Kourouma

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ANSU KOUROUMA, ) Case No.: 1:26 CV 587

)

Petitioner ) JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

)

v. )

)

SCOTT A HILDEBRAND, et al., )

)

Respondents ) ORDER

Currently pending before the court in the above-captioned case is Ansu Kourouma’s

(“Petitioner” or “Kourouma”), Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

(“Petition”) (ECF No. 1), and Respondents Scott Hildebrand, Secretary of Homeland Security, and

the United States Attorney General’s (collectively, “Respondents”) Return of Writ and Motion to

Dismiss (“Motion”) (ECF No. 6). Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(2), Magistrate Judge Jennifer Dowdell

Armstrong was referred the case, and prepared a Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 7.) For the

following reasons, the court hereby adopts the Report and Recommendation, and dismisses the

Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Ansu Kourouma is a citizen and native of Guinea who entered the United States on or about

January 30, 2024. (Return of Writ Ex. A at PageID 44, ECF No. 6-1.) Kourouma alleges that he has

been in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Geauga County Jail

since July 24, 2025. (Pet. at PageID 12.) On August 16, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”) issued Kourouma a Notice to Appear (“Notice”) in relation to removal proceedings.

(Return of Writ Ex. A at PageID 44.) The Notice indicated that it was issued “after an asylum officer

ha[d] found that the respondent ha[d] demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture[,]” and

it ordered Kourouma to appear before an immigration judge on September 30, 2025. (Id.)

On November 11, 2025, Kourouma filed an application for asylum. (Pet. at PageID 14.) He

submitted evidence in support of the application on November 26, 2025. (Id.) Before the hearing

occurred, however, DHS filed a motion on January 6, 2026, to pretermit Kourouma’s asylum

application because of an applicable Asylum Cooperative Agreement (“ACA”). (Id.; see also Return

of Writ at PageID 32.) On January 8, 2026, the immigration judge partially granted DHS’s motion

to pretermit Kourouma’s asylum application, and scheduled a hearing. (Pet. at PageID 18.) The

hearing on DHS’s pretermit motion occurred January 30, 2026, after which the immigration judge

issued an order denying Kourouma’s asylum application, and ordering him removed to Uganda. (Id.

at PageID 20–22.) Kourouma appealed the immigration judge’s order by timely filing a Notice of

Appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Id. at PageID 12.) Kourouma’s appeal

remains pending.

On March 11, 2026, Kourouma filed the § 2241 Petition considered herein. (See generally

ECF No. 1). The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong (the

“Magistrate” or “Judge Armstrong”), pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) for the preparation of an

expedited Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 3). The Magistrate’s Initial Order (ECF

No. 4) issued on March 13, 2026, ordered Respondents to file their Return of Writ within 10 days.

(Id.) Accordingly, Respondents filed their Return of Writ (ECF No. 6), with Exhibits, on March 23,

-2-

2026. Petitioner did not file a Traverse, and the time to do so expired on March 28, 2026. (Magistrate

Initial Order at PageID 28.) On April 10, 2026, Judge Armstrong issued her R&R (ECF No. 7),

recommending dismissal of Kourouma’s Petition. On April 24, 2026, Kourouma timely filed his

Objection (ECF No. 8) to the R&R, to which Respondents filed a Response (ECF No. 9) on May 4,

2026.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When a court receives timely written objections to a magistrate judge’s R&R, it “shall make

a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations to

which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, de novo review is limited only to those

issues that a petitioner specifically identifies. Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 932

F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A “general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments

previously presented is not sufficient.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004).

Without specific objections, “[t]he district court’s attention is not focused on any specific issues for

review, thereby making the initial reference to the magistrate useless. The functions of the district

court are effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and the district court perform identical tasks

. . . wast[ing] judicial resources rather than saving them, and run[ning] contrary to the purposes of

the Magistrates Act.” Id. at 748 (citing Howard, 932 F.2d at 509).

Thus, a non-specific objection “has the same effect as a failure to object” to the R&R.

Aldrich, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 747–48. Consequently, a court that receives only general objections to

the Magistrate’s R&R, “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record

in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, Advisory Committee Notes (detailing

lessened standard for adopting R&R when no objection is filed). See also, e.g., Overholt v. Green,

-3-

No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018 WL 3018175, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018) (citing Howard, 932 F. 2d

at 509) (explaining courts should not have to do “[a] reexamination of the exact same argument that

was presented to the Magistrate Judge” absent specific objections); Brown v. Hamilton Cnty., No.

1:19-CV-00969, 2022 WL 2816266, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2022) (citation omitted)

(“disregard[ing]” objections to R&R for being too general).

Accordingly, the court must determine if specific objections to the R&R have been made.

Aldrich, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 749; Feathers v. Foley, No. 5:22-CV-540, 2024 WL 1990886, at *1

(N.D. Ohio May 6, 2024), certificate of appealability denied sub nom. Feathers v. Reynolds, No.

24-3466, 2024 WL 5707887 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2024). Insofar as Kourouma presented specific

objections, the court will conduct a “de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

However, insofar as Petitioner states “nothing more than mere disagreements with the R&R,” the

court need only review the R&R for clear error. Brown, 2022 WL 2816266, at *2.

I. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Federal district courts may grant Writs of Habeas Corpus to prisoners who are held “in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”18 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3). Habeas relief under § 2241 is available to non-citizens who seek to challenge the legality

of their detention in ICE facilities. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). Kourouma’s

Petition indicates that he is currently held in ICE custody at the Geauga County Jail, is filing a

Petition to challenge his “Pretermit to Uganda,” and acknowledges that he has a pending appeal in

the Board of Immigration Appeals regarding the application of the Uganda ACA to his case. (Pet.

at PageID 12.) Kourouma, through counsel, asserts two grounds for relief: (1) “Petitioner has been

-4-

held fore [sic] over seven months without any attempt to carry out a removal to Uganda and there

are no indications as to when or how he will be transported[;]” and (2) “The ACA treaties utilized

by the Trump Administration are racially and ethnically biased both in their inception and intent and

in their application.” (/d. at PageID 7-8.)

In her R&R, Judge Armstrong concluded that Kourouma’s first ground for relief was

premature and that the court lacked jurisdiction over his second ground. (R&R at PageID 59.)

Accordingly, she recommended that the court grant Respondents’ motion to dismiss and dismiss

Kourouma’s petition without prejudice. (/d.)

Kourouma filed an Objection (ECF No. 8), through counsel, but did not make specific

objections to the Magistrate’s determinations. Rather Kourouma writes at length about ACAs

generally, the safe third country exception, and Uganda being designated a safe third country. (/d.

at PageID 68-81.) As to these issues, Kourouma presents general arguments, policy concerns, and

conclusory allegations, but he does not identify potential inaccuracies in the R&R, or state specific

disagreements with the Magistrate’s conclusions.

Given the lack of specific objections to the R&R’s recommendation to dismiss, the court

“need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the

recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, Advisory Committee Notes. After a thorough review and

finding no clear error, the court can adopt the Magistrate’s R&R on this basis alone. However, the

court emphasizes that the outcome is the same even under de novo review. Despite the lack of

specific objections, the court reviewed Kourouma’s 17-page Petition and the record. After a

thorough review, the court finds Kourouma’s Petition must be dismissed, for the same reasons

enunciated in the R&R, as discussed below.

-5-

A. Ground One - Unlawful Detention

Kourouma’s first ground for relief is that his continued ICE detention is unlawful under

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), because he has been in custody for more than six months

and there is no indication of when he will be transported to Uganda. (Pet. at PageID 12.) As such,

Kourouma claims that, “[t]he pretermit is thus simply a ruse to continue incarceration[,]” in violation

of his due process rights. (Id.)

In her R&R, the Magistrate concluded that this claim is premature because Kourouma has

a pending appeal before the BIA, and is therefore not subject to a final order of removal. (R&R at

PageID 62.) The Magistrate noted that “[t]here may certainly become a point where Mr. Kourouma’s

continued detention implicates Zadvydas[,]” however, “because Mr. Kourouma’s removal order is

not yet final, neither the 90-day removal period nor Zadvydas’ six-month detention period have

begun to run.” (Id. at PageID 62–63.) The court agrees.

As the Magistrate explained, the removal detention provision of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”) which Zadyvdas construed, only applies to non-citizens who are subject to

a final order of removal. (Id. at PageID 62.) Here, there is no final removal order, and so any alleged

violation of the detention period stated in the INA or Zadyvdas is premature. Moreover, Kourouma

does not appear to argue in his Objection that the court should construe the INA removal provision

otherwise. Accordingly, the court adopts the Magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss Kourouma’s

first ground for relief without prejudice.

Additionally, the court adopts the Magistrate’s recommendation that it lacks jurisdiction to

consider Kourouma’s argument directly challenging his removal order. (R&R at PageID 64.) As part

of ground one, Kourouma appears to argue that the Government violated his due process rights when

-6-

it pretermitted his asylum application and ordered him removed to Uganda without an asylum

hearing. As the Magistrate explained, the INA limits a district court’s ability to grant a writ of habeas

corpus in the immigration context. (/d.) Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) provides that, “a petition

for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals” is the “sole and exclusive means for judicial

review of an order of removal[.]” Moreover, § 1252(b)(9) acts as an “unmistakable ‘zipper’

clause[,]” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999), that

consolidates “‘judicial review’ of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.”

IN.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001). The Magistrate determined that Kourouma’s challenge

to his removal order without an asylum hearing “falls within the scope of § 1252(b)(9),” (R&R at

PageID 64-65), and therefore this court lacks jurisdiction to consider it.

In his Objection, Kourouma writes: “The Magistrate Judge states that this Court lacks

jurisdiction over removal issues. However, federal courts have the ultimate power in reviewing

administrative agency actions. Loper-Bright v. Raimundo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).” (Obj. at PageID

82.) This assertion, like others made in his Objection, is general rather than specific, and thus, the

court need only review Judge Armstrong’s recommendation as to ground one for clear error. Finding

none, the court adopts the Magistrate’s recommendation that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider

this part of Kourouma’s first ground for relief.

B. Ground Two - Equal Protection Challenge to the ACA

Kourouma’s second ground for relief is that, “[t]he ACA treaties utilized by the Trump

Administration are racially and ethnically biased both in their inception and intent and in their

application,” and therefore violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Pet. at PageID 8, 15.)

-7-

In her R&R, Judge Armstrong explained that, like Kourouma’s challenge to his removal

order in ground one, the court lacks jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9) to consider Petitioner’s equal

protection arguments because they “arise[] from actions taken or proceedings brought to remove

him[.]” (R&R at PageID 65.) As such, the Magistrate recommended the court dismiss Petitioner’s

second ground for relief for want of jurisdiction. (/d. at PageID 66.)

Rather than engage with this conclusion and recommendation, Kourouma’s Objection lodges

general policy complaints with ACAs as a whole, and provides a 2017 example of President Trump’s

remarks about immigrants entering the U.S. since his inauguration. (Obj. at PageID 81.) These

general disagreements are not objections warranting de novo review. See Brown, 2022 WL 2816266,

at *2. As such, the R&R’s clear explanation of why this court cannot consider Petition’s second

ground for review is essentially unchallenged. Finding no clear error in the R&R, the court adopts

the Magistrate’s recommendation that it dismiss Petitioner’s second ground for relief for want of

jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and after careful review of the R&R and record, the court finds

no clear error on the face of the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 7), and adopts it as its own.

In addition, the court finds that, even on de novo review, the Petition must be denied. Thus, for

reasons fully explained in the R&R, and reiterated here, the court hereby denies Kourouma’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and enters judgment in favor of Respondents.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

June 4, 2026

-8-