like nearly every other authority cited by Plaintiff, Clearfield Trust has no

application to any issue in this case. In re Sterling, 565 B.R. at 265 (citation

omitted), aff'd, 737 Fed.Appx. 52.

Davila v. Lang, 343 F. Supp. 3d 254, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see Ngambo v. Soc. Sec.

Admin., No. 23-CV-963 (AEK), 2024 WL 4203262, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2024),

aff'd, No. 24-2715, 2025 WL 1355019 (2d Cir. May 9, 2025) (same).

5. “Common Law and Natural Law rights of free will and moral agency”

Plaintiff includes the above in a bullet-pointed list of alleged “violations.” Dkt. No.

tt

1-1 at 2. He offers no context or factual explanation. However, he has not shown any

private cause of action for violations of common law or natural law rights of “free will”

and “moral agency.” /d. Reading plaintiff's submissions liberally, to the extent plaintiff

may contend that the television(s) at IPH tuned to CNN, a television

station/programming with which he disagrees, apparently in common areas of the

facility, plaintiff identifies no violation of any federal law, New York State law, or any

14

private cause of action associated with alleged violations of the “rights of free will and

moral agency.” /d. Plaintiff's vague claims regarding being forced to view television

programming with which he disagrees and violations of unspecified common law and

natural law are frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “A

claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an

arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the

complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (holding that “finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when

the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible’).

This Court “has the inherent power to dismiss without leave to amend or

replead where the substance of the claim pleaded is frivolous on its face, or

where amendment would otherwise be futile.” Dieujuste v. Sin, 731 F. Supp.

3d 440, 455 (E.D.N.Y.), reconsideration denied, 734 F. Supp. 3d 232

(E.D.N.Y. 2024), aff'd, 125 F.4th 397 (2d Cir. 2025). “An action is ‘frivolous’

when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . .; or (2) the

claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (cleaned up).

Sovereign citizen theories “have been consistently rejected by federal

courts as legally frivolous.” Barton v. Clark, No. 23 CIV. 5827 (LGS), 2023

WL 6929178, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2023). Therefore, this action must

also be dismissed on this basis even when construed liberally as a pro se

pleading. See Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475

(2d Cir. 2006).

tt

Kelly, 2026 WL 1745788, at *2. Accordingly, it is recommended that such claims be

dismissed with prejudice and without opportunity to amend. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

6. Claims on Behalf of Trust/Plaintiff's Role as Trustee

15

As a final note, in his complaint and civil cover sheet, plaintiff indicates that he is

proceeding as the executor/beneficiary of the Tashano Jenkins Estate Trust. It is not

clear whether, in indicating his role as the beneficiary/trustee of the trust and discussing

actions plaintiff alleges defendant took against the trust, see, e.g., dkt. no. 1-1 at 4,

plaintiff is seeking to proceed at all on behalf of the trust. However, to the extent

plaintiff, in so noting his role and discussing the trust, he seeks to proceed as a trustee

on behalf of the trust, the undersigned observes:

a trust cannot proceed pro se in an Article III court. The statute governing

appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, only allows two types of

representation: “‘that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a

governmental regulatory body and that by a person representing himself.”

Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Eagle

Associates v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991).

Accordingly, “[t]he statute does not permit ‘unlicensed lay[persons] to

represent anyone else other than themselves.” /d. (quoting Eagle

Associates, 926 F.2d at 1308). “Thus, a nonlawyer trustee cannot bring

claims on behalf of a trust.” Nasledie Davudova Express Tr. v. JP Morgan

Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass’n, No. 24-CV-7633 (LTS), 2024 WL 4769687, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2024) (citing Bell v. S. Bay Eur. Corp., 486 F. Supp. 2d

257, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2007))

Kelly, 2026 WL 1745788, at *2. Thus, to the extent plaintiff seeks to proceed pro se on

behalf of a trust, he is not permitted to proceed as such.

IV. Conclusion

tri Wherefore, it is hereby

ORDERED, that plaintiff's in forma pauperis application, Dkt. No. 2, be

GRANTED, and it is

RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff's complaint, dkt. no. 1, be DISMISSED in its

entirety with prejudice and without opportunity to amend, and it is

16

ORDERED, that this Report-Recommendation & Order be served on plaintiff in

accordance with the Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff has FOURTEEN (14) days within which

to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the

"| Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14)

DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85,

89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.

1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 72.9

Dated: June 23, 2026

Albany, New York pao?

Paul J. Evangelista

“ U.S. Magistrate Judge

® If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail, three

(3) additional days will be added to the fourteen-day (14) period, meaning that you have seventeen (17)

days from the date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections.

See FED.R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday,

then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

See id. § 6(a)(1)(c).

17