GREEN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ISAIAH GREEN, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:26CV450

)

LEAH GARLAND, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the Court for review of subject matter

jurisdiction. (See Text Order dated May 15, 2026 (directing “Clerk

to refrain from issuance of summons pending review of [Plaintiff’s]

Complaint to determine if the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over this action”).) Because Plaintiff has not

established a basis for this Court’s exercise of subject matter

jurisdiction, the Court should dismiss this action.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff instituted this action by paying the filing fee (see

Receipt of Funds dated May 14, 2026) and filing the Complaint

(Docket Entry 1). The Complaint names one Defendant, Leah Garland,

a “Deputy Clerk” of this Court. (Id. at 2.)1 Despite the

admonition in the form portion of the Complaint that “[f]ederal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” (id. at 3; see also id.

1 Quotations from Plaintiff’s filings apply standard

capitalization conventions.

(explaining that, “[g]enerally, only two types of cases can be

heard in federal court: cases involving a federal question and

cases involving diversity of citizenship of the parties”)),

Plaintiff did not identify “the basis for federal court

jurisdiction” (id.). (See id.; see also id. at 1-2 (listing

addresses for both Plaintiff and Deputy Clerk Garland in North

Carolina); Docket Entry 2 at 1 (marking box denominating “U.S.

Government” as “Defendant” in section of Civil Cover Sheet

soliciting “Basis of Jurisdiction” and checking boxes denominating

Plaintiff and Deputy Clerk Garland as “Citizen of This State” in

section of Civil Cover Sheet soliciting “Citizenship of Principal

Parties” (all-caps, bold, and enlarged font omitted)).)

In the space designated within the Complaint for Plaintiff to

“[w]rite a short and plain statement of [his] claim” (Docket Entry

1 at 4), he wrote:

This Plaintiff was denied the U.S. constitutional right

to sign an appeal motion to the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court

of Appeals for a plaintiff pro se litigant, who this

Plaintiff pro se litigant was given the authority to sign

on her behalf the legal court motion as her legal-lawful

aid under the Sixth Article of the United States

Constitution – being denied this legal lawful right by

the white female court clerk at the United States Fed.

Courthouse (at Greensboro, N.C. 5/12/2026).

(Id.; see also id. (“requesting a 7.5 million dollar settlement by

this court actor, who wilful [sic] and intentional [sic]

overstepped her limited powers of authority, acting on the behalf

of a court which have [sic] on record the continous [sic] denial of

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circumventing the United States constitutional laws that deny black

and brown skin color taxpaying citizens to exercise the

constitutional law rights as provided by the United States ratified

laws by the United States Congress that are given by law to be

exercised by taxpaying citizens of all ethnic group members”);

Docket Entry 2 at 1 (checking box designating “Nature of Suit” as

“Other Civil Rights,” citing (as basis for “Cause of Action”)

“Article VI – United States Constitution” (all-caps, bold, and

enlarged font omitted)).)

The Complaint thus seeks to hold Deputy Clerk Garland liable

for damages under the Constitution for her enforcement of the

requirement that, in this Court (like all other United States

District Courts), “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other

paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the

attorney’s name – or by a party personally if the party is

unrepresented,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (emphasis added); see also

M.D.N.C. LR 11.1(a) (“Any individual who is representing himself or

herself without an attorney (pro se) must appear personally when

required and may not delegate that duty to any other individual,

including husband or wife, or any other pro se party. Any

individual representing himself or herself without an attorney is

bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, this

Court’s Local Rules, and all other applicable law.” (italics

omitted)).

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DISCUSSION

“The [C]lourt must determine whether it has subject matter

jurisdiction over [this] action before proceeding any further.”

Coley _v. United States Postal Serv., No. 1:11CV986, 2013 WL

2474357, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 10, 2013) (unpublished) (Schroeder,

J.). In that regard, “[a] federal court has an independent

obligation to assess its subject-matter jurisdiction, and it will

raise a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion.”

Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d

474, 480 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).° Furthermore,

“[t]he burden is on the party asserting the jurisdiction of the

[C]ourt to show that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist.” Bowman v.

White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir. 1968).

Here (as the Introduction documents), the Complaint ignores

the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Regardless, due to

the common state citizenship of Plaintiff and Deputy Clerk Garland

* Similarly, the Court retains inherent authority to review

the Complaint for frivolousness. See, e.g., Traywick v. Medical

Univ. of S.C., 671 F. App’x 85, 86 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Because [the

plaintiff] is neither a prisoner nor proceeding in forma pauperis

in district court, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (2), 1915A

(2012), permitting sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to

state a claim, do not apply. A court has, however, inherent

authority to dismiss frivolous complaints.” (internal citations

omitted)); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012)

(“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the

inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been

paid.”).

(again, as documented in the Introduction), Plaintiff could not

satisfy the requirements for diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy

exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs, and is between[:] (1) citizens of different States;

(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign

state, except . . . [lawful permanent residents] domiciled in the

same State; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens

or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a

foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of

different States.”). And any attempt by Plaintiff to invoke

federal-question jurisdiction based on “[t]he claim[] raised . . .

under the United States Constitution [would] fare no better,”

Housecalls Home Health Care, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Health

& Hum. Servs., 515 F. Supp. 2d 616, 628 (M.D.N.C. 2007) (Eliason,

M.J.), recommendation adopted, id. at 618 (Osteen, J.), given that

claim’s patent frivolity.

Indeed, “[o]ver the years th[e United States Supreme] Court

has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to

entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if the[

claims] are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely

devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, plainly

unsubstantial, or no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine,

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415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Put another way, “where a claim is obviously without

merit, Hagans precludes a federal district court from exercising

its jurisdiction.” Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.

1999); see also Marshall v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., No.

1:16CV550, 2017 WL 2774265, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 26, 2017)

(unpublished) (Schroeder, J.) (“As to federal question

jurisdiction, the court does not lack authority to act simply

because a claim lacks merit or is doubtful. But a claim is too

insubstantial and frivolous to support federal question

jurisdiction when it is obviously without merit.” (internal

brackets and quotation marks omitted)). “In addition, because [the

C]ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously

frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is

permitted.” Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012);

accord, e.g., Ferguson v. Wooton, 741 F. App’x 955, 955 (4th Cir.

2018); Smith v. Kagan, 616 F. App’x 90, 90 (4th Cir. 2015); Yi v.

Social Sec. Admin., 554 F. App’x 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014).

The Supreme Court further has explained that “a complaint

. . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law

or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Plaintiff’s claim against Deputy Clerk Garland for “deni[al of] the

U.S. constitutional right to sign an appeal motion . . . for

a[nother] plaintiff pro se litigant” (Docket Entry 1 at 4)

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qualifies as frivolous because that claim “lacks an arguable basis

[] in law,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. For starters, “direct causes

of action do not ordinarily exist under the United States

Constitution.” Housecalls, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 628. “Exceptions

have been made in situations such as existed in Bivens[ v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971)],” Housecalls, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 628, but the Bivens

implied-cause-of-action-exception does not extend to the federal

constitutional claim asserted by Plaintiff.

“In Bivens, the [Supreme C]ourt permitted an implied cause of

action for plaintiffs whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated

by federal officers.” Williams v. United States, Civ. Action No.

21-537, 2021 WL 1720230, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2021)

(unpublished). Subsequently, “[t]he [Supreme] Court held that the

Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause gave [a congressional

administrative assistant] a damages remedy [against a Congressman]

for gender discrimination,” Ziglar v. Abassi, 582 U.S. 120, 131

(2017), and “held that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause gave [a federal prisoner’s estate] a damages

remedy [against federal prison officials] for failure to provide

adequate medical treatment,” id. “Th[o]se three cases . . .

represent the only instances in which the [Supreme] Court has

approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution

itself.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he Supreme Court has refused to extend

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Bivens a number of times and expansion of the Bivens remedy is now

disfavored.” Williams, 2021 WL 1720230, at *3.

Accordingly, even if – contrary to the express terms of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) – the Constitution entitled

Plaintiff to sign a court filing on behalf of a fellow pro se

litigant, any Bivens claim against Deputy Clerk Garland for denying

Plaintiff that entitlement “would nevertheless be subject to

dismissal,” id., as that “claim[] . . . do[es] not fit into any of

the recognized causes of actions to which Bivens has been

extended,” id. See, e.g., Harris v. Hunt, No. 22-4028, 2023 WL

8432699, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 3, 2023) (unpublished) (affirming

dismissal of federal constitutional claims against court employees

for “failure or refusal to file various motions and pleadings” and

explaining that “Supreme Court has never recognized a Bivens cause

of action for prisoners who claim that officers and employees of

the federal judiciary have violated the[ prisoners’] constitutional

rights,” as well as that “subjecting the government to the costs

and burdens of defending lawsuits arising out of the day-to-day

operations of the clerk of court’s office is a special factor that

counsels against implying a new Bivens cause of action in this

context” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Foltyniewicz v.

United States Supreme Court, No. 5:25CT3251, 2026 WL 382391, at *3-

4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2026) (unpublished) (“declin[ing] to recognize

a Bivens cause of action” against court clerks for rejecting court

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filings, because (A) such “claims present a new context that is

meaningfully different from the causes of action the Supreme Court

previously recognized, [(B) the claims] name[] a new type of

defendant,” and (C) “there indeed is a rational reason for the

court to defer to Congress for creation of a damages remedy in

[such] case[s]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In sum, the Complaint does not involve diverse parties and

does not present a non-frivolous, federal claim.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not established a basis for this Court to

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss this action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

June 24, 2026

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