Laura Naomi Clifton v. State of Tennessee

06/26/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

April 7, 2026 Session

LAURA NAOMI CLIFTON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C-25-144 Joseph Howell, Judge

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No. W2025-01520-CCA-R3-PC

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In May 2024, the Petitioner, Laura Naomi Clifton, pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual

exploitation of a minor via electronic means, and the trial court entered the agreed sentence

of concurrent two-year sentences, to be served at 30%. The plea agreement specified that

the Petitioner would not be placed on the sex offender registry. After serving her sentence,

the Petitioner was placed on the sex offender registry and forced to comply with its

requirements. Accordingly, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief. During the

hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court offered her time to consider her options.

She went to the parking lot to consider the matter and, while she was outside, the post-

conviction court dismissed her petition for failure to prosecute. The Petitioner asked the

post-conviction court to reconsider, and it denied her request. After a review of the record,

we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment, and we remand the case for a hearing

during which the Petitioner should be given the opportunity to pursue her petition for post-

conviction relief.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.

William W. Gill, Assistant Public Defender - Appellate Division, Franklin, Tennessee,

Parker Dixon, Assistant Public Defender, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Laura

Naomi Clifton.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney

General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Shaun A. Brown, Assistant

District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

This case arises from the Petitioner’s convictions for two counts of sexual

exploitation of a minor via electronic means entered on May 17, 2024. The guilty plea

hearing transcript indicates that she was indicted with two co-defendants, Gary Allen

Jordan and Amanda Walton. The State indicated that the indictment contained sixteen

counts, and the Defendant agreed that the facts would support the charges in the indictment

for the two counts to which she was entering her plea. The indictment is not included in

our record on appeal.

The plea agreement signed by both the State and the Petitioner indicated that the

guilty plea included the conditions that there would be “NO SOR,” which the parties agreed

meant no placement on the Sex Offender Registry (“SOR”). The trial court accepted the

Petitioner’s guilty plea, ordered her not to have contact with the victims, and entered the

agreed sentence of concurrent two-year sentences, to be served at thirty percent.

The Petitioner served her sentence and was placed on the SOR. She filed a motion

to be removed and was notified that her judgment was illegal because her offense mandated

being placed on the SOR. On May 11, 2025, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief,

asking to withdraw her guilty plea because she had been placed on the SOR. She indicated

that she had three minor children who lived directly across from their school, so placement

on the registry would severely impact their lives and her ability to see her children.

On June 16, 2025, the State responded and agreed that the Petitioner was entitled to

post-conviction relief because she was told that the conviction did not require placement

on the SOR. The prosecutor noted that the Petitioner did not make a bond in this matter,

meaning if the petition was granted, the Petitioner needed to be taken into custody and a

bond set.

On July 3, 2025, the Petitioner responded that she had served her sentence but was

required to register on the SOR, even though her plea agreement did not so require. She

asserted that, for these reasons, she was entitled to a reasonable bond. She asked the post-

conviction court to release her on her own recognizance or, alternatively, to set a bond of

not more than $10,000.

On July 7, 2025, the post-conviction court held a hearing on the post-conviction

petition. The State informed the court that the Petitioner was told that she would not be

required to register on the SOR but that, based on the conviction, she was required to

register. The State said it did not oppose the granting of the petition for post-conviction

relief but that she needed to be placed on bond. The Petitioner’s attorney informed the

court that he had asked that she be released on her own recognizance or that the court set a

bond of not more than $10,000. The State then asked the Petitioner to state on the record

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that she wanted to pursue her petition for post-conviction relief because “her main

complaint cannot be accomplished absent a ‘not guilty’ verdict.”

The post-conviction court placed the Petitioner under oath and asked her if she

wished to move forward with her petition. The Petitioner said she did not know because

she was under the impression that she could get a “lesser sentence.” The court said, “We’re

not here on that. We’re here on your pro se petition to withdraw your guilty plea through

a petition for post[-]convicton relief” but did not explain further. The trial court asked,

“And you wish to withdraw your plea?” The Petitioner attempted to whisper to her

attorney. The court noted this and said, “And if you wish to speak to [your attorney], you’re

free to do that.”

The Petitioner’s counsel requested that he be allowed to ask the Petitioner some

questions. Upon this questioning, the Petitioner said that she understood that, if she were

allowed to withdraw her plea, the result would be that she start the process over at the

beginning where she would be subject to continued prosecution and “theoretically could

still end up on the sex offender registry.” The Petitioner understood that, while the case

was pending, she would be off the SOR but that she would have to go through the trial

process again. The Petitioner said, “Yeah. I want to go through with it. It’s worth a try.”

The State then stated that “I just want her to understand she got concurrent

sentencing on these two counts. She could get consecutive sentencing by the [c]ourt

because her record is one of misdemeanors and a prior felony.” The Petitioner attempted

to argue why the statute to which she pleaded guilty was not applicable and that she should

not have been convicted of this offense because there was no “gratification.” The trial

court interrupted her, saying that the parties were not there to try the case. Instead, they

were present to decide the narrow issue of whether she should withdraw her guilty plea.

The Petitioner and her counsel began speaking off the record and the trial court

stated, “And, again, Ms. Clifton, if you need to take a minute and y’all sit down and speak

to this, I have no objection to that.” The Petitioner’s counsel asked to “pass it for a moment

while she thinks about it.” The court agreed and told the Petitioner, “We’ll come back to

your case.” The court took a break from the matter from 12:17 p.m. until 1:08 p.m.

Returning to the matter, the State informed the trial court that the Petitioner had left.

The court agreed that it had seen her going out the door but thought she was maybe just

going out to discuss the case with her companion. The State informed the court that he had

looked in both halls and spoken to the deputies who informed him that the Petitioner and

her companion had left and had not come back. The State said, “So at this point, I guess

she has failed to prosecute her post[-]conviction.” The Petitioner’s counsel said that he

had no information and surmised that the Petitioner had left.

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The trial court said, “I guess I will dismiss it for failure to prosecute.” The court

went on to state, “If she gets in touch with you in the next thirty days . . . .” The court did

not complete the sentence. The Petitioner’s counsel said, “Yes, Your Honor.”

On July 10, 2025, three days after the hearing, the post-conviction court filed an

order dismissing the petition. The order indicated that the Petitioner had left the courtroom

and had not returned and that the petition should therefore be dismissed because “the

[P]etitioner failed to remain in the courtroom and present her petition.”

On July 14, 2025, the Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider her petition for post-

conviction relief. She explained that the day of the hearing she panicked because she

believed that she would be taken into custody if her motion was granted. While she had

served her sentence, she had never made bond in this matter, so withdrawing her plea would

place her bond status at issue. Post-conviction counsel asserted that he attempted to

alleviate her concerns by filing a motion to release her on her own recognizance or set a

low bond, but the Petitioner believed she could not pay any amount of bond. She asked

the court to allow her to withdraw her guilty plea.

The post-conviction court held a hearing on the motion to reconsider. The

Petitioner’s counsel explained that the Petitioner became concerned at the hearing that she

was going to be incarcerated, so she left to consider her options. She later decided she

would, in fact, like to withdraw her guilty plea. The State asserted that the Petitioner left

the building and the property on the day of the hearing, so she abandoned her claim, so her

petition should be dismissed

The Petitioner testified that, during the hearing, the prosecutor mentioned her bond

might be $10,000 and she did not have that money. She thought she would be incarcerated

if she pursued her motion. The Petitioner said that she has been diagnosed with depression,

bipolar disorder, attention deficit disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. The

Petitioner said that, on the day of the hearing, she left the courtroom for about an hour and

attempted to come back at 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. The door was locked, so she asked the clerk

if she could open the door but was informed that she did not make it back in time. The

Petitioner explained how having to register as a sex offender had impacted her life

negatively. She said she wanted to withdraw her guilty plea, and she understood the

potential impact of her decision.

During cross-examination, the State asked the Petitioner why she thought the post-

conviction court’s schedule “operat[ed] on what [she] wanted to do and when [she] wanted

to do it.” The Petitioner said she did not think it did, and the prosecutor responded, “Well,

yeah you do.” The prosecutor informed the Petitioner that the judge could have arrested

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her for leaving the building on the day of the hearing. The Petitioner maintained that she

just went to the parking lot, but when she returned, the door was locked. The Petitioner

checked with the court clerk who said that court was over. The prosecutor said, “You

understand the [c]ourt runs his docket, and the [c]ourt, he moves on, he rules. You weren’t

here. He ruled. . . . So why now does the judge have to open all this back up just because

you say you wanted to, and you changed your mind now after a month later?”

The Petitioner said, “He doesn’t have to, but . . .” and went on to explain that she

was told she would not have to register as a sex offender but was then required to register.

This was affecting her ability to see her children because they live near a school, as well as

impacting other aspects of her life. The prosecutor said, “you have control over his docket

is what you’re basically saying rather than him control of yours.”

On September 2, 2025, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner’s motion to

reconsider. It is from this judgment that the Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed her

petition for failure to prosecute. The State first contends that the Petitioner did not timely

file a notice of appeal, so her claim is waived, and next contends that the post-conviction

court did not abuse its discretion.

A. Notice of Appeal

The State asserts that we should dismiss the appeal because the Petitioner did not

timely file her notice of appeal. The post-conviction court held a hearing on her motion

July 7, 2025, and filed a written order July 10, 2025. She ultimately filed her notice of

appeal on September 30, 2025, well beyond the deadline. An untimely notice of appeal

can, and often does, result in a dismissal of the appeal. The Rules of Appellate Procedure,

however, provide that the requirement of a timely-filed notice of appeal “may be waived

in the interest of justice.” Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). Waiver of an untimely notice of appeal

is never required, and “[i]f this Court were to summarily grant a waiver whenever

confronted with untimely notices, the thirty-day requirement of Tennessee Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(a) would be rendered a legal fiction.” State v. Rockwell, 280 S.W.3d

212, 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007); Matthews v. State, No. W2021-00898-CCA-R3-PC,

2022 WL 1284288, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2022), no perm. app. filed.

When considering whether a waiver on an untimely notice of appeal is appropriate,

“this court will consider the nature of the issues presented for review, the reasons for and

the length of the delay in seeking relief, and any other relevant factors presented in the

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particular case.” Rockwell, 280 S.W.3d at 214. “Other relevant factors may include the

merits of the appeal.” State v. Murray, No. M2020-00168-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL

2156932, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27, 2021), no perm. app. filed. The appealing party

“bears the responsibility to properly perfect his [or her] appeal or to demonstrate that the

‘interests of justice’ merit waiver of an untimely filed notice of appeal.” State v. Thomas,

No. W2022-00109-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 328337, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20,

2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 7, 2023); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a).

When considering the aforementioned factors, we conclude that the interests of

justice require that we waive the timeliness of the notice of appeal. The nature of this case

involves the State improperly informing the Petitioner that she would not have to register

as a sex offender. After serving multiple years of incarceration, she was required to register

on the SOR, which negatively impacts multiple aspects of her life including her ability to

see her children. We further find that there is merit to this appeal, and we grant the

Petitioner relief, which is also a valid basis for waiver. See Murray, 2021 WL 2156932, at

*3. We therefore turn to address the merits of this appeal.

B. Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute

“[A] trial court has inherent authority to dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief

with prejudice based on a petitioner’s failure to prosecute.” Caraway v. State, No. W2021-

00360-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 1580639, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 19, 2022) (citing

Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-33 (1962)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29,

2022). A post-conviction court may dismiss a post-conviction petition on their own motion

for failure to prosecute, but “‘this authority should be exercised sparingly and with great

care.’” Id. (quoting Hodges v. Att’y Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

This court has upheld the dismissal of a post-conviction petition for failure to prosecute

when the Petitioner abused the post-conviction process. See Dillard v. State, No. W2010-

00306-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 744740, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2011), perm. app.

denied (Tenn. May 27, 2011). It is settled that, if the post-conviction court “discerns that

a litigant is abusing the post-conviction process by filing successive petitions and seeking

repeated withdrawals, or is otherwise acting in bad faith, dismissal of the action for failure

to prosecute, with prejudice to the petitioner’s right to refile the petition, would be proper.”

Williams v. State, 831 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tenn. 1992); see Cazes v. State, 980 S.W.2d 364,

365 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that “[t]hose who abuse the [post-conviction] process cannot be

heard to complain when access to the remedy is denied”).

This court has also, however, reversed the dismissal of a post-conviction petition

for failure to prosecute when the record did not establish an abuse of process. See

McWilliams v State, W2019-00935-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 3410239, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.

App. June 19, 2020) (reversing the dismissal when the petitioner failed to appear to court

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twice for a hearing on the post-conviction petition), no. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application

filed; see also McLeod v. State, W2024-01786-CCA-R3-PC, 2025 WL 3034326, at *1

(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2025) (reversing the dismissal when the petitioner’s case had

to be reset seventeen times), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. Dismissal would be

improper when the record does not show that the petitioner caused the delays in the case,

and the post-conviction court does not make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of

law to support its decision to dismiss. See McLeod, at *5 (citing Nance v. State, No. E2005-

02265-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 1575110, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2006)). We

review a post-conviction court’s dismissal of a post-conviction petition for failure to

prosecute under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. (citing Caraway, 2022 WL 1580639,

at *7).

The McLeod court described two cases that we find instructive here:

In Jackson v. State, No. W2019-00731-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 5792961, at

*1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2020), the petitioner filed his pro se petition

for post-conviction relief in March 2017, and the post-conviction court

appointed counsel. Despite having counsel, the petitioner proceeded to file

numerous pro se amended post-conviction petitions and pro se motions

seeking continuances, seeking recusal of the post-conviction court, seeking

removal of appointed counsel, and seeking to represent himself. Jackson,

2020 WL 5792961, at *2-3. At a hearing in November 2018, the post-

conviction court expressed frustration with the delays in the case and warned

the petitioner that an evidentiary hearing would occur at the next scheduled

hearing or would be dismissed. Id. at *3. At the petitioner’s final hearing on

March 21, 2019, the post-conviction court removed counsel from

representation and allowed the petitioner to proceed pro se but again warned

the petitioner that the case would be “handled” that day or dismissed. Id.

The petitioner advised the post-conviction court that he was not prepared to

proceed pro se and requested another continuance, but the post-conviction

court denied the request and dismissed the petition for failure to prosecute,

noting that the case already had been scheduled for an evidentiary hearing

several times and concluding that the petitioner had “ ‘persisted in interfering

with the administration of justice.’” Id. at *4. Subsequently, the post-

conviction court entered a sixteen-page “comprehensive” order in support of

its dismissal. Id. at *4. On appeal, this court reversed the post-conviction

court, concluding that the record did not demonstrate that a significant delay

in the case could be attributed to the petitioner, that the petitioner’s pro se

filings while represented by counsel were a nullity, and that the post-

conviction court’s granting the petitioner’s request to proceed pro se and then

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demanding that he immediately represent himself at the evidentiary hearing

was unreasonable. Id. at *5.

In contrast, in Dillard v. State, . . . 2011 WL 744740, at *6 . . ., this

court found “abundant evidence that the petitioner abused the post-

conviction process” when the petitioner had “repeated opportunities” for an

evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court warned the petitioner that he

would be required to proceed with an evidentiary hearing on a particular date,

the petitioner refused to present his proof on that date, and his behavior

caused delays in the case. See id. at *5-6.

In another case cited by McLeod, the Caraway case, this court upheld the post-

conviction court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s post-conviction petition for failure to

prosecute when more than four years passed between the petitioner’s filing his pro se

petition and the dismissal. 2022 WL 1580639, at *2-3. During that time, the case was

reset approximately twenty-six times, mostly at the petitioner’s request. The post-

conviction court warned the petitioner that it was going to dismiss the petition for failure

to prosecute six months before the court did so. Id. After orally dismissing the petition,

the post-conviction court issued a twenty-five-page written order setting out its “extensive”

factual findings and conclusions of law. Id. at *3. This court ruled that the post-conviction

court “did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in dismissing the petition.”

Id. at *8.

In the case under submission, the Petitioner filed her petition for post-conviction

relief on May 11, 2025. A hearing on the petition, at which the Petitioner was present, was

held on July 7, 2025. At the hearing, after the Petitioner exhibited concern about the bond

issue, the post-conviction court asked the Petitioner if she still wanted to withdraw her plea,

and she responded, “Yeah. I want to go through with it. It’s worth a try.” The State then

informed her that she could get consecutive sentencing and, when the Petitioner sought

clarity about the statutory requirements of the statute she was convicted under, she was told

that the hearing was only on the narrow issue of whether she should withdraw her plea.

The Petitioner and her counsel began speaking off the record and the post-

conviction court stated, “And, again, Ms. Clifton, if you need to take a minute and y’all sit

down and speak to this, I have no objection to that.” The Petitioner’s counsel asked to

“pass it for a moment while she thinks about it.” The post-conviction court agreed and told

the Petitioner, “We’ll come back to your case.” The court took a break from the matter

from 12:17 p.m. until 1:08 p.m. The court then dismissed the Petitioner’s petition but told

her counsel to inform him if she changed her mind in the next thirty days. Three days later,

the court filed a written order dismissing the petition. The Petitioner filed a motion to

reconsider four days later, seven days after her hearing, saying she panicked when she

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thought she was going to be taken into custody. At a hearing, she explained that she went

to the parking lot to consider options. She remained there for an hour and, when she

attempted to return, the doors were locked and the court clerk informed her that court was

adjourned. The trial court denied her motion.

Based on these facts, and the interests of justice, and the precedence of this court,

we conclude that the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it dismissed the

Petitioner’s petition for failure to prosecute. The Petitioner was clearly not abusing the

judicial process. She was confronted with a difficult decision. She attempted to ask for

clarity, which she was not given. She was unsure what her bond would be, whether she

would have to go back into custody despite having already served over two years, and

whether the facts of her case even supported the statute pursuant to which she was

convicted. Navigating all these factors, she stepped outside to consider her options in the

parking lot. Upon attempting to return, she found the doors locked. She contacted her

attorney and told him that she still wanted to withdraw her guilty plea, and her attorney

informed the post-conviction court of this fact seven days after the hearing. Notably, the

post-conviction court gave counsel thirty days to inform it of any change in the Petitioner’s

mind and then filed a written order three days later without further notice to counsel or to

the Petitioner. To conclude, the record does not demonstrate that the Petitioner abused the

post-conviction process or acted in bad faith. Accordingly, we conclude that the post-

conviction court erred by dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute.

We note that the Petitioner’s case involves an hour in making a decision. We

reversed a post-conviction court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute when the Petitioner

had reset the case seventeen times. As previously stated, dismissal for failure to prosecute

is an authority that should be exercised “sparingly” and “with great care.’” Caraway, 2022

WL 1580639, at *7. The prosecutor’s allegation that the Petitioner thought the court’s

schedule “operat[ed] on what [she] wanted to do and when [she] wanted to do it” is wholly

unfounded. At the suggestion of the post-conviction court, the Petitioner took some time

to consider her options and found herself locked out of the courtroom. Although the post-

conviction court told the Petitioner’s counsel to notify the court should Counsel hear from

the Petitioner, three days later, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition without

further communication with the Petitioner or her counsel.

We reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition for

failure to prosecute. We remand this case for a hearing during which the Petitioner may

be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea, based on the fact that the State improperly informed

her that she would not be required to register as a sex offender after her release, as clearly

evidenced by the record. The record supports a finding that the Petitioner has frequently

and consistently appeared at court, which should be considered in setting her bond.

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III. Conclusion

Upon review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed

the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief for failure to prosecute. We remand for

a hearing that is consistent with this opinion.

___ S/ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER ____________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, PRESIDING JUDGE

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