The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
GUADALUPE LOPEZ CRUZ, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-806-R
)
TODD BLANCHE, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Guadalupe Lopez Cruz, a noncitizen1 and Mexican national proceeding
with counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 1, challenging
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). United States District Judge David L. Russell referred this matter to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Doc. 3.
The undersigned set an expedited briefing schedule, Doc. 7, and the Petition is at issue.
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the
Petition, Doc. 1.
I. Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the United States on April 21, 2021,
near Brownsville, Texas, on an H2A Temporary Agricultural Worker visa after being
recruited by a company in Mexico. Pet. at 1; Resp. at 10. Petitioner’s visa expired on
1 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
June 25, 2021, but he remained in the United States without authorization past that date.
Pet. at 1; Resp. at 10; Doc. 11-2 at 1 (Notice to Appear). On May 15, 2024, ICE
encountered Petitioner following his arrest by the Oklahoma Highway Patrol for
Aggravated Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. Pet. at 1; Resp. at 10. On May 17,
2024, ICE served Petitioner with a warrant for arrest and placed him into removal
proceedings before the Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a through the
issuance of a Notice to Appear. Pet. at 1; Resp. at 10; Doc. 11-2 at 1. Petitioner was
charged with being deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) as someone who remained
in the United States for a time longer than permitted. Doc. 11-2 at 1.
At some later point, Petitioner was released from ICE custody. Pet. at 1-2; Resp. at
10. Petitioner alleges he complied with all conditions of his release. Pet. at 2. On
August 19, 2024, he entered a plea of no contest to five charges in the District Court of
Tulsa County, including a felony charge for Aggravated Driving Under the Influence.
Resp. at 10-11; Doc. 11-3 (Petitioner’s Criminal Plea). Petitioner alleges he filed a T-Visa
application and a Spousal Family-based petition, and his removal proceedings remain
pending. Pet. at 2; Resp. at 11.
On November 12, 2025, ICE re-detained Petitioner in Oklahoma City while
attending a scheduled check-in. Pet. at 2; Resp. at 11. Petitioner alleges he was not given
an explanation for the revocation of his release. Pet. at 2. On April 30, 2026, an
immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s request for bond at a custody redetermination
hearing after finding Petitioner failed to establish he was not a danger to the community.
Resp. at 11; Doc. 11-5 at 1 (IJ Order).
When Petitioner filed his Petition, he was detained at Diamondback Correctional
Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Pet. at 4. He remains detained there. See ICE Online
Detainee Locator System, at https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited June 25,
2026).
II. Petitioner’s Claims
Petitioner asserts two counts in his Petition.
• Count I: Violation of Due Process. Petitioner alleges his re-
detention violates his right to due process where he had previously
been released from custody and was re-detained without any
legitimate basis. Pet. at 6-7.
• Count II: Violation of ICE Regulations. Petitioner alleges his re-
detention absent materially changed circumstances violates 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.1(c). Pet. at 7. Specifically, he alleges once ICE “has exercised
[its] discretion to release a [noncitizen] on bond, it may not re-detain
the individual without a legitimate and materially changed custody
basis.” Id. at 5.
He asks the Court to “issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release
Petitioner immediately.” Id. at 7 (citation modified). Petitioner also requests an award of
attorney fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Id. 2
III. Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
2 To the extent Petitioner requests EAJA fees and costs, he must seek those separately after
a final judgment if he is a prevailing party. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Thus, the Court
need not address this request at this juncture.
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
IV. Analysis
A. Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a).
The parties do not dispute Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
See Pet. at 5 (alleging Petitioner’s re-detention is under § 1226(a)); Resp. at 10 (confirming
Petitioner’s detention is not under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1231). Further, courts, including
this Court, have consistently held § 1226(a) applies to those noncitizens like Petitioner
whom ICE encounters in the country and not at the border. See, e.g., Valdez v. Holt, No.
CIV-25-1250-R, 2025 WL 3709021, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025) (holding § 1226(a)
applies to noncitizens found within the United States and not at the border); see also
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2026) (holding § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to noncitizens found in the country but noting § 1226(a) would apply to noncitizens
“who overstay or violate the terms of their visas”).
B. Due process entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing.
Petitioner alleges that his re-detention violates his right to due process where he had
previously been released from custody and was re-detained without any legitimate basis.
Pet. at 6-7. The undersigned concludes that because § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s
detention, he is owed the due process provided to him under the statute. When Ҥ 1226
governs Petitioner’s detention, the due process owed to Petitioner is that provided for in
§ 1226—namely, an individualized bond hearing before an IJ.” Velasquez Salazar v.
Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1241 (D.N.M. 2025).
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects all persons within the United
States from being “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. Amend. V. It applies to noncitizens within the United States “whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
However, the undersigned disagrees with Respondents that the proper test to determine
whether Petitioner’s due process has been violated comes from Zadvydas, see Resp. at 17-
20, because Zadvydas related to noncitizens with final orders of removal detained pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1231. See Resp. at 17 (citing Zadvydas and acknowledging the holding
applied to noncitizens detained under § 1231). Rather, in the civil immigration detention
context, courts consistently apply the balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), to evaluate the process owed a noncitizen. See, e.g., Hernandez-Lara v.
Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27-39 (1st Cir. 2021) (applying Mathews to due process challenges to
prolonged detention under § 1226(a)); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851-55 (2d
Cir. 2020) (same); see also Merchan-Pacheo v. Noem, No. 25-CV-03860, 2026 WL 88526,
at *4-6 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2026) (concluding the Supreme Court “created a framework that
permits Petitioner’s release” and “in no way suggests that the court should decline to
consider the Mathews factors”).
The Mathews test includes three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected
by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor.
First, Petitioner has a strong liberty interest in being free from physical detention.
This is “the most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from
imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
529 (2004)). Because freedom from restraint is “at the core of the liberty interest protected
by the Due Process Clause, commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 80 (1992) (citation modified). “Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens,” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003), but that
power remains subject to “important constitutional limitations,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
It does not eliminate Petitioner’s significant interest in being free from detention. See, e.g.,
Diaz v. Noem, No. 26-CV-00782, 2026 WL 733587, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2026)
(concluding the first Mathews factors supports finding a due process violation where
petitioner “is being held in a detention facility that strongly resembles penal confinement,
is away from his family, and is unable to maintain his employment” (citation modified)).
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is high here, considering Respondents’
current position to afford him no bond hearing. See, e.g., Montero Cordova v. Noem, No.
26-CV-00526, 2026 WL 867689, at *9 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2026) (finding the second
Mathews factor favors petitioner because “the risk of erroneous deprivation will remain
high” “without the opportunity to have the hearing to which Petitioner is entitled” under
§ 1226(a) and noting “a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge will provide
immense value as an additional safeguard” (citation modified)); Orellana v. Noem, 807 F.
Supp. 3d 745, 754 (W.D. Ky. 2025) (“A re-detention, without any individualized
assessment, leads to a high risk of erroneous deprivation of an individual’s liberty
interest.”).
Finally, the Court must consider the government’s interest, including any fiscal or
administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. While “control over matters of
immigration is a sovereign prerogative” and the “government’s interest in efficient
administration of immigration laws at the border is weighty,” Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (citation modified), such interests in detaining Petitioner without
procedural safeguards do not outweigh his liberty interest or risk of erroneous deprivation.
See Montero Cordova, 2026 WL 867689, at *10 (finding though “the Government’s
interest in enforcing its immigration policies must be afforded considerable weight,” the
third factor favors petitioner because “the fiscal and administrative burdens of providing a
bond hearing under § 1226(a) are minimal and do not provide adequate justification for
foregoing the hearing entirely”); Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926,
943 (D. Colo. 2025) (comparing the “quite limited” harm to government, “because the
administrative burden of a bond hearing is minimal,” to the “sizeable harm posed to
[petitioner] by continued—and potentially unnecessary—detention” (citation modified)).
Further, the fact Petitioner had been living in the United States for more than four years
when he was re-detained also weighs in his favor. See Ekenge v. Baltazar, No. 26-CV-
00630, 2026 WL 617341, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2026) (finding the government’s interest
“not substantial” where petitioner was re-detained after being released and “any costs are
far outweighed by the risk of erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest at issue” (citation
modified)).
Bond hearings “are a significant procedural safeguard to balance the Government’s
interest in immigration enforcement against individual liberties.” Singh v. Bondi, No. 26-
CV-0125, 2026 WL 690013, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2026). Petitioner’s continued
detention without a bond hearing violates his due process liberty interests, and he is entitled
to a prompt bond hearing under § 1226(a) before an IJ.
C. Petitioner’s re-detention violates ICE regulations.
Petitioner also alleges his re-detention absent materially changed circumstances
violates 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c). Pet. at 7. Section 236.1(c)(9) gives immigration officials
broad discretion to revoke bond or conditional parole “at any time.” After an authorized
official exercises discretion to revoke the bond or parole granted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
the noncitizen is to be rearrested under the original warrant. See id. § 1226(b) (“The
[Secretary of Homeland Security] at any time may revoke a bond or parole authorized
under subsection (a), rearrest the alien under the original warrant, and detain the alien.”).
Officials authorized to revoke a noncitizen’s release are “the district director, acting district
director, deputy district director, assistance district director for investigations, assistant
district director for detention and deportation, or officer in charge.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(9).
As an initial matter, the Court has jurisdiction to determine whether Petitioner’s re-
detention violates § 236.1(c). Though 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) prohibits judicial review of the
Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of § 1226, Petitioner
is not challenging a discretionary determination of the Attorney General. Rather, Petitioner
is challenging the nondiscretionary procedures Respondents must use to revoke
Petitioner’s previous release under § 1226. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to
review Petitioner’s claim. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (stating
§ 1226(e) does not preclude challenges to the statutory framework relating to Petitioner’s
detention); accord Mukantagara v. Noem, 164 F.4th 765, 771-72 (10th Cir. 2026)
(concluding § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which also bars judicial review of discretionary decisions
of the Attorney General, does not prohibit a court’s review of a “nondiscretionary first
step” about an eligibility determination that must precede a discretionary decision).
No evidence in the record indicates any authorized ICE official chose to exercise
their discretion to cancel Petitioner’s Order of Release.3 That alone is sufficient to find the
proper procedures were not followed in effectuating Petitioner’s detention. See Singh v.
Grant, No. CIV-26-289-R, 2026 WL 1099500, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 22, 2026) (“No
evidence in the record indicates that any authorized official chose to exercise their
discretion to revoke Petitioner’s release on bond. That alone is sufficient to find that proper
procedures were not followed in effectuating Petitioner’s detention.” (emphasis in
original)) (R&R), adopted, No. CIV-26-289-R, 2026 WL 1483557, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May
27, 2026) (adopting the R&R because Respondents waived de novo review of this issue
but agreeing with the Magistrate Judge who “issued a well-reasoned opinion finding ICE
failed to comply with procedures”). Further, no evidence in the record indicates Petitioner
3 Neither party has provided the Court with Petitioner’s Order of Release on Recognizance
or any documentation relating to the revocation of his release other than unsupported
statements in Petitioner’s Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien. See Doc. 11-4 at 2.
was re-arrested “under the original warrant,” as required under § 1226(b). Singh, 2026 WL
1099500, at *3 (noting “there is no evidence that Petitioner was arrested pursuant to his
original warrant of arrest” in finding Respondents violated their own regulations when
revoking Petitioner’s release (citation modified)) (R&R), adopted, 2026 WL 1483557, at
*2 (adopting the R&R because Respondents waived de novo review of this issue but
agreeing with the Magistrate Judge who “issued a well-reasoned opinion finding ICE failed
to comply with procedures”).
The undersigned is not persuaded by Respondents’ argument that Petitioner failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to appeal his denial of bond to the Board
of Immigration. Here, Petitioner is not appealing the IJ’s denial of bond but rather alleging
ICE failed to properly revoke his release on recognizance under § 1226(a). The
undersigned is similarly not persuaded by Respondents’ argument that ICE’s violation of
its own regulations resulting in Petitioner’s re-detention without proper process is harmless
error. Accord Nguyen v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. CIV-26-87-R, 2026 WL 1506428,
at *7 (W.D. Okla. May 29, 2026) (finding respondents’ violation of a different regulatory
provision was not harmless error).4 Accordingly, the Court should find Petitioner’s re-
detention violated ICE regulations.
4 The undersigned agrees with Respondents that Petitioner’s reliance on 8 C.F.R. § 241.13
for the proposition that he was entitled to a Notice of Revocation of Release is misplaced,
as § 241.13 is inapplicable to Petitioner. See Resp. at 29. However, as already stated,
Respondents violated § 236.1(c) by improperly revoking Petitioner’s release under that
regulation.
D. The most Petitioner is entitled to is a bond hearing, but such a hearing
already occurred.5
Petitioner does not request a bond hearing and instead asks the Court to “issue a
Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner immediately.” Pet. at 7
(citation modified). Consistent with this Court’s approach in previous cases, the
undersigned would typically recommend Petitioner be afforded a constitutionally sufficient
individualized bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).6 See Karimov v. Cerna, No. CIV-26-
5 Magistrate Judges in this District, including the undersigned, have previously
recommended the Court order the government to bear the burden at a bond hearing to
establish a petitioner’s risk of flight or danger when granting habeas relief to similarly
situated petitioners when (1) their re-detention violates due process and (2) they raise such
a claim and specifically request burden shifting. However, Judges in this District,
including this Court, have declined to order burden shifting. See Singh v. Figueroa, No.
CIV-26-600-R, 2026 WL 1181699, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 30, 2026) (denying
petitioner’s request for burden shifting, and holding “although petitioner is entitled to a
bond hearing under § 1226(a), the Court declines to specify or alter the burden of proof at
this stage”) (citation modified); see also, e.g., Singh v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-712-HE, Order,
Doc. 13 at 2-7 (W.D. Okla. June 18, 2026) (analyzing the Mathews factors and concluding
“petitioner is not entitled, as a matter of Fifth Amendment Due Process, to a hearing at
which the burden of proof is on the government”); Rangel v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-568-D,
2026 WL 1625653, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. June 5, 2026) (declining “to place the burden on
the government to justify Petitioner’s detention pending removal proceedings”); Singh v.
Grant, No. CIV-26-279-J, 2026 WL 1035100, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 16, 2026)
(declining to reach petitioner’s due process claims and concluding burden shifting to the
government in a § 1226(a) bond hearing is premature and not ripe for adjudication before
a bond hearing has been conducted). Accordingly, the undersigned does not recommend
burden shifting in this case.
6 In some cases, Judges in this District have ordered release for noncitizens whose earlier
release was improperly revoked in the absence of changed circumstances or proper
procedures. See, e.g., Singh v. Grant, No. CIV-26-289-R, 2026 WL 1483557, at *1-2
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2026) (ordering release where ICE improperly revoked petitioner’s
prior bond ordered by an immigration judge); Ewere v. Cerna, No. CIV-26-320-SLP, 2026
WL 1207088, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May 4, 2026) (ordering release where ICE improperly
304-R, 2026 WL 950130, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 8, 2026) (“As a remedy, Petitioner
requests his immediate release, but the Court concludes that a bond or custody
redetermination hearing is the appropriate remedy.” (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 779 (2008))). As this Court has acknowledged, “Petitioner is entitled to the custody
procedures provided by [§ 1226(a)],” and “the statute provides the Department of
Homeland Security the discretion to either detain a noncitizen or release the noncitizen on
bond.” Id. (citation modified). As such, “an individualized custody redetermination
hearing would provide Petitioner with the process he is due under the statute.” Id. (citation
modified).
However, Petitioner has already received a bond hearing, and this Court cannot
review the discretionary determination of the IJ. The determination of bond under
§ 1226(a) is within the purview of the IJ, who considers whether a noncitizen is a flight
risk or a danger to the community. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c). As already discussed, § 1226(e)
revoked petitioner’s prior humanitarian parole); Skutar v. Mullin, CIV-26-0036-HE, Doc.
15, at 2-3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 24, 2026) (ordering petitioner’s immediate release and stating
“while the Attorney General has authority to revoke bond at any time under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(b), if an immigration judge has determined the noncitizen should be released, the
DHS may not re-arrest that noncitizen absent a change of circumstance”) (citation
modified). However, here Petitioner fails to allege or prove he was previously ordered
released pursuant to § 1226(a) by an immigration judge rather than at the discretion of an
ICE or customs agent. Accordingly, Petitioner has not alleged or provided evidence that
the circumstances of his re-detention entitle him to release rather than a bond hearing. See
Singh v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-471-SLP, 2026 WL 1255801, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May 7, 2026)
(finding petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing but not release because he “has not provided
the Court with evidence of his prior Order of Release or its terms, nor has Petitioner
supported his requested form of relief with legal authority”). Therefore, the undersigned
concludes Petitioner is entitled only to a bond hearing and not release.
“strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to an IJ’s discretionary decision to
keep a noncitizen in detention.” Nucamendiz v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-13851, 2026 WL
221449, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2026) (citation modified); see also Mwangi v. Terry, 465
F. App’x 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing § 1226(e) and noting “the Attorney General’s
exercise of discretion is not subject to judicial review”). “Thus, a district court has no
jurisdiction to consider a habeas petitioner’s challenge to the decision to either grant or
deny bond.” Kumar v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. CIV-26-164-R, 2026 WL 753944, at *2
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 17, 2026); see also Perez v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1151-SLP, 2026 WL
597126, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 3, 2026) (“Thus, the Court finds that the IJ relied on
evidence in the record to make a discretionary decision to deny Petitioner bond; therefore,
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review that decision.”).
The IJ’s bond determination order states that after full consideration of the evidence
presented, the IJ found Petitioner “did not establish [he is] not a danger to the community.”
Doc. 11-5 at 1. As in Kumar, “Petitioner does not indicate that he was denied the
opportunity to present evidence at the bond hearing or that the IJ improperly shifted the
burden of proof.” 2026 WL 753944, at *2. Thus, “he has not shown that the decision was
somehow legally erroneous or unconstitutional.” Id.7 Accordingly, “the Court lacks
7 Section “1226(e) does not preclude habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or
questions of law.” Hernandez Casallas v. Jones, No. CIV-26-53-J, 2026 WL 324646, at
*2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 6, 2026) (citation modified); see also Kumar, 2026 WL 753944, at *2
(noting petitioner’s arguments about the potential adequacy of the bond hearing, such as
the denial of an opportunity to present evidence or the IJ’s application of an improper
burden of proof, were too undeveloped to warrant habeas relief); Perez, 2026 WL 597126,
at *6 n.11 (noting petitioner did not allege the bond hearing was unconstitutional, such as
jurisdiction to reconsider the IJ’s discretionary decision,” id. (citation modified), to deny
bond.
V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY the
Petition for habeas relief. The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and
Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later than July 2,
2026. See id. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If a party wishes to respond to the
other party’s objections, such response must be filed not later than July 8, 2026. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the
factual and legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. See Moore v.
United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 25" day of June, 2026.
Chow. Bbphous-
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
raising a claim about the “impropriety of burden allocation at the bond hearing’).
However, at no time does Petitioner allege the bond hearing he already received was
constitutionally deficient. See Kumar, 2026 WL 753944, at *2; Perez, 2026 WL 597126,
at *6 n.11; see also Singh v. Blanche, No. CIV-26-311-D, 2026 WL 915596, at *9 & n.9
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 3, 2026) (recommending denial of habeas relief to petitioner who had a
prior bond hearing and “nowhere alleges [in his petition] that the IJ used the wrong burden
of proof’ or otherwise violated the law at the prior bond hearing) (R&R), adopted, 2026
WL 1010480 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 14, 2026).
14