Brown

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

JUAN V. BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:24-cv-00216-SRC

)

RONNIE HAMPTON and LUCAS )

HAMPTON )

)

Defendants. )

Memorandum and Order

I. Background

In February 2024, Brown brought many claims against numerous corrections officers

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See doc. 1. The Court dismissed all of Brown’s claims, except the

individual-capacity claims against Ronnie and Lucas Hampton. Doc. 8 at 10 (The Court cites to

page numbers as assigned by CM/ECF.). Brown then asked the Court to reconsider those

dismissals five times, see docs. 13, 44, 54, 58, 107, and the Court denied each request, see docs.

17, 45, 55, 61, 119. In October and November 2024, the Court allowed Brown to supplement his

Complaint with allegations of events that took place after Brown’s filing it. Docs. 45, 50.

Brown’s original Complaint, supplemented with these events, formed Brown’s Second Amended

Complaint. Doc. 51.

The Hamptons moved for summary judgment on many of Brown’s claims arising out of

incidents on August 22, 2023 and September 8, 2023, see doc. 103, and the Court granted

summary judgment in their favor, docs. 119–20. In its ruling, the Court found that the various

allegations against Ronnie regarding incidents occurring on August 22, 2023 and September 8,

2023 could not survive summary judgment. Doc. 119 at 12–16. And “the only physical contact

that Lucas made with Brown” on August 22, 2023 involved holding his arm during the escort to

of any de minimis physical force from this incident, the Court found that such force cannot rise to

an Eighth Amendment violation. See id. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1992)).

However, “[l]iberally construing Brown’s operative complaint, the Court identifie[d] two

potential claims that remain,” on which the Hamptons did not move for summary judgment. Id.

at 16. First, “Brown allege[d] . . . that he ‘suffered numb toes and feet’ because the Hamptons

denied him a blanket.” Id. at 18 (cleaned up) (quoting doc. 51 at 21–22). The Court

“question[ed] whether [this] allegation alone, even if true, can support an Eighth Amendment

conditions-of-confinement claim” in light of Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 447 (8th Cir. 1995).

Id. Second, Brown alleged that “Ronnie ‘maced’ Brown four times on September 8, 2024.” Id.

(citing doc. 51 at 25–26). The Court “question[ed] the claim’s factual predicate,” because there

was “no evidence that Ronnie ever visited Brown’s new facility or otherwise had any connection

to that facility at any relevant time.” Id.

Based on these deficiencies in Brown’s remaining claims, the Court “order[ed] Brown to,

no later than September 8, 2025, file a supplemental brief explaining why the Court shouldn’t

grant the Hamptons summary judgment on the remaining claims.” Id. September 8 came and

went, and on September 10, Brown filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision.

Doc. 122. Brown also filed numerous letters and motions after that, which the Court now takes

up. Docs. 122–29.

In all these filings, Brown provides no basis for relief on either of these two claims.

Therefore, the Court grants the Hamptons summary judgment on these two claims. The Court

also identifies an additional potential claim that may remain in Brown’s Second Amended

Complaint, arising out of incidents that allegedly occurred after Brown filed this lawsuit (and

below, the Court orders supplemental briefing on this claim.

II. Standard

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Under Rule 56(f), the Court may

grant summary judgment “sua sponte, ‘provided that the party against whom judgment will be

entered was given sufficient advance notice and an adequate opportunity to demonstrate why

summary judgment should not be granted.’” Hubbard v. Parker, 994 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir.

1993) (quoting Interco Inc. v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 900 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis

removed).

III. Discussion

None of Brown’s new filings address the Court’s concerns regarding the two claims for

which the Court previously ordered supplemental briefing. See doc. 119 at 16–18. Additionally,

the Court previously said that “[t]he parties may not file further briefing without leave of court,”

beyond filing the supplemental briefing that the Court requested. Doc. 119 at 19. Brown did not

seek leave to file any of his supplemental documents, none of which address the two relevant

claims. While the Court can deny Brown’s motions on these bases alone, the Court also finds

that they fail on the merits, as discussed below.

A. Brown’s first motion for reconsideration

In his motion, Brown “ask[s] for [r]econsideration of the [C]ourt[’]s order to dismiss [his]

civil action.” Doc. 122 at 1. Brown claims that this Court “has greatly erred in its [r]uling,”

arguing that “[t]here exist[s] a [g]enuine [d]ispute on [the] record that contradicts Defendants

Lucas Hampton[’s] and Ronnie Hampton[’s] [d]enial of [E]ighth [A]mendment excessive use of

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) to support the proposition that “when opposing parties tell two

different stories[,] one of which is blatantly contradicted by [the] record so that no reasonable

jury could believe in[,] a court should not adopt that version of the facts for [the] purpose of

ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgement [sic].” Doc. 122 at 1.

Brown does not identify how the Court “greatly erred” or why the Hamptons’ factual

claims are “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Id. Therefore, the Court denies Brown’s

motion to reconsider. Id.

B. Brown’s discovery motions and motion for stay

Brown next filed numerous letters and requests in November and December 2025, and

January 2026. See generally docs. 123–27. In the first letter, he asks for both an update

regarding the case and a copy of discovery. Doc. 123. He also asks for discovery in two other

letters. Docs. 124, 126. In one letter, he asks for a stay of the case until he receives

“[d]ocumentation [that] states [t]he Defendants assaulted [Brown] on aug.22.2023 [sic].” Doc.

125 at 1. He also attaches two exhibits to this document; one is a request for internal review,

grievance, and appeal forms, and the second appears to be his correctional facility’s response to

that request. See id. at 2–3. The Court construes these motions as discovery motions and denies

them as untimely. See doc. 22 at 2 (providing that the parties must complete discovery by

January 27, 2025); see also doc. 84 at 9 (“The parties must not file any discovery motion after

the January 27, 2025, discovery deadline.”).

Regarding Brown’s request for a stay, “the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the

power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy

of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Emerson Elec. Co. v. Black & Decker

Mfg. Co., 606 F.2d 234, 237 n.6 (8th Cir. 1979) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,

der Bank Austria Creditanstalt fur Niederosterreich und Bergenland v. Nejezchleba, 477 F.3d

942, 945 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997)). Because the

Court denies Brown’s discovery motions, the Court finds that it need not stay proceedings

pending discovery.

C. Brown’s request for documents

In an additional filing, Brown asks for computer printout copies of various filings on the

docket and their attached exhibits. Doc. 127 at 1. The Court denies this request in the interest of

judicial economy, because Brown provides no reasons why getting copies of documents and

exhibits already on the record would help him avoid summary judgment on his two remaining

claims. See generally id.

D. Brown’s motion for discovery sanctions and to bar summary judgment

In his final filings, Brown moves for sanctions and to bar summary judgment. Doc. 128.

He claims that the Hamptons “have engaged in a strong desire to suppress the truth of [Brown’s]

[m]aterial [f]acts by submitting fraudulant [sic] testimony and the intentional spoilation of

[v]ideo [d]ocument [e]vidence.” Doc. 128 at 1 (citing Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727 (8th

Cir. 2002)). Brown states that he submitted evidence that contradicts the Hamptons’ denial that

they did not retain information regarding the August 22, 2023 incidents. Id. at 2. He claims that

the Hamptons have stated that they received no litigation hold, and that they are suppressing

“[t]he [f]act that the information was available.” Id. at 3. Brown claims that the suppressed

August 22, 2023 video footage shows both Ronnie directing Lucas to assault Brown and Lucas

punching Brown’s knees and legs while Brown was handcuffed to a bench. Id. at 4.

Brown attaches two exhibits to his motion; the first is a Missouri Department of

Corrections response to Brown’s grievance appeal dated April 15, 2024, see doc. 128-1, which

3, 2025 order. See doc. 128-2 (containing doc. 93). Brown says that his first exhibit establishes

that “thier [sic] is a [r]ecord and it has [b]een [r]efferd [sic] to appropriate staff for further

[r]eview.” Doc. 128 at 2.

Brown’s motion fails for three reasons. First, despite the Court’s repeated reminders, see

doc. 65 at 1; doc. 68 at 3, Brown’s motion does not indicate that he has met and conferred with

opposing counsel proximate to filing the motion, see generally doc. 128. Pursuant to the

undersigned’s Judge’s Requirements, before filing a discovery motion (including a motion for

discovery sanctions), a party must confer with opposing counsel and attempt to resolve the

dispute. Judge’s Requirements at 6. Even “[i]n cases involving incarcerated pro se litigants, the

Court expects parties to confer . . . in writing before filing a discovery motion.” Id. And the

party that files the discovery motion must, in the motion, describe “how the parties tried to

resolve the dispute.” Id. Brown’s motion doesn’t comply with these requirements. See doc.

128.

Second, even if Brown did, the deadline for discovery motions has long passed, as noted

above. Finally, Brown’s motion substantially repeats arguments he made in a previous motion.

Compare id., with doc. 91; see also doc. 128 at 2 (referencing doc. 91). When the Court

adjudicated Brown’s previous motion, it found that the Hamptons “acted reasonably when they,

in the normal course of business, didn’t retain the August 22, 2023, video footage.” Doc. 106 at

3; see also doc. 100-1 at 1–2; doc. 93. And the Court had the benefit of the April 15, 2024

Grievance-Appeal Response when coming to this conclusion. See doc. 93 at 1–2 (discussing

doc. 91-1, in which Brown attached the April 15, 2024 Grievance-Appeal Response); see also

doc. 106 (entered after the Court’s considering this grievance appeal).

modify the Court’s previous conclusions. And while this motion also asks the Court to “bar”

summary judgment, id. at 1, Brown provides no argument or authority regarding his two

remaining claims, see generally id. Further, his cite to Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727 (8th

Cir. 2002) does not save him. The Eighth Circuit’s upholding a district court’s sanctions order

against prison officials for withholding some videos and producing others heavily edited—

despite previous assurances to produce originals—does not change the Court’s conclusion here

regarding materially different circumstances. Id. at 733–34. Accordingly, the Court denies his

motion. Id.

E. Brown’s second motion for reconsideration

In his most-recent motion, Brown asks for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

60(b) because of the Hamptons’ alleged fraud from “[f]abrication of [e]vidence” and

“suppression of said [e]vidence.” Doc. 129 at 1. Specifically, as above, he references the

Missouri Department of Corrections’ failure to retain video footage from August 22, 2023. See

id. at 1–2. He claims to have submitted “official forms of [the] Department of Corrections that

show [that] Defendants and [the] Department of Corrections were aware of the August 22, 2023

video [d]uring case opening notification” and “had these [r]ecords well up into April 15, [20]24.”

Id. at 2. He references “Exhibit #1” for these propositions, which refers to the April 15, 2024

Grievance-Appeal Response, which Brown recently filed as Exhibit 1, see doc. 128-1, in his

motion for sanctions and summary judgment, see doc. 128. Finally, he says that “Defendants[’]

[f]raudulent and [p]rejudicial information amount[s] to actions for penalty, [f]ine, [sic] and

sanctions denying summary judgment.” Doc. 129 at 2.

Once again, the April 15, 2024 Grievance-Appeal Response provides no basis for the

Court’s reconsideration of its denial of sanctions against the Hamptons relating to the

Brown mentions “[f]abrication,” doc. 129 at 1, he does not support this assertion, nor will the

Court permit him to file new discovery-related motions at this juncture, as noted above.

Therefore, Brown provides no basis for this Court’s reconsideration of its decision not to

sanction the Hamptons and the Court denies the motion. Doc. 129.

F. Potential remaining claim

In addition to the two claims the Court pointed out previously, doc. 119 at 16–18, the

Court now identifies one potential remaining claim in Brown’s Second Amended Complaint,

doc. 51, when liberally construed. This claim arises after Brown filed this lawsuit, and after the

events on which the Hamptons moved for summary judgment. See doc. 103. Brown claims that

after filing this lawsuit, Ronnie repeatedly harassed Brown, taunting him with “threats of

physical violence on numerous occasions.” Doc. 51 at 21. Lucas then said he would “blow

[Brown’s] head off” if he saw him around town, because Brown “snitched” on him. Id. But as

the Court noted previously, doc. 119 at 13, “mere verbal threats made by a state-actor do not

constitute a [section] 1983 claim.” Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378–79 (8th Cir.

1992). Therefore, the Court questions the legal sufficiency of this claim as well.

Brown also mentions an “ongoing conspiracy of abuse and harassment by D.O.C. staff,”

but doesn’t direct that claim against any particular defendant. Doc. 51 at 11; see White v.

Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1081 (8th Cir. 2017) (requiring a causal link between an alleged

violation and a defendant’s conduct); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th

Cir. 1990) (“Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the

deprivation of rights.”). So, the Court does not treat this as a live claim.

Given this deficiency in Brown’s remaining claim, the Court sees little reason at this time

why it should not grant the Hamptons summary judgment on this claim, but will await the

Brown notice that it intends to dismiss this claim. See Hubbard, 994 F.2d at 531 (holding that

“[a] federal district court may grant summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, sua

sponte, ‘provided that the party against whom judgment will be entered was given sufficient

advance notice and an adequate opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not

be granted’” (quoting Interco, 900 F.2d at 1269)).

Brown may, no later than August 1, 2026, file a supplemental brief explaining why the

Court shouldn’t grant the Hamptons summary judgment on this remaining claim. If he does not,

or if his response provides no compelling reason against the grant of summary judgment, the

Court will grant summary judgment to the Hamptons and dismiss Brown’s Second Amended

Complaint.

The parties may not file further briefing without leave of court. And to be abundantly

clear, the Court is not granting Brown leave to amend his Second Amended Complaint and is not

permitting him to otherwise attempt to add claims to this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court grants the Hamptons summary judgment on Brown’s two

additional claims, as provided above, and denies Brown’s [122] [123] [124] [125] [126] [127]

[128] [129] motions. The Court orders Brown to file, no later than August 1, 2026, a

supplemental brief on the potential remaining claim the Court identified, as required by this

Memorandum and Order. If Brown fails to file a supplemental brief by the deadline, then the

Court may, without further notice, enter summary judgment in favor of the Hamptons and

dismiss Brown’s Second Amended Complaint. A separate judgment accompanies this

Memorandum and Order.

So ordered this 1st day of July 2026.

STEPHEN R. CLARK

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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