The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LEE COFER,
Defendant and Appellant.
S286297
Sixth Appellate District
H050122
Monterey County Superior Court
20CR010763, 20CR008059, 21CR000245,
21CR001076, 21CR001243
June 25, 2026
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and
Chou* concurred.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
PEOPLE v. COFER
S286297
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
After reaching a plea agreement with the prosecution,
defendant Christopher Lee Cofer was sentenced at a single
hearing on five separate pending criminal cases. Defendant had
been in presentence custody for extended periods in some of
these cases and for shorter periods in others. In imposing
sentence, the trial court awarded defendant custody credits in
each case that reflected the time he spent in custody in that
specific case. Below, a divided Court of Appeal agreed with
defendant that under Penal Code section 2900.51 he should
receive presentence custody credits in each of his five cases for
all the time he served in custody on any of these cases, except
for custody time that preceded his arrest in a particular case.
(People v. Cofer (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 333, 341–342 (Cofer).)
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the resolution of these cases
through a single sentencing hearing meant that they all
involved the same “proceedings” for purposes of section 2900.5,
subdivision (b), under which “the custody to be credited” against
a sentence must be “attributable to proceedings related to the
same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.” (See
Cofer, at p. 341.) This interpretation of the statute, if correct,
would result in defendant receiving more than 300 additional
1
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
days of custody credit on his lead (six-year) term, relative to
credits awarded by the trial court.
We disagree with the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of
section 2900.5. Applying conventional statutory analysis, we
conclude that “proceedings,” as used in section 2900.5,
subdivision (b), is properly understood as referring to an
individual criminal case. As such, custody credit is not
automatically applied across multiple, distinct prosecutions
merely because those cases are resolved and sentenced at a
single hearing. In this case, that means that the trial court
correctly interpreted the statute in awarding credits in each
case for the time defendant spent in custody in that matter,
rather than awarding him credit in each case for time served in
other cases. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeal.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As noted, this case involves the award of presentence
credit in five separate criminal cases that were resolved at a
single sentencing hearing.
Defendant was arrested in case No. 20CR008059 (case A) 2
on September 27, 2020. In case A, he was charged with vehicle
burglary (§ 459); possession of burglar’s tools (§ 466); driving
without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)); and grand theft
of personal property (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)), with it being
alleged that these crimes all occurred on or about September 27,
2
Like the majority below, we refer to defendant’s five cases
as cases A, B, C, D, and E. (See Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 335–336.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
2020. Two prior strike convictions were also alleged. (§§ 667,
subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
Defendant was arraigned two days later, with bail being
set at $60,000. On November 10, 2020, defendant posted bail
and was released.
On December 18, 2020, while out on bail, defendant was
charged in case No. 20CR010763 (case B) with vehicle burglary
(§ 459) and grand theft of an access card and access card account
information (§ 484g), with the complaint alleging that both
offenses occurred on or about September 26, 2020. The
complaint alleged one prior strike conviction. (§§ 667,
subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
Almost a month later, on January 14, 2021, defendant was
charged in case No. 21CR000245 (case C) with second degree
burglary (§ 459) and vandalism under $400 (§ 594,
subd. (b)(2)(A)). 3 The complaint also alleged a prior strike
conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
Defendant was arrested and taken into custody in cases B
and C on January 12, 2021. He was arraigned in both cases on
January 14, 2021, and was released on his own recognizance on
January 18, 2021.
On February 13, 2021, defendant was arrested in his final
two cases. Three days later, he was charged in
case No. 21CR001076 (case D) with second degree burglary
(§ 459); possession of burglar’s tools (§ 466); and possession of
3
The complaint in case C averred that defendant
committed both criminal offenses alleged therein on or about
January 9, 2021. Therefore, he was out on bail in case A when
he allegedly committed the acts comprising his two offenses in
case C.
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)).
The complaint also contained one prior strike allegation (Pen.
Code, §§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and alleged
that defendant committed the charged offenses on or about
February 13, 2021, while released on bail or on his own
recognizance (§ 12022.1, subd. (d)).
On February 19, 2021, defendant was charged in
case No. 21CR001243 (case E) with second degree burglary
(§ 459). The complaint also alleged a prior strike. (§§ 667,
subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) Although the complaint
did not include an allegation that the offense was committed
while defendant was released on bail or on his own recognizance,
it stated defendant committed the burglary on or about
January 12, 2021.
Defendant was arraigned on February 16, 2021, in case D,
and bail was set at $120,000. He was arraigned in case E on
March 3, 2021, and bail was set at $20,000. Defendant
remained in custody in both cases D and E. At that time, he
remained out of custody in cases A, B, and C.
On August 10, 2021, the People moved to consolidate all
five of defendant’s cases. Defendant opposed the motion.
Apparently, the trial court never heard the motion.
On August 18, 2021, the trial court declared a doubt
regarding defendant’s competency to stand trial, suspended
criminal proceedings in all five cases, revoked defendant’s bail
in case A, and remanded defendant to custody in cases B and C.
After defendant was determined to be competent, criminal
proceedings were reinstated on September 1, 2021. Defendant
was released on his own recognizance in cases A and B but
remained in custody in cases C, D, and E.
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Defendant resolved all five cases by plea agreement a few
months later. On January 26, 2022, defendant pleaded no
contest to felony second degree burglary in cases A, B, and C and
misdemeanor second degree burglary in cases D and E. He also
admitted a strike allegation in case B. The rest of the charges
in all five cases were dismissed with waivers under People v.
Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (Harvey). 4 On March 25, 2022, the
court remanded defendant into custody in cases A and B
pending sentencing, at which point defendant was in custody on
all five cases.
Consistent with the parties’ agreement, on March 30,
2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to a six-year term in
case B and shorter concurrent terms in the other cases. In
case A, the court awarded presentence credits of 66 actual
custody and 66 days conduct credit; in case B, the court awarded
21 days of actual custody and 20 days conduct credit; in case C,
the court awarded 225 days of actual custody and 224 days
conduct credit; in cases D and E, the court deemed the sentences
served with 183 days of actual custody and 182 days conduct
credit in each.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial
court granted a certificate of probable cause to challenge the
calculation of presentence custody credits. Defendant then
4
A Harvey waiver is a defendant’s agreement, as part of a
plea bargain, to allow the sentencing court to consider facts
supporting dismissed counts. (See generally Harvey, supra,
25 Cal.3d at p. 758.)
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
moved in the trial court under section 1237.1 5 to correct his
presentence credits. Specifically, defendant requested an award
of additional presentence credit for the time that he was on bail
or on his own recognizance in cases A, B, and C while
simultaneously in custody in cases D and E. He also asked that
any presentence credits in excess of the one-year sentences
deemed served in the misdemeanor cases D and E be “applied to
another case, where a longer term of incarceration was
imposed.”
Defendant supported his motion with a summary of his
custody status in each case. For case A, defendant represented
he was in custody from September 27 to November 10, 2020; out
on bail from November 10, 2020, to August 18, 2021; in custody
from August 18 to September 1, 2021; released on his own
recognizance from September 1, 2021, to March 25, 2022; and
back in custody on March 25, 2022, until he was sentenced in
this matter. In case B, defendant was assertedly in custody
January 12 to January 18, 2021; released on his own
recognizance from January 18 to August 18, 2021; in custody on
August 18 to September 1, 2021; out of custody beginning
September 1, 2021, and then back in custody on March 25, 2022,
5
Section 1237.1 provides: “No appeal shall be taken by the
defendant from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an
error in the calculation of presentence custody credits, unless
the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the
time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after
sentencing, the defendant first makes a motion for correction of
the record in the trial court, which may be made informally in
writing. The trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice of
appeal has been filed to correct any error in the calculation of
presentence custody credits upon the defendant’s request for
correction.”
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
until he was sentenced in this matter. For case C, defendant
stated he was in custody from January 12 to January 18, 2021;
released on his own recognizance from January 18 to August 18,
2021; and remained in custody from August 18, 2021, until he
was sentenced in this matter. And for cases D and E, defendant
maintained he was in custody beginning February 13, 2021,
until he was sentenced in both matters.
Following People v. Jacobs (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 67,
which held that a defendant sentenced in two separate criminal
cases at a single hearing was entitled to presentence custody
credit only for custody related to the specific case for which he
was sentenced (id. at pp. 83–84), the trial court denied the
request for additional presentence credits, finding that
defendant was not entitled to further credits for cases where he
remained on bail or was released on his own recognizance while
in presentence custody in other cases. However, the trial court
awarded seven additional custody credits in both cases B and C
based on its interpretation of the records defendant submitted
in support of the motion. The court denied defendant’s request
to reduce his term of imprisonment with the credits exceeding
one year in cases D and E, noting that defendant had received
credit for that time in case C.
Defendant appealed. A divided Court of Appeal reversed
the judgment, with the majority concluding that defendant was
entitled to custody credit in all cases for any time that he was in
custody in any of the five cases, provided that the custody to be
applied did not precede defendant’s arrest in a particular case.
(Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 335, 342.)
The Cofer majority premised its holding on the first
sentence of section 2900.5, subdivision (b), which provides, “For
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the
custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to
the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.”
The majority concluded that this sentence was ambiguous as
applied to defendant’s situation. (Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at p. 340.) It reasoned that the phrase, “ ‘attributable to
proceedings related to the same conduct’ ” could support two
different interpretations. (Ibid.) First, that phrase could be
interpreted consistent with Jacobs so that “each criminal case
must be considered a separate proceeding even if resolved and
sentenced at the same time.” (Ibid.) In that circumstance, the
award of presentence custody credits for each criminal case
would be calculated based on the time a defendant spent in
custody in that specific case. Alternatively, the court reasoned,
the subject phrase “could also mean that a defendant is entitled
to credit in all cases that are resolved and sentenced together
for all custody attributable to all conduct in those cases
occurring after the defendant’s arrest in any given case.” (Id. at
pp. 340–341.) Under that interpretation, a defendant would
receive credit for all days of actual custody without regard to the
defendant’s technical custody status in any particular case. (Id.
at p. 341.)
The Cofer majority concluded “the latter interpretation [is]
more consistent with the purposes of awarding presentence
credit, and it is not foreclosed by any Supreme Court authority.”
(Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 341.) In rejecting the
People’s argument that the court’s approach would create a
windfall for defendant, the majority stated that its “decision
ensures equal treatment between defendant and individuals
who could afford bail on additional cases.” (Ibid.)
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
A dissent concluded that the majority’s interpretation
conflicted with section 2900.5’s text, our previous
interpretations of that statute in People v. Bruner (1995)
9 Cal.4th 1178 (Bruner) and In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487
(Joyner), and what the dissent perceived as a well-established
understanding among trial counsel and courts regarding how
the statute operates. (Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 342–
343, 344, 346–348 (dis. opn. of Lie, J.).) The dissent explained
it “read section 2900.5 to mean that credit for a single period in
presentence custody will be given against multiple concurrent
sentences imposed in multiple cases, so long as the presentence
custody is attributable to each of those cases.” (Id. at p. 343
(dis. opn. of Lie, J.).) It concluded defendant was not entitled to
custody credit in cases A and B for custody time accrued only in
his other cases, stating, “That all cases were later sentenced in
a single coordinated hearing did not retroactively change
[defendant’s] release status in cases A, B, and C or expand the
bases for his confinement in cases D and E.” (Id. at pp. 343–344
(dis. opn. of Lie, J.).)
We granted review to address the apparent conflict
between Jacobs and Cofer.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Section 2900.5
Subdivision (a) of section 2900.5 provides for the award of
credits at sentencing for time a defendant has already spent in
custody. These credits reduce the length of time a defendant
spends incarcerated following conviction and sentencing. This
subdivision states in relevant part that in “all felony and
misdemeanor convictions . . . when the defendant has been in
custody, including, but not limited to, any time spent in a jail,
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation
facility, hospital, prison, juvenile detention facility, or similar
residential institution, all days of custody of the defendant,
including days . . . credited to the period of confinement
pursuant to Section 4019 . . . shall be credited upon his or her
term of imprisonment.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).)
Subdivision (b) of section 2900.5, meanwhile, limits the
application of the custody credits authorized in subdivision (a).
Subdivision (b) provides, “For the purposes of this section, credit
shall be given only where the custody to be credited is
attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for
which the defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be given
only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple
offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.” (§ 2900.5,
subd. (b).) Because defendant did not receive any consecutive
sentences, we are only concerned with the first sentence of
subdivision (b).
B. This Court’s Precedent Interpreting
Section 2900.5
We have interpreted section 2900.5 on multiple occasions.
(See, e.g., In re Marquez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 14, 20 (Marquez);
Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 1180, 1192; Joyner, supra,
48 Cal.3d at p. 489; In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 155–156
(Rojas).) Our prior decisions have articulated a “strict
causation” rule for the award of custody credits. (Joyner, at
p. 489.) Pursuant to this standard, custody will not be credited
under section 2900.5, subdivision (b) absent a showing that the
conduct that underlies the term to be credited was a “ ‘but for’ ”
cause of the earlier restraint. (Bruner, at p. 1194; see id. at
p. 1193; Joyner, at p. 489 [“a period of time previously credited
against a sentence for unrelated offenses cannot be deemed
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
‘attributable to proceedings’ resulting in a later-imposed
sentence unless it is demonstrated that the claimant would have
been at liberty during the period were it not for a restraint
relating to the proceedings resulting in the later sentence”];
Rojas, at p. 156 [“Section 2900.5 does not authorize credit where
the pending proceeding has no effect whatever upon a
defendant’s liberty”].)
Notably, these cases have addressed situations in which a
defendant was sentenced in at least two cases at different times,
with the issue being how to apply presentence custody credit to
a sentence imposed in the latter case. In this context, we have
(1) determined that section 2900.5 did not entitle a defendant to
credit toward his sentence for a period of presentence custody
when, during that same period, he was serving a prison term for
a prior unrelated offense (Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 154);
(2) concluded that a defendant serving a sentence pursuant to
convictions incurred in Florida who was placed under a
custodial “hold” associated with a pending case in California
could not receive presentence credits against his subsequently
imposed California sentence for the time the hold was in place,
when such time was already being credited against his earlier
imposed Florida sentence (Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 489); 6
and (3) held a defendant was not entitled to presentence custody
credit for his concurrent sentence for a drug offense when that
drug offense was only one of “multiple, unrelated incidents of
misconduct” giving rise to his previous term of incarceration for
6
In Joyner, we also criticized our prior interpretation of
section 2900.5, subdivision (b) in In re Atiles (1983) 33 Cal.3d
805 (Atiles), wherein we suggested maximizing the application
of custody credits was required under the statute. (Joyner,
supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 494–495.)
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
a parole violation (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1193; see id. at
p. 1194).7
We also have clarified that the requirement of “ ‘strict
causation’ . . . is applicable in cases involving the possibility of
duplicative credit that might create a windfall for the
defendant.” (Marquez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 23.) Thus, in
Marquez, we concluded that a defendant serving a sentence
should receive credit for time in custody that, at the time it was
served, owed both to a sentence imposed in one matter and to a
custodial hold arising out of a different case filed in another
county, in a circumstance where the earlier convictions were
later reversed and the charges dismissed. (Id. at p. 20.) We
explained, “once Santa Cruz County dismissed its charges, all
custody following Monterey County’s hold, including the period
between petitioner’s sentencing in Santa Cruz County and his
Monterey County sentencing, is properly characterized as
‘attributable to [the Monterey County] proceedings related to
the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.’ ”
(Ibid.)
In each of the cases described above, we determined that
custody credit could only be applied in cases where the subject
presentence custody was ultimately attributable to the
underlying proceeding in which the defendant was sentenced.
(See, e.g., Marquez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 20–21; Rojas, supra,
23 Cal.3d at p. 156.) But these cases all concerned multiple
proceedings that were resolved at separate hearings (see, e.g.,
Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 489 [“duplicative credits against
7
We overruled Atiles to the extent it reached a contrary
conclusion to our holding in Bruner. (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 1194.)
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
separately imposed concurrent sentences for unrelated offenses
will be granted only on a showing of strict causation” (italics
added)].) None of our decisions establish how the statutory
requirement that presentence custody be “attributable to
proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant
has been convicted” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b)) applies in a case like
this, where a defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms at a
single hearing pursuant to a plea agreement that resolved
several different cases.
C. Text of Section 2900.5, Subdivision (b) and
Legislative History
Because our prior decisions do not provide a definitive
answer to the question before us, we return to the statute.
“ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a
plain and commonsense meaning. . . . If the language is clear,
courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal
interpretation would result in absurd consequences the
Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and
public policy.” [Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions
of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory
scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word,
phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the
legislative purpose.” ’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616–617.)
Section 2900.5, subdivision (b) does not define
“proceedings,” so we look to its “ ‘ “plain meaning . . . as
understood by the ordinary person.” ’ ” (People v. Walker (2024)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1035.) A proceeding has been defined as a
“legal action.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th
ed. 2003) p. 990, col. 1.) According to Black’s Law Dictionary,
“proceeding” means “[t]he regular and orderly progression of a
lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of
commencement and the entry of judgment.” (Black’s Law Dict.
(12th ed. 2024) p. 1459, col. 1, italics added.) Within the context
of section 2900.5, subdivision (b), these definitions support an
interpretation of “proceedings” as referring to a specific legal
action filed against a criminal defendant — in other words, a
criminal case.
Further examination of the statute’s language
corroborates this interpretation of “proceedings.” (§ 2900.5,
subd. (b).) Subdivision (b) limits credits “only” to custody that
“is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for
which the defendant has been convicted.” (Ibid., italics added.)
This language connecting custody time to “proceedings related
to the same conduct” reinforces that “proceedings” (ibid.) is
concerned with separate cases arising from distinct acts and
arrests, not a sentencing hearing. This makes sense;
defendant’s time in custody was “attributable to” (§ 2900.5,
subd. (b)) the entire course of proceedings in his individual
cases, including the decisions to place defendant in custody that
occurred as those cases independently unfolded. (See Smith v.
Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83 [explaining that in
interpreting statutory language “ ‘we give “significance to every
word, phrase, [and] sentence” ’ ”].) Conversely, it is not sensible
to regard this custody time as somehow “attributable to”
(§ 2900.5, subd. (b)) the joint sentencing hearing that came only
after custody time was served. Such an interpretation would
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
assign that hearing causal significance in relation to defendant’s
custody time that it clearly does not possess.
An interpretation of “proceedings” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b)) as
concerned with a specific case is also consistent with other Penal
Code statutes and case law that equate a “proceeding” with an
individual action. For example, section 683 states, “The
proceeding by which a party charged with a public offense is
accused and brought to trial and punishment, is known as a
criminal action.” (See also Burns v. Superior Court (1903)
140 Cal. 1, 6 [“ ‘In its more general sense, in law, [proceeding]
means all the steps or measures adopted in the prosecution or
defense of an action’ ”]; Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 345
(dis. opn. of Lie, J.) [“ ‘proceeding’ turns on the operative
charging documents that allege the criminal conduct for which
the People seek punishment, not on a purely procedural decision
to coordinate scheduling for multiple actions”].)
This understanding of how section 2900.5, subdivision (b)
should apply here is also consistent with our case law
concerning the resolution of multiple cases at a single hearing.
In People v. Soria (2010) 48 Cal.4th 58 (Soria), for example, we
addressed the levying of restitution fines in such a situation.
There, the defendant was separately charged in three different
cases. He entered negotiated pleas in all three cases at a single
hearing, and the trial court ordered restitution fines in each case
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) 8 and section 1202.45.9
(Soria, at p. 62.) The defendant appealed, arguing that
imposing separate fines in each case was unauthorized. The
Court of Appeal agreed. (Ibid.) In rejecting the appellate court’s
conclusion, we explained: “When several cases are resolved by
a single plea bargain in which the defendant enters separate
pleas, it is plain that there is one bargain but multiple cases.”
(Id. at p. 65.) Absent consolidation, “separately filed cases
remain separate for purposes of the restitution statutes, even
when they are jointly resolved at the plea and sentencing stages.
In the context of sections 1202.4[, subdivision ](b) and 1202.45,
a ‘case’ is a formal criminal proceeding, filed by the prosecution
and handled by the court as a separate action with its own
number.” (Id. at pp. 64–65.) “Defendants who commit multiple
crimes, and are consequently before the court in multiple cases
when their pleas are taken, are properly subject to multiple
fines.” (Id. at p. 66.)
The rationale we enunciated in Soria applies here, too.
The expediency of resolving all five of defendant’s cases under
one plea bargain and at a single sentencing hearing did not
transform multiple cases into one proceeding for purposes of
8
“Section 1202.4[, subdivision ](b) requires the court to
impose ‘a separate and additional restitution fine’ of not less
than $200 or more than $10,000 ‘[i]n every case where a person
is convicted of a crime,’ absent ‘compelling and extraordinary
reasons for not doing so.’ ” (Soria, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 62.)
9
“Section 1202.45 . . . requires ‘an additional parole
revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4,’ ‘[i]n every case
where a person is convicted of a crime and [the] sentence
includes a period of parole . . . .’ ” (Soria, supra, 48 Cal.4th at
p. 62.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
awarding custody credits pursuant to section 2900.5,
subdivision (b).
In this respect, we find unpersuasive the Court of Appeal’s
interpretation of “proceedings” as equivalent to a coordinated
hearing. 10 (See Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 340–341.)
Rather, as the dissent below noted, “ ‘California courts have long
recognized that the term “proceedings” is broader than the term
“hearings.” [Citations.] Indeed, . . . any attempt to equate the
two “flies in the face of the ordinary meaning of
‘proceedings.’ ” ’ ” (Cofer, at p. 344 (dis. opn. of Lie, J.).) “[A]
legal proceeding may well have several stages” (Gipe v. Superior
Court (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 617, 626), of which a sentencing
hearing is merely one. We find no basis to conclude that the
Legislature intended “proceedings” to carry a different meaning
in section 2900.5, subdivision (b). The fact that multiple, open
criminal cases against a defendant are resolved at a single
hearing does not change the definition of proceedings or
otherwise render that term ambiguous in the context of
awarding custody credits pursuant to section 2900.5,
subdivision (b).
Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s argument that an
interpretation of “proceedings” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b)) as concerned
with individual cases would improperly elevate form over
substance. Specifically, defendant claims that “custody labels
should not dictate a defendant’s statutory right to presentence
10
The fact that the Legislature used the plural term
“proceedings” in section 2900.5, subdivision (b) does not alter
our interpretation here. As the Attorney General observes, in
the Penal Code, “[w]ords used in the singular number includes
the plural, and the plural the singular.” (§ 7, subd. (a).)
17
PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
credits, especially when they do not reflect reality.” Yet, as the
Attorney General observes, defendant’s “custody status in his
various cases was not ‘purely technical’ . . . but the product of
how the separate proceedings unfolded in light of the court’s
rulings and the parties’ litigating positions.” And in critiquing
one perceived technicality, defendant’s argument for receiving
additional credits relies wholly on the fact that, for whatever
reason, his cases happened to be sentenced at the same hearing.
More importantly, in interpreting section 2900.5,
subdivision (b), we are constrained by the actual words of the
statute. (See Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th
243, 253.) The text of this provision clearly contemplates that
custody credits be awarded in a particular case commensurate
with time spent in custody in that case. Even if this means that
mere “custody labels” control in a situation such as this, the
plain import of the text establishes that the Legislature
intended such a result.
In sum, we construe the word “proceedings,” as used in
section 2900.5, subdivision (b), as contemplating a single case —
meaning that custody credits under the statute can be awarded
in a particular case only when the custody time involved is
attributable to that case. In a matter like the one before us, in
which a defendant is being sentenced in multiple, unrelated
criminal cases at a single hearing, “credit for a single period in
presentence custody will be given against multiple concurrent
sentences imposed in multiple cases, so long as the presentence
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
custody is attributable to each of those cases.” (Cofer, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 343 (dis. opn. of Lie, J.).) 11
Although the clarity of the statutory language as a whole
makes it unnecessary to delve deeply into the legislative history,
the circumstances behind the addition of the term “proceedings”
to section 2900.5, subdivision (b) provide no reason to question
our interpretation of the statute.
When first enacted in 1971, section 2900.5, subdivision (b)
read, “For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only
where the custody to be credited is attributable to charges
arising from the same criminal act or acts for which the
defendant has been convicted.” (Stats. 1971, ch. 1732, § 2,
p. 3686.) Thus, at its inception, section 2900.5, subdivision (b)
tethered the applicable custody credit to a specific charge or
charges, so long as those charges were based on the same
criminal act or acts — making it even more limited than its
current form. Linking presentence custody to a certain charge
11
The “ ‘strict causation’ ” rule we have developed and
applied in other contexts (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1193)
does not prohibit such application of custody credits in this
situation. Here, even dealing with sentences involving multiple
proceedings, we are not concerned with the possibility of
awarding presentence credit to a sentence in one case that was
already applied to a sentence in an earlier, unrelated conviction.
(See Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 489.) Under the
circumstances, time spent in presentence custody in a particular
case is fairly deemed “attributable to” that case (§ 2900.5,
subd. (b)) even when it coincides with time spent in presentence
custody in another case. For example, despite defendant being
in custody in cases C, D, and E simultaneously, he is entitled to
credit for the presentence custody time served in each of those
cases so long as that time is attributable to the case giving rise
to the sentence.
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
(or even multiple charges) rather than the entire criminal case,
created a situation in which a defendant might not receive
custody credit in a proceeding in which the charge giving rise to
the custody was ultimately dismissed, and the defendant was
convicted of and sentenced on a different charge based on an
entirely different criminal act.
In 1976, the Legislature amended section 2900.5,
subdivision (b), to replace “charges arising from” with
“proceedings related to.” (See Stats. 1976, ch. 1045, § 2,
p. 4666.) This change was one of several made to the statute at
that time to clarify that time spent in certain nontraditional
custodial settings qualified for custody credits. The rationale
behind this amendment was described in one committee
analysis as follows: “The provisions in the bill eliminating the
limitation of creditable custody to that occurring between arrest
and sentencing, and allowing credit for custody attributable to
related proceedings, rather than related charges, are intended
to require the granting of credit for time spent in the California
Rehabilitation Center,” a civil commitment facility. (Sen. Com.
on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3653 (1975–1976 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Aug. 13, 1976, p. 5, underscoring omitted.)
Although the effect of the 1976 amendments may have been to
liberalize the charge-specific custody credit regime associated
with the earlier version of the statute, we find no persuasive
indication in the legislative history behind this change that in
revising the statute the Legislature intended to assign a
bespoke meaning to “proceedings” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b)) that
would equate that term with sentencing hearings even when
custody time is not naturally understood as “attributable to”
(ibid.) such hearings.
20
PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
D. Defendant’s Remaining Counterarguments Are
Unpersuasive
Defendant advances several other arguments in support
of his interpretation of section 2900.5, subdivision (b). We do
not regard any of these contentions as persuasive.
First, defendant maintains that our case law articulating
and applying the “strict causation” standard establishes that
section 2900.5 limits the award of custody credits only in
circumstances where a defendant seeks credit for time spent in
custody after a conviction and sentence. Emphasizing that he
just seeks presentence credits for time spent in custody before
he was sentenced for all of his pending cases at a single hearing,
defendant characterizes the Court of Appeal majority as having
engaged in a straightforward application of the strict causation
rule.
We disagree. Defendant’s argument is irreconcilable with
the plain language of section 2900.5, subdivision (b). As has
already been explained, the statute limits custody credits to
those earned in a specific case. On its face, this limitation
applies to credits earned through custody served prior to any
sentencing. In making his argument, defendant misreads our
case law. The fact that we have denied credits in a later resolved
case for time spent in custody following a conviction and
sentence in another matter, as in Rojas and Joyner, does not
mean that presentence credits are always available to a
defendant for time spent in custody prior to conviction and
sentence, without further consideration of the defendant’s
custodial status in a particular case.
Additionally, defendant provides no support for his
position other than language from a dissent in Joyner. (See
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 496 (dis. opn. of Broussard, J.)
[“the applicable statute and established case law demonstrate
that a defendant facing two unrelated charges is entitled to
pretrial custody credit on each charge until he starts serving a
term of imprisonment on one of them”].) “[B]ut dissenting
opinions are not binding precedent.” (People v. Lopez (2012)
55 Cal.4th 569, 585; see People v. Panighetti (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 978, 1001 [“Dissenting opinions, of course, are
not binding and have ‘ “no function except to express the private
view of the dissenter” ’ ”].) And in any event, the dissent does
not help defendant here. The dissent in Joyner based its
reasoning on the fact that the custody for which the defendant
sought credit was attributable, at least in part, to the charge
that was comprising his sentence. (Joyner, at p. 496
(dis. opn. of Broussard, J.) [“The defendant is nonetheless
entitled to dual credit for multiple restraints before he begins
serving a term; the defendant need only show that the charge as
to which he seeks credit was a basis, not necessarily the
exclusive basis, for the custody”].) The same cannot be said
here, where defendant seeks custody credit for presentence time
served in unrelated criminal cases and not the underlying case
for which he was sentenced.
Next, defendant cites isolated language in a footnote in
Bruner to suggest that “when concurrent sentences are imposed
at the same time, presentence custody is credited against all.”
(Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1192, fn. 9.) However, this
language must be read in context. There, we were discussing a
1978 amendment to section 2900.5. (See Stats. 1978, ch. 304,
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
§ 1, p. 632.) 12 The language on which defendant relies appears
in a sentence addressing the amendment’s effect on sentences
imposed in a single proceeding. But we also explained that
“there is no indication the 1978 amendment was concerned with
concurrent sentences for unrelated conduct imposed in multiple
proceedings.” (Bruner, at p. 1192, fn. 9.) The case before us
involves multiple proceedings; so, the discussion of the 1978
amendment in this footnote does not apply.
Defendant also invokes In re Sosa (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d
1002 (Sosa) and People v. Gonzalez (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 246
(Gonzalez) for the proposition that “trial courts often are urged
to move earned presentence credits from one case to another to
avoid dead time.” Neither case is helpful to defendant’s position
here.
In Sosa, the appellate court was not addressing an
argument to transfer presentence custody from one case to
another under section 2900.5, subdivision (b). Instead, the
court determined that the defendant’s presentence custody
credit applied against his parole term, not just his prison
sentence. (Sosa, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1005–1006.) And
although the court briefly discussed section 2900.5,
subdivisions (a) and (c), that discussion has no bearing on the
analysis of the issue before us. (See Sosa, at p. 1005.)
Gonzalez is no more instructive here than Sosa. In
Gonzalez, the defendant was in custody due to three cases, and
12
“The [1978] amendment added a second sentence to
section 2900.5, subdivision (b), providing that ‘[c]redit shall be
given only once for a single period of custody attributable to
multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.’ ”
(Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1192, fn. 9.)
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
his presentence credit exceeded the total sentence on his first
case. (Gonzalez, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 248–249, 251.)
The Court of Appeal held that the remaining credit for that
custody period was attributable to the defendant’s first two
cases and thus should be applied to the sentence in the
defendant’s second case. (Id. at p. 252.) The appellate court
emphasized that the case before it was like the one we addressed
in Marquez, supra, 30 Cal.4th 14. (See Gonzalez, at pp. 252–
254.) The court explained: “The credits . . . were only awarded
against a single case . . . . However, once the few days of custody
left to complete the sentence in [that case] were credited to
defendant, the remaining custodial time should have been
characterized as solely attributable to the [second] case and
allocated accordingly.” (Id. at p. 254.) The same is not true here.
It is undisputed that some of defendant’s presentence custody is
not attributable to all the cases for which he was ultimately
sentenced. Gonzalez does not support transferring credits to a
case in which the custody giving rise to those credits is not
attributable.
Defendant also echoes the Court of Appeal majority’s
assessment that its interpretation of section 2900.5,
subdivision (b) functions to ensure “equal treatment between
defendant and individuals who could afford bail on additional
cases.” (Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 341, italics added.)
That is to say, the Court of Appeal majority saw its
interpretation of subdivision (b) as benefitting defendants who
are charged in multiple criminal cases, especially those
defendants who commit additional crimes while out on bail.
But, as previously explained, there is no indication that the
Legislature intended subdivision (b) of section 2900.5 to apply
across multiple, separate criminal actions. (See Atiles, supra,
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
33 Cal.3d at p. 814 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [“I doubt that the
Legislature intended to bestow a special benefit on recidivists”].)
And, of course, defendant still received credit in the appropriate
cases for all of the time he spent in custody; he is simply not
receiving credit in all of his cases for the days he served in any
of them merely because he was sentenced in all of the cases at
the same hearing. The policy rationale given by the Court of
Appeal majority does not justify an additional award of credits
that would contravene the text and plain meaning of
section 2900.5, subdivision (b). (See Skidgel v. California
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 26; Torres
v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771, 782
[where “the application of firmly established rules of statutory
construction” establish a statute’s meaning, we “may not rest”
our decision “on the weighing and balancing of public policy
considerations”].)
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Kunath (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 906 (Kunath) is similarly misplaced. The
defendant in Kunath was charged in two separate cases; he
made bail in the first case but was remanded to custody in the
second. (Id. at p. 909.) The appellate court determined that the
defendant was entitled to full credit of all presentence custody
in both cases, which were sentenced at a single hearing. The
court explained, “Where . . . the defendant’s custody is solely
presentence on all charges and he is simultaneously sentenced
on all charges to concurrent terms, the policy behind
section 2900.5 applies. Presentence custody credits must apply
to all charges to equalize the total time in custody between those
who obtain presentence release and those who do not.” (Id. at
p. 911.)
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PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
The Kunath opinion does not clearly convey the
defendant’s custody status in each case at all relevant times; at
multiple junctures it refers to the defendant before the court as
seeking credit for time spent in custody in “both cases.”
(Kunath, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 909, 911.) The court’s
precise holding is therefore somewhat difficult to discern. To
the extent that Kunath can be read as holding that the
defendant before it was entitled to presentence custody credit in
a case to which that credit was not attributable, the court was
incorrect in light of the plain text of section 2900.5,
subdivision (b), as we have explained. Accordingly, we
disapprove People v. Kunath, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 906 to the
extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.
Finally, as the Attorney General observes, various
mechanisms exist through which a defendant may be able to
secure the application of custody credits to multiple separately
charged and simultaneously pending cases. For example, a
defendant may seek to have duplicative or pooled custody
credits included within any plea deal, or a defendant may
request that release in one case be revoked upon placement in
custody in another matter. Additionally, it may be the case that
a defendant, as Cofer asserts, could seek relief through a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing his counsel was
ineffective for not attempting to optimize the application of
custody credits under section 2900.5, subdivision (b).
In sum, we interpret the term “proceedings,” as used in
section 2900.5, subdivision (b), as synonymous with a criminal
case. As such, under subdivision (b), presentence credit that is
to be applied must be attributable to the criminal case in which
a defendant is being sentenced. This approach “produces fair
and reasonable results in a majority of cases, and . . . can be
26
PEOPLE v. COFER
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
readily understood and applied by trial courts.” (Joyner, supra,
48 Cal.3d at p. 495.) As applied here, the trial court correctly
interpreted the statute in awarding presentence custody credits
to defendant’s sentences; the Court of Appeal majority did not.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the
matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
CHOU, J. *
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
27
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Cofer
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 103 Cal.App.5th 333
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S286297
Date Filed: June 25, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Monterey
Judge: Stephanie E. Hulsey
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Mary Jo Strnad, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Ron Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General,
Michael R. Johnsen, Amit Kurlekar, Victoria Ratnikova, Seth K.
Schalit and Claudia H. Phillips, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Mary Jo Strnad
Attorney at Law
216-E Mount Hermon Road, Suite 252
Scotts Valley, CA 95066
(831) 471-8514
Claudia H. Phillips
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 510-3859