Oakley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

DAWN OAKLEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-120-VMC-NHA

POLK COUNTY BOARD OF

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant

Polk County Board of County Commissioners’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. # 30), filed on November 24, 2025, seeking

summary judgment on all claims in this Florida Civil Rights

Act (“FCRA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

case. Plaintiff Dawn Oakley responded on December 22, 2025.

(Doc. # 33). The County replied on January 12, 2026. (Doc. #

36). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Parties and County Policies

The Polk County Board of County Commissioners (“the

County”) is the governing body for Polk County, Florida. (Joe

Decl. at ¶ 2). Polk County Fire Rescue (“PCFR”) provides

countywide ambulance transport and fire rescue services to

the unincorporated parts of the county. (Id. at ¶ 3). PCFR

employees are trained and certified by the State of Florida

as firefighters, emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”), or

paramedics, or they can be dual certified as a

firefighter/paramedic or firefighter/EMT. (Id. at ¶ 4).

In 2003, PCFR hired Ms. Oakley, a white woman, to work

as an EMT. (Pl. Depo. at 12:4-8, 33:11-13). In 2018, Ms.

Oakley obtained her firefighter certification and became a

firefighter/EMT. She held this position in 2022. (Id. at

12:12-17, 14:24-25). Ms. Oakley was a member of the Polk

County Professional Firefighters, IAFF - Local 3531 (the

“Union”). (Id. at 14:3-9; Joe Decl. at ¶ 12). As such, she

was subject to the collective bargaining agreement between

the Union and the County, including its provisions about drug

testing. (Pl. Depo. at 71:1-12; Joe Decl. at ¶ 12, Ex. 3 at

4-5). Ms. Oakley was also subject to the County’s Employee

Handbook and required to comply with PCFR’s Code of Conduct.

(Pl. Depo. at 71:8-10, 95:15-21; Joe Decl. at ¶ 11).

B. Drug Testing

Florida classifies firefighters and EMTs as safety

sensitive positions and, as such, they are subject to drug

and alcohol testing procedures. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 5). The County

maintains a drug free workplace policy, which includes

procedures for conducting random drug testing of employees in

safety sensitive positions. (Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. 1 at 11). Thus,

employees in safety sensitive positions throughout the

County, including PCFR, are obligated to undergo random drug

testing. (Pl. Depo. at 118:5-11; Joe Decl. at ¶¶ 10-11, Ex.

1 at 11, Ex. 2 at 2-3). The drug free workplace guidelines

are designed to protect the County from employees’ use of

illegal drugs, abuse of prescription drugs or alcohol at any

time, as well as employees reporting for work or performing

work under the influence of a non-prescribed substance,

illegal drug, or alcohol. (Joe Decl. at ¶¶ 9, 11, Ex. 1 at 5,

Ex. 2 at 2-3). PCFR employees must “strictly adhere” to the

County’s drug free workplace policies. (Id. at ¶ 11, Ex. 2 at

2-3). Randomly selected employees must submit to a

breathalyzer test and provide a urine sample if selected for

a random drug test. (Id. at ¶ 13).

The County’s employee wellness center analyzes the

breathalyzer test, and an independent third-party testing

facility analyzes the urine sample. (Id. at ¶ 14). These tests

are reviewed by a licensed physician who serves as the Medical

Review Officer (“MRO”), and who applies federal regulations

established by the United States Department of Transportation

(“DOT”). (Id.; Berry Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4, 9).

On March 28, 2022, Ms. Oakley was selected to undergo a

random drug test. (Pl. Depo. at 55:23–56:21; Joe Decl. at ¶

18). Before she drove to Bartow where the test would be

administered, Ms. Oakley took two pills from her to-go pill

bottle that she believed were Tylenol to alleviate her back

pain. (Pl. Depo. at 55:21–57:2, 101:1-20). But Ms. Oakley

accidentally ingested her husband’s Vyvanse, which she

mistook for Tylenol. (Id. at 55:21–57:2, 58:6-8, 64:1-7,

75:9-18, 99:10-24, 101:1-20). The weekend before her drug

test, Ms. Oakley put one of her husband’s Vyvanse pills in

her to-go pill bottle in case they decided to spend the night

in Orlando after a concert. (Id. at 58:6–60:18). Ms. Oakley

had forgotten about her husband’s Vyvanse, failing to remove

it from her to-go bottle. (Id. at 62:2–63:11). Ms. Oakley

completed a breathalyzer test and provided a urine sample.

(Id. at 56:14-17, Ex. 1).

On May 3, 2022, Ms. Oakley received an e-mail from

Lashana Joe, the County’s Employee Relations Manager,

notifying her that she needed to speak with the MRO about her

drug test. (Id. at 96:19-24; Joe Decl. at ¶ 21). That same

day, Ms. Oakley spoke with a nurse from the MRO’s office.

(Pl. Depo. at 57:6–58:8). The nurse asked if Ms. Oakley had

a prescription for Vyvanse or Adderall because there may have

been a “false positive” for amphetamines. (Id.). Because Ms.

Oakley did not have a prescription for either drug, the nurse

advised her that the MRO would call her. (Id. at 98:4–99:9).

Ms. Oakley spoke with MRO, Dr. Bruce Berry, MD, later

that same day. (Id. at 99:6-24). Dr. Berry notified Ms. Oakley

that she tested positive for amphetamines, and that he would

send the results to the County. (Id. at 99:10-24). Ms. Oakley

notified Dr. Berry that she could have taken Sudafed, and she

may have mistakenly taken her husband’s Vyvanse on the day of

the test because she had confused it with Tylenol. (Id. at

99:10-24, 100:10-20).

Dr. Berry does not consider an individual’s mistaken

ingestion of a medication to be a basis to negate a drug test

result. Rather, it qualifies as a positive drug test. (Berry

Decl. at ¶ 12). DOT regulations do not authorize an MRO to

consider an individual’s explanations of a confirmed positive

drug test result. (Id. at ¶ 10-12). Pursuant to the DOT

regulations, an individual cannot claim that they mistakenly

or unknowingly ingested a drug to avoid confirmation of a

positive drug test. (Id.). When an individual tests positive

for a drug, Dr. Berry classifies accidental ingestion of

medication as a failed drug test. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12).

Ms. Oakley admitted to taking 70 milligrams of Vyvanse,

and, although she did not feel any effects from the

medication, she was still under its influence during her

shift. (Pl. Depo. at 55:21–58:8, 64:1-7, 83:23–84:2, 126:19–

128:7, 140:19–141:7). While Ms. Oakley was responsible for

knowing what medication she took, she asserted PCFR should

have provided her with a second chance to pass the drug test

because she made a mistake. (Id. at 82:13-20; Joe Decl. at ¶¶

27-28).

C. Termination

On May 6, 2022, Ms. Joe and Deputy Fire Chief, Richard

Parnell, met with Ms. Oakley and her Union representative to

notify Ms. Oakley that Dr. Berry confirmed her positive drug

test. (Pl. Depo. at 92:18–93:22; Joe Decl. at ¶ 25).

Ms. Joe notified Ms. Oakley that she would be terminated

from her employment with PCFR, pursuant to its drug testing

policies and procedures. (Pl. Depo. at 93:15–94:25; Joe Decl.

at ¶ 26). Ms. Joe also advised Ms. Oakley that she could file

a grievance through her Union or proceed through the employee

Appeals Council if she wanted to challenge her termination.

(Pl. Depo. at 29:16-25, 93:15–94:25; Joe Decl. at ¶ 30). Ms.

Oakley told Ms. Joe she mistakenly took the medication and

“begged for a retest.” (Pl. Depo. at 48:18-21, 93:23–94:12,

124:4-9).

During the meeting, Ms. Joe heard Ms. Oakley’s

explanation for the positive drug test; however, in

accordance with the DOT standards and regulations, the County

does not consider an individual’s accidental or mistaken

ingestion of another person’s prescription medication to be

a valid reason for overturning a positive test result or

authorizing a retest. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 29; Berry Decl. at ¶¶

10-12). Allowing an individual to retest on this basis defeats

the purpose of the drug free workplace program. (Joe Decl. at

¶ 29).

Ms. Oakley appealed the termination decision to the

Appeals Council. (Pl. Depo. at 93:24–94:25, Ex. 7 at 1). The

Appeals Council consists of four County employees appointed

by the County Manager. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 31, Ex. 6 at 1-2). The

Council hears employees’ appeals of disciplinary actions and

communicates its findings to the County Manager. (Id.).

Through the appeal, Ms. Oakley presented her case and

submitted a written statement explaining her positive drug

test. (Pl. Depo. at 107:8-10, 129:1-5, Ex. 6, Ex. 7).

Following the hearing, the Appeals Council upheld Ms.

Oakley’s termination, ending her employment with the County.

(Id. at 104:6-11, 107:16-22).

D. John Doe and Other County Employees

Ms. Oakley asserts the County discriminated against her

because she is a white female. (Id. at 33:8-13, 34:1-4, 43:1-

6). Ms. Oakley believes this because the County allowed John

Doe, an African American man and PCFR employee, to retake

his drug test after failing his first test. (Id. at 17:3-

14, 33:8–34:15, 43:13-19, 132:3–134:9). But Ms. Oakley was

not allowed to retake her drug test — a decision she

attributes to discrimination. (Id.). Ms. Oakley does not

allege the County discriminated against her in any other

way. (Id. at 53:6–54:4).

In April 2022, Mr. Doe was selected for a random drug

test. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 36). The County received notice that

he tested positive for amphetamines on June 2, 2022. Upon

receipt of this notice, the County’s Human Resources

department notified Mr. Doe of the results and its intent to

move forward with his termination. (Id. at ¶ 37).

The County allowed Mr. Doe to address the test results.

(Id. at ¶ 38). Mr. Doe presented a list of his prescribed

medications and asserted he did not ingest anything else

that could have resulted in the positive test. (Id.). He

explained the medication was part of a weight loss program.

(Id.). At no point during the meeting did Mr. Doe admit to

taking illegal drugs or prescription medication that was not

prescribed to him. (Id. at ¶ 39). Based upon the information

Mr. Doe provided, the County authorized a second drug test.

(Id. at ¶ 40). Mr. Doe passed his second test and was allowed

to remain employed by PCFR. (Id.).

Ms. Oakley does not have any direct knowledge of the

circumstances surrounding Mr. Doe’s drug testing or his

employment with PCFR. (Pl. Depo. at 19:24–20:4, 22:3-14,

23:1-9, 40:21–41:1, 131:15-18, 136:4-9). She testified that

she only heard that the County allowed Mr. Doe to retake an

initial failed drug test from unnamed individuals at PCFR.

(Id. at 133:15–135:10). Ms. Oakley assumes Kandis Baker-

Buford, the Director of Equity and Human Resources, approved

Mr. Doe’s retest because he is part of a “diversity program.”

(Id. at 18:2-7, 19:5-8, 27:3-7). Further, Ms. Oakley

believes Mr. Doe “has been put on a pedestal” and “he’s been

coddled,” being “basically [Ms.] Baker-Buford’s sidekick for

years.” (Id. at 66:23–67:11). Ms. Oakley believes the County

did not terminate Mr. Doe because he is an African American

male and was a member of the County’s diversity program.

(Id. at 17:3-14, 18:2-7, 27:3-7; 34:16-21, 41:1-19, 134:14-

21). Ms. Oakley does not know if the County terminated any

African American firefighter/EMTs or male employees in

general for failing a random drug test. (Id. at 39:24-40:12).

But she did admit that every case concerning discipline of

employees is different. (Id. at 66:7-22).

Polk County applies the MRO’s findings and conclusions

regarding a drug test pursuant to its corresponding policies

and procedures. (Joe Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16, Ex. 1). Specifically,

if the MRO reports a positive test result for an individual,

the County applies the disciplinary standards from its drug

free workplace policy. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-18, Ex. 1 at 14). In

doing so, it provides each employee an opportunity to explain

or contest the test results. (Id. at ¶ 16).

The County has consistently terminated firefighter/EMTs

and any other individuals in safety sensitive positions who

fail a drug test. (Id. at ¶ 33). It does not issue less

severe discipline following an unexcused, positive drug

test. (Id.). From January 2015 through December 2023, Polk

County either terminated or allowed resignation in lieu of

termination for 14 employees after positive random drug

tests. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35, Ex. 7). Eight of these employees,

including Ms. Oakley, worked for PCFR. (Id. at ¶ 34). The

group included two African American males, one Hispanic

male, and one white male. (Id.). The fifth male did not

disclose his racial identity, so that remains unknown.

(Id.). In addition to Ms. Oakley, two white females have

also been terminated for positive drug tests. (Id.). Four

white males and two Hispanic males who worked in the County’s

other divisions also lost their jobs after positive drug

tests. (Id.).

E. Procedural History

Ms. Oakley initiated this action against the County in

January 2025. (Doc. # 1). In her complaint, Ms. Oakley asserts

the following claims: (1) gender discrimination in violation

of the FCRA (Count One); (2) race discrimination in violation

of the FCRA (Count Two); (3) gender discrimination in

violation of Title VII (Count Three); and race discrimination

in violation of Title VII. (Id.). The County answered the

complaint (Doc. # 18), and the case proceeded through

discovery.

The County now seeks summary judgment on all claims.

(Doc. # 30). Ms. Oakley has responded (Doc. # 33), and the

County has replied. (Doc. # 36). The Motion is ripe for

review.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to

defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude

a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving

party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742

(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g

Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if

it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.

1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing

the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are

no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260

(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986)).

“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-

moving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings,’ and by its

own affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations

or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to

be true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the

non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344

F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder

evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference

from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine

issue of material fact, the Court should not grant summary

judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846

F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s

response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his

conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only

proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034

(11th Cir. 1981).

III. Analysis

A. Failure to Dispute the County’s Statement of

Material Facts

As an initial matter, Ms. Oakley’s response violates the

Court’s requirements for summary judgment briefing, as laid

out in a February 21, 2025 order. (Doc. # 23). The Court

requires every response to a summary judgment motion to

include a section titled “Response to Statement of

Material Facts.” The opposing party’s response must

mirror the statement of material facts by admitting

and/or denying each of the moving party’s

assertions in matching numbered paragraphs. Each

denial must set forth a pinpoint citation to the

record where the fact is disputed. Although the

opposing party’s response must correspond with the

paragraph scheme used in the statement of material

facts, the response need not repeat the text of the

moving party’s paragraphs. In deciding a motion for

summary judgment, the Court will deem admitted any

fact in the statement of material facts that the

opposing party does not specifically controvert,

provided record evidence supports the moving

party’s statement.

(Id. at 2-3).

Ms. Oakley’s response does not respond at all to the

County’s statement of material facts in its Motion. (Doc. #

33). Ms. Oakley, thus, has failed to dispute any of the

County’s numerous statements of material fact. Therefore,

provided the record evidence cited by the County supports

each statement, the Court deems admitted all facts in the

Motion’s statement of material facts.

B. The Merits

In its Motion, the County argues that Ms. Oakley’s claims

fail under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In response, Ms. Oakley

argues that her claims survive summary judgment under either

the McDonnell Douglas framework or the convincing mosaic of

circumstantial evidence approach. (Doc. # 33 at 3-9).

“In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff

alleging intentional discrimination must present sufficient

facts to permit a jury to rule in her favor.” Lewis v. City

of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019). “One way

that she can do so is by satisfying the burden-shifting

framework set out in” McDonnell Douglas. Id. “When proceeding

under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial

burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination

by showing (1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2)

that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3)

that she was qualified to perform the job in question, and

(4) that her employer treated ‘similarly situated’ employees

outside her class more favorably.” Id. at 1220-21. “If the

plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the

burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. at 1221.

“Finally, should the defendant carry its burden, the

plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant’s

proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful

discrimination, an obligation that ‘merges with the

[plaintiff’s] ultimate burden of persuading the [factfinder]

that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.’”

Id. (citation omitted).

However, “establishing the elements of the McDonnell

Douglas framework is not, and never was intended to be, the

sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment

motion in an employment discrimination case.” Smith v.

Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).

Alternatively, “[a] ‘convincing mosaic’ may be shown by

evidence that demonstrates, among other things, (1)

‘suspicious timing, ambiguous statements . . . , and other

bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory

intent might be drawn,’ (2) systematically better treatment

of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the employer’s

justification is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City,

934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019). The convincing mosaic

approach “is not more forgiving than the [McDonnell Douglas

framework] on the final question, which is whether a

reasonable jury could infer illegal discrimination.”

McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1335 (11th Cir.

2024).

Here, Ms. Oakley’s gender and race discrimination claims

fail under either the McDonnell Douglas framework or the

convincing mosaic approach. No reasonable jury could conclude

that the County discriminated against Ms. Oakley based on her

race or gender. Ms. Oakley does not dispute that she was

randomly selected for drug testing and that she tested

positive for a drug that she was not prescribed and,

therefore, had unlawfully (albeit accidentally) taken. See

Pears v. Mobile Cnty., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1090 (S.D. Ala.

2009) (noting that “a positive drug test” “unquestionably”

qualifies as “a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” to

discharge an employee). The evidence that Ms. Oakley relies

on to create a genuine dispute of material fact about

discrimination includes: (1) Mr. Doe’s being allowed to take

a second drug test when Ms. Oakley was not, and (2) the

severity of terminating a long-time employee with no other

disciplinary history, rather than allowing her to retest.

(Doc. # 33 at 7).

First, John Doe is not a sufficient comparator to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under

McDonnell Douglas or support a convincing mosaic of

discrimination. “[A] plaintiff asserting an intentional-

discrimination claim under McDonnell Douglas must demonstrate

that she and her proffered comparators were ‘similarly

situated in all material respects.’” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218.

“A plaintiff needn’t prove . . . that she and her comparators

are identical save for their race or gender.” Id. at 1227.

“Nor is it necessary for a plaintiff to prove purely formal

similarities — e.g., that she and her comparators had

precisely the same title.” Id. A similarly situated

comparator, however, ordinarily “will have engaged in the

same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff”; “will

have been subject to the same employment policy, guideline,

or rule as the plaintiff”; “will ordinarily (although not

invariably) have been under the jurisdiction of the same

supervisor as the plaintiff”; and “will share the plaintiff’s

employment or disciplinary history.” Id. at 1227-28. “[A]

plaintiff and her comparators must be sufficiently similar,

in an objective sense, that they ‘cannot reasonably be

distinguished.’” Id. at 1228 (citation omitted).

Here, Mr. Doe was not similarly situated in all material

respects to Ms. Oakley. Ms. Oakley admitted that she took her

husband’s prescription medication, which caused her positive

drug test. She did not argue that the drug test was a false

positive; rather, she argued her inappropriate use of

another’s prescription medication was accidental. But

accidental ingestion of another person’s prescription

medication is still considered a positive drug test under the

DOT regulations. (Berry Decl. at ¶¶ 10-11). Dr. Berry, the

MRO working for the company contracted by the County to

perform drug testing, averred that he does “not consider an

individual’s claim that she mistakenly took another person’s

prescription medication to be a reason to negate a positive

drug test.” (Id. at ¶ 12). Likewise, Ms. Joe averred that the

County “does not consider a person’s accidental or mistaken

ingestion of illegal drugs or another person’s prescription

medication to be a valid reason to overturn a positive drug

test or to allow a retest” because doing so “would defeat the

purpose of the drug free workplace program.” (Joe Decl. at ¶

29). Thus, in the County’s eyes, Ms. Oakley admitted she had

engaged in misconduct and her positive drug test was

considered “unexcused.”

In sharp contrast, Mr. Doe denied taking any illegal

drugs or prescription drugs not prescribed to him. (Id. at ¶¶

38-39). That is, he admitted no wrongdoing. See Abel v.

Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that

plaintiff who “freely admitted having taken $10.00 from the

cash register” was not similarly situated to other employee

who “never confessed to taking county funds for personal

use”). Mr. Doe instead presented a list of his prescription

medications, including a medication prescribed for weight

loss, presumably to show his positive drug test was a false

positive caused by his prescription medication. (Id.).1 As a

result of this explanation, the County considered Mr. Doe’s

positive drug test “excused,” which led to Mr. Doe being

allowed to take a second drug test that was negative. (Id. at

¶ 40). Thus, Ms. Oakley and Mr. Doe did not engage in the

same conduct, rendering them materially dissimilar.

Even aside from considering him a true comparator, the

decision not to fire Mr. Doe could not persuade a reasonable

jury that discrimination was the reason for Ms. Oakley’s

termination. Ms. Oakley’s testimony that Mr. Doe was a

favorite of HR because of his participation in the County’s

diversity program, (Pl. Depo. at 18:2-7, 19:5-8, 27:3-7,

66:23–67:11), was speculation not based on personal

1 In her response, Ms. Oakley states that she disputes that

Mr. Doe “presented prescriptions and therefore warranted a

retest.” (Doc. # 33 at 5). However, Ms. Oakley asserts this

“dispute” without citation to any record evidence. Therefore,

Ms. Joe’s declaration regarding the circumstances of Mr.

Doe’s positive drug test and retest is undisputed.

knowledge. Likewise, Ms. Oakley had no personal knowledge

about why Mr. Doe was allowed a retest beyond rumors she

heard. (Id. at 19:24–20:4, 22:3-14, 23:1-9, 40:21–41:8,

131:15-18, 136:4-9). Nevertheless, Ms. Oakley insists that

disregarding her speculative testimony is equivalent to

“improperly weigh[ing] credibility.” (Doc. # 33 at 6). Not

so. “[I]nferences in favor of a plaintiff can be based only

on evidence — not on speculation.” Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt.

Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1058 (11th Cir. 2020). “Even on

summary judgment, a court is not obliged to take as true

testimony that is not based on personal knowledge.” Citizens

Concerned About Our Child. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 193

F.3d 1285, 1295 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999).

Additionally, there is undisputed evidence that multiple

County employees of different races and genders were also

terminated or forced to resign after positive drug tests.

These include eleven men of various races, including two

African American men and three Hispanic men. (Joe Decl. at ¶¶

34-35). Besides Mr. Doe, there is no evidence that other men

or non-white employees who tested positive for drug use kept

their jobs. See Crawford v. Newport News Indus. Corp., No.

4:14-cv-130, 2018 WL 4561671, at *53 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2018)

(granting summary judgment on race discrimination claim where

a plaintiff “failed to identify a single white employee who

was not terminated after a positive drug test,” and, in fact,

there was a white employee who was likewise “required to

submit to drug testing, and upon a positive result, was

terminated”), report and recommendation adopted in part, No.

4:14-cv-130, 2018 WL 2943445 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2018). And

Ms. Oakley has not presented evidence of any statements

evincing discriminatory animus by her superiors or the

decisionmakers for her termination. Given the number of men

of various races whose employment ended after positive drug

tests and the County’s undisputed explanation that it

considered Mr. Doe’s positive drug test “excused,” the single

example of an African American man being allowed to retake

his drug test does not raise a reasonable inference of race

or gender discrimination.

True, “[p]roof that an employer failed to follow its

established policies in reaching an employment decision may

be evidence of pretext.” Harley v. The Health Ctr. of Coconut

Creek, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2006). But

here, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Ms.

Oakley, the County did follow its policy on discipline after

a positive drug test for both Ms. Oakley and Mr. Doe.

According to Ms. Joe, it is the County’s policy to “provide

each employee an opportunity to explain or contest the test

results” after a positive drug test. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 16). It

is undisputed that the County gave both Ms. Oakley and Mr.

Doe an opportunity to explain their positive drug tests. Ms.

Oakley and Mr. Doe gave different explanations for their

positive drug tests. The County determined that only Mr. Doe’s

explanation sufficiently “excused” his positive test and

warranted a retest. Because the County considered Ms.

Oakley’s positive test “unexcused,” the County followed its

policy of ending the employment of those with unexcused

positive drug tests when it terminated Ms. Oakley, as it had

also done with numerous other employees. (Id. at ¶ 34). Thus,

the County did follow its policy as to both Ms. Oakley and

Mr. Doe.

Ms. Oakley’s other arguments are also unavailing. First,

she cites no record evidence for her assertion that she “had

an unblemished 19-year record as a firefighter/EMT.” (Doc. #

33 at 8). Ms. Oakley did not include her lack of prior

discipline in her own statement of material facts (Id. at 2-

3), and does not cite any record evidence for this alleged

fact elsewhere in her response. More fundamentally, even

assuming she had no disciplinary history, the decision to

fire a long-time employee for testing positive for drugs not

prescribed to her does not raise the specter of pretext. In

an undisputed declaration, Ms. Joe explained that she was

“not aware of the County issuing less severe discipline to

any employee following an unexcused, positive random drug

test.” (Joe Decl. at ¶ 33) (emphasis added).

Ms. Oakley argues that termination was a draconian

punishment for a good employee who made a mistake. The Court

tends to agree and has sympathy for Ms. Oakley. But this Court

cannot second guess whether the County’s decision was

“prudent or fair.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla.,

Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Dent v.

Fed. Mogul Corp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1315 (N.D. Ala. 2001)

(“Although termination may, to some, seem a draconian

response given the level of Plaintiff’s offense, the

reasonableness of Defendant’s disciplinary policies is not a

consideration in determining whether Plaintiff has produced

sufficient evidence to prevail on his claims of race and sex

discrimination.”).

This Court does “not sit as a super-personnel department

that reexamines an entity’s business decisions. No matter how

medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how high-handed its

decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm’s

managers, [Title VII] does not interfere.” Elrod v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation

omitted). “[A]n employer may fire an employee for a good

reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or

for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a

discriminatory reason.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v.

STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation

omitted). While it may have been fairer for the County to

retest Ms. Oakley rather than terminate her, Ms. Oakley has

not demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether the County’s decision was discriminatory based on her

race or gender.

The Motion is granted on all claims.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendant Polk County Board of County Commissioners’

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 30) is GRANTED.

(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of

Defendant Polk County Board of County Commissioners and

against Plaintiff Dawn Oakley on all counts of the

complaint.

(3) Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to terminate all

pending deadlines and CLOSE the case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 4th

day of March, 2026.

fan Hunaby (mei¥h

VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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