Maness

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DONALD WAYNE MANESS, §

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Plaintiff, §

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v. § Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-2650-G-BT

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ELIZABETH OSAADE, ROBERTO §

GARZA, and JOHN DOE, §

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Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this civil action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), pro se Plaintiff Donald Maness alleges

that Defendant Elizabeth Osaade, a nurse at FCI Seagoville, willfully falsified

medical records and failed to order testing that would have revealed he had

prostate cancer.1 See generally Compl. (ECF No. 3); Resp. to Magistrate Judge

Questionnaire (“MJQ”) (ECF No. 6). Defendant Osaade moves to dismiss Maness’s

claims, arguing that Maness failed to plead adequate facts giving rise to a plausible

Bivens claim or, if Maness does state a Bivens claim, that she is entitled to qualified

immunity. See Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 38). As explained below, Maness failed to

state a plausible Bivens claim. So the District Judge should GRANT Osaade’s

motion (ECF No. 38) and DISMISS Maness’s claims against her.

1 Maness voluntarily dismissed his claims against Defendant Roberto Garza, a

doctor at FCI Seagoville. See Mot. (ECF No. 51); Instruction (ECF No. 54).

Background

Maness is currently an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

See generally Compl. (ECF No. 3). From about December 5, 2022, to April 28,

2023, he was in custody at FCI Seagoville. See id.; see also Exs. ISO Compl. 9 (ECF

No. 23).

Osaade conducted Maness’s health intake evaluation, including a recorded

health history and physical examination (“H&P”). See Compl. 3, 6, 7; see also Resp.

to MJQ (ECF No. 6). Maness alleges that Osaade falsified medical records by

documenting examinations that never occurred. Compl. 7–8; see also Resp. to

MJQ 1–4. Maness alleges that Osaade documented a normal prostate following a

digital rectal exam that Maness maintains never occurred. See id. at 4.

Furthermore, although Osaade noted a PSA test was ordered, Maness alleges the

test was never administered. See id.; see also Compl. 10.

Following his transfer from FCI Seagoville, Maness was diagnosed with

prostate cancer, bladder cancer, and chronic kidney disease. Compl. 4, 7. Maness

alleges that had Osaade performed a competent evaluation and accurately

documented the H&P in December 2022, his cancer would have been detected

earlier, allowing him to benefit from a broader range of treatment options.

Compl. 7; Resp. to MJQ 3. Instead, he alleges, because of Osaade’s deliberate

indifference, his condition deteriorated, and he endured invasive biopsies,

multiple surgeries, and the placement of a catheter. Compl. 10–11; Resp. to MJQ 3.

By this lawsuit, Maness seeks to hold Osaade liable for the injuries resulting

from her alleged failure to provide adequate medical care. Compl. 8, 11.

Legal Standards and Analysis

A Bivens claim is an implied private action for damages against federal

officers—like Osaade, a nurse employed at FCI Seagoville—alleged to have violated

a citizen’s constitutional rights. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66

(2001). The Supreme Court has approved a Bivens action under the Eighth

Amendment against federal officials for failure to provide medical treatment. See

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1990); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 137

(2017) (recognizing from Carlson the existence of a Bivens claim “for failure to

provide medical care”).2

Prison officials have a duty to provide constitutionally adequate medical

care. Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 409 (5th Cir. 2013). An inmate seeking to

establish a violation regarding medical care must allege facts showing that prison

officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Morris v.

Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 747 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that because only the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment, a

2 Maness alleges he was a pretrial detainee when Osaade treated him. Compl. at 6.

The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to federal pretrial detainee

medical indifference claims, not the Eighth Amendment. See Burk v. LaSalle Corr.

V, LLC, 2026 WL 194941, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2026), rec. adopted 2026 WL

542700 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2026); see also Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772,

778 (5th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, the same deliberate indifference standard

applies whether the individual is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner. Gibbs

v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2001).

prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs). “A serious medical need is one for which

treatment has been recommended or for which the need is so apparent that even

laymen would recognize that care is required.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339,

345 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006).

“Deliberate indifference is an ‘extremely high’ standard to meet,” Brewster

v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009), and requires satisfaction of both an

objective and a subjective component. Rogers, 709 F.3d at 410. An inmate must

first prove an objective exposure to a substantial risk of serious bodily harm.

Gobert, 463 F.3d at 345–46. As to the subjective component, a prison official acts

with deliberate indifference only where he (1) knows the inmate faces a substantial

risk of serious harm and (2) disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it. Id. at 346; see also Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159

(5th Cir. 1999) (stating a prison official is not liable for the denial of medical

treatment unless he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety”).

A prison official’s “failure to alleviate a significant risk that the official should

have perceived, but did not, is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.”

Domino v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994)) (alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted). “[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a

negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001).

Instead, a prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw

the inference.” Brewster, 587 F.3d at 770 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see

Lawson v. Dallas Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that deliberate

indifference is a “subjective inquiry” and inmate must show prison official was

actually aware of risk of harm and consciously ignored it).

Allegations of malpractice, negligence, or unsuccessful treatment fail to

establish deliberate indifference. Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. Similarly, an inmate's

disagreement with the treatment provided does not give rise to a constitutional

claim. Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997). “Even if a lapse in

professional judgment occurred, any such failure amounts to mere negligence or

malpractice, and not a constitutional violation.” Evans v. Brouwer, No. 9:13-CV-

302, 2017 WL 4216067, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2017) (internal citations omitted).

And, even in the context of a misdiagnosed condition causing irreversible

injury to a prisoner, “inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, i.e.,

negligence, does not constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Gordon v. Texas, 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Further, medical

judgment about whether to recommend specialized care does not establish

deliberate indifference. See Jenkins v. United States, 733 F. App'x 218, 219 (5th

Cir. 2018). In sum, an inmate must demonstrate that prison staff “refused to treat

him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in

any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious

medical needs” to state a viable claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs. Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985).

Maness fails to plausibly allege deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs. He alleges no facts showing Osaade—who saw Maness only for his intake

evaluation—subjectively understood him to face a serious risk of cancer and failed

to take reasonable measures to abate it. Nor does he allege facts that would give

rise to an inference that it was obvious he should be screened for cancer. For

example, he does not allege that he made any complaints that would suggest an

issue with his prostate or his bladder or that he presented with any history or

symptoms of cancer, such as difficulty or pain when urinating or blood in his urine.

Instead, he alleges that Osaade inaccurately recorded his H&P and failed to

perform or order certain specific tests to screen for cancer that he thinks should

have been done—although she ordered other lab tests. See generally Exs. ISO

Compl. (ECF No. 23).3

3 To the extent that Maness alleges that Osaade, for some unexplained reason, lied

about Maness’s health status and the treatment she provided, or falsified his

medical records, he provides no facts making these wholly conclusory allegations

plausible. The Court need not credit such conclusory and implausible allegations

under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Grizzle v. McIntire, No. 5:22-CV-017-BQ, 2022 WL

17818101, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2022) (“And to the extent Grizzle bases this

claim on Defendant Brown’s alleged lie, Grizzle fails to state a claim. Because

Grizzle offers no facts in support of his belief that Defendant Brown lied about his

suicidal thoughts…. Grizzle’s allegations are too conclusory to survive screening.”)

(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (further citation omitted); see

also Al-Ra’id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1995) (conclusory allegations

insufficient to show deliberate indifference or any other constitutional violation).

These facts fail to show deliberate indifference. Maness’s theory that Osaade

had an obligation “to discover any and all health-related issues and direct it to the

proper specialist for care” is wrong as a matter of law. See Resp. 2. (ECF No. 45).

The Constitution does not entitle Maness to all the medical treatment he desires

on demand. See Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that

pretrial detainee was not entitled to the best medical treatment money can buy).

Nor is an inmate entitled to perfect medical care. On the contrary, the federal

Constitution does not even require that an inmate’s medical care be free from

negligence or medical malpractice. Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693, 697–98 (5th Cir.

1999).

Maness’s complaints about the care that he received at FCI Seagoville

establish only a disagreement with his medical treatment or, at most, negligence—

neither of which demonstrates deliberate indifference. See Alvarez v. City of

Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“Deliberate indifference

is a degree of culpability beyond mere negligence or even gross negligence; it must

amount to an intentional choice, not merely an unintentionally negligent

oversight.”) (quoting James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2009));

see also Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Unsuccessful

medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute

deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner's disagreement with his medical

treatment, absent extraordinary circumstances.”) (citations omitted). Thus,

Maness fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

Leave to Amend

Ordinarily, “a pro se litigant should be afforded an opportunity to amend his

complaint before it is dismissed.” Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767–68. Even so, the Court

need not grant leave to amend “if the plaintiff has already pleaded his ‘best case.’”

Id. at 768.

Maness responded to an MJQ that advised him to set out all facts in support

of his claim, allowing him to plead his best case. See Nixon v. Abbott, 589 F. App’x

279 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (responding to the MJQ is an acceptable method

for a pro se litigant to develop the factual basis of his complaint). And the time to

file objections to this recommendation (further explained below) allows Maness

yet another opportunity to show the Court that this case should not be dismissed

with prejudice, and that the Court should instead grant him leave to amend. See

Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021), as revised (Nov.

26, 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice so

requires, but a movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her

amendments would be and how those amendments would cure the initial

complaint's defects. If the plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended

complaint nor explain how the defects could be cured, a district court may deny

leave.”).

If Maness fails to show that further leave to amend should be granted, the

Court should dismiss this case with prejudice.

Recommendation

For the reasons stated, the District Judge should GRANT Defendant

Elizabeth Osaade’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 38) and dismiss Maness’s claims

against Osaade with prejudice unless, within the time to file objections, Maness

shows a basis to grant leave to further amend the complaint.

SO RECOMMENDED.

_ ry

March 6, 2026. VD \ |

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,

an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination

is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the

briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written

objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district

judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.

Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).