The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JAMES HUGHES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:25-cv-02506-AAS
SUPERVISOR GAVIN NESTOR,
GAVIN SEALS,
CEO TIM PERRYMAN,
ATLANTIC SQUIRED SUPPLY, LLC,
AND DYLAN QUILLA
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
ORDER
Defendants, Atlantic Squared Supply, LLC,1 Tim Perryman, Dylan
Quilla, Gavin Seale, and Gavin Nestor (collectively “defendants”), move to
dismiss the Plaintiff James Hughes’s amended complaint. (Docs. 14, 25). Mr.
Hughes opposes the motion. (Doc. 30).
1 Atlantic Squared Supply’s name is misspelled in Mr. Hughes’s complaint (Doc. 14),
and therefore in the docket. This does not affect the proceedings. See Padernera v.
Lagenwalter of Kendall, Inc., No. 07 60421 CIV COHN, 2007 WL 1723664 at n. 1
(S.D. Fla. June 13, 2007); See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding a
pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are held to a less stringent standard and the court must
liberally construe language in the plaintiff’s favor.).
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I. BACKGROUND
On September 17, 2025, Mr. Hughes filed a complaint against Mr.
Nestor, Mr. Perryman, and Mr. Seales. (Doc. 1). On October 6, 2025, Mr.
Hughes filed a motion to amend his complaint. (Doc. 4). The court granted the
motion to amend on October 10, 2025. (Doc. 6). On October 20, 2025, Mr.
Hughes filed his first amended complaint against the defendants. (Doc. 8). On
October 22, 2025, the court dismissed Mr. Hughes’s first amended complaint
as an impermissible shotgun pleading and granted Mr. Hughes leave to amend
his complaint. (Doc. 10).
On November 3, 2025, Mr. Hughes filed his second amended complaint
against the defendants. (Doc. 12). On November 7, 2025, the court dismissed
his second amended complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading and
granted Mr. Hughes leave to amend his complaint. (Doc. 13).
On November 17, 2025, Mr. Hughes filed his third amended complaint
against the defendants. (Doc. 14). In that complaint, Mr. Hughes alleges claims
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Doc. 14). Specifically,
Count I alleges disability discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), Count II
alleges failure to accommodate under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), and Count III
alleges retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). (Doc. 14). On December 26,
2025, the defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Hughes’s complaint. (Doc. 25). Mr.
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Hughes responded in opposition. (Doc. 30).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” A complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). In
reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court applies the plausibility standard
set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id.
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, review is generally limited to the four corners of the complaint. When
reviewing a complaint for facial sufficiency, a court “must accept [a] [p]laintiff’s
well pleaded facts as true and construe the [c]omplaint in the light most
favorable to the [p]laintiff.” Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 232,
233 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). A pro
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se plaintiff’s complaint is liberally construed, but the court will not “serve as
de facto counsel” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading.” Albert v. Discover
Bank, No. 24-10224, 2025 WL 1514052 at *1 (11th Cir. May 28, 2025) (citing
Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The ADA Claims Against the Individual Defendants
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the ADA “does not provide for
individual liability, only for employer liability.” Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d
1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th
Cir. 1991) (explaining that “[t]he relief granted under Title VII is against the
employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation
of the Act.”). The ADA “precludes individual liability for violations of the ADA’s
employment discrimination provisions. It also precludes individual liability for
violations of the ADA’s anti-retaliation provisions in the employment context.”
Woltz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 6:13-CV-32-ORL-22KRS, 2013 WL 672530,
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2013); See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830–33
(11th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). Thus, all Counts against the
individual defendants, Mr. Nestor, Mr. Seals, Mr. Perryman, and Mr. Quilla
are DISMISSED.
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B. The ADA Claims Against Atlantic Squared Supply, LLC
i. Failure to Name Atlantic Squared Supply in the EEOC
Charge Does Not Bar Suit
Atlantic Squared Supply argues that it cannot be held liable because it
was not named in Mr. Hughes’s EEOC charge. (Doc. 25, pp. 12−13). Instead,
Metal Roofing of Florida is named. (Doc. 25-1).
“Ordinarily, a party not named in the EEOC charge cannot be sued in a
subsequent civil action.” Virgo v. Riviera Beach Associates, Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350,
1358 (11th Cir. 1994). The purpose of this rule is “to notify the charged party
of the allegations” and “allow[] the party an opportunity to participate in
conciliation and voluntarily comply with the requirements of Title VII.” Id.
However, “the naming requirement is construed ‘liberally,’ such that a party
unnamed in the EEOC charge may properly be sued so long as the purposes of
Title VII are fulfilled.” McCulley v. Allstates Tech. Servs., No. CIV.A. 04-0115-
WS-B, 2005 WL 1475314 at *23 (S.D. Ala. June 21, 2005) (citing Virgo, 30 F.3d
at 1358–59). The naming requirement is not meant to operate as a technical
“stumbling block” that frustrates the fulfillment of Title VII’s statutory
objectives. Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1327,
1353–54 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
To determine whether an unnamed party in an EEOC charge may be
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subject to federal court jurisdiction, courts in the Eleventh Circuit avoid rigid
tests and instead examine the following factors as set out in Virgo: “(i)
similarity of interest between named and unnamed parties; (ii) whether
plaintiff could have ascertained the unnamed party’s identity at the time of the
EEOC filing; (iii) whether the unnamed party received adequate notice of the
EEOC charge; (iv) whether the unnamed party had adequate opportunity to
participate in the EEOC conciliation process; and (v) whether the unnamed
party will be actually prejudiced by exclusion from the EEOC proceedings.”
McCulley, 2005 WL 1475314 at *103–04; See Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1359; Gordon v.
MCG Health Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Scelta, 57 F.
Supp. 2d at 1354.
The balance of these factors tips in favor of allowing Mr. Hughes to
proceed with his claims against Atlantic Squared Supply. In analyzing the first
factor, courts in the Eleventh Circuit typically find sufficient similarity of
interest when the unnamed party is the sole owner of the named party. Harris
v. Mothers Making a Change, No. 1:20-CV-4357-CAP-CCB, 2021 WL 12300765
at *5 (N.D. Ga. July 13, 2021); see U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm’n v. Princess Martha, LLC, 705 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1362 (M.D. Fla. 2023)
(finding similarity of interests when the EEOC pleaded the defendants “share
common ownership and management”). In contrast, “cases where there is no
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ownership or management overlap between a named party and an unnamed
party, courts often refuse to find a sufficient similarity of interest to allow the
suit against the unnamed party to proceed.” Harris, 2021 WL 12300765 at *5.
Here, Mr. Hughes alleges that on or about December 22, 2022, Atlantic
Squared Supply purchased Metal Roofing Systems of Florida, and there is
overlapping management between the two entities. (Doc. 14, p. 4). The first
Virgo factor weighs in favor of Mr. Hughes.
The second factor may weigh in a plaintiff’s favor where the unnamed
entity was not reasonably identifiable at the time the EEOC charge was filed.
Harris, 2021 WL 12300765 at *7; see e.g. Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1359 (where one
entity did not yet exist but later assumed the liabilities of its predecessor). By
contrast, where a plaintiff could readily have identified the entity but failed to
name it in the charge, courts have declined to excuse the omission, even when
the plaintiff proceeds pro se. Harris, 2021 WL 12300765 at *7. Here, Mr.
Hughes alleges he was unaware Atlantic Squared Supply owned Metal Roofing
Systems of Florida during his employment. (Doc. 30). “[Mr. Hughes] was a
machinist employee, not privy to corporate ownership structures. He
reasonably identified his employer as ‘Metal Roofing of Florida,’ the name used
in his workplace.” (Doc. 30). He was not given access to materials disclosing
ownership by Atlantic Squared Supply. (Doc. 30). Because he was not certain
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of the corporate structure at the time, he did not name Atlantic Squared Supply
in his charge. (Doc. 30). He nevertheless claims he informed the EEOC of
potential ownership during his EEOC interview, but the EEOC did not
investigate the corporate structure. (Doc. 30). The second Virgo factor weighs
in favor of Mr. Hughes. Cf. Princess Martha, 705 F. Supp. 3d at 1362 (“This
factor weighs against a plaintiff who had actual knowledge of the unnamed
party’s identity.”) (citing Lewis v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 402 F. App’x 454,
457 (11th Cir. 2010)).
The third factor, the notice requirement, includes actual notice and
“notice to the unnamed party of that party’s liability under Title VII for the
claims described in the EEOC charge.” Harris, 2021 WL 12300765 at *8. When
an unnamed party is the sole owner of a named party, the unnamed party
should have received proper notice of its liability under Title VII. See Virgo, 30
F.3d at 1350. Here, Atlantic Squared Supply is the sole owner of Metal Roofing
of Florida. (Doc. 14). Additionally, the defendants do not argue any lack of
notice of Mr. Hughes’s EEOC charge,2 and the shared ownership and
employment between Metal Roofing of Florida and Atlantic Squared Supply
supports a reasonable inference of notice. (Doc. 14). The third Virgo factor also
2 However, the defendants do argue they are not named in EEOC Charge. (Doc. 25,
pp. 12−13).
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weighs in favor of Mr. Hughes. See DiGiro v. Pall Corp., 993 F. Supp. 1471,
1474 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (“It is well-established that an administrative charge
against one defendant may provide sufficient notice to another defendant,
when the two are closely related entities.”)
The fourth factor centers on whether the unnamed party had notice of
the EEOC charge and an opportunity to participate. Harris, 2021 WL
12300765 at *8. Courts have recognized “that ‘[t]he association between
defendant via their control by [the CEO and registered agent] and their
sharing of a Human Resource Department and counsel creates a unique
situation where one entity’s participation in the EEOC conciliation process
would represent the interests of the other entity.’” Princess Marta, 705 F. Supp
3d at 1364 (citing Hull v. Paramount Printing, LLC, No.
421CV00190HLMWEJ, 2021 WL 9624561, *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2021)); see
McCulley v. Allstates Tech. Servs., No. Civ.A. 04-0115, 2005 WL 1475314, *24
(S.D. Ala. June 21, 2005) (finding that the unnamed party could not credibly
argue it lacked notice, “given that the corporate actors handling the charge on
[named party’s] behalf were also affiliated with [unnamed party]). Here, Mr.
Hughes alleges both companies were under the same management and
ownership. (Doc. 14, pp. 2−4). Additionally, for the reasons discussed under the
third factor, notice may be reasonably inferred. See Princess Marta, 705 F.
9
Supp 3d at 1364 (stating “[t]he fourth and fifth Virgo factors involve similar
considerations to the third.”) The fourth Virgo factor weighs in favor of Mr.
Hughes.
The fifth factor, prejudice, is presumed “when a party does not
participate in the conciliation process.” Harris, 2021 WL 12300765 at *9; see
Gordon, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 (finding “no evidence that the defendant [was]
prejudiced by its exclusion from the EEOC proceedings” because the defendant
was “closely related” to the named party). When a party has notice of claims
and a strong similarity of interest, courts find less prejudice. Harris, 2021 WL
12300765 at *9. Here, Atlantic Squared Supply did not participate in the
conciliation process and therefore is presumed to have suffered prejudice.
However, because Atlantic Squared Supply owns Metal Roofing of Florida and
shares similar interests, (Doc. 14) the prejudice is diminished. Accordingly, the
fifth factor weighs slightly in favor of Atlantic Squared Supply, but it carries
less weight in the overall balancing analysis.
Last, the Eleventh Circuit also considers “whether an investigation of
the unnamed party could have reasonably grown out of the EEOC charge.”
Lewis, 402 F. App’x at 457. This consideration supports the inclusion of an
unnamed party when the party’s identity or role in the alleged discrimination
was or would likely be discovered during the EEOC’s reasonable investigation.
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Id. Here, Mr. Hughes alleges he disclosed the potential ownership of Metal
Roofing of Florida by Atlantic Squared Supply. (Doc. 30). This disclosure and
the corporate structure of the two entities could have prompted an
investigation into Atlantic Squared Supply. Therefore, this consideration
weighs in favor of Mr. Hughes.
When considered together, the Virgo factors weigh in favor of Mr.
Hughes. As such, Mr. Hughes’s claims proceed. See Lewis v. Tegna, Inc., No.
824CV00402WFJSPF, 2024 WL 1604073 at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2024)
(permitting a claim to proceed past the motion to dismiss stage against an
unnamed party); Princess Martha, 705 F. Supp. 3d at 1360−65 (analyzing the
Virgo factors and permitting the claim to proceed past the motion to dismiss
stage).
ii. Mr. Hughes Exhausted His Administrative Remedies
Atlantic Squared Supply also argues Mr. Hughes’s complaint must be
dismissed because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies by including
information in his complaint not in the EEOC charge. (Doc. 25). Atlantic
Squared Supply is correct that prior to filing a complaint under the ADA, a
plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Gregory v.
Georgia Dep’t of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004). The purpose
of this step “is that the [EEOC] should have the first opportunity to investigate
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the alleged discriminatory practices to permit it to perform its role in obtaining
voluntary compliance and promoting conciliation efforts.” Evans v. U.S. Pipe
& Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 929 (11th Cir. 1983). However, judicial claims
outside the scope of the EEOC complaint are allowed if they “amplify, clarify,
or more clearly focus” the allegations in the EEOC complaint. Gregory, 355
F.3d at 1279 (quoting Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1989)).
Further, courts are cautious to bar Title VII claims for procedural
technicalities. Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280; Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
431 F.2d 455, 465 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting “the scope of an EEOC complaint
should not be strictly interpreted.”).
The proper inquiry here is whether the allegations in Mr. Hughes’s
complaint are likely or reasonably related to, or grow out of, the allegations
contained in the EEOC charge following his termination. Browning v. AT & T
Paradyne Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1568, 1572 (M.D. Fla. 1993). In his charge, he
complained of a failure to provide accommodations after he requested them,
and complained of his termination shortly after attending a medical
appointment. (Doc. 25-1). Construed liberally, the factual allegations in the
EEOC charge could reasonably be expected to encompass claims of disability
discrimination, denial of reasonable accommodations, and retaliation. See e.g.
Browning, 838 F. Supp. At 1572 (finding plaintiff’s unlawful discharge claim
12
was reasonably related to his EEOC charge because, in his EEOC
questionnaire, he specifically alleged the employer’s discriminatory conduct
was an effort to force him to quit. His eventual termination was based on the
same allegedly discriminatory behavior, making the discharge the natural and
foreseeable culmination of conduct under investigation). Mr. Hughes
sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies.
C. Mr. Hughes’s ADA Claims Against Atlantic Squared Supply
i. Count I – Disability Discrimination
“The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against disabled
employees.” Surtain v. Halmin Terrace Found., 879 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir.
2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). “To state a discrimination claim under the
ADA, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest ‘(1) that he
suffers from a disability, (2) that he is a qualified individual, and (3) that a
‘covered entity’ discriminated against him on account of his disability.’”
Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246 (citing Cramer v. Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
A “disability” under the ADA is defined as “(a) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual; (b) a record of such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having
such impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The ADA defined a “qualified
13
individual” as a person “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
Applying these standards, Mr. Hughes has plausibly stated a claim for
disability discrimination under the ADA. Mr. Hughes alleges he suffers from
multiple medical conditions, including a herniated disc, rhabdomyolysis, and
bullous pemphigoid which limit major life activities including working,
walking, concentrating, and major bodily functions. (Doc. 14, pp. 4, 9−10). Mr.
Hughes further alleges he was a qualified individual, having performed his job
satisfactorily for three years and having been regarded as the “#2 guy” in his
role. (Doc. 14, p. 10). Mr. Hughes alleges Atlantic Squared Supply, a covered
entity, took adverse employment actions against him on account of his
disability including, demotion, disparate treatment compared to other injured
employees, threats of discipline and termination, and ultimately termination.
(Doc. 14, pp. 5, 10).
Atlantic Squared Supply, in sum, argues Mr. Hughes’s allegations are
vague and lack specific details, such as the identities of comparators or the
names of involved employees. (Doc. 25). However, “[t]o survive a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the complaint does not need detailed factual allegations . . .
but must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
14
grounds upon which it rests.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir.
2010). Accepting the well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing reasonable
inferences in Mr. Hughes’s favor, the court concludes the complaint plausibly
alleges disability discrimination under the ADA 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). See Am.
Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010). The
defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Hughes’s ADA discrimination claim is
DENIED.
ii. Count II – Failure to Accommodate
In contrast to a claim for intentional discrimination (Count I), “a failure
to make reasonable accommodations claim requires no animus and occurs
when a covered entity fails to fulfill its affirmative duty to ‘make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified applicant or employee with a disability’ without demonstrating that
‘the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business.’” Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692, 2007 WL 2404705, at *4 (11th Cir.
Aug. 24, 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). To properly allege a failure
to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) he is disabled, (2) he is a
qualified individual, (3) he made a specific request for a reasonable
accommodation, and (4) the employer failed to provide a reasonable
accommodation or failed to engage in a requisite interactive process to identify
15
a reasonable accommodation. D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d
1014, 1021 (11th Cir. 2020).
A reasonable accommodation is a change or adjustment to the workplace
or job duties that allows an employee to carry out the “essential functions” of
the position. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016).
Examples of a reasonable accommodation include “job restructuring; modified
work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modification
of equipment; appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials, or policies; and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.” Bender v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Def., No. 21-12103, 2022
WL 3703805 at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 2022); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
To state a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must plead how
he can perform the essential functions of their role with the reasonably
requested accommodation. See Bodie-Jernigan v. Sch. Bd. Of Broward Cnty.,
Fla., No. 24-12593, 2025 WL 2741931 at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding
a plaintiff “did not plead sufficient facts showing that she could maintain
discipline or effectively teach online—two essential functions of her job.”). If a
plaintiff pleads he can perform the essential functions of his job, “without more,
[it] is conclusory, and not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id.; Salyer v
Amsouth Bank, No. 8:04-CV-2543-T-17MAP, 2007 WL 9723535 at *2 (M.D.
16
Fla. Apr. 18, 2007) (finding plaintiff failed to state a claim because she did not
“explain how” any reasonable accommodations “would have allowed [her] to
perform the essential functions of her job.”).
Mr. Hughes is a qualified individual with a disability.3 However, he does
not allege how any of his requested accommodations—light work, air
conditioning, an exhaust fan, and night shift assignments—would allow him
to meet the essential functions of his job. Rather, he offers only the conclusory
assertion that “[w]ith reasonable accommodations, [he] could have performed
the essential functions of his job.” (Doc. 14, p. 11). Such a bare allegation,
without factual support describing the essential functions of the job or how the
requested accommodations would permit their performance, is insufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr.
Hughes’s failure to accommodate claim is GRANTED.
iii. Count III – Retaliation
The ADA prohibits employers from taking adverse action against
individuals because they challenged conduct prohibited by the ADA or because
3 Mr. Hughes does not address his qualifications under Count II, and also does not
elaborate on the nature of his impairments or the limitations imposed by his
disability in that count. However, because he sets forth those allegations in Count I,
the court will rely on those allegations for its analysis of Count II. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are held to a
less stringent standard and the court must liberally construe language in the
plaintiff’s favor.).
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they filed a complaint or charge under it. Bodie-Jernigan, 2025 WL 2741931 at
*3; see 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). “To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead
that (1) [he] engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) [he] suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” Bodie-Jernigan, 2025 WL 2741931
at *3 (quoting Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th
Cir. 1998)).
A request for a reasonable accommodation is considered a “‘statutorily
protected activity’ only if the plaintiff ‘had a good faith, objectively reasonable
belief that he was entitled to those accommodations.’” Meyer v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Hum. Servs., 592 F. App’x 786, 792 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998)). “[A]
request for leave ‘might be a reasonable accommodation in some cases,’ so long
as the leave request is not for an indefinite leave.” Schoebel v. Am. Integrity
Ins. Co. of Fla., No. 8:14-CV-426-T-27AEP, 2015 WL 4231670 at *6 (M.D. Fla.
July 10, 2015).
Here, Mr. Hughes adequately pleads the first element. Mr. Hughes
informed his supervisors about taking medical leave, not an indefinite leave.
(Doc. 14, p. 13). This request is a protected activity under the ADA as Mr.
Hughes reasonably believed he was entitled to that leave of absence. Mr.
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Hughes also clears the first element through his request for reasonable
accommodations. (Doc. 14, p. 13). See Bodie-Jernigan, 2025 WL 2741931 at *3;
Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1388 (“The first element may be met by a request
for a reasonable accommodation.”).
To meet the second element, an adverse employment action must occur
when an “employer took an action that was ‘materially adverse,’ that is, one
that caused injury or harm that would dissuade a reasonable employee from
engaging in the protected activity.” Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89 F.4th 852,
858 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006)). Mr. Hughes also meets the second element as he alleges
Atlantic Squared Supply demoted him, threatened him, and ultimately
terminated him. (Doc. 14, p. 10). This conduct caused harm and would dissuade
a reasonable employee from engaging in the protected activity. See Tyler v. Kia
Motors Mfg. Georgia, Inc., 702 F.App’x 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding
termination is an adverse employment action).
For a plaintiff to prove the third element, he must establish “(1) the
decisionmakers knew of his protected activity; and (2) the protected activity
and adverse action were not wholly unrelated.” Harris v. Fla. Agency for Health
Care Admin., 611 F. App’x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2015); Shannon v. BellSouth
Telecomm., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715 (11th Cir. 2002). Generally, when an
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adverse action closely follows protected activity, that “temporal proximity”
alone can be enough to raise a factual dispute as to causation. Hurlbert v. St.
Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006). But if there
is no additional evidence linking the two, a gap of about three months between
the protected conduct and the adverse action is too long, by itself, to support a
reasonable inference of causation. Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th
Cir. 2006).
Here, Mr. Hughes alleges he engaged in protected activity when he
discussed potential medical leave and requested reasonable accommodations,
and his supervisors were aware of this activity because it occurred through
direct conversations with them. (Doc. 14, p. 13). Mr. Hughes alleges one of the
protected activities, his consideration of medical leave, occurred on August 11,
2025, and his termination followed just fifteen days later, on August 26, 2025.
(Doc. 14, p. 14). This close temporal proximity supports a reasonable inference
of causation. The court concludes Mr. Hughes sufficiently states a claim for
retaliation under the ADA. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr.
Hughes’s retaliation claim is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
All counts are dismissed against the individual defendants because the
ADA “precludes individual liability for violations of the ADA’s employment
20
discrimination provisions.” Woltz, 2013 WL 672530, at *3; See Albra, 490 F.3d
at 830-33 (internal citations omitted). Mr. Hughes states a discrimination and
retaliation claim under the ADA against Atlantic Squared Supply, LLC
(Counts I and III). However, Count II, failure to accommodate, is dismissed
because Mr. Hughes does not allege how any of his requested accommodations
would allow him to meet the essential functions of his job. Accordingly, the
defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 25) is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part. Atlantic Squared Supply must file its answer to Counts I and III by
March 20, 2026.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on March 3, 2026.
Aranda. Agneth Saxe
AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE
United States Magistrate Judge
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