Imami

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MIR MOZAMEL IMAMI, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-566-J

)

TODD M. LYONS, et al., )

)

Respondents.1 )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Mir Mozamel Imami, a noncitizen,2 seeks a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 3.3 United States District Judge Bernard

M. Jones, II referred the case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial

proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 9. The Government

responded, Doc. 13, and Petitioner has replied, Doc. 14. So the matter is at

issue.

1 Respondent Fred Figueora is not a federal official, and the response is

not filed on his behalf. See Doc. 13, at 8 n.1.

2 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578

n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).

3 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation

and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless

otherwise indicated.

For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court grant

Petitioner’s habeas petition in part and order Respondents to immediately

release Petitioner.

I. Factual background and Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner is a citizen of Afghanistan. Doc. 3, at 1. On February 21, 2023,

he entered the United States without inspection. Id. The next day, he was

placed into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Doc. 13, Ex. 2. The

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a Notice to Appear (NTA)

charging him as removable under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA).4 Id. Ex. 2. DHS released Petitioner on an order of

recognizance under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and enrolled him in an Alternatives to

Detention program. Id. at 15 & Ex. 3. Petitioner missed a check-in on March

13, 2023, and DHS terminated him from the program as an absconder. Id. at

15.

4 This section is codified in the United States Code as 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) provides that a noncitizen who is

present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived

in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the

Attorney General is ineligible to be admitted to the United States. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

2

On July 12, 2023, Petitioner applied for Asylum and Withholding of

Removal. Id. & Ex. 5. On January 5, 2026, during a regular check-in,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) took him into custody. Id. & Ex.

4. Petitioner maintains he has no criminal history since he entered the United

States and has not violated any conditions of his release. Doc. 3, at 3.

He argues that his re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing

violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Doc. 3, at 4-11; that ICE

failed to provide him with the required notice and interview in violation of its

own regulations and his due process rights, id. at 12; (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4

and 241.13); that temporary injunctive relief is required so the Court may

preclude his transfer to another facility;5 and that the immigration system’s

structural bias requires relief in the form of immediate release, id. at 15.

He asks this Court to order his immediate release; in the alternative hold

a bond hearing; or order Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing

within three days where the government bears the burden of proving by clear

and convincing evidence that he poses a danger to the community or an

unreasonable risk of flight and ensure Respondents’ compliance; declare his

redetention without notice and an opportunity to be heard violated the Fifth

5 The Court addressed this request in its Order for a Response, Doc. 11.

3

Amendment; pending this Court’s consideration and disposition of this

Petition, temporarily restrain and enjoin Respondents, and all persons acting

at their direction or in concert with them, from removing Petitioner from the

United States or transferring Petitioner outside the jurisdiction of this Court

absent prior order of this Court; enjoin Respondents from re-detaining

Petitioner after release without: providing prior written notice of the grounds

for detention, affording Petitioner an opportunity to be heard and to present

evidence; and making an individualized determination, supported by specific

facts and evidence, that Petitioner poses a flight risk or danger to the

community; and award Petitioner his reasonable costs and attorney’s fees. Id.

at 26-27.

In their response to the habeas corpus petition, Respondents argue this

Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, that Petitioner has not

exhausted his available remedies because he never requested a bond hearing,

that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and that his

due process rights are co-extensive with statutory standards requiring no

safeguards before revoking release. Doc. 13.

4

II. Standard of review.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in

custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of

the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are

properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d

1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88

(2001)).

III. Discussion.

A. Petitioner has the right to procedural due process.

Petitioner claims that his ongoing detention without a hearing violates

his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Doc. 3, at 4-

7. To the extent that Respondents substantively address Petitioner’s

procedural due process argument, they assert that Petitioner is an “applicant

for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) of the

INA and is therefore categorically ineligible for a bond hearing. Doc. 13, at 16.

Section 1225(b)(2) mandates detention for noncitizens who are

“applicant[s] for admission, [where] the examining immigration officer

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determines that [the noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond

a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And under

§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), “[i]f an immigration officer determines that [the noncitizen]

. . . who is arriving in the United States . . . is inadmissible under section

1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) . . ., the officer shall order the [noncitizen] removed

from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien

indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.”

An individual detained as inadmissible upon inspection at the border can only

be paroled into the United States “‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or

significant public benefit.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).

Respondents provide only that Petitioner was released on his own

recognizance after being referred to the Alternatives to Detention program.

Doc. 13, Exs. 1, 3. The reason for Petitioner’s release remains unclear, but “it

is illogical to suggest that his re-detention is governed by § 1225(b)(1), which

. . . governs procedures for the inspection of aliens arriving in the United

States who have not been admitted or paroled.” See Rafibaev v. Noem, 2026

WL 607559, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2026). And, likewise, § 1225(b)(2) cannot

apply to Petitioner as “a noncitizen paroled into the country.” Qasemi v.

Francis, 2025 WL 3654098, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) ((“[A] noncitizen

6

paroled into the country—i.e., a noncitizen residing in the United States—is

not an arriving alien.”).

1. Section 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention.

Section 1226 governs “the usual removal process.” Salcedo Aceros v.

Kaiser, 2025 WL 2637503, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (quoting Dep’t of

Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020)). The § 1226 process

starts when the Government files an NTA with an immigration court. Id.

Section 1226 then lets the Government arrest and detain noncitizens or release

them on bond or on conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Release is required

if the noncitizen can show they are not a danger and will show up at future

hearings. Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *1 (citing Diaz v. Garland, 53

F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022) and 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). Id. If detention

continues, the noncitizen gets a bond hearing before an immigration judge. Id.

To be released, noncitizens must show by a preponderance of the evidence that

they are not a security threat, community danger, or a flight risk. Id.

The initial decision to pursue Petitioner’s detention “under § 1226(a)

precludes the [G]overnment from later ‘switch[ing] tracks’ to subject him to

mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” Gutierrez v. Chesnut, 2025 WL

3514495, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025) (citing Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL

7

2637503, at *8). The rule is simple: “Sections 1226(a) and 1225(b) cannot be

applied simultaneously.” Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8.

The Court should conclude that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s

detention.6

2. Petitioner is entitled to relief under § 1226.7

When Petitioner was detained after residing in the country for almost

three years, he was not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)

as Respondents argue. Respondents released Petitioner under § 1226. So

6 Petitioner’s asylum request does not change this outcome. This Court

has “declined to find” that either refusing to voluntarily depart or seeking

asylum “‘constitutes ‘seeking admission’ for purposes of this subsection.’”

Malacidze v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1527-D, 2026 WL 227155, at *3 (W.D. Okla.

Jan. 28, 2026) (quoting Cruz-Hernandez v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1378-D, 2026 WL

18932, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 2, 2026)); see also Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden,

Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1284 (11th Cir. 2026) (“This argument

fails at the gate. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) makes it clear that an applicant for

admission’s status as one ‘seeking admission’ becomes relevant upon

examination by an immigration officer, which occurs before a § 1229a

proceeding even commences.” (quoting 8 U.SC § 1225(b)(2)(A))).

7 Citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252, Respondents argue the Court does not have

jurisdiction to review DHS’s discretionary decisions to revoke Petitioner’s

release. Doc. 13, at 31-32. But, as Petitioner points out (Doc. 14, at 2), that

section applies to “judicial review of a final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(1). Petitioner does not have a final order of removal, and he

“challenges the legality of his continued detention under the statutory

framework governing custody and bond determination.” Cortes v. Holt, No.

CIV-25-1176-SLP, 2026 WL 147435, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2026). So this

Court does not lack jurisdiction. Id.

8

Petitioner is entitled to retain the legal protections under § 1226(a). And

Respondents cannot erase them by simply “switching tracks.” Salcedo Aceros,

2025 WL 2637503, at *8; Briceno Solano v. Mason, 2026 WL 311624, at *14

(S.D.W. Va. Feb. 4, 2026).

To release Petitioner, DHS had to determine that he “would not pose a

danger to property or persons,” and that he was “likely to appear for any future

proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). Respondents identify no change in

circumstances that required revocation of Petitioner’s conditional release. So

he is entitled to release. See Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 70 (2d

Cir. 2026) (concluding the petitioner’s detention was “governed by Section

1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A),” and explaining that its holding “allows

noncitizens . . . who are already present in the United States and are

determined not to be a flight risk or danger to the community to be released on

bond under Section 1226(a) while their removal proceedings are pending”).

3. Procedural due process analysis.

“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to

deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. Freedom from

imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533

U.S. at 690 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); cf. Trump v.

9

J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (“‘It is well established that the Fifth

Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal

proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

“The [INA] establishes procedures for removing [and detaining

noncitizens] living unlawfully in the United States.” Johnson v. Guzman

Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 527 (2021); see Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S.

573, 578 (2022) (“The INA establishes procedures for the Government to use

when removing certain noncitizens from the United States and, in some cases,

detaining them.”). Respondents encourage the Court to rest its decision on the

statutory interpretation question. See Doc. 13, at 19-23.

Respondents also argue that “Zadvydas applies in this case,” arguing it

outright “supplants” the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), due

process test. Doc. 13, at 24. But Zadvydas issues arise after a final order of

removal, not before. The 90-day removal period does not commence until the

removal order is administratively final. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). See, e.g.,

Rodriguez-Luna v. Noem, 2026 WL 1557162, at *2 (D.N.M. June 2, 2026).

(“Petitioner’s appeal is still pending and the removal order has not become

administratively final[, so] any claim for relief under Zadvydas is premature.”).

Respondents also argue that, even applying Mathews, Petitioner can show no

due process violation. Doc. 13, at 25.

10

This Court analyzes Petitioner’s procedural due process claim to

determine whether he has a protected liberty interest, and what process is

necessary to ensure any deprivation of that liberty interest aligns with the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). In examining the necessary process, the Court turns

to the three factors set forth in Mathews (1) “the private interest that will be

affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would

entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.

“When the [G]overnment grants [a noncitizen] parole into the country, it

creates a liberty interest intimately tied to freedom from imprisonment.”

Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); see also

Iza v. Arnott, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026) (“Individuals

released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interest

in their ‘continued liberty.’” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482

(1972))); Sahil v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2026 WL 560216, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 27,

2026) (finding “that noncitizens acquire a liberty interest once released from

11

immigration detention”). Petitioner’s interest in physical freedom “is the most

elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004);

see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (stating that an individual’s interest in

being free from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process]

Clause protects”). DHS deprived Petitioner of his protected status when it re-

detained him.

Turning to the Mathews factors, the Court finds that Petitioner has a

significant private interest in remaining free from detention after spending

almost three years here. By initially releasing Petitioner on his own

recognizance, the Government necessarily determined that he was “neither a

security risk nor a risk of absconding,” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). Respondents have

presented no evidence that there was a formal change in this assessment. By

permitting Petitioner to remain at liberty for nearly three years, the

Government enabled Petitioner to develop a protected liberty interest in

remaining out of custody. To be sure, “Congress may make rules as to aliens

that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,

522 (2003). But that power remains “subject to important constitutional

limitations.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. And it does not erase Petitioner’s

significant interest in remaining free from detention.

12

Respondents do not suggest Petitioner violated any laws while in the

United States. During his release, Petitioner’s interest in release grew even

stronger as he presumably “form[ed] the other enduring attachments of normal

life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The first Mathews factor favors Petitioner.

Second, the Court considers “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The

risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is considerable

where ICE arrested him at a scheduled check-in without any notice of the

reason or a pre-deprivation hearing.

“Constitutionally inadequate notice also often leads to constitutionally

inadequate opportunity to be heard, because opportunity to be heard must be

meaningful to be constitutionally sufficient.” Saqib v. Andrews, 2026 WL

350830, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026), adopted, 2026 WL 440566 (E.D. Cal.

Feb. 17, 2026). Respondents detained Petitioner with no procedural safeguards

to determine whether the revocation of his release was justified. This factor

weighs in Petitioner’s favor. See, e.g., E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d

1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the Government may believe it has a

valid reason to detain Petitioner does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate

the detention in a manner that comports with due process.”).

13

Finally, the Court considers the Government’s interest, including any

fiscal or administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “While this Court

recognizes that the [G]overnment has an interest in enforcing immigration

laws,” the Government’s interest in arresting Petitioner without a

determination whether he posed a risk of flight or danger is low. Saqib, 2026

WL 350830, at *6. And the Court can discern no significant administrative or

fiscal burden associated with placing the burden on the Government to follow

its own laws and regulations. See, e.g., Iza, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (“An alien’s

opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation of his parole is only

meaningful if the [G]overnment comports with its own internal standards

regarding parole revocation.”). Especially given that Petitioner’s detention was

not considered necessary even after he missed a check-in and for nearly three

years after.8

8 Petitioner alleges Respondents have provided neither the reasons for his

re-detention following his release nor an interview at which he can present

evidence demonstrating there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future. Doc. 3, at 12. And so he argues that Respondents

have violated their own regulations in re-detaining him. Id. at 12-13.

Respondents are correct that, because Petitioner is not subject to a final

order of removal, these regulations are not in play. Doc. 13, at 29; see 8 C.F.R.

§ 241.13(a) (establishing “special review procedures for those [noncitizens] who

are subject to a final order of removal”). That said, revocation of release still

requires notice of a change in circumstances. See Danierov v. Noem, 2026 WL

45288 (D.N.M. Jan. 7, 2026) (“Although DHS may revoke release at any time,

courts require a material change in circumstances as to whether the noncitizen

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B. Remedy.

Habeas is “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,

553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). “The typical remedy for such detention is, of course,

release.” Id.; see also Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 (“Habeas has traditionally

been a means to secure release from unlawful detention.”). Federal district

courts have broad equitable powers to craft habeas relief. Burton v. Johnson,

975 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1992). District courts have the power and

authority to dispose of habeas corpus matters “as law and justice require.” 28

U.S.C. § 2243; see also United States v. Allen, 139 F.3d 913 (10th Cir. 1998) (“If

the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental

requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.”

(quoting Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir.1990))).9

poses a danger to the community or an unreasonable risk of flight before

revoking release.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

9 Respondents’ argument that Petitioner failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies lacks merit. Doc. 13, at 32-33. Immigration Courts

feel bound by Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), so

Petitioner correctly believed it futile to seek a bond hearing or appeal the

decision to not provide one. In Hurtado, the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) held that those who entered the country without admission or parole are

ineligible for a bond hearing and are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Hurtado is not binding on this Court. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (“[C]ourts need not and under the APA may not defer

to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”).

15

The undersigned finds that the ongoing violation of Petitioner’s due

process rights requires his immediate release subject to the same conditions of

his earlier release.10 This view is shared by numerous courts across the

country.11

IV. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s habeas petition in part and order his immediate

10 “Many orders in similar cases require that a bond hearing be set in a

short period of time with an automatic release if the hearing does not occur.

Those cases do not examine the effect of a pending asylum petition or a clear

conditional release order under § 1226.” Velasquez Montillo v. Brooksby, 2026

WL 592355, at *10 (D. Utah Mar. 3, 2026).

11 See Ewere v. Cerna, No. CIV-26-320-SLP, 2026 WL 1207088, at *1-2

(W.D. Okla. May 4, 2026) (ordering Petitioner’s “immediate release” for due

process violation and denial of a bond hearing); Singh v. Noem, 2026 WL

766228, at *10 (D.N.M. Mar. 18, 2026) (“Petitioner’s . . . release is required to

remedy the ongoing due process violation caused by Petitioner being detained

while his conditional parole has not yet been terminated.”); Velasquez Montillo,

2026 WL 592355, at *10 (concluding immediate release was the appropriate

remedy where “there has been no notice of a change in circumstances requiring

modification of the November 2021 [order of release on recognizance]”); Vielma

Uzcategui v. Brooksby, 2026 WL 622751, at *13 (D. Utah Mar. 5, 2026) (same

as to petitioner ordered released on her own recognizance in September 2023);

Murzi v. Noem, 2026 WL 395111, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2026) (ordering

petitioner’s immediate release where petitioner had previously been released

on parole).

16

release.12 The Court should deny Petitioner’s motion to expedite as

moot. Doc. 15.

The undersigned also recommends that the Court order

Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status report within ten

business days of the Court’s order, and to promptly provide a copy of this

order to Counsel for the Warden of the Diamondback Correctional Facility.

Finally, the Court should order that Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner

without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decision-maker

where the Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing

evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk and a danger to the community.13

12 Should the Court determine a bond hearing is the appropriate remedy,

the undersigned recommends that, given Petitioner’s prolonged detention

under the incorrect statute, the Court should find that it is more appropriate

for the Government to bear the burden of proof in this context. See, e.g., Garcia

Cortes v. Noem, 2025 WL 2652880, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025) (placing the

burden of proof on the Government to justify the petitioner’s continued

detention (citing L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1185 (D. Colo. 2024)).

Having released Petitioner in 2023, the Government ought to now bear the

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a

danger to the community or a risk of flight such that he should remain in

detention. See L.G., 744 F. Supp. 3d at 1186 (“In general, the Supreme Court

has held that the clear and convincing standard applies to civil detention

where liberty is at stake.” (first citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,

751 (1987), and then citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979))).

13 The Court finds that it need not reach Petitioner’s remaining arguments.

As to Petitioner’s request for EAJA fees, Petitioner must seek those separately

after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

17

The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to

this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by June 25,

2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

72.14 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely

objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate

review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United

States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation

disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the

captioned matter.

14 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has

reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that

rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus

petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under

Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x

227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be

applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they

need not be in every instance – particularly where strict application would

undermine the habeas review process.”).

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ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2026.

ga Ler

SUZANNE MITCHELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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