Raymond

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 26-CV-22494-RAR

GEORGE RAYMOND, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________________________/

ORDER REQUIRING PAYMENT OF FILING FEE OR

AMENDED MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Combined Application to Proceed

in Forma Pauperis Without Prepaying Fees or Costs and Request for Service of Process by the

United States Marshals Service (“IFP Motion”), [ECF No. 3], filed on April 10, 2026.

Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed their Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief,

[ECF No. 1], on April 10, 2026. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Yeney

Hernandez, [ECF No. 2]. Plaintiffs proceeded to file the instant IFP Motion, [ECF No. 3], as well

as several other Motions seeking injunctive relief and expedited consideration. See [ECF Nos. 4,

6, 7, 17, 18, 21, 26]. On June 22, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate Magistrate Judge

Referral and Motion for Reassignment to Article III Judge, [ECF No. 27], which Magistrate Judge

Hernandez granted, [ECF No. 28]. Accordingly, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. See

[ECF No. 29].

As a threshold matter, the Court finds that there is an insufficient basis to grant Plaintiffs’

IFP Motion. As such, Plaintiffs must either file a sufficient IFP Motion or pay the filing fee before

the Court will examine the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and whether service by the U.S. Marshals

Service is warranted. Further, several of Plaintiffs’ other Motions are mooted by the Court’s denial

of Plaintiff’s IFP Motion.

I. IFP Motion

Courts may authorize a party to proceed in forma pauperis in any suit so long as the party

complies with the prescriptions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), i.e., by submitting an affidavit “that

includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses [and showing] that the person is unable

to pay” court filing fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The Court’s determination is limited to “whether

the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners,

Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 1976)). Although the affidavit “need not

show that the litigant is ‘absolutely destitute’ to qualify for indigent status under § 1915,” it must

show that “the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to

support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Id. (citations omitted).

“There is no absolute right to be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in civil matters;

rather it is a privilege extended to those unable to pay filing fees when the action is not frivolous

or malicious.” Startti v. United States, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1969) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

1915). The Court “has wide discretion in denying an application to proceed [in forma pauperis]

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This is especially true, the rubric goes, in civil cases for damages, wherein

the courts should grant the privilege sparingly.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306 (quoting Flowers v.

Turbine Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1972)). Where a court finds the “affidavit is

insufficient to provide an adequate basis for an IFP determination,” the court may direct the

plaintiff “to file a supplemental affidavit providing additional information . . . which may assist

the court in its ruling.” Id. at 1308.

Regarding their employment and income, Plaintiff George Raymond represents that he “is

currently unemployed and has no regular salary or wages,” and Plaintiff Edward Raymond

represents that he “is currently employed in limited capacity and has no income sufficient to pay

the filing fee without substantial hardship.” IFP Mot. at 2. Further both assert that “[n]either

Plaintiff has received income from pension, annuity, life insurance, disability payments, interest,

dividends, rent, or other regular sources in the past twelve months sufficient to cover the $405.00

federal filing fee without substantial hardship.” Id. Plaintiffs then assert that their primary assert—

the commercial property that is the subject of this case—“is not presently available to Plaintiffs as

a source of funds,” and that they have “limited liquid assets—cash on hand and bank balances

insufficient to pay the filing fee without hardship.” Id. at 2-3. Finally, Plaintiffs claim that they

“have monthly obligations for rent, utilities, food, transportation, and personal necessities that

consume substantially all available income.” Id. at 3.

Plaintiffs’ IFP Motion is deficient. The Court is unable to evaluate Plaintiffs’ IFP status

without further detail about Plaintiffs’ income, assets, and liabilities. Plaintiffs provide no amounts

as to how much they receive in income (particularly for Edward Raymond, who indicates that he

is currently employed). Nor do Plaintiffs indicate how much they have in assets, merely

characterizing them as “limited.” And Plaintiffs assert that their monthly obligations “consume

substantially all available income” without specifying the cost of these obligations or their

incomes. As such, the Court is unable to compare “the applicant[s’] assets and liabilities in order

to determine whether [they have] satisfied the poverty requirement.” See Thomas v.

Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiffs’ IFP Motion also does not appear to be completely forthcoming. Plaintiffs note

that “Plaintiff Edward Raymond has previously been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

by this Court in Case No. 25-CV-20764 (S.D. Fla.), before the Honorable Roy K. Altman.” IFP

Mot. at 3. Notwithstanding the fact that only Edward Raymond was a Plaintiff in that case, it

appears upon the Court’s review that Plaintiff Edward Raymond did pay the filing fee in that case

and never sought to proceed in forma pauperis. See Raymond v. LSM Trading USA llc, et al., 25-

20764, ECF No. 3; see also Shaik v. TokMedia Enters. LLC, No. 25-CV-20985-RAR, 2025 WL

740852, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2025) (denying “materially incomplete and misleading” IFP

motion as insufficient).

Ultimately, Plaintiffs have failed to file a legally sufficient IFP Motion, nor paid the filing

fee for their Complaint. Although a pro se pleading must be construed liberally, see Waldman v.

Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017), a pro se litigant must still conform with procedural

rules, see Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Moon v. Newsome,

863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). The Court cannot proceed with addressing this case until

Plaintiffs have resolved the filing fee issue.

II. Motions for Injunctive Relief

Finally, Plaintiffs have filed several Motions for injunctive relief that warrant denial

without prejudice and with leave to refile. On April 14, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency

Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Enforcement of State Court Writ of Possession

Pending Resolution of Federal Action. [ECF No. 4]; see also [ECF No. 10] (striking emergency

designation). On April 15, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Emergency Motion for Ex Parte

Temporary Restraining Order. [ECF No. 7]; see also [ECF No. 10] (striking emergency

designation). And on May 20, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to Enjoin Sale or Transfer of Subject Property

Pending Adjudication of Federal Claims. [ECF No. 18]; see also [ECF No. 19] (striking

emergency designation).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 “court[s] may issue a preliminary injunction

only on notice to the adverse party.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1). However, the Defendants in

this case have yet to be served. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs’ Motions seeking a

preliminary injunction, [ECF Nos. 4, 18], are wholly premature. See, e.g., Palm Beach Cnty. Env’t

Coal. v. Fla., 587 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“Plaintiffs have failed to make a

showing that warrants injunctive relief. At the time of the hearing, neither [] defendant[] had been

served . . . Therefore, the Court does not appear to have jurisdiction over the Federal Defendants

in the instant action.”); Hussain v. Ponce, No. CV1806579JFWRAO, 2019 WL 1055235, at *2

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019) (“Plaintiff is not entitled to any preliminary injunctive relief at this time,

as his Motion is premature . . . the defendant has not been served or appeared in this action.

Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the defendant.”); Smalls v. Stirling, No.

9:24-CV-03966-SAL-MHC, 2024 WL 5112075, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2024) (“The request for a

preliminary injunction should be denied because it is premature as this action has not yet been

served, and Defendants have not answered or otherwise plead.”).

Plaintiffs’ Motion seeking an ex parte temporary restraining order, [ECF No. 7], must also

be denied. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1), courts may issue temporary restraining

orders without notice to the adverse party only if two prongs are met. First, “specific facts in an

affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or

damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Second, the movant must “certif[y] in writing any efforts made to give notice

and the reason why it should not be required.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(B). “[C]ourts have

recognized very few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO.” Reno Air Racing

Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, Plaintiffs state that “[o]n April 9, 2026, the state court verbally granted Defendant’s

Motion for Writ of Possession following a hearing at which the state court denied all relief

requested by Plaintiffs” but “[t]he written writ order had not been signed as of the filing of this

Motion.” [ECF No. 4] at 4. Plaintiffs argue “that if Defendant receives notice of a pending federal

TRO before it is granted, Defendant will immediately contact the state court and push to have the

writ signed and the Sheriff dispatched before this Court can act.” Id. at 5.

But Plaintiffs do not establish that they face immediate and irreparable injury such that

notice need not be required. First, Plaintiffs acknowledge that “Defendant U.S. Bank’s counsel of

record—Roetzel & Andress, LPA, and specifically Paul A. Giordano, Esq.—has actual notice of

this federal action through multiple independent channels.” Id. at 6. Second, Plaintiffs’ Motion

was filed two months ago, and there is no indication that Defendants have taken the action

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin. Accordingly, it does not appear that Plaintiffs face such an imminent and

irreparable injury requiring the drastic remedy of Court intervention without allowing Defendants

an opportunity to respond. Plaintiffs remain free to “pursue the preliminary relief [they seek]

following proper notice to Defendants.” Lawrence v. Fundworks, LLC, No. 1:25-CV-00139-JPB,

2025 WL 1421914, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2025). Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ IFP Motion, [ECF No. 3], is DENIED without prejudice.

2. If Plaintiffs wish to maintain this action, they must either file a legally sufficient

motion to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the mandatory $405.00 filing fee—which includes

both the $350.00 filing fee set by Congress and an additional $55.00 administrative fee imposed

by this District—on or before July 31, 2026. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (“The clerk of each district

court shall require the parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court . . . to

pay a filing fee of $350[.]”); see also Court Fees, UNITED STATES DIST. CT. S. DIST. OF FLA.,

https://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/court-fees (last visited June 25, 2025).

3. The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiffs the Court’s form titled

“Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs,” which requires

additional detail regarding Plaintiffs’ income, assets, and liabilities.

4. Failure to either timely pay the filing fee or file a legally sufficient IFP Motion

will result in the dismissal of the Complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Sellers v. United States,

881 F.2d 1061, 1063 (11th Cir. 1989).

5. The Clerk’s Office is instructed to administratively CLOSE this case pending

Plaintiff’s compliance with this Order.

6. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Referral to the Volunteer Attorney Program, [ECF No. 21],

is DENIED without prejudice and with leave to refile provided Plaintiffs file a legally sufficient

IFP motion or pay the filing fee.

7. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Expedite Ruling on in Forma Pauperis Application and to

Direct Immediate U.S. Marshals Service, [ECF No. 6]; Motion to Expedite Consideration of

Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and for Immediate Direction to the United States

Marshals Service to Effectuate Service of Process, [ECF No. 17]; and Motion for Clarification of

Status of Pending Motions, [ECF No. 26], are DENIED as moot.

8. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Enforcement of State Court

Writ of Possession Pending Resolution of Federal Action, [ECF No. 4]; Supplemental Motion for

Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, [ECF No. 7]; and Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction to Enjoin Sale or Transfer of Subject Property Pending

Adjudication of Federal Claims, [ECF No. 18], are DENIED without prejudice.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 25th day of June, 2026.

RODOLFO A. RUIZ II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies provided to:

George Raymond

7110 NW 6th Court

Miami, FL 33150

307-225-9311

PRO SE

Edward Raymond

7110 NW 6th Court

Miami, FL 33150

310-564-6227

PRO SE

Page 8 of 8