THIBEAULT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

CAROLINE M. THIBEAULT, )

Individually and in her capacity )

as legal guardian of Noah Thibeault )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) No. 2:26-cv-00287-JAW

)

OAK HILL CONDOMINIUMS, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

The occupant of a condominium unit, on her own behalf and on behalf of her

disabled adult son, seeks a temporary restraining order against the condominium

association and its board members for several alleged violations of the Fair Housing

Act, the Maine Human Rights Act, the Maine Condominium Act, and other state law

tort claims. The court concludes the requested temporary restraining order should

not issue at this time, because the occupant has not demonstrated irreparable harm

that, absent injunctive relief, cannot be adequately remedied by damages.

I. BACKGROUND1

A. Procedural History

On April 24, 2026, Caroline Thibeault, individually and in her capacity as legal

guardian of her son, Noah Thibeault (collectively, the Plaintiffs), filed a thirteen-

1 In ruling on the motion as quickly as possible, the Court has done its level best, but the parties

should appreciate “the temporal constraints under which the district court labored.” See Bl(a)ck Tea

Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2004).

count complaint in Sagadahoc County Superior Court against Oak Hill

Condominiums, as well as the Oak Hill Condominium Owners Association and

several members of its board, Roland Guerette, Peter Leone, Carla Chatterton, Paula

Mckenna, and Steven Lary (collectively, the Defendants). Notice of Removal, Attach,

1. Verified Compl. (ECF No. 1) (Compl.). The Plaintiffs allege the Defendants violated

the Fair Housing Act, the Maine Human Rights Act, the Maine Condominium Act,

breached their fiduciary duty to the Plaintiffs and other unit owners, and both

intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress upon the Plaintiffs. Id.

¶¶ 199-317. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and

punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 36-53.

That same day, the Plaintiffs also filed a motion requesting a temporary

restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction.2 Pls.’

Mot. for TRO and Prelim. and Permanent Inj. (ECF No. 7); Notice of Removal, Attach.

2, Pls.’ Mot. for TRO and Prelim. And Perm. Inj (Mot. for TRO). The Plaintiffs also

filed a motion for an expedited hearing. See Notice of Removal, Attach. 4, Pls.’ Mot.

for Expedited Hr’g for Pls.’ Mot. for TRO and Prelim. and Permanent Inj. (Mot. for

Hr’g). On May 19, 2026, the Defendants filed objections to both motions. Id., Attach.

10, Defs.’ Joint Obj. to Mot. for TRO, and Prelim. and Permanent Inj. (Defs.’ Opp’n);

id., Attach. 11, Defs.’ Joint Obj. to Pls.’ Mot. for Expedited Hr’g (Obj. to Hr’g).

2 As the title of this order confirms, the Court addresses only the Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary

restraining order, not their motion for preliminary or permanent injunction.

On May 29, 2026, the Defendants removed this action to federal court. Notice

of Removal. On June 19, 2026, the Plaintiffs filed their reply briefs in support of their

motions for a TRO and hearing. Pls.’ Reply to Defs.’ Joint Obj. to Pls.’ Mot. for TRO

and Inj. Relief (ECF No. 9) (Pls.’ Reply); Pls.’ Reply to Defs.’ Joint Obj. to Pls.’ Mot. for

Expedited Hr’g on Pls.’ Mot. for TRO and Inj. Relief (ECF No. 10) (Pls.’ Hr’g Reply).

B. Factual Background3

This case arises from a dispute over the interpretation of the phrase

“commercial activity” under a condominium community’s rules. The Plaintiffs,

Caroline Thibeault and her son Noah Thibeault, are residents of Oak Hill

Condominiums in Topsham, Maine. Ms. Thibeault is the sole caregiver and legal

guardian of Noah, who is severely disabled and requires continuous supervision and

care. Seeking to find an arrangement that would allow Ms. Thibeault to maintain

employment as a licensed hairstylist while providing continuous care for Noah, Ms.

Thibeault applied for a reasonable accommodation to provide limited in-home

hairstyling services from her Oak Hill condo. Despite confirmation from the Oak Hill

property manager and local compliance officer and Ms. Thibeault’s belief that her

proposed hairstyling service complied with community rules, the Oak Hill

Condominium Owners Association Board denied her request for a reasonable

accommodation. The Plaintiffs claim the board’s failure to grant a reasonable

accommodation, including their refusal to engage in a good-faith interactive process,

3 For the purposes of the requested TRO, the Court reviews the relevant facts as pleaded in the

verified complaint and the declarations submitted by the parties, which the Court takes as true at this

stage of the proceeding.

violates state and federal law. The Plaintiffs further allege the Defendants retaliated

against the Plaintiffs because of Ms. Thibeault’s request for a reasonable

accommodation through a pattern of selective enforcement and targeted amendment

of community rules, harassment, surveillance, escalating financial penalties, and

initiating state foreclosure proceedings in an effort to dissuade the Plaintiffs from

exercising their civil rights.

1. The Relevant Parties and the Property

Defendants Oak Hill Condominiums and Oak Hill Condominium Owners

Association (collectively, Oak Hill) are a non-profit corporation and condominium unit

owners association established under Maine law. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Defendants Roland

Guerette, Peter Leone, Charla Chatterton, Paula McKenna, and Steven Lary are

residents of Oak Hill and members of the Oak Hill Condominium Owners

Association’s Board (the Board). Id. ¶¶ 6-10.

Plaintiff Caroline Thibeault is the legal occupant of an Oak Hill condominium

unit located at 17 Ruby Lane, Unit 1 Topsham, Maine 04086 (the Property). Id. ¶ 1.

She is a licensed hairstylist, which is her primary occupation and sole source of

income. Id. ¶ 22. In the past, she had rented a chair or booth at a nearby salon but

later began operating her hairstyling business from the Property. Id. ¶ 26. She is

also the mother and legal guardian to her adult son, Noah Thibeault, who is severely

disabled. Id. ¶ 2.

Noah Thibeault, who is twenty-five years old, is diagnosed with severe autism

spectrum disorder and anxiety, which cause him significant emotional dysregulation,

as well as other behavioral challenges, and impair his ability to communicate. Id.

¶ 17. Noah requires 24-hour care and supervision, which Ms. Thibeault, as Noah’s

sole caregiver, provides. Id. ¶ 18.

Ms. Thibeault’s mother, Diane Marchetti, is the record owner of the Property.

Ms. Marchetti is not a party in this case. In February 2025, Ms. Marchetti suffered

a medical event that required her to transition from the Property to an assisted living

facility, The Highlands, in Topsham, Maine. Id. ¶¶ 3, 20. Although they are not

tenants subject to a lease, since Ms. Marchetti’s transition to The Highlands, Ms.

Thibeault and Noah continue to reside at the Property and Ms. Thibeault has

undertaken all maintenance and financial obligations at the Property. Id. ¶ 21.

2. Caroline Thibeault’s Hairstyle Service and Oak Hill

Community Rules

Ms. Thibeault is a licensed hairstylist and relies on her occupation as her sole

source of income. Id. ¶ 22. In the past, Ms. Thibeault was able to work as a hairstylist

while simultaneously providing care and supervision for Noah. Id. ¶¶ 22-31. She

would rent a chair or booth at local salon and bring Noah with her to work. Id. ¶¶ 26-

28. However, disruption from the COVID-19 pandemic and other circumstances out

of her control caused Ms. Thibeault repeatedly to relocate her workspace. Id. ¶ 26.

The frequent change in work environments aggravated Noah’s emotional

dysregulation, anxiety, and behavioral problems. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. On several occasions,

Noah’s behavioral episodes disrupted the workspace and made others, including

customers, uncomfortable. Id. ¶ 29. After consulting Noah’s medical providers, Ms.

Thibeault began exploring alternative work arrangements that would provide Noah

with the stability and routine his disability required while maintaining her ability to

earn a living. Id. ¶¶ 28-31.

At that time, in early 2023, Oak Hill’s rules permitted commercial activities

within a condominium unit under certain conditions. Id. ¶¶ 32-34. Under Rule 19,

adopted in 2021, Oak Hill permitted commercial activities within units, so long as

the activity was not externally detectable, complied with zoning laws, did not create

undue traffic, and remained consistent with the residential character of the

community. Id. ¶¶ 33-34; id., Attach. 2, 2023 Rules. Many Oak Hill residents

operated similar commercial activities from their respective units, including a

quilting business, pet care services, interior and exterior contracting work, the

manufacture and sale of custom bicycle racks, counseling services, seamstress

services, catering, and stained-glass sales. Id. ¶ 35-36.

Accordingly, in spring 2023, Ms. Thibeault began operating a limited

hairstyling service from the Property. Id. ¶¶ 31, 37-40. She maintains that her

hairstyling service complied with the requirements of Rule 19. Id. ¶¶ 40-50.

Although she received confirmation from both Oak Hill’s Property Manager that she

complied with Rule 19 and the Topsham Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) that her

activity qualified as a permissible “minor home occupation” under applicable zoning

law, Ms. Thibeault received conflicting communication from the Board about her

compliance. Id. ¶¶ 41-68. Believing her conduct was permissible under community

rules, Ms. Thibeault submitted to the Board a request to confirm her compliance,

which she alleges the Board scrutinized more closely than other similar requests,

including by directing other residents to record visitors coming to and from the

Property. Id. ¶¶ 69-78.

3. The Board Determines Caroline Thibeault’s Hairstyling

Service Does Not Comply with Community Rules

After receiving Ms. Thibeault’s request to confirm compliance, the Board

consulted legal counsel. Id. ¶¶ 57-58. In correspondence with counsel, the Board

noted that although the Oak Hill Declaration prohibits “commercial activity,” the

Board had previously adopted Rule 19 to permit such activities under defined

conditions. Id. ¶ 59. Counsel advised that, while the Declaration controls over any

inconsistent rules, the term “commercial activity” is not defined in the Declaration or

Oak Hill’s rules and therefore required an analysis of whether Ms. Thibeault’s use

was incidental and subordinate to residential use, consistent with applicable zoning

law, the nature of the Property’s primary use, and in consideration of comparable

uses by neighboring units. Id. ¶¶ 60-65. Counsel further recommended consulting

with the Topsham CEO but did not inform the Board that Ms. Thibeault had already

received confirmation from the CEO that her use was permissible. Id. ¶¶ 66-67.

According to the Plaintiffs, the Board fired Counsel shortly thereafter. Id. ¶ 68. In

addition, the Topsham CEO confirmed that he had advised the Board directly that

Ms. Thibeault’s hairstyle service complied with local zoning law. Id. ¶ 69; id., Attach.

6, CEO Email.

On June 21, 2023, the Board voted to table Ms. Thibeault’s request for

confirmation of compliance and instead sought additional community input. Id.

¶¶ 70-71. The Plaintiffs report a mixed response from the Oak Hill community. Some

residents expressed support for the Plaintiffs, acknowledging that other residents

engaged in similar commercial activities, raised concerns regarding the lack of

services available for individuals with disabilities, and called for consistent

enforcement of the community rules. Id. ¶¶ 72-73. Around this time, Ms. Thibeault

became aware of statements made by another resident in a public restaurant near

Oak Hill, disparaging her and Noah and suggesting that the Board had already

decided against her and had encouraged surveillance of her home by other residents.

Id. ¶¶ 74-75. Visitors to the Plaintiffs’ home also observed individuals photographing

vehicles near the Property. Id. ¶¶ 77-78. The Plaintiffs claim this level of scrutiny

from the Board was unique to the Plaintiffs and that the Board had never subjected

other residents to surveillance. Id.

On July 19, 2023, the Board determined Ms. Thibeault’s hairstyle service was

not permitted by community rules. Id. ¶ 79. The Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Thibeault

was not given an opportunity to be heard directly by the Board prior to its

determination. Id. ¶ 80. The Plaintiffs also maintain that her use complied with

Rule 19 and was consistent with the Board’s continued allowance of other residents’

similar activities. Id. ¶ 80. The Plaintiffs further claim that the Board’s decision

failed to acknowledge the purpose for the requested activity was to care for Noah,

who is disabled, address their former counsel’s guidance that the Oak Hill

Declaration’s prohibition of “commercial activity” was ambiguous, that Rule 19 may

require clarification, or that they consult the Topsham CEO on applicable zoning law.

Id. ¶¶ 81-83. According to the Plaintiffs, the Board did not amend Rule 19 or

otherwise clarify the definition of “commercial activity” before determining her use

was a violation. Id. ¶ 84.

4. Ms. Thibeault’s Reasonable Accommodation Requests and

the Defendants’ Allegedly Retaliatory Conduct

Following the Board’s determination that Ms. Thibeault’s use violated

community rules, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendants engaged in a pattern of

harassment and retaliation in an attempt to force the Plaintiffs out of Oak Hill. On

August 11, 2023, the Board informed Ms. Thibeault that it had received complaints

from other community members about her hairstyle services but refused to provide

any information about those complaints when Ms. Thibeault asked for more

information. Id. ¶¶ 85-86. On August 17, 2023, the Board sent Ms. Thibeault an

email asking “approximately how many different service providers come each day” to

assist Noah, suggesting that the Board was monitoring the number of visitors to the

Property. Id. ¶ 87. The email also stated it would be a violation of the Oak Hill

Declaration if Ms. Thibeault had received compensation for her hairstyling services.

Id. ¶ 90. On August 19, 2023, the Board sent a notice to Ms. Marchetti, detailing the

alleged violations of Oak Hill rules. Id. ¶ 93. On September 17, 2023, despite having

already determined Ms. Thibeault’s hairstyling service violated Oak Hill rules, the

Board held another meeting about the dispute. Id. ¶ 94.

On October 18, 2023, the Board revised Rule 19 “in a manner that specifically

targeted [Ms. Thibeault’s] activities and served to reinforce its prior determination

that she was in violation of” community rules. Id. ¶¶ 101-103. According to Ms.

Thibeault, the Board’s amendment to Rule 19 violated its own Bylaws. Id. ¶¶ 97-98,

101-102. Ms. Thibeault further alleges the Board removed her from the Oak Hill’s

residents’ email list to prevent her from participating. Id. ¶ 99. She further alleges

the Board revoked her access to the Oak Hill payment portal, blocking her from

paying her monthly HOA fees and common expenses. Id. ¶ 100.

On October 30, 2023, citing Noah’s disability, Ms. Thibeault submitted a

formal request for reasonable accommodation under the Maine Human Rights Act

(MHRA) and the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Id. ¶ 117. However, before the Board

responded to her request, on December 4, 2023, the Board issued a notice of violation

to Ms. Marchetti, explaining that it would begin assessing a $75 daily fine continued

Rule 19 violations. Id. ¶ 128. The notice also incorrectly claimed that Ms. Thibeault

operated her hairstyle services without a license, despite the fact that she maintained

a valid license for her services. Id. ¶ 129. Between December 14, 2023 and January

18, 2024, several Oak Hill residents filed complaints to the Maine Cosmetology

Board, which the Plaintiffs allege, given the several complaints’ timing and near

identical language, the Board coordinated. Id. ¶¶ 130-131. Around the same time,

the Board also sent a complaint to Ms. Thibeault’s mortgage lender, Bath Savings

Bank, incorrectly asserting Ms. Thibeault operated her hairstyling service without a

license. Id. ¶ 134.

On January 12, 2024, the Board denied Ms. Thibeault’s reasonable

accommodation request. Id. ¶ 135. In denying her response, the Board stated that

“there is no suggestion . . . that Ms. Thibeault is an individual with a physical or

mental disability. Likewise, there is no allegation that granting Ms. Thibeault’s

request would afford her an equal opportunity to use/enjoy her housing that she is

currently not receiving on account of a disability she has.” Id. ¶ 136. Furthermore,

the Board explained that permitting Ms. Thibeault’s requested use would be a

“fundamental alteration to the nature of the housing,” which is impermissible “absent

a revision to the Declaration by unanimous vote of the owners.” Id. ¶ 139. The

Board’s response did not acknowledge Noah’s disability, which was known to the

Board. Id. ¶¶ 137-138.

Throughout 2024, Ms. Thibeault explored alternative arrangements for Noah’s

care to no avail. Id. ¶ 148. Some time that year, Noah was involved in a car accident

that worsened his anxiety and behavioral challenges. Id. ¶ 146. He was also

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. The Board continued to assess

Ms. Thibeault a daily penalty, which Ms. Thibeault deferred payment on while she

contested the validity of her hairstyling service. Id. ¶ 145.

On November 22, 2024, Oak Hill issued a demand letter to Ms. Thibeault and

Ms. Marchetti, asserting that they owed $54,413.26 for common charges and

assessments. Id. ¶ 150. Ms. Thibeault claims the Board altered the accounting

method for accruing daily penalties to manufacture an artificial delinquency on the

Property’s fees in order to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 151-154. On

January 22, 2025, Oak Hill filed a foreclosure complaint against Ms. Marchetti, as

the Property owner, in Sagadahoc County Superior Court, docket number RE-25-01.

Id. ¶ 157; id., Attach. 16, Foreclosure Compl. The Plaintiffs sought unsuccessfully to

intervene in the state foreclosure action. See Oak Hill Condos. v. Diane Marchetti,

2026 ME 31, 354 A.3d 1128 (affirming trial court’s denial of the Plaintiffs’ motion to

intervene).

On April 30, 2025, the Plaintiffs submitted a second reasonable

accommodation request to the Board, outlining Noah’s increased needs following his

car accident and Ms. Thibeault’s need as his primary caregiver and legal guardian to

provide him with a stable home environment while allowing her to make a living.

Compl. ¶¶ 161-162. This time, Oak Hill quickly denied her request, explaining that

Ms. Thibeault could “rent a commercial space and take her son to work with her.” Id.

¶ 163-164.

5. The Plaintiffs File a Maine Human Rights Commission

Complaint

On May 28, 2025, Ms. Thibeault filed a complaint with the Maine Human

Rights Commission (MHRC), asserting Oak Hill had engaged in housing

discrimination based on Noah’s disability. Id. ¶ 168. An MHRC investigator

conducted a preliminary investigation and, on September 9, 2025, issued a report

concluding “[t]here are Reasonable Grounds to believe that Oak Hill Condominiums

Association discriminated against [Ms. Thibeault] based on disability.” Id. ¶¶ 169-

176; id., Attach. 19, MHRC Investigator’s Report at 5. Specifically, the investigator

found:

[Ms. Thibeault] established her prima-facie case. [Noah] comes within

the protections of the MHRA as a person with disabilities, as does [Ms.

Thibeault] given her association with a disabled person, see 5 M.R.S.

§ 4553(1-D). [Oak Hill] knew of [Noah’s] disabilities. [Ms. Thibeault]

requested authorization to offer limited hair stylist services from her

home, and subsequently, a halt to foreclosure proceedings and the

elimination of accumulated fees and late charges due to what [Oak Hill]

viewed as continued rule violations. [Ms. Thibeault and Noah] needed

the requested accommodation because [Ms. Thibeault] must

simultaneously work and care for [Noah], and she is unable to bring

[Noah] to an off-Premises work location. Given the limited scope of [Ms.

Thibeault’s] business activity, the requested accommodation was

reasonable on its face, and [Oak Hill] rejected [Ms. Thibeault’s]

accommodation requests.

[Oak Hill] failed to establish a defense to [Ms. Thibeault’s] reasonable

accommodation request by showing the request was unreasonable. [Ms.

Thibeault’s] business activity may have caused minor annoyance and

inconvenience (singular instances of a client parking in a neighboring

driveway and knocking on a door, a slight increase in traffic, etc.) yet, it

did not pose an undue burden in that it was not too expensive, was not

an undue administrative burden, and was not unreasonable for some

other reason. [Oak Hill’s] offers to aid [Ms. Thibeault] in relocating her

business off-Premises were futile as the very reason for the

accommodation request was to keep [Noah] with [her], at home, while

she worked. [Oak Hill] failed to engage in an informal, interactive

process to determine whether an appropriate, feasible accommodation

existed. Instead of engaging in good faith dialogue with [Ms. Thibeault],

[Oak Hill] amended its rule to the detriment of [Ms. Thibeault] and

[Noah].

MHRC Investigator’s Report at 4-5.

On October 27, 2025, the MHRC held a public hearing on the Investigator’s

report. Compl. ¶ 177. During the hearing, the MHRC commissioners noted that Oak

Hill ignored Ms. Thibeault’s reasonable accommodation requests on behalf of her son

and that the timing and severity of the financial penalties against Ms. Thibeault and

Ms. Marchetti strongly suggested discriminatory, punitive, and retaliatory intent

rather than legitimate enforcement of community rules. Id. ¶ 179. The MHRC

commissioners further observed that Oak Hill’s position would not likely withstand

judicial scrutiny. Id. ¶ 180. The MHRC Commissioner voted unanimously “to find

there are Reasonable Grounds to believe that Oak Hill Condominiums

discriminated against Caroline Thibeault based on disability.” Id., Attach. 20, MHRC

Comm’n Meeting Mins. at 3 (emphasis in original). The MHRC did not enter into a

conciliation agreement with the Plaintiffs within the ninety period as provided by

Maine law. Compl. ¶ 182.

In the months that followed, the Plaintiffs report that the Defendants continue

to harass, discriminate, retaliate, and surveil them and the Property, including

directing residents to take pictures of the Property and threatening to issue

additional violations for trivial matters, such as the wattage of a lightbulb outside

the unit and ordering Ms. Thibeault to take down a set of string lights. Id. ¶ 187.

Ms. Thibeault alleges that she has suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional

distress, including anxiety, fear, and humiliation as a result of the Defendants’

pattern of discriminatory, harassing, and retaliatory conduct. Id. ¶¶ 194-197.

6. The Plaintiffs’ Complaint

The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants’ failure to grant a reasonable

accommodation necessary to permit Ms. Thibeault to conduct limited in-home

hairstyling services as a means of maintaining employment while providing

continuous care for Noah and the Defendants’ pattern of selective enforcement,

refusal to engage in a good faith interactive process, retaliation, harassment,

surveillance, and escalating financial penalties in response to Ms. Thibeault’s request

for a reasonable accommodation violate state and federal law. Id. ¶¶ 199-317.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ conduct violates the MHRA,

the FHA, and the Maine Condominium Act (MCA) (Counts II-IX). Id. ¶¶ 223-303.

The Plaintiffs also allege the Defendants’ conduct constitutes both intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress against Ms. Thibeault (Counts X-XI). Id.

¶¶ 304-317. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and

punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs.4 Id. at 36-53.

II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

A. The Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order

The Plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO requests four forms of relief from the Court.

First, “a reasonable accommodation permitting Plaintiff to provide limited hair

services from [the Property] subject to the reasonable conditions” provided in their

motion. Mot. for TRO at 1. Second, “an order directing Defendants to cease all

surveillance, discrimination, harassment, and retaliatory conduct toward Plaintiff

and her son.” Id. Third, the Plaintiffs ask that the Court dismiss with prejudice the

state foreclosure action against Ms. Marchetti. Id. at 1-2. Finally, the Plaintiffs

request “discharge of any and all violations and related fees, fines, penalties, and/or

liens asserted by Defendants against Plaintiffs and the Property.” Id. at 2.

The Plaintiffs maintain they have met their burden to show that the factors

for issuing a TRO weigh in their favor. They argue they have demonstrated a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims for disability

discrimination in housing, retaliation for protected conduct, interference with civil

rights, aiding and abetting unlawful discrimination, and related causes of action

4 Counts I, XII, XIII, although framed as causes of action, are requests for specific relief: Count

I seeks declaratory relief and Counts XII and XIII seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief,

respectively. Compl. ¶¶ 199-222, 318-327.

arising under the MCA.5 Id. at 14-22. Next, the Plaintiffs insist they have

demonstrated irreparable harm under the law given the combination of the Plaintiffs’

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims and that the

Defendants’ state foreclosure action against the Property creates a direct and

imminent threat of loss to the Plaintiffs. Id. at 22-24. The Plaintiffs argue the

balance of harms weigh in favor of injunctive relief, as it would preserve the status

quo, protect Ms. Thibeault from continued accrual of fines while she maintains her

hairstyle business and provides for Noah, and would not impose an undue burden on

the Defendants. Id. at 24-26. Finally, the Plaintiffs maintain the public interest

favors their requested TRO because enforcement and protection of civil rights serve

a public purpose beyond the Plaintiffs’ individual interests. Id. at 26-27. Should the

Court issue the requested relief, the Plaintiffs urge the Court to waive any bond

requirement. Id. at 27-28.

B. The Defendants’ Opposition

The Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs’ motion. First, the Defendants argue that

if the Plaintiffs are correct that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims,

then they are also likely to succeed in defending the state foreclosure action,

indicating that injunctive relief is therefore unwarranted. Defs.’ Opp’n ¶ 1. The

Defendants further argue that the Plaintiffs have not shown irreparable harm

because the procedural posture of the foreclosure action does not present an imminent

threat to the Plaintiffs losing their home. Id. ¶ 2. Next, the Defendants dispute that

5 The Plaintiffs do not argue the likelihood of success on their state tort law claims.

the balance of harm weighs in the Plaintiffs’ favor, explaining that Ms. Thibeault

continues to operate her hairstyling service from the Property and has not paid any

of the accrued fines while she litigates her claims. Id. ¶ 3. Similarly, the Defendants

argue that public policy does not favor the requested injunction, because Ms.

Thibeault may continue to operate the service pending resolution of her claims and

the state foreclosure action. Id. ¶ 4.

C. The Plaintiffs’ Reply

In reply, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants’ opposition does not

meaningfully dispute their right to interim relief. Pls.’ Reply at 2. The Plaintiffs go

on to reiterate their motion’s arguments supporting their requested injunction. Id.

at 2-5.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not

be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation omitted). The standard for

issuing a temporary restraining order is the same as for a preliminary injunction.

See Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, Inc., 564

F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D. Me. 2008). The movant must show “(1) a substantial likelihood

of success on the merits, (2) a significant risk of irreparable harm if the injunction is

withheld, (3) a favorable balance of hardships, and (4) a fit (or lack of friction) between

the injunction and the public interest.” NuVasive, Inc. v. Day, 954 F.3d 439, 443 (1st

Cir. 2020) (quoting Nieves-Márquez v. P.R., 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003)). “The

First two factors are the most important.” Together Emps. v. Mass Gen. Brigham,

Inc., 19 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)).

Trial courts enjoy wide discretion in making judgments regarding the

appropriateness of preliminary injunctive relief. Charlesbank Equity Fund II v.

Blinds to Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir. 2004).

IV. DISCUSSION

Because a preliminary injunction preserves the Court’s ability to grant final

relief, the movant must show irreparable harm that, in the absence of a preliminary

injunction, would “impair the court’s ability to grant an effective remedy” following a

decision on the merits. See 11A WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§ 2948.1 (3d ed. 2021). In the context of a TRO, an irreparable injury is one which

“cannot adequately be compensated for either by a later-issued permanent injunction,

after a full adjudication on the merits, or by a later-issued damages remedy.” Rio

Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 76 (1st Cir. 2005); accord Mass

Gen. Brigham, Inc., 19 F.4th at 7-8 (“[A]dequate legal remedies foreclose injunctive

relief . . . .”) (citation omitted).

Although acknowledging that they seek monetary relief for their claims, the

Plaintiffs argue the alleged harms caused by the Defendants “cannot be fully

remedied by money alone.” Mot. for TRO at 23. As the Plaintiffs explain

Defendants’ initiation and continued pursuit of foreclosure proceedings

creates a direct and imminent threat of loss of Plaintiffs’ home, resulting

in the potential displacement of Plaintiff and her disabled son and the

permanent deprivation of housing rights that cannot be restored

through monetary damages . . . In particular, the denial of a reasonable

accommodation necessary to allow Plaintiff to provide continuous care

for her disabled son while maintaining her livelihood results in ongoing

and compounding harm that directly impacts Plaintiffs’ ability to

remain in their home and for Plaintiff to fulfill her caregiving

responsibilities. The foreclosure process and escalating fines do not

merely impose financial consequences, but operate as enforcement

mechanisms that threaten the forced loss of Plaintiffs’ residence, a harm

that is by its nature irreparable once carried out.

Id. Given the state foreclosure proceedings, combined with “the high likelihood of

[their] success on the merits,” including the MHRC’s findings, the Plaintiffs insist

they have satisfied the irreparable harm requirement. Id. at 22-24.

Although the Plaintiffs are correct to note “that when the likelihood of success

on the merits is great, a movant can show somewhat less in the way of irreparable

harm and still garner preliminary injunctive relief,” EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94

F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted), the Court cannot conclude that they

have met their burden to show “a substantial injury that is not accurately measurable

or adequately compensable by money damages,” Ross-Simon of Warwick, Inc. v.

Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1996), “grounded on something more than

conjecture, surmise, or [their] unsubstantiated fears of what the future may have in

store.” Charlesbank Equity Fund II, 370 F.3d at 162. As the Plaintiffs are careful to

argue, the only aspect of their requested injunction that legal remedies arguably

cannot adequately compensate relates to the pending state foreclosure action.

However, as the Defendants point out, those proceedings remain pending and the

trial court has not issued judgment. The Plaintiffs’ claim of irreparable harm arising

from the state foreclosure action is therefore speculative.

Moreover, the interest at stake in the state foreclosure action concerns Ms.

Marchetti’s ownership of the Property and the Plaintiffs, as possessory occupants of

the Property, are not parties to that action. Nor does the state foreclosure action

impede the Plaintiffs’ ability to pursue the claims alleged in their complaint, as

evidenced by the proceedings before the MHRC. As the Supreme Judicial Court of

Maine explained in its opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of the Plaintiffs’

motion to intervene in the state foreclosure action, the Plaintiffs’ purely possessory

interest as an occupant “would be a stake in any potential eviction proceeding,” not

the underlying foreclosure action against Ms. Marchetti. See Oak Hill Condos. v.

Diane Marchetti, et al., 2026 ME 31, ¶ 10, 354 A.3d 1128. Again, the Plaintiffs have

not shown irreparable harm because eviction proceedings have not commenced and

this Court will not make a prediction about if and when those proceedings are likely

to commence.

Furthermore, it seems unlikely that this Court has authority to enjoin the state

foreclosure action as the Plaintiffs request. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal

courts from enjoining state court proceedings except “as expressly authorized by Act

of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its

judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. “This prohibition against enjoining proceedings in a

state court applies to state foreclosure proceedings.” Murphy v. Bank of America,

N.A., No. 12-11034-FDS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144417, at *8 (D. Mass. Oct. 5, 2012)

(first citing Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1990); and then

citing Ungar v. Mandell, 471 F.2d 1163 (2d Cir. 1972)). Although the Plaintiffs’

motion and the Defendants’ opposition were filed in state court before the matter was

removed to federal court, the Plaintiffs’ reply—filed after removal—did not address

this issue.6

Finally, the Plaintiffs claims that without the requested injunction, Ms.

Thibeault cannot make a living and support Noah is unsupported by the limited

record before the Court. Based on the party’s briefing, it is clear Ms. Thibeault

continues to operate her hairstyling service from the Property and that she has not

paid the fines accrued. In their opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion for an expedited

hearing, the Defendants explain that they do not seek to enjoin Ms. Thibeault’s

continued operation of her hairstyling service as the litigation proceeds, “preferring

instead that the Court make a reasoned decision after considering all the facts.” Obj.

to Hr’g ¶ 1. The Plaintiffs did not meaningfully respond to the Defendants’

representation. Additionally, the Plaintiffs’ own briefing indicates that Ms. Thibeault

continues to operate her hairstyling service.

The Court therefore cannot conclude that the Plaintiffs have met their burden

to show irreparable harm in the absence of their requested injunction. The Plaintiffs’

several claims all appear susceptible to remedy by a damages award, the state

foreclosure action does not present an immediate threat of substantial injury to the

6 Similarly, because an injunction must “state its terms specifically” and “describe in reasonable

detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required,” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(B)-(C), the scope of the

Plaintiffs’ request for the Court to order the Defendants “to cease all surveillance, discrimination,

harassment, and retaliatory conduct toward Plaintiff and her son,” Mot. for TRO at 1, appears

impermissibly broad and vague, and raises fundamental issues of enforceability. This complexity is

further compounded by the complaint’s allegation that at least some of the retaliatory conduct, albeit

allegedly at the direction of the Defendants, was committed by other residents, some known but others

known to the Plaintiffs, who are not parties in this action. Again, the Court recognizes the Plaintiffs

filed their motion while the matter was still in state court, and thus possibly subject to a different

state law standard, but the Plaintiffs should have anticipated the applicable federal standard in their

reply or sought leave to amend their motion after removal.

Plaintiffs (and appears to require relief the Court could not order in any event), and

the limited record before the Court shows that Ms. Thibeault has been able to

continue operating her hairstyle service while she pursues her claims.

Accordingly, the Court need not address the remaining factors governing the

issuance of a TRO, because the Plaintiffs have not shown the requisite threat of

irreparable injury. Mass Gen. Brigham, Inc., 19 F.4th at 7-8 (failure to show

irreparable harm ends the Court’s inquiry); Charlesbank Equity Fund II, 370 F.3d at

162 (irreparable harm is “a necessary threshold showing for an award of preliminary

injunctive relief”).

However, in concluding that the Plaintiffs have not met their burden to obtain

their requested TRO, the Court emphasizes that it is not weighing whether the

Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their claims. Esso Standard Oil, Co.

(P.R.) v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[T]he party seeking the

preliminary injunction bears the burden of demonstrating that these four factors

weigh in its favor”); Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 8-9

(1st Cir. 2012) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that

is never awarded as of right”). Despite the “serious legal issues” alleged, because the

Plaintiffs have not shown the requisite irreparable harm, “they [have] failed to

sustain their burden to demonstrate” that their requested TRO should issue at this

time. We the People PAC v. Bellows, 512 F. Supp. 3d 74, 77 (D. Me. 2021).

V. CONCLUSION

The Court therefore DENIES the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (ECF No. 7), to the extent the

Plaintiffs request a temporary restraining order, and Motion for Expedited Hearing

for Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and

Permanent Injunction (ECF No. 1-4).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 24th day of June, 2026