Thomas N. Allen v. Stanton Heidle, Warden

06/25/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs on March 3, 2026

THOMAS N. ALLEN v. STANTON HEIDLE, WARDEN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County

No. 25-CR-11130 Mark L. Hayes, Judge

No. W2025-01364-CCA-R3-HC

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas N. Allen, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary

dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable

claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that his life sentence for first degree

murder is illegal and his judgment of conviction is void because (1) the trial court’s

comments regarding parole eligibility were in direct contravention of the relevant statute

and (2) the statutory sentencing scheme for persons convicted of first degree murder

rendered his sentence unfairly disparate and in direct contravention to the purposes and

principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“the Sentencing

Act”). He further claims that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to appoint him

counsel despite the Petitioner’s indigent status. After review, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY,

JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

Thomas N. Allen, Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Leslie Renee Byrd, Assistant Attorney

General; Danny Goodman, Jr., District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of

Tennessee.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2006, a Hamblen County jury convicted the Petitioner of the June 2003 first

degree premeditated murder of the victim, Donald Wilder, Jr., based upon a theory of

criminal responsibility. See State v. Smith, No. E2006-00984-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL

4117603, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008).

At the Petitioner’s joint trial with his two codefendants, the evidence established that

codefendant George Smith shot and killed the victim with the assistance of codefendant

Shannon Jarnigan, his girlfriend. Id. at *1-3, *6-7, *9-11, *12-13. Evidence additionally

established that the Petitioner ordered the victim’s murder, provided a weapon and drugs

to assist in the killing, and provided money and drugs in exchange for the killing. Id. at

*8-13. Several witnesses testified that the Petitioner wanted the victim, a confidential

informant, killed for “snitching” on him. Id. at *7-8, *11, *18.

Directly following the announcement of the guilty verdict, the trial court informed

the jury of the sentencing process for the Petitioner and his two codefendants. The trial

court noted that the State had filed a notice of enhancement for the Petitioner’s two

codefendants and, as such, the two sentencing options were “life imprisonment which

means a person has to serve [fifty-one] years before they are eligible for parole or life

without the possibility of parole.” The trial court then explained that because the State had

not filed a notice of enhancement for the Petitioner, his sentence would “automatically be

life in prison which . . . is [fifty-one] years before eligibility for parole.” When sentencing

the Petitioner, the trial court stated, “[T]he jury has found you guilty of murder in the first

degree. It’s my duty to sentence you to life in prison, which is [fifty-one] years before the

eligibility for parole.” The trial court recited the Petitioner’s rights regarding the appeal

process and imposed a life sentence for the Petitioner’s conviction. For reasons of

“fairness,” the State withdrew its notice of enhancement for the Petitioner’s codefendants.

The trial court then sentenced codefendant Smith “to serve life in prison,” noting that it

was a sentence of “[fifty-one] years before eligibility for parole.” As for codefendant

Jarnigan, the trial court ordered, “[I]t is my duty to sentence you to a sentence of life

imprisonment which, as I’ve told everyone else, means [fifty-one] years before eligibility

for parole. It’s not [fifty-one] years; it’s [fifty-one] years before eligibility for parole.” The

Petitioner’s judgment of conviction shows the Petitioner was sentenced to life

imprisonment to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Regarding release

eligibility, the “1st” degree murder box is checked.

The defendants’ filed a direct appeal of their convictions to this court, wherein they

collectively challenged the following: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their

first degree murder convictions; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence establishing Hamblen

County as the proper venue for the case; (3) the trial court’s denial of their motion for

change of venue; (4) the trial court’s consolidation of the Petitioner’s trial with that of his

codefendants; (5) the trial court’s acceptance of the State’s peremptory challenges to two

potential jurors after providing a race-neutral reason for exclusion; (6) the trial court’s

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refusal to grant a new trial after their showing a juror should have been disqualified for

actual bias or prejudice; (7) the trial court’s admission of a recording of a conversation

between the Petitioner’s two codefendants; and (8) the trial court’s admission of the

Petitioner’s prior criminal charge for delivery of cocaine. Smith, 2007 WL 4117603, at *1.

This court affirmed, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. Id.

Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for both post-conviction relief and a writ

of error coram nobis. See Allen v. State, No. E2010-01971-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 826522,

at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012). Following

a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Id. at *4. On appeal, the Petitioner

argued that he was entitled to post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of

his trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct and that he was entitled to coram nobis relief

because a witness’s recantation amounted to newly discovered evidence. Id. at *4-10. This

court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court. Id. at *1. He later filed a petition

to reopen the post-conviction proceeding, alleging ineffective assistance of post-conviction

counsel. See Allen v. Parris, No. 2:15-CV-23, 2018 WL 1595784, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar.

30, 2018) (detailing this prior procedural history while adjudicating the Petitioner’s federal

writ of habeas corpus). The motion was denied, and this court denied the Petitioner’s

request for permission to appeal. Id.

The Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 in federal court asserting various claims that his conviction and sentence should be

overturned. See Allen, 2018 WL 1595784, at *1, *3. Many of these claims mirrored his

prior allegations for relief on direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings in state court.

Id. at *3. The district court denied the petition and dismissed the action with prejudice. Id.

at *16.

In 2018, the Petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court,

alleging that the indictment for his first degree murder conviction was defective for failing

to cite the correct statutory provision, that the trial court erred by giving erroneous jury

instructions, and that the indictment was illegally amended during trial. See Allen v.

Phillips, No. W2018-01736-CCA-R3-HC, 2019 WL 1754047, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Apr. 17, 2019). The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed his petition, and this court

affirmed. Id.

In 2021, the Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA

Analysis Act of 2001, wherein he sought DNA testing of the victim’s remains. See Allen

v. State, No. E2022-00373-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 16780005 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8,

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2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2023). The post-conviction court summarily

dismissed the petition, which decision this court affirmed on appeal. Id. at *2, *6.

On June 9, 2025, the Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Therein, he alleged that he was indigent and requested the habeas corpus court appoint him

counsel and asserted that he was entitled to relief based on two grounds. As to the first

ground, he argued that the trial court’s “instruction to the jury” that provided his sentence

was “life in prison which . . . is [fifty-one] years before eligibility for parole” was in direct

contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(i)(1) and (i)(2)(A) because

persons convicted of first degree murder on or after July 1, 1995, were not eligible for

parole. Thus, the habeas corpus court’s imposition of a life sentence for a first degree

murder conviction with parole eligibility rendered his sentence illegal and judgment of

conviction void.

Regarding the Petitioner’s second ground for relief, he claimed that his sentence

was illegal because it was in direct contravention of the purposes and principles of the

Sentencing Act. He asserted the Sentencing Act’s purpose was to eliminate disparities and

inequalities in sentences amongst similarly situated persons. However, he argued the

statutory sentencing scheme for persons convicted of first degree murder demonstrated a

“clear disparity” when some individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment “with parole”

and others were sentenced to life imprisonment “with no parole eligibility.” To this point,

he noted that persons convicted of first degree murder who received life imprisonment

“with parole” were those sentenced before July 1, 1995, and juvenile offenders. Contrarily,

he contended that he fell into a category of persons convicted of first degree murder who

were sentenced to life imprisonment “with no parole eligibility” despite being a “similarly

situated” person and “involved in the same type[] of crime.” Therefore, he claimed that

his sentence was imposed in direct contravention of the Sentencing Act’s purposes and

principles requiring that sentences not be disparate or unequal, rendering his judgment of

conviction void.

On July 17, 2025, the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus. While the court noted that the petition was not properly

verified by affidavit, it waived strict compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section

29-12-107(a) and proceeded to consider the substance of the petition.

As to the Petitioner’s first ground for relief, the habeas corpus court found that the

judgment form showed the Petitioner’s sentence as life imprisonment, which was

authorized at the time of the Petitioner’s conviction under Tennessee Code Annotated

section 39-13-202. However, it found that the trial court had “misspoke[n]” to the jury

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about the Petitioner’s parole eligibility. The habeas corpus court explained that Code

section 40-35-501(i) prohibited release eligibility for persons committing the offense of

murder in the first degree on or after July 1, 1995. Instead, such persons were required to

serve 100 percent of the sentence imposed by the trial court less any sentence credits earned

and retained, but no such sentence could be reduced by sentence credits by more than

fifteen percent. Notwithstanding the trial court’s comments, the habeas corpus court found

that the judgment form was correctly completed and, at the time the trial court made these

comments, the Petitioner’s trial was complete and the guilty verdict rendered. As such, the

habeas corpus court found that the trial court’s comments did not make the Petitioner’s

sentence illegal or his judgment of conviction void.

As for the Petitioner’s second ground for relief, the habeas corpus court found that

the Petitioner was essentially arguing that his sentence was unfairly disparate, rendering it

illegal, because of changes made by the legislature over time to sentencing practices

concerning persons convicted of first degree murder. The habeas corpus court found that

the Petitioner’s judgment form did not appear void on its face and was compliant with

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. As such, he was not entitled to relief.

The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. Also, it determined that

the Petitioner was indigent, so it did not tax the costs of the proceedings to him.

On September 4, 2025, the Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal. Regarding

the timeliness of his filing, the Petitioner submitted an affidavit claiming that the habeas

corpus court’s order denying his petition was not mailed to him until August 18, 2025. He

additionally attached the envelope in which the order was mailed from the clerk’s office of

the habeas corpus court. On September 10, 2025, this court found that the interest of justice

weighed in favor of waiving the timely filing requirement and granted the Petitioner’s

request for a delayed appeal. The Petitioner’s appeal is now before this court for review.

II. ANALYSIS

The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing

his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, he argues that he presented a colorable

claim for relief that his sentence is illegal and judgment of conviction void because the trial

court’s comments concerning parole eligibility were in direct contravention of statute and

his “disparate” sentence was in direct contravention of the purposes and principles of the

Sentencing Act. The Petitioner additionally argues that the habeas corpus court erred by

failing to appoint him counsel due to his indigent status. The State responds that the habeas

corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition was proper because the Petitioner failed

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to comply with mandatory procedural requirements in that his petition was not verified by

affidavit, and alternatively, he failed to present a colorable claim for relief.

The Tennessee Constitution guarantees a convicted criminal defendant the right to

seek habeas corpus relief. See Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15. While the right to seek a writ of

habeas corpus is a constitutional right, it is regulated by statute in Tennessee. See Ussery

v. Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1968). The statute provides, with certain limited

exceptions, that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any pretense

whatsoever, . . . may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such

imprisonment and restraint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101(a). However, the “grounds

upon which habeas corpus relief will be granted are very narrow.” Taylor v. State, 995

S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). The writ will issue only where the petitioner has established:

(1) a lack of jurisdiction for the order of confinement on the face of the judgment or in the

record on which the judgment was rendered; or (2) that the petitioner’s sentence has

expired, and he is entitled to immediate release. See State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630

(Tenn. 2000) (citing Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)). The purpose of

the habeas corpus petition is to contest a void, not merely a voidable, judgment. State ex

rel. Newsom v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. 1968).

“A void judgment is one that is facially invalid because the court did not have the

statutory authority to render such judgment.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256

(Tenn. 2007). A sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute is illegal and thus,

void. Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000). A petitioner bears the

burden of establishing a void judgment or illegal confinement by a preponderance of the

evidence. See Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000). A habeas corpus court

may summarily dismiss a petition without a hearing when the petition “fails to demonstrate

that the judgment is void.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004); see Tenn.

Code Ann. § 29-21-109. The determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a

question of law, and our review is de novo. Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 255.

The procedural requirements of the habeas corpus statutes are “mandatory and must

be followed scrupulously.” Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 165 (citing Bateman v. Smith, 194

S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tenn. 1946)). If a petitioner does not strictly comply with these

procedural provisions, a habeas corpus court may dismiss the petition on that ground alone.

See Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 21; State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Tenn.

1964).

The procedural requirements for habeas corpus petitions are set forth in Tennessee

Code Annotated section 29-21-107, which provides in part that an “[a]pplication for the

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writ shall be made by petition, signed either by the party for whose benefit it is intended,

or some person on the petitioner’s behalf, and verified by affidavit.” Tenn. Code

Ann. § 29-21-107(a). A petition has been “verified by affidavit” if said affidavit has been

notarized or verified under oath. See Jones v. State, No. M2019-01935-CCA-R3-HC, 2020

WL 4208425, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2020) (finding a petition to be procedurally

defective as the affidavits provided by the petitioner were “neither notarized nor verified

under oath”); see also Soimis v. State, No. M2014-01700-CCA-R3-HC, 2015 WL

1881064, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2015) (finding the petitioner failed to verify his

petition by affidavit because his signature under the “Verification Under Oath” section was

not witnessed by a notary and did not have a stamp affixed).

Initially, we agree with the habeas corpus court that the Petitioner’s petition for writ

of habeas corpus is not properly verified by affidavit. The last page of the petition is titled,

“AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-21-107(a)” and is followed by,

“ I, [the Petitioner], do hereby swear that all of the aforementioned is true and exact to the

best of my knowledge as presented on this 24th day of May, 2025[.]” This page

additionally bears the Petitioner’s digital signature. However, this page is not notarized

and there is no indication that the Petitioner was under oath when he signed the petition.

See Soimis, 2015 WL 1881064, at *2 (holding summary dismissal of a petition for writ of

habeas corpus was proper when, inter alia, the petitioner failed to have a notary witness

his signature and affix the stamp); Marshall v. Watwood, No. W2023-01314-CCA-R3-HC,

2024 WL 1174672, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2024) (holding that the summary

dismissal of the habeas corpus petition was proper based on the petition’s lack of

verification because it was not notarized and there was no indication the petitioner was

under oath when he signed it), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 17, 2024). As such, this

procedural defect alone makes the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal proper. See

Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 21; Bomar, 381 S.W.2d at 291.

However, dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus is not required based on

a failure to comply with the statutory procedural requirements, and a habeas corpus court

may choose to adjudicate a petition on its merits despite procedural defects. Hickman, 153

S.W.3d at 21 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109). Because the habeas corpus court here

did not dismiss the petition based on the Petitioner’s failure to comply with the procedural

requirements, we will likewise address the merits of the Petitioner’s arguments in his

petition.

Now, and at the time of the Petitioner’s offense, three punishments were available

for a conviction for first degree murder: (1) death, (2) imprisonment for life without

possibility of parole, or (3) imprisonment for life. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(c).

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A sentence of imprisonment for life is defined as sixty years. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-35-501(h)(1); Brown v. Jordan, 563 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tenn. 2018). Relative to

offenses committed prior to July 1, 1995, Tennessee Code Annotated

section 40-35-501(h)(1) governs release eligibility and parole for defendants convicted of

first degree murder who received life sentences. See Brown, 563 S.W.3d at 200-01. Under

this provision, release eligibility occurs after service of sixty percent of sixty years less any

earned and retained sentence reduction credits, but a defendant shall not be eligible for

parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-five years of such a sentence,

subject to certain authority. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(h)(1). Conversely, at the

time of the Petitioner’s June 2003 offense, Code section -501(i) governed the release

eligibility for offenders who committed first degree murder on or after July 1, 1995, and

received a life sentence. Code section -501(i) provided:

There shall be no release eligibility for a person committing [first degree

murder], on or after July 1, 1995 . . . Such person shall serve one hundred

percent (100%) of the sentence imposed by the court less sentence credits

earned and retained. However, no sentence reduction credits authorized

by § 41-21-236, or any other provision of law, shall operate to reduce the

sentence imposed by the court by more than fifteen percent (15%).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i)(1)-(2)(A). Thus, defendants sentenced under this statute

are required to serve one hundred percent of sixty years less any sentence reduction credits

up to fifteen percent of the sentence. See id.; Brown, 563 S.W.3d at 200. Fifteen percent

of sixty years is nine years, meaning an offender who receives a life sentence for

committing first degree murder on or after July 1, 1995, may be eligible for release, at the

earliest, after service of fifty-one years. Brown, 563 S.W.3d at 200-01. However, a life

sentence under this provision “do[es] not entitle [a d]efendant to parole,” but rather

“permit[s] release from confinement after serving fifty-one years.” State v. Guerrero, No.

M2014-01669-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2208546, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2015)

(emphasis omitted) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i)(1)).

In the present case, we conclude that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim

for habeas corpus relief. We agree with the habeas corpus court that the trial court in this

case misspoke when it stated that the Petitioner would be parole eligible after fifty-one

years of service of his life sentence. Rather, the trial court likely meant that the Petitioner

may be eligible for release after fifty-one years of service of his life sentence, assuming he

earns the maximum allowable sentence reduction credits. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-35-501(i); Brown, 563 S.W.3d at 200-01. Nevertheless, the Petitioner’s life

sentence, as reflected on his judgment form, is authorized by statute, and as such, he is not

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entitled to habeas corpus relief in this regard. See Draper v. Lindamood, No. W2013-

01030-CCA-R3-HC, 2014 WL 465723, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2014) (affirming

the summary dismissal of a habeas corpus petition despite the trial court’s using the phrase

“life sentence with the possibility of parole,” instead of “life,” to describe the petitioner’s

sentence under the plea agreement because the court’s explanation of the sentence was in

line with the statute); Hearing v. Mills, No. W2011-01226-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL

12931580, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2012) (holding the petitioner was not entitled

to habeas corpus relief even though his judgments of conviction for felony murder reflected

the sentence length as fifty-one years, reasoning such was a clerical error); Kesterson v.

Mills, No. W2008-00745-CCA-R3-HC, 2009 WL 453967, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb.

23, 2009) (affirming the denial of habeas corpus relief despite the trial court’s comments

regarding lifetime community supervision as a part of the petitioner’s sentence when the

judgment ultimately entered reflected a proper sentence with no lifetime community

supervision requirement).

As to the Petitioner’s second ground for relief, he essentially argues that legislative

amendments regarding the authorized sentences for offenders convicted of first degree

murder created a disparity among similarly situated offenders that contradict the purposes

and principles of the Sentencing Act. However, the Petitioner has failed to show how such

changes to the sentencing laws divested the trial court of jurisdiction to sentence the

Petitioner in this case or how his life sentence was unauthorized or was contrary to the

applicable statutory scheme at the time of his offense. The Petitioner’s judgment of

conviction is facially valid, and the sentence reflected thereon is legal. We agree with the

habeas corpus court that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief in this regard. See Hill v.

Genovese, No. W2021-01150-CCA-R3-HC, 2022 WL 1077316, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Apr. 11, 2022) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that statutory changes to parole eligibility

for life sentences for offenders convicted of first degree murder were at odds with the

purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act).

Lastly, the appointment of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding is discretionary.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-204 (providing the habeas corpus court “shall determine the

question of indigency and appoint counsel, if necessary, in the manner set out in this part.”

(emphasis added)). As such, “an indigent petitioner does not have a right to appointed

counsel in a habeas corpus action except to the extent that appointment of counsel is found

to be ‘necessary’ within the meaning of” Code section -204. See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at

260-61. Moreover, a habeas corpus court may dismiss a petition without the appointment

of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing when the petition fails to demonstrate that

the judgment is void. See id. at 261; Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109. As the Petitioner

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failed to state a colorable claim for relief, the habeas corpus court did not err by summarily

dismissing the petition without the appointment of counsel.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court summarily

dismissing the petition.

s/Kyle A. Hixson .

KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

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