Marshall

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DEREK “COLDDRANK” MARSHALL

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 25-805-JWD-EWD

MUSIC ACCESS, INC.,

ROBERT GONZALEZ,

STEVE CAVAZOS, AND DOES 1–10

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3), or Alternative,

Motion to Transfer to the Northern District of Texas due to Improper Venue (“the Motion”) (Doc.

25), filed by Defendants Music Access, Inc. (“Music Access”) and Steve Cavazos (collectively,

“Defendants”). Plaintiff Derek “Colddrank” Marshall (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. (Doc. 33.)

Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 36.) For the reasons below, the Court will grant the Motion in part.

This case will be transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a producer, songwriter, and recording artist who resides in Baton Rouge,

Louisiana. (Doc. 1 at 2.)1 He is also the “joint author, performer, and rightful copyright holder” of

several “commercially successful” recordings, including the songs “One Night Stand” and “Good

Foot.” (Id. at 1.) Defendant Music Access “is a Texas-based music company.” (Id. at 2.) Defendant

Robert Gonzalez is, according to Plaintiff, a “representative of Music Access.” (Id. at 3.) And

Defendant Steve Cavazos is the Vice President of Music Access. (Id.)2

1 For the most part, the above factual allegations come from the Complaint (Doc. 1). At this stage, “[t]he allegations

of the complaint, except insofar as controverted by opposing affidavits, must be taken as true.” Thompson v. Chrysler

Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985).

2 Defendants Does 1–10 (“the Doe Defendants”) “are presently unknown parties” who facilitated and/or benefited

from the “exploitation of Plaintiff’s works.” (Doc. 1 at 3, 9.) The Doe Defendants have not been served. (Id. at 9.)

Defendants’ Motion presumes that the Doe Defendants live in Texas. (Doc. 25-1 at 11.) Otherwise, the parties do not

discuss these defendants in their respective filings.

Plaintiff alleges that, despite his “protectable creative contributions” to the aforementioned

recordings (e.g., melodies, lyrics, vocal hooks, background vocals), “Defendants released,

monetized, and publicly exploited these works without crediting Plaintiff or paying any royalties

or compensation” to him. (Id. at 1, 3.) Specifically, Defendants released and monetized Plaintiff’s

works via YouTube, VEVO, Spotify, Apple Music, and other platforms/services. (Id. at 3.) This

conduct has caused Plaintiff “substantial harm,” including loss of royalties/profits, loss of credit,

and reputational damage. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff therefore brings, inter alia, claims of copyright

infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, false designation of origin and false endorsement under 15

U.S.C. § 1125(a), unjust enrichment, and breach of an implied-in-fact contract arising when

Plaintiff authored or contributed to the relevant works. (Id. at 4–8.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that, on or about January 30, 2025, Defendant Cavazos sent

Plaintiff a proposed asset purchase agreement (“the Proposed Agreement”), by which Defendants

sought to acquire Plaintiff’s rights to “One Night Stand” and “Good Foot.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff

“never executed th[is] agreement,” but Defendants “continued their exploitation” of Plaintiff’s

works. (Id. at 1, 3–4.) Plaintiff suggests that the Proposed Agreement is a de facto acknowledgment

of “Plaintiff’s authorship and ownership” of the relevant works. (Id. at 1.) Neither party has

provided the Proposed Agreement to this Court.

Defendants have, however, provided the Affidavit of Robert Gonzalez, who identifies

himself as the President and CEO of Music Access. (Doc. 25-2 at 1–2.)3 Gonzalez swears that:

(1) “All of [Defendants’] activities” take place in Dallas, Texas. (Id. at 1.) (2) “All of the named

Defendants are domiciled in Dallas County . . . .” (Id.) (3) Music Access “is a Texas corporation

3 The Court may properly consider Gonzalez’s sworn statements when determining whether it has personal jurisdiction

over Defendants. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985); accord Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1165 (citing

Washington v. Norton Mfg. Co., 588 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979)).

and [is] registered to do business in . . . Texas.” (Id. at 2.) (4) Music Access “has no direct and

intentional affiliation with Louisiana”; it is not located in Louisiana, has no officers or employees

in Louisiana, conducts no business in Louisiana, does not advertise in Louisiana, and directs no

activities toward Louisiana. (Id. at 1.) And (5) requiring Defendants to travel to this District

(e.g., to testify as witnesses) “would pose an undue burden,” financially and otherwise. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on September 9, 2025. (Doc. 1.) On February 13, 2026,

Defendants filed the instant motion. (Doc. 25.) Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) (i.e., for lack of personal jurisdiction), under Rule 12(b)(3) (i.e., for

improper venue), or under Rule 12(b)(7) (i.e., for failure to join a necessary party).4 (Id. at 1; Doc.

25-1 at 12–14.) In the alternative, Defendants seek transfer of this case to the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Texas. (Doc. 25 at 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a)).)

Plaintiff does not dispute that this case can be transferred to the Northern District of Texas. (See

Doc. 33.) But Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ requests for dismissal and transfer. (Id. at 7.)

II. RULE 12(B)(2) STANDARD

When a non-resident defendant moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears

the burden of establishing that the district court can exercise personal jurisdiction. Herman v.

Cataphora, Inc., 730 F.3d 460, 464 (5th Cir. 2013). When the court resolves a Rule 12(b)(2)

motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing

of personal jurisdiction. Id. (citing Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999));

accord Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999). The court may consider, inter alia,

4 The Court can decide Defendants’ Motion under Rule 12(b)(2) and therefore pretermits analysis of venue and joinder

of necessary parties. The Court does, however, note the following: In the Opposition, Plaintiff’s Counsel cites Palmer

v. Braun, 376 F.3d 1254, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004), in support of the argument that venue is proper with respect to

Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim. (Doc. 33 at 4–5.) To be sure, Palmer is a real case. But the quote which

Counsel purports to pull from Palmer does not appear therein. As far as the Court can tell, the quote does not appear

in any case. Because this case will be transferred, the Court will not pursue this issue. But the Court cautions counsel

to review all briefs carefully before filing.

affidavits submitted by the parties. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).

Uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint must be taken as true. Johnston v. Multidata

Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008).

In a diversity action, a federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-

resident defendant if the forum state’s long-arm statute so permits and if the exercise of such

jurisdiction complies with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Priv., Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 2018)

(citing Johnston, 523 F.3d at 609). Louisiana’s long-arm statute, La. R.S. § 13:3201, extends the

exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process. Anderson v. GlobalSantaFe Offshore

Servs., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742 (E.D. La. 2013) (citing Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina,

Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing La. R.S. § 13:3201(B))); accord A & L Energy, Inc.

v. Pegasus Grp., 2000-3255 (La. 6/29/01), 791 So. 2d 1266, 1270. As a result, the usual two-step

inquiry “collapses into one federal due process analysis.” Danziger & De Llano, L.L.P. v. Morgan

Verkamp, L.L.C., 24 F.4th 491, 495 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Sangha, 882 F.3d at 101).

A court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant satisfies due process

“where the defendant [has] ‘purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the

forum state by establishing minimum contacts with the forum state, and the exercise of jurisdiction

over that defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Savoie

v. Pritchard, 122 F.4th 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac

Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (cleaned up)). “Sufficient contacts

will give rise to either general or specific jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Shambaugh & Son, L.P. v.

Steadfast Ins. Co., 91 F.4th 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2024)). General jurisdiction applies where a

defendant’s “affiliations with the [forum state] are so continuous and systematic as to render [it]

essentially at home” there. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919

(2011) (quotation omitted). “With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal

place of business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.

117, 137 (2014) (cleaned up).

“The court may assert specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose

contacts with the forum state are singular or sporadic only if the cause of action arises out of or is

related to those contacts.” Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818

F.3d 193, 212 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Sangha, 882 F.3d at 101 (“[S]uch jurisdiction exists ‘when

a nonresident defendant has purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation

results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.’” (quoting Walk Haydel

& Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2008))); Goodyear, 564

U.S. at 919 (“[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or

connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” (quotation omitted)).

The Fifth Circuit has articulated a three-step test for specific jurisdiction: (1) Does the

defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state? In other words, has the defendant

purposefully directed its activities toward the forum state or availed itself of the privileges of

conducting activities there? (2) Does the cause of action arise out of or result from the defendant’s

forum-related contacts? (3) Is the exercise of personal jurisdiction fair and reasonable? Libersat v.

Sundance Energy, Inc., 978 F.3d 315, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Seiferth v. Helicopteros

Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2006)); see also McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753,

759–60 (5th Cir. 2009) (reciting the five factors comprising the “fair and reasonable” inquiry).

III. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

A. Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 25)

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff cannot establish general or specific personal

jurisdiction. (Doc. 25-1 at 7.) Plaintiff does not allege general jurisdiction. (Id.) But regardless,

Defendant Music Access is incorporated in Texas and has its principal place of business there. (Id.

(referencing Doc. 25-2 at 1); see also Doc. 25-2 at 1 (noting that the named Defendants are

domiciled in Dallas County).) Thus, Defendants say, the Court “does not have general personal

jurisdiction over Defendants.” (Doc. 25-1 at 8.)

As far as specific jurisdiction, Defendants point out that the Complaint alleges only that

Defendant Cavazos presented Plaintiff with the Proposed Agreement, which Plaintiff refused to

sign. (Id.) Defendants contend that a proposed contract cannot establish specific jurisdiction. (Id.

at 8–9 (citing Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2007)).)

Likewise, “[a]n exchange of communications in the course of developing and carrying out a

contract . . . does not, by itself, constitute the required purposeful availment of the benefits and

protections of [the forum state].” (Id. at 9 (quoting Moncrief Oil, 481 F.3d at 312).) With respect

to the allegations that Defendants exploited Plaintiff’s works, Defendants note that all of their

conduct must have occurred in Texas, not Louisiana. (Id. at 9–10 (citing Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd.

v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2014)); see also Doc. 25-2 at 1 (“All of the business conducted

by Music Access, Inc. is conducted . . . in Dallas, Texas.”).)

Defendants add that, even if they had the requisite minimum contacts with Louisiana, the

exercise of personal jurisdiction would, in this instance, run counter to “traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” (Id. at 10 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945)).) The burden on Defendants would be heavy because they are based in and operate in

Texas; relatedly, key witnesses and “the majority, if not all, of the evidence relevant to this

litigation w[ill] be located in Dallas.” (Id. at 11.) And while Louisiana may have an interest “in

providing its resident a convenient forum [in which] to litigate claims,” such interest “must be

weighed against” Defendants’ lack of ties to Louisiana and the aforementioned burdens. (Id.)

Defendants urge that, if the Court deems dismissal inappropriate, then it should transfer this case

to the Northern District of Texas, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Id. at 12.)

B. Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 33)

Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants’ “principal place of business is . . . Texas” but

disputes Defendants’ characterization of “the nature of their contacts with Louisiana.” (Doc. 33 at

1.) According to Plaintiff, the transmission of the Proposed Agreement “constitutes the

‘transacting of business’ within the meaning of the Louisiana Long-Arm Statute and establishes

the minimum contacts necessary to support specific personal jurisdiction.” (Id.)

In support of this contention, Plaintiff cites McFadin v. Gerber, where some defendants

“directed the sale of merchandise” toward the forum state. (Id. at 3 (citing McFadin, 587 F.3d

753).) Plaintiff posits that the instant case is similar to McFadin in that, here, Defendants

“initiate[d] the contact” by sending Plaintiff—“a Louisiana resident”—a contract. (Id. (emphasis

in original).) In other words, Defendants “deliberately reached into this forum to conduct

business.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the Proposed Agreement is “central” to his claims in that it

admits his authorship and ownership of the relevant works. (Id. at 3–4.)

Finally, Plaintiff claims that, “[g]iven modern travel and electronic discovery,” the

inconvenience of litigating in this District is “minimal.” (Id. at 4.) He adds that “Louisiana has a

manifest interest in providing a forum for its residents to resolve disputes concerning their

intellectual property.” (Id. (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).)

C. Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 36)

Defendants reiterate that the Proposed Agreement does not establish a prima facie case of

personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 36 at 2 (citing Johnston, 523 F.3d at 609).) Otherwise, Defendants

argue—for the first time—that the Complaint fails to state a valid claim for relief. (Id. at 2–4.)5

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

1. Applicable Law

The Supreme Court has explained that the “‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the

defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who

reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). “Accordingly, [the Supreme Court] ha[s]

upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who have purposefully ‘reach[ed] out beyond’

their State into another by, for example, entering a contractual relationship that ‘envisioned

continuing and wide-reaching contacts’ in the forum State . . . .” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp.

v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479–80 (1985)). “But the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the

defendant and the forum.” Id.

Consistent with the above, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[a] single act directed at the

forum state can confer personal jurisdiction so long as that act gives rise to the claim asserted, but

merely contracting with a resident of the forum state does not establish minimum contacts.”

Moncrief Oil, 481 F.3d at 311 (citing Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211; Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska

Mech., Inc., 700 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1983)). Nor does “[a]n exchange of communications in

the course of developing and carrying out a contract” independently “constitute the required

purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of [state] law.” Id. at 312 (citing Holt Oil &

5 Notably, Defendants have not moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). (See Doc. 25.) In any event, Defendants’

arguments under this rule are ancillary. The Court need not—and will not—reach them.

Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1986)); see, e.g., Freudensprung v. Offshore

Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 345 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he fact that WWAI contracted with

Texas-based OTSI, initiated and contemplated a long-term business relationship with OTSI,

communicated with OTSI concerning the development and execution of the contract, and wired

money to OTSI in Texas do not indicate that WWAI intended to avail itself of the privilege of

doing business in Texas.”).

2. Analysis

Plaintiff does not attach any affidavits or documentary evidence to his Opposition. And he

does not otherwise contest Defendant Gonzalez’s sworn statements. Thus, for purposes of deciding

Defendants’ Motion, the Court accepts that (1) “[a]ll of the named Defendants are domiciled in

Dallas County, Texas,” and (2) Defendant Music Access is not located in Louisiana, has no

officers or employees in Louisiana, conducts no business in Louisiana, does not advertise in

Louisiana, and directs no activities toward Louisiana. (Doc. 25-2 at 1.) Relatedly, the Court accepts

that (3) Music Access conducts all of its business through its offices in Dallas. (Id.) Given these

facts, the Court has little difficulty concluding that it lacks general personal jurisdiction over

Defendants. Indeed, Plaintiff does not argue that the Court has such jurisdiction.6

The question, then, is whether the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

It does not. Worth repeating, Plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie case of specific

jurisdiction. See Herman, 730 F.3d at 464; see also Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 270. That is, Plaintiff

must show that Defendants have the requisite minimum contacts with Louisiana. See Libersat, 978

6 See also Payton v. Town of Maringouin, No. 18-563, 2021 WL 2544416, at *26 (M.D. La. June 21, 2021)

(deGravelles, J.) (“[W]hen a party does not address an issue in his brief to the district court, that failure constitutes

waiver on appeal. . . . By analogy, failure to brief an argument in the district court waives that argument in that court.”

(quoting JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Com. & Indus., 336 F. Supp. 3d 620, 634 (M.D. La. 2018) (deGravelles, J.))), aff’d,

No. 21-30440, 2022 WL 3097846 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022); JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs., L.L.C. v. United States, 831

F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2016) (“To avoid waiver, a party must identify relevant legal standards and any relevant Fifth

Circuit cases.” (quotation omitted)).

F.3d at 318–19. And Plaintiff must show that his claims arise out of or result from those contacts.

See id. Working backward, the Court finds that neither prong has been satisfied.

Because specific personal jurisdiction is claim-specific, “[a] plaintiff bringing multiple

claims that arise out of different forum contacts of the defendant must establish specific

jurisdiction for each claim.” Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 274. Here, however, Plaintiff insists that all of

his claims arise out of one forum contact: Defendants’ transmission of the Proposed Agreement to

Plaintiff. (See Doc. 33 at 2–4.) There are manifold issues with this position. Most fundamentally,

specific jurisdiction applies “only if the cause[s] of action asserted arise[] out of or [are] related

to” Defendant’s contacts with Louisiana. See, e.g., Int’l Energy Ventures, 818 F.3d at 212

(emphasis in original). None of Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the Purchase Agreement. And while

the Complaint alleges that the agreement “expressly acknowledges” Plaintiff’s interests in the

songs “One Night Stand” and “Good Foot,” (Doc. 1 at 3), it is at best a stretch to say that Plaintiff’s

claims relate to the agreement in a way that establishes specific jurisdiction, see, e.g., Shambaugh,

91 F.4th at 372 (using “results from” instead of “relates to”); Advanta-Star Auto. Rsch. Corp. of

Am. v. Search Optics, LLC, No. 21-1174, 2021 WL 4989797, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 27, 2021)

(rejecting the argument that a copyright claim arose out of or related to licensing agreements which

had been terminated years prior and which concerned different copyrighted materials). Instead,

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of and relate to/result from Defendants’ alleged exploitation of

Plaintiff’s intellectual property. Because Defendants conduct all of their business in Texas, such

misconduct would necessarily have occurred in Texas. (See Doc. 25-1 at 9–10; Doc. 25-2 at 1.)

The second issue is that Plaintiff “never executed” the Proposed Agreement. (Doc. 1 at 3;

see also id. at 1, 4.) So, Plaintiff’s asserted basis for specific personal jurisdiction is a contract that

was never formed. The Fifth Circuit has made clear that, on its own, a contract falls short of

establishing specific jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moncrief Oil, 481 F.3d at 311 (“[M]erely contracting

with a resident of the forum state does not establish minimum contacts.”); Hydrokinetics, 700 F.2d

at 1029 (“Although [Alaska Mechanical] did agree to purchase goods which it knew were to be

manufactured by Hydrokinetics in Texas, no performance by Alaska Mechanical was to take place

in Texas, other than perhaps the payment for the goods.”). The Court agrees with Defendants that

the Proposed Agreement falls even shorter. Transmission of the agreement was an (unavailing)

“exchange of communications.” See Moncrief Oil, 481 F.3d at 312 (citation omitted).

Plaintiff emphasizes that, here, Defendants “initiate[d] the contact.” (Doc. 33 at 3

(emphasis in original).)7 While a defendant’s initiation of contact may militate in favor of finding

that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state, this

factor is not dispositive here. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478–79; see also Sayers Constr., L.L.C.

v. Timberline Constr., Inc., 976 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[A]ny solicitation by Timberline

is . . . irrelevant because it establishes, at most, a relationship between Timberline and Sayers—

not Timberline and Texas.”); My Fabric Designs, Inc. v. F+W Media, Inc., No. 17-2112, 2018 WL

1138436, at *6–7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2018) (explaining that courts must “examine the totality of

the circumstances to determine whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum

state”); Glob. Weather Prods., LLC v. Joe Pags Media, LLC, No. 23-1350, 2024 WL 4860816, at

*4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2024) (“Global Weather Productions must show that the Contract

established [that] M3 Media would engage in conduct in Texas in furtherance of its obligations

such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Texas.”); Apollo Holding Co.,

7 Plaintiff also argues that McFadin confirms his position. (See Doc. 33 at 3.) But McFadin reiterated that “merely

contracting with a resident of the forum state does not establish minimum contacts.” McFadin, 587 F.3d at 760

(quoting Moncrief Oil, 481 F.3d at 311). And ultimately, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court lacked

personal jurisdiction over the contract claim. Id. at 761. That the district court had personal jurisdiction over some tort

claims brought against other defendants who directed the sale of goods to Texas is unrelated. See id. at 763–64.

LLC v. Roe, No. 24-2773, 2025 WL 1474738, at *10 (E.D. La. May 22, 2025) (“That Roe reached

into Louisiana to initiate the negotiations . . . resulted from nothing but the mere fortuity that

Plaintiffs happen to be residents of the forum.” (cleaned up)). Plus, Defendants are correct that the

Complaint does not actually allege that Defendants initiated contact. (See Doc. 1 at 3.)

Simply, Plaintiff does not “plead facts sufficient to make a prima facie case of specific

personal jurisdiction” over Defendants. See Talisman Specialty Underwriters, Inc. v. N. Am. Cas.

Co., No. 24-893, 2025 WL 958220, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2025). Because Plaintiff has not

met his burden, see Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271, the Court “need not examine whether exercising

specific jurisdiction over [Defendants] comports with ‘fair play and substantial justice,’” see

Panda Brandywine, 253 F.3d at 870.

B. Transfer

1. Applicable Law

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest

of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it

might have been brought.” Transfer “is only authorized if the movant establishes that: ‘(1) venue

is proper in the transferor district; (2) venue is proper in the transferee district; and (3) the transfer

will serve the convenience of the parties, the convenience of witnesses, and the interests of

justice.’” MAPP, LLC v. Floor & Décor Outlets of Am., Inc., No. 23-45, 2024 WL 944227, at *7

(M.D. La. Feb. 21, 2024) (deGravelles, J.) (quoting O’Quin v. Fin. Servs. Online, Inc., No. 18-36,

2018 WL 5316360, at *10 (M.D. La. Oct. 26, 2018) (deGravelles, J.)); see also Aguacate Consol.

Mines, Inc. of Costa Rica v. Deeprock, Inc., 566 F.2d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1978); 14D Wright &

Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 3827, 3842 (4th ed. 2026).

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides that “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case

laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,

transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” The Fifth Circuit

has held that, “[w]here a court finds [that] it lacks personal jurisdiction, it . . . is authorized under

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to transfer the action to ‘any district or division in which it could have been

brought’” if doing so “is ‘in the interest of justice.’” Herman, 730 F.3d at 466 (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 1406(a)) (citing Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1967)).

Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides that “[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court . . .

and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of

justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court . . . in which the action or appeal

could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed.”

2. Analysis

The Court notes that, while Plaintiff opposes both dismissal and transfer, (Doc. 33 at 7), he

nowhere disputes that this action could have been brought in the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Texas, (see Doc. 33; see also Doc. 25-2 at 1 (“All of the named Defendants

are domiciled in Dallas County, Texas . . . .”); Doc. 25-1 at 18–20 (acknowledging that venue is

likewise proper in the Northern District of Texas)). And for their part, Defendants argue that, if

the Court deems dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) inappropriate, then the Court should transfer this

case to the Northern District of Texas. (Doc. 25-1 at 12.)

In support of this contention, Defendants reference only 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Id.) But this

Court can—and does—look beyond § 1404(a), viz., to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See Louis v. Leidos, Inc.,

No. 24-350, 2025 WL 350238, at *4 (M.D. La. Jan. 30, 2025) (deGravelles, J.); see also Franco

v. Mabe Trucking Co., 3 F.4th 788, 796 (5th Cir. 2021) (Dennis, J.) (“In light of § 1631’s

mandatory language, our sister circuits have applied the statute to transfers even when the parties

did not move under § 1631 . . . .” (emphasis added)).

In Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., the Fifth Circuit performed extensive analysis of 28

U.S.C. § 1631, which section “appears to be intended to avoid the confusion that was created by

§§ 1404(a) and 1406(a)’s focus on whether venue was proper” in the transferor district. Franco, 3

F.4th at 794; see also Ross v. Colo. Outward Bound Sch., Inc., 822 F.2d 1524, 1527 (10th Cir.

1987). Section 1631 plainly provides “that a district court shall transfer the case if there is a lack

of jurisdiction and justice so demands[,] regardless of the propriety of the original venue.” Franco,

3 F.4th at 794. The Fifth Circuit has held that, as used in the section, “the term ‘jurisdiction’ . . .

encompasses both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 795.

Here, the Court has determined that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants, and so

it need not reach the issue of whether venue is proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631; see also Franco, 3

F.4th at 796 (citing Ross, 822 F.2d at 1527 (“stating that, where district court lacked personal

jurisdiction over the defendant, ‘[t]he correct course . . . was to transfer the action pursuant to

[§ 1631]’”)). Instead, the “sole issue” is whether it is in the interest of justice to transfer this case,

as opposed to dismissing it under Rule 12(b)(2). See Withers v. City of Aberdeen, No. 23-1510,

2024 WL 5159887, at *3 (M.D. La. Dec. 18, 2024) (Jackson, J.); see also Harutyunyan v. Love,

No. 19-41, 2019 WL 5551901, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2019) (“A case is ‘transferable’ pursuant

to § 1631 when three conditions are met: (1) the transferee court would have been able to exercise

its jurisdiction on the date the action was misfiled; (2) the transferor court lacks jurisdiction; and

(3) the transfer serves the interests of justice.” (cleaned up)).

Again, no party disputes that this action could have been brought in the Northern District

of Texas. And the Court now finds that transfer to the Northern District of Texas is in the interest

of justice—because it better promotes judicial economy than would dismissal, and because it better

conserves the parties’ resources. See, e.g., Wilson v. Farley Ctr. at Williamsburg, No. 22-114, 2024

WL 659487, at *5 (M.D. La. Feb. 16, 2024) (Jackson, J.); Louis, 2025 WL 350238, at *5; see also

14D Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 3827 (4th ed. 2026).

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3),

or Alternative, Motion to Transfer to the Northern District of Texas due to Improper Venue (Doc.

25) is GRANTED IN PART. This case is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Texas. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 26, 2026.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA