White

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JAMES PATRICK WHITE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:25-cv-75-SPC-DNF

TRISTEN MURPHY,

Defendant.

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Tristen Murphy’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 21) and Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 25). For the

reasons stated below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Background

Plaintiff James Patrick White is a prisoner of the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDOC). He claims that Murphy—a former officer at Charlotte

Correctional Institution (Charlotte CI)—violated his Eighth Amendment right

to be free from excessive force. (Doc. 1 at 2-4, 7). Murphy moves to dismiss,

raising qualified immunity and arguing that White fails to state a claim and is

not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. (Doc. 21). The Court recounts

the factual background as pled in the Complaint, which it must take as true to

decide whether White states a plausible claim. See Chandler v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t

of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 2012).

On September 9, 2024, White took a shower at Charlotte CI. (Doc. 1

at 3). After the shower, Murphy arrived to escort White back to his cell. (Id.)

White remarked, “We were in these showers for quite a long time.” (Id.)

Murphy became “hostile and aggressive,” threatening to “put [White] back in

there for another 20 minutes.” (Id.) To “avoid conflict,” White said, “No sir,

I’[d] rather go back to my cell.” (Id.) Murphy responded by punching White

and screaming, “Mother f*cker.” (Id.) A “security orderly” intervened and said

to Murphy, “Hey man[,] what are you doing, you’re on camera.” (Id.) The

punch caused White to fall to the ground. (Id.) He “hit the back of his head,”

which “created a knot and minor abrasion.” (Id. at 4). His left foot also received

a “nice size[d] gash.” (Id.) During the incident, White was handcuffed. (Doc.

1-1 at 2).

White seeks $50,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive

damages. (Doc. 1 at 6). He also requests a “declaration” that Murphy’s conduct

violated the constitution and a “restraining order” against Murphy. (Id.)

Legal Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must

accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in a light

most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

The preferential standard of review, however, does not let all pleadings

adorned with facts survive to the next stage of litigation. The Supreme Court

has been clear on this point—a district court should dismiss a claim when a

party does not plead facts that make the claim facially plausible. See Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when

a court can draw a reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing

party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation

marks omitted)). And a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions

amounting to a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant

deprived him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2)

the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654

F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865,

872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an

affirmative causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the

constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059

(11th Cir. 2001).

White is representing himself in this action. Courts hold the pleadings

of pro se litigants to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by

attorneys. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

But courts do not have a duty to “re-write” a pro se litigant’s complaint to find

a claim. See Washington v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 256 F. App’x 326, 327

(11th Cir. 2007).

Discussion

A. Pleading Sufficiency

White alleges that Murphy used excessive force against him in violation

of the Eighth Amendment. The core judicial inquiry for an excessive-force

claim is “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Sconiers v. Lockhart,

946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34,

37 (2010)). A prisoner asserting an excessive-force claim must establish two

elements: “the official must have both ‘acted with a sufficiently culpable state

of mind’ (the subjective element), and the conduct must have been ‘objectively

harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). A claim satisfies the subjective element if

the force was “sadistically and maliciously applied for the very purpose of

causing harm.” Id. The objective component “focuses on whether the official’s

actions were harmful enough or sufficiently serious to violate the constitution.”

Id. (cleaned up).

White states a plausible excessive-force claim. As Murphy escorted

White from the shower to his cell, White said, “We were in these showers for

quite a long time.” (Doc. 1 at 3). Murphy threatened to send White back to the

shower “for another 20 minutes.” (Id.) White said, “No sir, I’[d] rather go back

to my cell.” (Id.) In response, Murphy allegedly punched a handcuffed White,

causing him to fall over and hit the back of his head. (Id.; Doc. 1-1 at 2). Taken

as true, these allegations are sufficient to plead that Murphy applied force

“sadistically and maliciously . . . for the very purpose of causing harm,” and

that the use of force was “sufficiently serious to violate the constitution.”

Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1265; see also Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208, 1213 (11th

Cir. 1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment “prohibit[s] the use of

excessive force by a prison guard against an inmate” who is restrained and

“pose[s] no continuing threat”).

Murphy says the Complaint must be dismissed because White’s injuries

were de minimis. (Doc. 21 at 7). Not so. “An inmate who is gratuitously beaten

by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive-force claim merely

because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins,

559 U.S. at 38. “To conclude . . . that the absence of some arbitrary quantity

of injury requires automatic dismissal of an excessive-force claim improperly

bypasses [the] core [judicial] inquiry,” which is the nature of the force. Id. at

39. Even if White’s injuries could be described as de minimis, that would not

warrant dismissal of his excessive-force claim.

B. Qualified Immunity

Murphy argues that qualified immunity bars White’s claim against him.

(Doc. 21 at 5). “Qualified immunity protects government officials from

individual liability unless they violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Snorton v. Owens, 808 F. App’x 814, 820 (11th Cir. 2020). An official invoking

qualified immunity must first show he was acting within the scope of his

discretionary authority. Id. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show:

(1) the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the

unlawfulness of the official’s conduct was clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation. Id. at 820-21. Murphy was plainly acting within the scope

of his discretionary authority when he used force on White.

“A federal right is ‘clearly established’ when ‘at the time of the officer’s

conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would

understand that what he was doing is unlawful.’” Anderson v. Vazquez, 813 F.

App’x 358, 360 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589

(2018)). “In other words, existing law must have placed the constitutionality

of the officer’s conduct beyond debate.” Wesby, 132 S. Ct. at 589 (internal

quotations omitted). To show that a legal principle is clearly established, a

plaintiff must produce precedent “clear enough that every reasonable official

would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.”

Id.

As explained above, White adequately alleges that Murphy violated his

Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. So the question is

whether the unlawfulness of Murphy’s actions was clearly established at the

time. It was. When the incident occurred, it was clearly established that “the

unjustified use of excessive force by a prison guard against an inmate” violates

the Eighth Amendment. Davis, 936 F.2d at 1213. It was also clearly

established that the Eighth Amendment forbids the use of gratuitous force

against “a handcuffed, non-resisting” prisoner. Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d

1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008). White claims that Murphy punched him even

though he was handcuffed and posed no threat of harm. Accepting these

allegations as true, Murphy is not entitled to qualified immunity.

C. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

Finally, Murphy argues that White is not entitled to injunctive or

declaratory relief. (Doc. 21 at 8). As noted above, White seeks injunctive relief

in the form of a “restraining order” against Murphy. (Doc. 1 at 6). He also

requests a “declaration” that Murphy’s conduct violated the constitution. (Id.)

Claims for “declaratory and injunctive relief” are “inherently prospective

in nature.” Checker Cab Operators, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 899 F.3d 908,

916 (11th Cir. 2018). Thus, to establish entitlement to “injunctive or

declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it appears there is a

substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.” Worthy v. City

of Phenix City, 930 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2019). “[T]he continuing

controversy . . . must be real and immediate, and create a definite, rather than

speculative threat of future injury.” Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1552 (11th

Cir. 1985).

White fails to show that injunctive or declaratory relief is available here.

The Complaint concerns an excessive-force incident that occurred 18 months

ago. Nothing about the incident suggests that White faces “a real and

immediate threat of repeated injury.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58

(2024). Indeed, the FDOC no longer employs Murphy, and White no longer

resides at Charlotte CI, the facility where the incident took place. (Doc. 21

at 8; Doc. 25 at 13; Doc. 28). Therefore, White fails to establish “a substantial

likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.” Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1215;

see also Vann v. Tabil, No. 2:23-cv-396-SPC-NPM, 2024 WL 3849896, at *5

(M.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2024) (dismissing prisoner’s “claims for injunctive and

declaratory relief” because he no longer resided at facility where defendant-

officers worked).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant Tristen Murphy’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs

Complaint (Doc. 21) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

2. White’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief are

DISMISSED.

3. Murphy must answer the Complaint within 14 days of this

Opinion and Order.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 5, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: TpaP-2

Copies: All Parties of Record