Com. v. Lucas, D.

J-S11009-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

DARIAN LUCAS :

:

Appellant : No. 1484 WDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 4, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No: CP-25-CR-0001069-1994

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and NEUMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JUNE 26, 2026

Appellant, Darian Lucas, appeals pro se from the order entered on

November 4, 2025, in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, dismissing

as untimely Appellant’s petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

A prior panel of this Court, which resolved Appellant’s first PCRA petition,

summarized the relevant facts as follows.

This case has its genesis in a fight that culminated in Appellant

discharging a loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun into a

crowded bar on March 13, 1994. Four patrons, William Sansom,

Natasha Smith, Andre Barnes and Calvin Martin were wounded [or

killed.] As a result, Appellant was arrested and charged with

various offenses arising out of this incident.

A jury trial was held in January of 1995, following which Appellant

was convicted of murder in the first degree, attempted criminal

homicide, aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly

endangering another person, possession of an instrument of crime

and carrying a firearm without a license. After a penalty hearing,

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the jury voted to impose a sentence of life imprisonment rather

than the death penalty.

On March 3, 1995, Appellant was sentenced to a term of life

imprisonment with regard to his murder conviction.

Commonwealth v. Lucas, 2269 Pittsburgh 1997 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 24,

1998) (unpublished memorandum at 1-2) (footnotes omitted), appeal denied,

739 A.2d 164 (Pa. 1999).

Appellant filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed. Id. at 3.

Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court,

which denied same on August 6, 1996. See Commonwealth v. Lucas, 681

A.2d 1341 (Pa. 1996).

Appellant subsequently filed four unsuccessful PCRA petitions, the

dismissals of which were affirmed by this Court: Lucas, 2269 Pittsburgh 1997;

Commonwealth v. Lucas, 1054 Pittsburgh 1998 (Pa. Super. filed May 10,

1999), appeal denied, 747 A.2d 366 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Lucas,

607 WDA 2008 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 7, 2008), appeal denied, 971 A.2d 488

(Pa. 2009), and Commonwealth v. Lucas, 1815 WDA 2012 (Pa. Super. filed

June 19. 2013), appeal denied, 78 A.3d 1090 (Pa. 2013).

Appellant filed the underlying PCRA petition, his fifth, on September 18,

2025. In it, Appellant mentions Overby v. Wetzel, No. 11-5616, 2025 WL

1559150 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2025), for the proposition that “voir dire answers

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are presumed prejudicial.”1 PCRA petition at 3. Appellant provides no further

explanation of how Overby would be relevant in the disposition of the merits

of his case.2

____________________________________________

1 Appellant also intertwines the prejudice claim under Overby with a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. It would seem that Appellant believes that

his direct appeal counsel was ineffective for not challenging the trial court’s

handling of voir dire, based on the reasoning of Overby.

To the extent Appellant raises such a claim, the claim is waived and/or

meritless. The claim is waived because Appellant provided no meaningful

discussion of counsel’s ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Wharton, 811 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2002). Additionally, the claim is meritless.

Even if Overby had recognized a new constitutional right, as Appellant claims,

we have reiterated that it is not ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to

predict future changes in governing law. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130

A.3d 601, 650 (Pa. 2017).

2 On direct appeal, Overby argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to challenge’s the trial court refusal to conduct individual voir dire of

prospective venire persons and excluding prospective jurors who had

incarcerated family members. We concluded that the appellant was entitled

to no relief as he had failed to show he suffered prejudice from counsel’s

omission. Commonwealth v. Overby, 2020 WL 7785574 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court denied Overby’s petition for

allowance of appeal on July 21, 2021.

Subsequently, Overby filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus before the

federal district court alleging, among other things, that the trial court violated

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by automatically excluding

prospective jurors based solely on the fact that they had incarcerated family

members, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue

this claim further.

The federal district court granted Overby’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

noting that established federal law presumes prejudice from the wholesale

and improper exclusion of a category of jurors, and that the Superior Court’s

requiring of Overby to adduce the prejudice he suffered from the defective

voir dire was inconsistent with federal law. Overby v. Wetzel, No. 11-

05616, 2025 WL 1561526 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (report and recommendation).

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In the context of addressing the timeliness of the underlying petition,

Appellant stated that Overby is “new case law that is presidential [sic] in prior

case appeal, stated failure to establish that he suffered prejudice in connection

with voir dire challenge this was error.” Id. at 8 (verbatim). It would seem,

therefore, that Appellant believes that Overby qualifies under the after-

recognized constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar.

Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must determine

whether the underlying PCRA petition is timely, as its timeliness implicates our

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa.

2000) (stating that “given the fact that the PCRA’s timeliness requirements

are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, no court may properly disregard

or alter them in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA

petition that is filed in an untimely manner”); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737

A.2d 214, 220 (Pa. 1999) (holding that where a petitioner fails to satisfy the

PCRA time requirements, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the

petition).

As noted, Appellant believes that Overby qualifies as an after-

recognized constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar.

We disagree.

To invoke the after-recognized constitutional right exception

pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), a petitioner must plead and

prove that (1) “the right asserted is a constitutional right that was

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [our

Supreme Court] after the time provided in [Section 9545]”; and

(2) “the right has been held by that court to apply retroactively.”

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[Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1154 (Pa. 2020)]

(citation and original quotation marks omitted). Importantly, the

court announcing the new constitutional right must have ruled

that the right applied retroactively prior to the filing of a petition

for collateral review. Id. at 1154, 1161 (stating that, by use of

the words “has been held” and “that court” in Section

9545(b)(1)(iii), “the legislature clearly intended that the right was

already recognized [as applicable with retroactive force] at the

time the petition was filed”); see also Commonwealth v.

Washington, 636 Pa. 301, 142 A.3d 810, 823 (2016)

(Dougherty, J. concurring) (stating, the “safety valve for

vindication of new and retroactive rights is logically limited to

pronouncements from the two courts of last resort that can

recognize new rights and makes clear that the court of last resort

announcing the new right should also issue the holding on the

retroactivity of the new right”).

Commonwealth v Branthafer, 315 A.3d 113, 131 (Pa. Super. 2024).

There are several problems with Appellant’s timeliness argument. First,

Overby is a decision from a federal district court. Decisions of federal district

courts are not binding on Pennsylvania courts, even when a federal question

is involved. See, e.g., Commonwealth v Burgos, 64 A.3d 641 (Pa. Super.

2013). Second, Overby did not recognize a new constitutional right. Third,

for purposes of the exception, only the recognition of a new constitutional

right by the United States Supreme Court or our Supreme Court will trigger

the exception and only if the recognition was held to be applicable

retroactively. Because none of the above conditions are met here, the

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underlying PCRA petition is untimely. As such, we cannot reach the merits of

the underlying PCRA. See, e.g., Fahy, supra.3, 4

Order affirmed.

DATE: 6/26/2026

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3 In light of our disposition, Appellant’s application to strike and the June 3,

2026 “motion to take judicial notice” are denied as moot. Additionally,

Appellant’s application to compel is similarly denied as moot. While we are

not pleased with the trial court’s handling of our March 31, 2026, order, in

light of our disposition, the trial court is relieved from further compliance.

4 In a supplemental filing, Appellant mentions Commonwealth v. Blakeney,

346 A.3d 318 (Pa. 2025). It is unclear how Blakeney would help Appellant.

Blakeney deals with the newly discovered facts exception to the PCRA time-

bar. Here, Appellant unsuccessfully attempted to raise an after-recognized

constitutional right exception. To the extent that Appellant argues that

Overby or Blakeney constitute newly discovered facts, it is well-established

that judicial opinions do not qualify as newly discovered fact. See

Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 2011).

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