Ambler

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

RASHEE AMBLER, : Case No. 1:26-cv-236

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Michael R. Barrett

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

:

HARRIS, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a prisoner who is incarcerated at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, filed this

pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio state law for events that took place while

he was incarcerated at Warren Correctional Institution (WCI). He raises his claims against Warden

Harris, Mental Health Liaisons McDermott and Greatorex, Inspector J. Ledford, and Provider

Incellur. (Doc. 3 at 1–4). By separate Order, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. (Doc. 2).

I. Screening of Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner—and because he proceeds in forma pauperis—the Court must

dismiss the Complaint, or any part of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A(b). Pro se litigants’s pleadings are to be construed liberally

and held to lower standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712

(6th Cir. 2004). But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not within the purview of the district

court to conjure up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th

Cir. 2012).

In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in his favor, accept

all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Still, the Court is not required to accept factual allegations that are “clearly irrational or wholly

incredible.” Ruiz v. Hofbauer, 325 F. App’x 427, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2009). Rather, “[a] claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although “detailed factual allegations” are

not required, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further

factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted). In

the end, “basic pleading essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989).

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was housed in the Residential Treatment Unit at

WCI where prison officials treated him for depression and suicidal ideation. (Doc. 3 at 6). Starting

on April 9, 2024, Officer Crawford denied Plaintiff outdoor recreation because he had orders to

prohibit certain inmates, like Plaintiff, from accessing the outdoors. (Id.). Plaintiff sent kites to

several prison officials, including the warden and the institution inspector, to complain about the

denial of outdoor recreation. (Id.). That same day, Mental Health Liaison McDermott visited

Plaintiff. (Id. at 6–7). Plaintiff explained in the meeting that he slept most of the day, was not eating,

and was frequently having suicidal thoughts. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff claims that McDermott disregarded

his mental health issues and offered no treatment. (Id.).

Two days later, Plaintiff received a response from Inspector Ledford, which stated that since

Plaintiff had a certain classification—level E—he had to be restrained and could not have access to

outdoor recreation. (Id.). When Plaintiff attempted to escalate his grievances, Plaintiff says that

Ledford would close them. (Id.).

On October 23, 2024, Plaintiff attempted suicide by hanging. (Id. at 8). The next day, Mental

Health Liaison Greatorex examined Plaintiff. (Id.). After reading Plaintiff’s journal, Greatorex told

Plaintiff, “‘Don’t write or say suicidal stuff because I’ll have to put you on [suicide] watch.’” (Id.).

It also appears that Greatorex tried to persuade Plaintiff to sit in the “dayroom” while in belly chains

instead of being allowed to go outside unrestrained. (Id.). Plaintiff rejected this offer in the fear that

he could be stabbed while chained. (Id.). He instead opted to stay inside. (Id.).

About a week later, Plaintiff attempted suicide again. (Id.). This time, Plaintiff ingested

fifty-four pills because he believed that McDermott and Ledford were ignoring his grievances and

kites. (Id.). Plaintiff continued to file grievances concerning his lack of mental health treatment and

access to the outdoors. (Id.). On December 9, 2024, Plaintiff met with Mental Health Liaison

Incellur to speak about the denial of outdoor recreation and Plaintiff’s two suicide attempts. (Id. at

9). Incellur never questioned Plaintiff about the reasons he attempted suicide and was only curious

about where Plaintiff obtained the drugs for his second suicide attempt. (Id.). Incellur also did not

read Plaintiff’s journal, stating that reading “‘it doesn’t matter because central office wants all of you

guys out of here as soon as possible.’” (Id.)

Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 11).

C. Analysis

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff states that he is raising the following

claims:

Claim 1 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs

against Defendants McDermott, Greatorex, and Incellur for failing to provide

him with mental health treatment during his depression and suicidal ideation.

Claim 2 Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Defendants

McDermott, Greatorex, Ledford, and Incellur based on their alleged deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s inability to access outdoor recreation for months.

Claim 3 State-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against

Defendants McDermott, Greatorex, Ledford, and Incellur arising out of the

same allegations that form the basis of Claims 1 and 2.

At this stage in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties to this action,

the Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff may proceed with the following claims against the listed

Defendants in their individual capacities to the extent he seeks damages and in their individual and

official capacities to the extent he seeks injunctive relief: Claim 1 (deliberate indifference to serious

mental health needs claim against Defendants McDermott, Greatorex, and Incellur); Claim 2

(conditions of confinement claim based on lack of outdoor recreation against Defendants

McDermott, Greatorex, Ledford, and Incellur); and Claim 3 (state-law intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim against Defendants McDermott, Greatorex, Ledford, and Incellur).

Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are deserving of further development and may proceed at

this juncture. The Court advises Plaintiff that this is only a preliminary determination. The Court

has not made a determination as to the merits of the claims or potential defenses thereto, nor are

Defendants precluded from filing a motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, or other

appropriate motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley v. Austin, No.

8:20CV220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020).

For the following reasons, though, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for damages and

Defendant Harris should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

1. Official Capacity Claims for Damages Should be Dismissed

Plaintiff’s claims against any Defendant in his or her official capacity must be dismissed to

the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Plaintiff has named all Defendants in their individual

and official capacities. (See generally Doc. 3). Absent an express waiver, a state is immune from

damage suits under the Eleventh Amendment. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506

U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974). The State of Ohio has not

constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See

Johns v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524, 527 (6th Cir. 1985); State of Ohio v. Madeline Marie

Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 449, 460-62 (6th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to

actions where the state is not a named party, but where the action is essentially one for the recovery

of money from the state. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663; Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S.

459, 464 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535

U.S. 613 (2002). A suit against defendants in their official capacities would, in reality, be a way of

pleading the action against the entity of which defendants are agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Thus, actions against state officials in their official capacities are

included in this bar. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989). See also

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Cady v. Arenac Co., 574 F.3d 334, 344

(6th Cir. 2009)) (“[A]n official-capacity suit against a state official is deemed to be a suit against the

state and is thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, absent a waiver.” (citation and ellipsis

omitted)). Therefore, the Complaint should be DISMISSED as to all Defendants in their official

capacities for Plaintiff’s request for damages.

2. Defendant Harris Should be Dismissed

To state a claim against a defendant in his individual capacity, a plaintiff must allege personal

involvement of the defendant in causing plaintiff’s injury. Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1196

(6th Cir. 1992). A party cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the party personally participated

in, or otherwise authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional

conduct. Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989). To establish liability

under § 1983 against an individual defendant, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant was

personally involved in the conduct that forms the basis of his complaint. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d

889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999); Bellamy v. Bradley,

729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that, “[a]t a minimum a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a

supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the

unconstitutional conduct”). Thus, a claimed constitutional violation must be based on active

unconstitutional behavior, Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300, and cannot be based

upon the mere right to control employees. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A plaintiff must allege defendants

were personally involved because Ҥ 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat

superior.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff fails to meet this pleading standard as it relates to Defendant Harris. Plaintiff names

Harris in the Complaint but makes no allegations that he was personally involved in any of the alleged

violations. He only alleges that he sent grievances to Harris’s office. The mere fact that Harris was

WCI’s warden and was sent grievances is not enough to impose liability. Therefore, Harris should

be DISMISSED from the Complaint in his individual capacity.

II. Conclusion and Service of Process

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff may PROCEED with the following claims against the listed Defendants in their

individual capacities to the extent he seeks damages and in their individual and official

capacities to the extent he seeks injunctive relief: Claim 1 (deliberate indifference to serious

mental health needs claim against Defendants McDermott, Greatorex, and Incellur); Claim 2

(conditions of confinement claim based on lack of outdoor recreation against Defendants

McDermott, Greatorex, Ledford, and Incellur); and Claim 3 (state-law intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim against Defendants McDermott, Greatorex, Ledford, and

Incellur).

2. The United States Marshal SHALL serve a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 3), summons (Doc.

1-8), the separate Order issued granting the plaintiff in forma pauperis status (Doc. 2), and

this Order and Report and Recommendation upon Defendants McDermott, Greatorex,

Ledford, and Incellur.

3. Plaintiff SHALL serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon

Defendants’ attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for

consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the

Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of any document was

mailed to defendant or Defendants’ counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or

magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate

of service will be disregarded by the Court.

4. Plaintiff SHALL inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address which may occur

during the pendency of this lawsuit.

5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a copy of the Southern District of Ohio’s Guide

for Pro Se Civil Litigants.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s request for damages against the Defendants in their official capacities and

Defendant Harris be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) that for the foregoing reasons an

appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good

faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) any party may serve and file specific, written objections to this Report

& Recommendation (R&R) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy

thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either side for an

extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be

accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall respond to an

opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those

objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on

appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.

1981).

Date: April 3, 2026 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE