The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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IN RE WANG LITIGATION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
20-CV-05410 (OEM) (TAM)
21-CV-03254 (OEM) (TAM)
21-CV-07194 (OEM) (TAM)
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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs Qian Wang a/k/a Sarah Wang (“Sarah Wang”), Zhanwen Chi, Tiande Wang, Ya
Xu, Lu Yang, Jian Min Xu, Yuanfu Gao, and Jin Cheng Miao (collectively “Plaintiffs”)
commenced this action against Defendants Kirin Transportation Inc. d/b/a Kirin Transportation
(“Kirin”), Hebei Tiankai Foundation Engineering Technical Co., Ltd. d/b/a Hebei Tiankai Wood
& Land Construction (“Hebei”), Qiang Chen a/k/a Frank Chen (“Frank Chen”), Marriana Yuhua
Song a/k/a Nancy Song (“Nancy Song”), Qiuxiang Shi a/k/a Qiu Xian Shi (“Qiu Xian Shi”), and
Wei Wang a/k/a Maggie Wang (“Maggie Wang”) (collectively “Defendants”) for violations of the
New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). See generally
Complaint, Dkt. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”). On December 15, 2025, after an 11-day jury trial,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs and against all Defendants, except for Maggie
Wang, for violations of the NYLL. See generally Dkt. 148 to 148-7 (“Jury Verdict Sheets”).
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of judgment against Kirin, Hebei, Frank
Chen, Nancy Song, and Qiu Xian Shi, and in favor of Maggie Wang and against Plaintiffs pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(b)(2)(A).1 As a part of the judgment, Plaintiffs seek an
1 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment and Attorney Fees, Dkt. 152 (“Motion” or
“Mot.”); Declaration of Aaron B. Schweitzer in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment and Attorney Fees, Dkt. 151
award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54. For the following
reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
A. Consolidated Actions
On November 6, 2020, Sarah Wang and Zhanwen Chi commenced this action against
Kirin, Frank Chen, Nancy Song, and Qiu Xiang Shi. See generally Compl. On June 8, 2021,
Tiande Wang, Lu Yang, and Ya Xu commenced an action against Kirin, Frank Chen, Nancy Song,
and Qiuxiang Shi. See Wang v. Kirin Transportation Inc., 21-cv-03254, Complaint, Dkt. 1. On
December 30, 2021, Sarah Wang, Tiande Wang, Lu Yang, Ya Xu, and Zhanwen Chi commenced
an action against Hebei, Yingjie Li, and Maggie Wang.2 See Wang v. Hebei Tiankai Foundation
Engineering Technical Co., Ltd, 21-CV-07194, Complaint, Dkt. 1.
On January 7, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ conditional certification as a collective
action under the FLSA, subject to restrictions. See generally Memorandum and Order, Dkt. 47.
Thereafter, Jian Min Xu, Yuanfu Gao, and Jin Cheng Miao, joined as Plaintiffs. See generally
Consent to Become Party Plaintiff, Dkt. 65; Consent to Become Party Plaintiff, Dkt. 67; Consent
to Become Party Plaintiff, Dkt. 69. On February 20, 2025, the parties agreed to consolidate the
three actions before trial and the Court ordered the consolidation. See Minute Entry, dated Feb.
20, 2025; Order, dated Feb. 20, 2025.
Summarily, under the consolidated actions, Plaintiffs brought the following claims.
Zhanwen Chi, Tiande Wang, Ya Xu, Lu Yang, Jian Min Xi, Yuanfu Gao, and Jin Cheng Miao
allege that Defendants failed to pay them the federal minimum wage. Sarah Wang, Zhanwen Chi,
(“Schweitzer Decl.”); Memo of Law in Support of Opposition for Motion for Entry of Judgment and Attorney Fees,
Dkt. 154 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”); Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of motion for Entry of Judgment and
Attorney Fees, Dkt. 156 (“Reply”).
2 Plaintiffs dismissed their claims against Yingjie Li a/k/a Ying Jie Lie at trial.
Tiande Wang, Ya Xu, and Lu Yang alleged that Defendants retaliated against them in violation of
the FLSA and NYLL. All Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to: pay them the New York State
minimum wage; pay them overtime under the FLSA and NYLL; pay them an additional hour’s
pay at the minimum wage for the days when their spread-of-hours exceeded ten hours, as required
under the NYLL; timely pay them their earned wages according to their pay arrangements; furnish
them with notices of their wage rates at their times of hire as required by the NYLL; and furnish
them with wage statements when Plaintiffs received their payments of wages as required by the
NYLL.
B. Jury Trial and Verdict
The Court held a jury trial in this action from December 1, 2025, to December 15, 2025.
On December 15, 2025, the jury returned a verdict largely in favor of Plaintiffs. See Dkt. 148 to
148-7 (“Jury Verdict Sheets”). The jury found that the FLSA did not apply. See Dkt. 148 ¶ 5;
Dkt. 148-1 ¶ 5; Dkt. 148-2 ¶ 5; Dkt. 148-3 ¶ 5; Dkt. 148-4 ¶ 5; Dkt. 148-5 ¶ 5; Dkt. 148-6 ¶ 5; Dkt.
148-7 ¶ 5. Thus, the jury only found Defendants liable for violations of and awarded damages
under the NYLL. See generally Jury Verdict Sheets.
Specifically, as to employment, the jury found that Kirin, Hebei, Frank Chen, Nancy Song,
and Qiu Xian Shi were Plaintiffs’ employers, but Maggie Wang was not. See Dkt. 148 ¶ 1; Dkt.
148-1 ¶ 1; Dkt. 148-2 ¶ 1; Dkt. 148-3 ¶ 1; Dkt. 148-4 ¶ 1; Dkt. 148-5 ¶ 1; Dkt. 148-6 ¶ 1; Dkt. 148-
7 ¶ 1.
As to minimum wage, the jury found that Zhanwen Chi, Ya Xu, Jian Min Xu, and Yuanfu
Gao were paid below New York State minimum wage during their respective employments and
awarded them unpaid minimum wages in the following amounts, respectively: $900.00; $8,009.28;
$20,472.00; and $7,150.00. See Dkt. 148-1 ¶¶ 10(g)-(h); Dkt. 148-3 ¶¶ 10(g)-(j); Dkt. 148-5
¶¶ 10(a)-(h); Dkt. 148-6 ¶ 10(a)-(d). The jury found that Plaintiffs Sarah Wang, Tiande Wang, Lu
Yang, and Jin Cheng Miao were paid at least minimum wage throughout their respective
employments. See Dkt. 148 ¶ 10; Dkt. 148-2 ¶ 10; Dkt. 148-4 ¶ 10; Dkt. 148-7 ¶ 10.
As to overtime, the jury found that Plaintiffs were each paid their regular hourly rates for
all their overtime hours and were not paid an additional one-half times the greater of the minimum
wage and their regular rates as required under NYLL. See Dkt. 148 ¶¶ 6-8; Dkt. 148-1 ¶¶ 6-8;
Dkt. 148-2 ¶¶ 6-8; Dkt. 148-3 ¶¶ 6-8; Dkt. 148-4 ¶¶ 6-8; Dkt. 148-5 ¶¶ 6-8; Dkt. 148-6 ¶¶ 6-8;
Dkt. 148-7 ¶¶ 6-8. The jury found that Sarah Wang was paid a regular hourly wage in the first
instance, without an additional one-half times the greater of the minimum wage and her regular
rate for her overtime hours. See Dkt. 148 ¶ 4. For the other Plaintiffs, the jury found that they
were not paid by the hour and calculated their regular rates by dividing their regular weekly
earnings by their regular hours per week. See Dkt. 148-1 ¶ 4; Dkt. 148-2 ¶ 4; Dkt. 148-3 ¶ 4; Dkt.
148-4 ¶ 4; Dkt. 148-5 ¶ 4; Dkt. 148-6 ¶ 4; Dkt. 148-7 ¶ 4.
As to the spread of hours, the jury found that the Plaintiffs did not regularly work a spread
of hours greater than 10 hours and declined to award unpaid spread-of-hours damages to any
Plaintiff. See Dkt. 148 ¶ 11; Dkt. 148-1 ¶ 11; Dkt. 148-2 ¶ 11; Dkt. 148-3 ¶ 11; Dkt. 148-4¶ 11;
Dkt. 148-5 ¶ 11; Dkt. 148-6 ¶ 11; Dkt. 148-7 ¶ 11.
The jury found the Defendants did not act willfully in underpaying Plaintiffs their wages,
which precludes liquidated damages. See Dkt. 148 ¶¶ 28-32; Dkt. 148-1 ¶¶ 29-33; Dkt. 148-2
¶¶ 29-33; Dkt. 148-3 ¶¶ 29-33; Dkt. 148-4 ¶¶ 29-33; Dkt. 148-5 ¶¶ 14-17; Dkt. 148-6 ¶¶ 14-17;
Dkt. 148-7 ¶¶ 14-17.
As to the wage notice claims, the jury found that Defendants had not furnished Plaintiffs
with wage notices and wage statements, but that Defendants proved various affirmative defenses
to non-furnishing of wage notices. Therefore, the jury awarded damages only on Plaintiffs’ wage
statement claims. See Dkt 148 ¶ 12-13; Dkt. 148-1 ¶ 12-13; Dkt. 148-2 ¶ 12-13; Dkt. 148-3 ¶ 12-
13; Dkt. 148-4 ¶ 12-13; Dkt. 148-5 ¶ 12-13; Dkt. 148-6 ¶ 12-13; Dkt. 148-7 ¶ 12-13.
Finally, as to retaliation, the jury found that Zhanwen Chi was not retaliated against; but
that Sarah Wang and Tiande Wang were retaliated against by Kirin and Nancy Song; and that Ya
Xu and Lu Yang were retaliated against by Kirin, Nancy Song, and Hebei. See Dkt. 148 ¶¶ 14-
27; Dkt. 148-1 ¶¶ 14-28; Dkt. 148-2 ¶¶ 14-22; Dkt. 148-3 ¶¶ 14-28; Dkt. 148-4 ¶¶ 14-28. The jury
declined to award any damages to Sarah Wang, Tiande Wang, and Lu Yang for failure to mitigate
damages, or because their damages were mitigated in their entirety—but awarded Ya Xu
$24,400.00 in post-mitigation damages for his retaliation claim. See Dkt. 148 ¶¶ 14-27; Dkt. 148-
1 ¶¶ 14-28; Dkt. 148-2 ¶¶ 14-22; Dkt. 148-3 ¶¶ 14-28; Dkt. 148-4 ¶¶ 14-28.
DISCUSSION
A. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
The NYLL provides an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing
plaintiff. N.Y. Lab. Law § 198(1-a) (“In any action instituted in the courts upon a wage claim by
an employee [under the NYLL] or the commissioner in which the employee prevails, the court
shall allow such employee to recover . . . all reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”); Fisher v. SD Prot.
Inc., 948 F.3d 593, 600 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs are “the prevailing party for the purposes of
the . . . NYLL ‘if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’” Kahlil v. Original Old Homestead Rest., Inc., 657 F.
Supp. 2d 470, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
“The burden is on the party moving for attorney’s fees to justify the hourly rate sought.” Ehrlich
v. Royal Oak Fin. Servs., Inc., CV-12-3551 (BMC), 2012 WL 5438942, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
2012); see also Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Rest., 897 F. Supp. 2d 76, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“District
courts have broad discretion, using ‘their experience with the case, as well as their experience with
the practice of law, to assess the reasonableness’ of each component of a fee award.” quoting Fox
Indus., Inc. v. Gurovich, CV 03-5166 TCP WDW, 2005 WL 2305002, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21,
2005)). The Second Circuit has instructed district courts considering awards of attorney’s fees:
[T]he better course—and the one most consistent with attorney’s fees
jurisprudence—is for the district court, in exercising its considerable discretion, to
bear in mind all of the case-specific variables that we and other courts have
identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in setting a reasonable
hourly rate. The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing
to pay. In determining what rate a paying client would be willing to pay, the district
court should consider, among others, the Johnson factors; it should also bear in
mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to
litigate the case effectively. The district court should also consider that such an
individual might be able to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using their desire to
obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from being associated with the
case. The district court should then use that reasonable hourly rate to calculate what
can properly be termed the “presumptively reasonable fee.”
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d
Cir. 2008) (internal citations and emphasis omitted).
“The resulting product of a reasonable rate and reasonable number of hours is the ‘lodestar’
figure against which Plaintiff’s requested amount is judged.” Ji Guo Chen v. Glow Asian Foods,
Inc., 19-CV-630 (ST), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173207, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2023) (citation
omitted).
Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to $182,831.83 in attorney’s fees and $5,259.45 for
costs. Schweitzer Decl. ¶¶ 78-79 (citing to Schweitzer Decl., Exhibit 16 as proof of costs, which
receipt totals amount to $5,259.45). Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ arguments, stating first that
Plaintiffs “failed to separate or apportion the time attributable to each individual case” and
Plaintiff, and second that the application should be because Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of
law. Opp’n at 25-26. Defendants also argue that, should attorney’s fees and costs be granted, the
Court should substantially reduce the amount of attorney’s fees granted. Id. at 26-27. The Court
considers the reasonableness of each component of Plaintiffs’ fee request in turn.
1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
Plaintiffs suggest that their hourly attorney’s fees should be calculated at the following
rates: $650 for Managing Attorney John Troy (“Mr. Troy”), Schweitzer Decl. ¶¶ 34, 78; $400 for
Managing Associate Aaron Schweitzer (“Schweitzer”) with a reduced rate to $200 for less than
associate level work and travel, id. at ¶¶ 48,78; $250 for Associate Eric Chen (“Chen”) with a
reduced rate to $150 for less than associate level work, id. at ¶¶ 53, 78; $250 for Tiffany Troy
(“Ms. Troy”) with a reduced rate of $150 for less than associate level work, id. ¶¶ 66, 78; $150 for
Litigation Clerk Frances Sayson (“Sayson”), id. at ¶¶ 71, 78; $200 for Managing Clerk Preethi
Kilaru (“Kilaru”), id. at ¶¶ 74, 77; $150 for Clerk Gavin Dass (“Dass”), id. at ¶¶ 77, 78.
Since the reasonable hourly rate should be what a reasonable, paying client would be
willing to pay to litigate the case effectively, see Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190, the Second Circuit
follows the “forum rule” to calculate a reasonable hourly fee, see Bergerson v. N.Y. State Off. of
Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 652 F.3d 277, 289-90 (2d Cir. 2011). The forum rule
advises courts to “use ‘the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing court sits’
in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 192 (quoting In re “Agent
Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Bergerson, 652 F.3d at
290. The Second Circuit has stated that fee awards must take into account the current market rate
in the district. Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 232-33 (2d Cir. 2006).
“In FLSA matters, ‘[c]ourts in the Eastern District have recently awarded hourly rates
ranging from $300 to $450 for partners, $200 to $325 for senior associates, $100 to $200 for junior
associates, and $70 to $100 for legal support staff.’” Shen v. ZenTao Inc., 19 CV 7269 (AMD)
(LB), 2025 WL 746478, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (quoting Diaz v. Rene French Cleaners,
Inc., 20-CV-3848 (RRM) (RER), 2022 WL 4646866, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2022), report &
recommendation adopted, 20-CV-3848 (RRM) (RER), 2022 WL 4662247 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30,
2022)), report & recommendation adopted, 19-CV-7269 (AMD) (LB), 2025 WL 746063
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025). But see Rubin v. HSBC Bank USA, NA, 763 F. Supp. 3d 233, 243-44
(E.D.N.Y. 2025) (explaining that attorney’s fees should increase in cost with inflation and adjusting
Eastern District of New York rates for inflation in a fair credit reporting act case). Plaintiffs
recommend the Court apply the hourly rates for attorney’s fees in Rubin, Mot. at 8, which were
increased to account for inflation, 763 F.Supp.3d at 243-44. The Court declines to do so and aligns
itself with the court in Shen, which declined to award Troy Law Firm the hourly rates of Rubin
because they “far exceed the reasonable rate for attorney’s fee awards in this district’s wage and
hour cases.” Shen, 2025 WL 746478, at *4. As a number of courts in this Circuit have recognized,
“[a] treatise worth of case law has emerged about the rates and hours that Troy Law has
requested . . . [a]nd courts have balked at the sort of rates requested in this case.” Id. at *5 (quoting
Garcia v. Francis Gen. Constr. Inc., 20 Civ. 4323 (JPC), 2022 WL 2698434, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July
12, 2022) and collecting cases); see also Cui v. D Prime Inc., 20-CV-03667 (OEM) (MMH), 2024
WL 3567008, at *4 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2024).
John Troy is the principal attorney and sole partner of Troy Law. Schweitzer Decl. ¶ 22.
He is a 1985 LLM graduate of Dickinson School of Law and was admitted to the New York State
Bar in 1989. Id. ¶¶ 23-24 Mr. Troy has been the attorney of record for 224 matters in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 227 matters in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, 393 matters in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and
at least 40 matters in other U.S. District Courts. Id. ¶ 29. Mr. Troy did not try this case before the
Court, but he billed no more than 23 hours total and appears to have participated only in strategy
and occasional conferences with the clients. The Court finds that $400 is a reasonable rate for the
services Mr. Troy has performed here. See, e.g., Feng v. Kelai Corp., 727 F. Supp. 3d 423, 458
(S.D.N.Y. 2024) (finding $425 per hour rate for Mr. Troy reasonable because he met with the
clients, drafted pleadings, motions, and communicated with counsel, but did not try the case or
appear before the court); Shen, 2025 WL 746478, at *5 (finding $400 per hour rate for Mr. Troy
reasonable).
Schweitzer is the managing associate of Troy Law. Schweitzer Decl. ¶ 36. He received
his J.D. from Fordham University School of Law in 2016 and was admitted to the New York bar
in 2018. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. He has litigated 138 cases in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, 132 cases in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and
“numerous other cases” in other U.S. District Courts. Id. ¶ 42. Schweitzer has conducted the bulk
of the legal work in this case, and he appeared before the Court and tried the entire case himself.
However, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments for the hourly rates they request
which exceed the reasonable rate for attorney’s fee awards in this district’s wage and hour cases.
Accordingly, the Court finds that a reasonable hourly rate for Schweitzer’s services in this case is
$250 and half of that rate for his travel time and clerical tasks. See Shen, 2025 WL 746478, at *5
(finding $250 per hour for Schweitzer reasonable).
Chen was an associate at Troy Law. Schweitzer Decl. ¶ 49. He received his J.D. from the
University of Cincinnati College of Law. Id. ¶ 50. He was admitted to the New York bar in 2020.
Id. ¶ 52. Ms. Troy is also an associate at Troy Law. See Schweitzer Decl. ¶ 66. She received her
J.D. from Fordham University School of Law. Id. ¶ 54. She was admitted to the New York bar
in 2021. Id. ¶ 55. She is the attorney of record in 67 cases in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, 43 cases in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
and several other cases in other U.S. District Courts and state courts. Id. ¶ 57. Here, both Chen
and Ms. Troy bill for conferences, research, and drafting of various affidavits, briefs, and motions,
as well as preparation for depositions. Courts have previously approved rates for Ms. Troy
between $100 and $200 per hour. Compare Garcia, 2022 WL 2698434, at *7 (awarding $200 per
hour for Ms. Troy), with Cui, 2024 WL 3567008, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2024) (awarding $150
per hour for Ms. Troy). Finding that the work of Ms. Troy and Chen are consistent with each other
and similar to the work performed in Garcia and Cui, the Court determines that $150 per hour and
half of that rate for travel time and clerical work is reasonable for Ms. Troy and Chen’s work here.
Plaintiffs also request fees for the work by Kilaru, Sayson, and Dass. Kilaru is the
managing clerk at Troy Law. Schweitzer Decl. ¶ 72. Dass is a clerk at Troy Law. Id. ¶ 75. Sayson
is a litigation clerk, having earned her J.D. from Ateneo de Manila University School of Law and
passed the Uniform Bar Exam in 2025. Id. ¶¶ 67, 69. This is the first fee application made for
Sayson. Though Plaintiffs request $150 for Sayson, she contributed no more than 4.51 hours to
this matter and only participated through communications to third parties for transcripts and FOIA
requests, apart from a one-off instance of 0.62 hours spent on “assist[ing] with case law search.”
Schweitzer Decl., Ex. 13, at 14-16 Dkt. 151-13 (“Billing Invoice”). The Court finds no reason to
depart from other courts’ findings that $100 per hour is reasonable for Kilaru’s work and $75 per
hour is reasonable for Dass’s work. See Shen 2025 WL 746478, at *5; Juarez v. 156-40 Grill LLC,
15-CV-5081 (CBA) (LGD), 2024 WL 4834313, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2024) (reducing hourly
rate for Dass and Kilaru to $75 per hour). Given the limited nature of Sayson’s contributions in
this matter, the Court similarly finds that a rate of $75 per hour for her work here is reasonable.
Accordingly, the Court deems the following hourly billing rates are reasonable and in line
with those typically approved for litigators, including Troy Law, in wage-and-hour cases: $400 per
hour for Mr. Troy; $250 per hour for Schweitzer; $150 per hour for Chen; $150 per hour for Ms.
Troy; $100 per hour for Kilaru; $75 per hour for Dass; and $75 per hour for Sayson.
2. Reasonable Number of Hours
Plaintiffs seek compensation for a total of 688.12 hours of work in litigating this matter.
Schweitzer Decl. ¶ 78. They represent that the amount of time “reflects the protracted procedural
history of this case, the multiplicity [of] Plaintiffs and Defendants, and the fact that Plaintiffs are
not fluent English speakers and required Chinese interpretation.” Mot. at 6. Defendants only
challenge the Motion insofar as they argue Plaintiffs were not wholly successful, thus warranting
a significant, across-the-board reduction. Opp’n at 26-27.
To determine the reasonableness of the number of hours billed by Plaintiffs’ counsel, the
Court must “‘examine[] the particular hours expended by counsel with a view to the value of the
work product and the specific expenditures of the client’s case’ and if it ‘concludes that any
expenditure of time was unreasonable, it should exclude these hours’ from the fee calculation.”
Hines v. City of Albany, 613 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109
F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1997)). In determining the reasonable number of hours of work for a fee
award, “courts are . . . expected to take into account their own familiarity and experience both
‘generally’ and with the particular case at hand. . . .” Melo v. Milagro Grocery Corp., 750 F. Supp.
3d 38, 62 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Concrete Flotation Sys., Inc. v. Tadco Constr. Corp.,
07-CV-319 (ARR) (VVP), 2010 WL 2539771, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010)). “[T]he district
court should exclude excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours . . . .” Quarantino v.
Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-35). “[D]istrict
courts have the legal authority and discretion to . . . apply an across-the-board reduction to the
hours billed or total fee award to account for time spent on clerical tasks (or block-billed time
entries reflecting a mix of clerical and legal work) . . . .” Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222,
234 (2d Cir. 2019); Marion S. Mishkin L. Off. v. Lopalo, 767 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2014)
(explaining “the district court is not obligated to undertake a line-by-line review” of a fee
application and “may, instead, ‘exercise its discretion and use a percentage deduction as a practical
means of trimming fat.’” (quoting McDonald ex rel. Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA
Pension Tr. Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2006))); see also, e.g., Shen, 2025 WL 746478, at *7
(imposing a blanket fee reduction of 30% on Troy Law in an FLSA–NYLL case); Cui, 2024 WL
3567008, at *10 (imposing a blanket fee reduction of 30% on Troy Law in an FLSA/NYLL case).
Here, the Court considers, in turn, the complexity of the case, billing practices, clerical and
ministerial tasks and delegation of work, and counsel’s success.
a. Complexity
“[C]ase-specific factors like the novelty or complexity of the matter are appropriately
considered in determining the reasonable hourly rate or hours billed.” Lilly, 934 F.3d at 232. The
Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ attempt to categorize the instant matter as anything more than
an ordinary FLSA/NYLL wage and hour action. See, e.g., Cui, 2024 WL 3567008, at *4
(“Although this case involved a jury trial, this Court agrees that there is nothing about this FLSA
case that was particularly complex. This case did not involve novel nor complex issues of law, the
facts of this case were not difficult to parse, nor were there a multitude of parties involved.”); Zang
v. Daxi Sichuan, Inc., 18-CV-06910 (DG) (SJB), 2023 WL 2305934, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2023)
(“Here, there is nothing about this FLSA case that was particularly complex. It did not involve
novel issues of law, complicated facts, or a multitude of parties.”); Shen, 2025 WL 74678, at *4.
Similarly, the “protracted nature” of the case is unconvincing as a basis for the number of hours
billed. The length of time the case has been pending does not reflect its complexity. See Shen,
2025 WL 746478, at *4 n.9.
b. Billing Practices
Several of counsel’s billing entries are vague, duplicative, or excessive, warranting a
reduction in the number of hours billed. See generally Billing Invoice. A court may exclude from
the lodestar calculation “excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours.” Quaratino 166
F.3d at 425; see also Luciano, 109 F.3d at 116 (“If the district court concludes that any expenditure
of time was unreasonable, it should exclude these hours from the lodestar calculation.”).
Additionally, “vague entries hamper the Court’s ability ‘to determine the reasonableness of the
time spent on particular tasks and warrant[s] a reduction in attorney’s fees.’” Cui, 2024 WL
3567008, at *8 (quoting Caban v. Emp. Sec. Fund of the Elec. Prods. Indus. Pension Plan,
10-CV-389 (SMG), 2015 WL 7454601, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2015)).
Samples of Plaintiff’s vague entries include Dass billing 0.5 hours to “Help out with
Conference.” Billing Invoice at 8. They also include Ms. Troy billing 1.07 hours to “review case,”
0.38 hours to “review case cont’d (recheck sent email),” and 0.48 hours to “review case facts
(email, binder, dropbox).” Id. at 9-10. Not to mention, these entries raise the Court’s eyebrow as
to whether Ms. Troy’s hours constituted clerical tasks or were duplicative; the inability to resolve
that mystery is the very reason vague entries are frowned upon. Courts have imposed reductions
up to 40% for vague entries. See Anderson v. County of Suffolk, CV 09-1913 (GRB), 2016 WL
1444594, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2016).
The billing records also reflect duplicate billing and overlapping efforts among counsel.
For example, Ms. Troy and Schweitzer both bill 3.50 hours and 3.25 hours, respectively, for “depo
prep Miao, Xu, Gao.” Billing Invoice at 10. Mr. Troy and Ms. Troy both billed 0.67 hours for
“Confer Client Wang, Qian.” Id. at 3. Ms. Troy billed 0.72, 0.37, and 0.25, respectively, for
“deposition scheduling with clients,” “deposition scheduling with OC,” and “call clients with JC
to finalize depo dates.” Id. at 10. She also duplicates “draft close certify discovery” for 0.33 and
0.25 hours. Id. at 9-10. Ms. Troy also billed 1.40 hours for “Draft Damages Calculation Chart,
Plf Yang, Lu” twice. Id. at 3. Courts addressing fee applications submitted by Troy Law have
encountered similar issues with overbilling and duplicative billing, resulting in reduced hours. See,
e.g., Shen, 2025 WL 746478, at *5 (reducing hours by 30%); Feng, 727 F. Supp. 3d at 460-61
(S.D.N.Y. 2024) (deducting hours line-by-line); Wang v. XBB, Inc., 18-CV-7341 (PKC) (ST), 2023
WL 2614143, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2023) (reducing hours for excessive and repetitive billing
by 40%).
c. Clerical and Ministerial Tasks and Delegation of Work
Counsel’s inappropriate delegation of work also fails to fit the bill. “[T]he Supreme Court
has opined that ‘purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate,
regardless of who performs them.’” Cui, 2024 WL 3567008, at *8 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins,
491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989)). “[D]istrict courts have the legal authority and discretion to either
reduce an attorney’s hourly rate for time spent on clerical tasks or apply an across-the-board
reduction to the hours billed or total fee award to account for time spent on clerical tasks (or block-
billed time entries reflecting a mix of clerical and legal work) . . . .” Lilly, 934 F.3d at 234. “[I]t
is not appropriate, for purposes of gauging the reasonable fee award, to assign partner-level billing
rates to tasks that first- or second-year associate[s] [or, here, a non-lawyer] could easily perform.”
Cui, 2024 WL 3567008, at *8 (quoting Zhang v. Lin Kumo Japanese Rest. Inc., 13 Civ. 6667 (PAE),
2015 WL 5122530, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2015)).
Troy Law is no stranger to this concept; it has faced hour reductions numerous times for
its failure to delegate work. See, e.g., Cui, 2024 WL 3567008, at *8; Zang, 2023 WL 2305934, at
*6; Shen, 2025 WL 746478, at *6. Even so, the billing records here reflect clerical-work entries
billing at associate or partner-level rates. For instance, Mr. Troy billed 0.25 hours to “Confer with
Interpreter for Trial Prep” and 0.25 hours to “Remind Clients of Trial Prep.” Billing Invoice at 14.
Schweitzer billed 1.5 hours to “print & bind transcripts of Frank Chen depo . . .” and 1.33 hours
to “print & bind transcripts of NLRB hearing (vols 7-10)” which are plainly clerical tasks. Id. at
16-17. Ms. Troy and Dass both billed various hours to input addresses and names into envelopes,
prepare envelopes for mailing, and mail demands. Id. at 9.
d. Degree of Success
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are not so intertwined to justify their “single,
undifferentiated fee request,” which does not permit the Court to differentiate hours devoted to
successful or unsuccessful claims. Opp’n at 26. Since Plaintiffs only prevailed on some but not
all claims, at a minimum, Defendants suggest an across-the-board reduction of no less than 67.5%
is warranted. Id. at 26-27.
When plaintiffs only partially succeed on their claims, courts shall consider whether the
claims are so “intertwined,”—that is, they “involve a common core of facts or [are] based on
related legal theories”—that most of “counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as
a whole.” Holick v. Cellular Sales of N.Y., 48 F.4th 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Hensley, 461
U.S. at 434-35). Where claims are not severable, it is “difficult to divide the hours expended on a
claim-by-claim basis,” and so instead of determining “how much time counsel devoted to each
such overlapping claim, [the court should] look to the significance of the overall relief obtained by
the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Zang, 2023 WL
2305934, at *9 (quoting Raja v. Burns, 43 F.4th 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2022)). Separately, with unrelated
claims, the “work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of
the ultimate result achieved.” Holick, 48 F.4th at 106 (quotations omitted). “[U]nrelated claims
were likely to be uncommon, and . . . most civil rights claims will involve a common core of facts,
or be grounded in related legal theories, or both.” Id. at 108 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).
Defendants urge the Court to find the latter instance applicable here, arguing that Plaintiffs’ wage
statement, overtime, minimum wage, and retaliation claims all “involve distinct factual and legal
elements with limited overlap.” Opp’n at 27. The Court disagrees, and Holick is instructive.
There, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ FLSA and NYLL claims were intertwined
because there was a common legal issue connecting the claims: “whether [p]laintiffs are employees
or independent contractors[;]” “all of the legal theories involve[d] wage and hour claims brought
under the FLSA and New York Labor Law[;]” and all of the plaintiffs’ claims arose “from a
common set of facts: the conditions of employment between [p]laintiffs and [the employer].”
Holick, 48 F.4th at 107. Here, too, Plaintiffs’ FLSA and NYLL claims arise out of a common core
of facts concerning the conditions of their employment as van drivers and theories of employment
status under the FLSA and NYLL. The Court therefore declines Defendants’ invitation to reduce
Plaintiffs’ compensable hours for a failure to differentiate hours by the success of each claim.
In consideration of the foregoing factors, the Court applies a 30% across-the-board
reduction to Plaintiffs’ requested hours.
3. Total Reasonable Fees
Based on the reasonable rates determined and 30% reduction in hours applied above,
Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees are calculated as follows:
Individual Requested Reasonable Recorded Reduction Reasonable Adjusted
Rate Rate Hours3 Hours Fees
John Troy $650 $400 47.28 30% 33.1 $13,240
Aaron $400 $250 217.16 30% 152.01 $38,002.50
Schweitzer
(full rate)
Aaron $200 $125 55.83 30% 39.08 $4,885
Schweitzer
(half rate)
Eric Chen $250 $150 81.23 30% 56.86 $8,529
Eric Chen $150 $75 5.45 30% 3.82 $286.50
(half rate)
Tiffany $250 $150 48.17 30% 33.72 $5,058
Troy
(full rate)
Tiffany $150 $75 44.76 30% 31.33 $2,349.75
Troy
(half rate)
Preethi $200 $100 14.1 30% 9.87 $987
Kilaru
Gavin Dass $150 $75 71.28 30% 49.9 $3,742.50
Frances $150 $75 4.51 30% 3.16 $237
Sayson
Total 412.85 $77,317.25
Accordingly, Plaintiffs are awarded $77,317.25 in attorney’s fees.
4. Costs
“An award of costs ‘normally include[s] those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred
by the attorney and which are normally charged fee-paying clients.’” Fisher, 948 F.3d at 600
(quoting Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1987)).
“The fee applicant must submit adequate documentation supporting the requested attorney’s fees
3 All recorded hours are taken from Paragraph 78 of the Schweitzer Declaration.
and costs.” Id. Plaintiffs submit receipts totaling $5,259.45 for court transcripts and interpreter
services. See generally Schweitzer Decl., Ex. 16, Dkt. 151-16 (“Cost Receipts”). Defendants do
not contest the adequacy of documentation. Finding that Plaintiffs have submitted adequate
documentation, Plaintiffs are entitled to $5,259.45 in costs.
B. Judgment
In line with the jury’s verdict, Plaintiffs request that they be awarded unpaid overtime and
minimum wages, including prejudgment interest thereon, damages for failure to furnish wage
statements, and lost wages due to retaliation. Mot. at 3-5. Defendants do not oppose this request.
See generally Opp’n. The judgment amounts for which Defendants are jointly and severally liable
to each Plaintiff and prejudgment interest are addressed below and summarized in Table 1 and
Table 2, respectively.
1. Joint and Several Liability
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are subject to joint and several liability, based upon the
duration of each Plaintiff’s employment with each Defendant. Reply at 6. Defendants, as
employers of Plaintiffs, are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiffs for damages. See Feng v. Kelai
Corp., 727 F. Supp. 3d 423, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (reciting that under the NYLL, an individual may
simultaneously have multiple employers such that “all joint employers are responsible, both
individually and jointly, for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the [FLSA]” and
the same is true under the NYLL) (quoting Martin v. Sprint United Management Co., 273 F. Supp.
3d 404, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) and citing Pineda v. Masonry Construction, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 2d
666, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). But, if different employers employed employees for different time
periods, each employer is only jointly and severally liable for the damages accrued during the
period it employed the employees. Cf. Sun v. Sushi Fussion Express, Inc., 16 CV 4840 (RPK)(LB),
2022 WL 2466858, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2022) (finding that the two employers did not
constitute a single enterprise and were thus only subject to joint and several liability for FLSA and
NYLL violations during the time periods of plaintiff’s employment at each of the two employers).
Here, Plaintiffs were employed by various Defendants and for various time periods, as set
forth by Plaintiffs in their motion papers, see Dkt. 156-1 at 1-8 (“Damage Calculations”), based
on the jury’s verdict, which determined which Defendants employed Plaintiffs, and for what time
periods, see Jury Verdict Sheets. Thus, Defendants are jointly and severally liable for each of the
NYLL claims based on the time periods that they actually employed each Plaintiff.
a. Application
Accordingly, Judgment shall be entered against Defendants in accordance with the
amounts set forth in Table 1:
Table 1
Total Joint and Several Liability of Defendants
Judgment
Kirin Hebei Frank Chen Nancy Qiu Xiang Shi
Song
Sarah Wang $8,044.79 $8,044.79 $7,156.79 $6,792.07 $0.00 $7,156.79
($3,044.79 ($2,156.79 in ($1,792.07 in ($2,156.79 in
in unpaid unpaid overtime unpaid overtime unpaid overtime
overtime wages + wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,0000 in
$5,000 in penalties for penalties for penalties for
penalties for nonfurnished wage nonfurnished nonfurnished wage
nonfurnished statements) wage statements) statements)
wage statements)
Zhanwen Chi $14,135.79 $14,135.79 $10,736.07 $14,135.79 $0.00 $10,736.07
($9,135.79 in ($5,736.07 in ($9,135.79 in ($5,736.07 in
unpaid minimum unpaid minimum unpaid minimum unpaid minimum
and overtime and overtime wages and wages and
wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in overtime wages + overtime wages +
penalties for penalties for $5,000 in %,000 in penalties
nonfurnished nonfurnished wage penalties for for nonfurnished
wage statements) statements) nonfurnished wage statements)
wage statements
Tiande Wang $9,184.52 $8,279.76 $6,821.43 $7,363.10 $0.00 $6,821.43
($3,279.76 in ($1,821.43 in ($2,363.10 in ($1,821.43 +
unpaid overtime unpaid overtime unpaid overtime $5,000 in penalties
wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in for nonfurnished
penalties for penalties for penalties for wage statements)
nonfurnished nonfurnished wage nonfurnished
wage statements) statements) wage statements)
Ya Xu $62,608.45 $38,208.45 $30,301.04 $19,994.13 $24,400.00 $30,301.04
(prejudgment ($8,009.28 in ($8,009.28 in ($348.96 in for ($8,009.28 in
interest only unpaid minimum unpaid minimum unpaid minimum retaliation unpaid minimum
to be wages + wages + wages + wages +
calculated on $25,199.17 in $17,291.76 in $14,645.17 in $17,291.76 in
$38,208.45) unpaid overtime unpaid overtime unpaid overtime unpaid overtime
wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in
penalties for penalties for penalties for penalties for
nonfurnished nonfurnished wage nonfurnished nonfurnished wage
wage statements) statements) wage statements) statements)
Lu Yang $56,458.33 $56,458.33 $33,865.74 $39,537.04 $0.00 $33,865.74
($51,458.33 in ($28,865.74 in ($34,537.04 in ($28,865.74 in
unpaid overtime unpaid overtime unpaid overtime unpaid overtime
wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in
penalties for penalties for penalties for penalties for
nonfurnished nonfurnished wage nonfurnished nonfurnished wage
wage statements) statements) wage statements) statements)
Jian Min Xi $50,080.00 $50,080.00 $0.00 $49,020.26 $0.00 $30,301.04
($20,472.00 in ($19,878.55 in ($8,009.28 in
unpaid minimum unpaid minimum unpaid minimum
wages + wages + wages +
$24,608.00 in $24,141.71 in $17,291.76 in
unpaid overtime + unpaid overtime + unpaid overtime
$5,000 in $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in
penalties for penalties for penalties for
nonfurnished nonfurnished nonfurnished wage
wage statements) wage statements) statements)
Yuanfu Gao $29,597.86 $29,597.86 $0.00 $21,605.47 $0.00 $18,944.29
($12,050.00 in ($5,234.04 in ($11,900 in unpaid
unpaid minimum unpaid minimum minimum wages +
wages + wages + $2,044.29 in
$12,547.86 in $11,371.43 in unpaid overtime +
unpaid overtime + unpaid overtime + $5,000 in penalties
$5,000 in $5,000 in for nonfurnished
penalties for penalties for wage statements)
nonfurnished nonfurnished
wage statements) wage statements)
Jin Cheng Mi $5,968.25 $5,968.25 $0.00 $5,968.25 $0.00 $0.00
ao ($968.25 in ($968.25 in
unpaid overtime unpaid overtime
wages + $5,000 in wages + $5,000 in
penalties for penalties for
nonfurnished nonfurnished
wage statements) wage statements)
2. Prejudgment Interest
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to prejudgment interest for their unpaid wages claims
pursuant to the NYLL. Mot. at 5. Plaintiffs assert that prejudgment interest on their unpaid wages
is calculated from the midpoint of their employment through the date of the jury’s verdict, and
Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the entire sum of interest. Mot. at 5. It is within the
Court’s discretion to determine the reasonable date from which prejudgment interest should accrue.
Feng, 727 F. Supp. 3d at 456 (quoting Villanueva v. 179 Third Ave. Rest. Inc., 500 F. Supp. 3d 219,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)). As it has done previously, the Court aligns itself with those courts that
calculate prejudgment interest on Plaintiffs’ NYLL claims from the midpoint date of the claims
through the date judgment is entered, rather than the date of the jury’s verdict. See Lei v. A & C
Seafood Int’l Grp., 1:21-cv-03471-OEM-SJB, 2023 WL 8828839, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2023);
Perez Campos v. Quentin Mkt. Corp., 16-CV-05303, 2018 WL 9945754, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17,
2018) (“Most courts in this district calculate simple prejudgment interest in NYLL actions from
the midpoint date of the claims through the date judgment is entered.”); Gortat v. Capala Bros.,
949 F. Supp. 2d 374, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Accordingly, the Court relies on Plaintiffs’ midpoint
dates as calculated based on the jury verdict sheets, see generally Jury Verdict Sheets, and set forth
in Plaintiffs’ Reply, see Damage Calculations.
a. Application
Each of the foregoing Plaintiffs shall be awarded pre-judgment interest on their unpaid
wage damages at the statutory interest rate of 9% per annum from each of the foregoing midpoint
dates until the date of judgment as set forth below in Table 2.
Table 2
Plaintiff Defendant Employment Start Employment End Date Midpoint Date
Date
Qian Wang Kirin June 1, 2016 December 2, 2020 September 2, 2018
Hebei November 1, 2017 December 2, 2020 May 19, 2019
Frank Chen June 1, 2016 March 31, 2019 October 31, 2017
Qiuxiang November 1, 2017 December 2, 2020 May 19, 2019
Shi
Zhanwen Chi Kirin November 1, 2016 March 31, 2019 January 15, 2018
Hebei November 1, 2017 March 31, 2019 July 17, 2018
Frank Chen November 1, 2016 March 31, 2019 January 15, 2018
Qiuxiang November 1, 2017 March 31, 2019 July 17, 2018
Shi
Tiande Wang Kirin June 1, 2016 January 31, 2017
Kirin April 1, 2019 December 3, 2020 September 2, 20184
Hebei April 1, 2019 December 3, 2020 February 1, 2020
Frank Chen January 1, 2016 January 31, 2017 July 17, 2016
Qiuxiang April 1, 2019 December 3, 2020 February 1, 2020
Shi
Ya Xu Kirin March 1, 2016 March 31, 2021 September 15, 2018
Hebei November 1, 2017 March 31, 2021 July 17, 2019
Frank Chen March 1, 2016 March 31, 2019 September 15, 2017
Qiuxiang November 1, 2017 March 31, 2021 July 17, 2019
Shi
Lu Yang Kirin March 1, 2015 March 31, 2021 March 16, 2018
Hebei November 1, 2017 March 31, 2019 March 16, 2017
4 The jury determined that Tiande Wang left Kirin on February 1, 2017, and returned on April 1, 2019. See Dkt. 148-
2 ¶ 2. Plaintiffs represent that the midpoint date for his entire period of employment with Kirin is October 6, 2018.
See Damage Calculations at 3.
Frank Chen March 1, 2015 March 31, 2019 March 16, 2017
Qiuxiang November 1, 2017 March 31, 2021 July 17, 2019
Shi
Jian Min Xi Kirin April 25, 2015 April 30, 2018 October 27, 2016
Frank Chen April 25, 2025 April 13, 2018 October 18, 2016
Qiuxiang November 1, 2017 April 30, 2018 January 30, 2018
Shi
Yuanfu Gao Kirin January 1, 2015 March 31, 2015 April 16, 20175
Kirin January 1, 2019 July 31, 2019
Frank Chen January 1, 2015 March 31, 2015 February 14, 20176
Frank Chen January 1, 2019 March 31, 2019
Qiuxiang January 1, 2019 July 31, 2019 April 17, 2019
Shi
Jin Cheng Miao Kirin January 1, 2016 August 31, 2016 May 2, 2016
Frank Chen January 1, 2016 August 31, 2016 May 2, 2016
C. Judgment as a Matter of Law
Defendants inexplicably spend 25 pages of their 27-page Memorandum of Law in Support
of Opposition Motion for Entry of Judgment and Attorney Fees arguing why the claims Plaintiffs
5 The jury determined that Yuanfu Gao left Kirin on April 1, 2015, and returned on January 1, 2019. See Dkt. 148-6
¶ 2. Plaintiffs represent that the midpoint date for his entire period of employment with Kirin is April 16, 2017. See
Damage Calculations at 7.
6 The jury determined that Yuanfu Gao stopped working for Frank Chen on April 1, 2015, and returned on January 1,
2019. See Dkt. 148-6 ¶ 2. Plaintiffs represent that the midpoint date for his entire period of employment with Frank
Chen is February 14, 2017. See Damage Calculations at 7.
succeeded on should be denied as a matter of law. See generally Opp’n at 1-25. Defendants failed
to move for a directed verdict before the case was submitted to the jury; consequently, Defendants
waived their arguments for judgment as matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2) (“A motion
for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury.”);
McCardle v. Haddad, 131 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In sum, a posttrial motion for JMOL can
properly be made only if, and to the extent that, such a motion specifying the same grounds was
made prior to the submission of the case to the jury.”); Luna v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 578 F. App’x
58, 59 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that the appellant waived one of her arguments on appeal by failing
to timely move for judgment as a matter of law at trial); see also Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty
& Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 286 (2d Cir. 1998). To the extent that Defendants have moved for
judgment as a matter of law, it is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs are
awarded $77,317.25 in attorney’s fees and $5,259.45 in costs due jointly and severally from all
Defendants.
Judgment shall be entered in accordance with the jury’s verdict, against Defendants in the
amounts set forth in Table 1, with prejudgment interest accruing at 9% per annum on unpaid
minimum wages and unpaid overtime wages based on the midpoint dates set forth in Table 2.
Plaintiffs shall also be awarded post-judgment interest, as calculated under 28 US.C. § 1961.
Pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 663(4), if any amounts remain upon the expiration of 90 days
following issuance of judgment, or 90 days after the expiration of the time to appeal and no appeal
therefrom is then pending, whichever is later, the total amount of judgment shall automatically
increase by 15%.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment consistent with this order and
close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
ORELIA E. MERCHANT
United States District Judge
March 17, 2026
Brooklyn, New York