noting that a claim is moot “where a plaintiff seeks to enjoin an activity that has already occurred, and [the court] 2 25-5722 cannot ‘undo’ that action’s allegedly harmful effects”
How later courts described this case
- noting that a claim is moot “where a plaintiff seeks to enjoin an activity that has already occurred, and [the court] 2 25-5722 cannot ‘undo’ that action’s allegedly harmful effects”
- explaining when a case becomes moot and when the exception for claims that are capable of repetition, yet evading review may apply
- explaining that an equal protection claim requires a plaintiff to “show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- setting forth requirements for claim preclusion under federal law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 24 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARL GORDON, No. 25-5722
D.C. No. 2:24-cv-06476-MRA-AS
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor of the State
of California, individual capacity and
official capacity; DOES, 1 through 10; ROB
BONTA, Attorney General of the State of
California, individual capacity and official
capacity; SHIRLEY WEBER, Secretary of
State of the State of California, individual
capacity and official capacity; STEVEN J.
REYES, Chief Counsel, Office of the
Secretary of State of the State of California,
individual capacity and official capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Monica Ramirez Almadani, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 22, 2026**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: CANBY, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Carl Gordon appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
without leave to amend his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that California’s
September 14, 2021, gubernatorial recall election was void. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234
(9th Cir. 2018) (qualified immunity); Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430
F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (claim preclusion); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483,
489 (9th Cir. 2003) (mootness). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Gordon’s claims against defendants in
their official capacities as barred by claim preclusion because Gordon raised or
could have raised these claims in his prior federal court action, which was against
the same defendants and resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Mpoyo,
430 F.3d at 987 (setting forth requirements for claim preclusion under federal law).
The district court properly dismissed Gordon’s claims for prospective
injunctive and declaratory relief because they are moot and are not capable of
repetition, yet evading review. See Porter, 319 F.3d at 489-90 (explaining when a
case becomes moot and when the exception for claims that are capable of
repetition, yet evading review may apply); see also Protectmarriage.com-Yes on 8
v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that a claim is moot “where a
plaintiff seeks to enjoin an activity that has already occurred, and [the court]
2 25-5722
cannot ‘undo’ that action’s allegedly harmful effects”).
The district court properly dismissed Gordon’s claims for damages because
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Cuevas v. City of Tulare, 107
F.4th 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Qualified immunity protects government officials
from liability under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly
established at the time.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011) (“[A] mere error of state law is not a
denial of due process.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (setting forth elements of “class
of one” equal protection claim); Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint Dist., # 93, 114 F.4th
1129, 1147 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that reasonable user fees imposed for the
reimbursement of the cost of government services are not a taking); Furnace v.
Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an equal protection
claim requires a plaintiff to “show that the defendants acted with an intent or
purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected
class” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
3 25-5722
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
4 25-5722