The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
State ex rel. Holderman v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2371.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-2371
THE STATE EX REL . HOLDERMAN [DECEASED], C/O HOLDERMAN, C HILD,
APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLANT, ET AL.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Holderman v. Indus. Comm.,
Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2371.]
Workers’ compensation—Death benefits—R.C. 4123.59(D)—The final paragraph
of R.C. 4123.59(D) functions as a residual or catchall provision for
determining the question of dependency when the specific situations
previously identified in R.C. 4123.59(D) do not apply—After awarding
$3,000 to deceased employee’s daughter as a prospective dependent under
penultimate paragraph in R.C. 4123.59(D), Industrial Commission was not
required to determine dependency under R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final
paragraph—Court of appeals’ judgment granting limited writ vacated and
writ denied.
(No. 2025-1498—Submitted April 14, 2026—Decided June 24, 2026.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,
No. 23AP-237, 2025-Ohio-4553.
Supreme Court of Ohio
__________________
The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} After Darrell W. Holderman (“the decedent”) died in a work-related
incident, his adult daughter, appellee, Patricia N. Holderman (“Holderman”), filed
a request for workers’ compensation death benefits. Appellant, the Industrial
Commission of Ohio, ordered payment for the decedent’s medical and funeral
expenses and awarded Holderman a lump sum as a “prospective dependent” under
R.C. 4123.59(D) but denied her request for weekly benefits as a person who was
either “wholly dependent” or “partly dependent” on her father’s support at the time
of his death under R.C. 4123.59(B) and (C), respectively. Holderman brought this
action in her father’s name, asking the Tenth District Court of Appeals for a writ of
mandamus directing the commission to vacate its orders and award her death
benefits as a wholly or partly dependent person. The Tenth District granted a
limited writ returning the matter to the commission for further proceedings. The
commission has filed this direct appeal, and Holderman has moved for oral
argument.
{¶ 2} For the reasons explained below, we deny Holderman’s motion for
oral argument, vacate the Tenth District’s judgment granting a limited writ of
mandamus, and deny the writ Holderman requested.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Legal Principles
{¶ 3} Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution authorizes the General
Assembly to enact laws establishing a state fund to be created by compulsory
contributions by employers “[f]or the purpose of providing compensation to
workmen and their dependents, for death, injuries, or occupational disease,
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occasioned in the course of such workmen’s employment.” (Emphasis added.)
Under this enabling language, the legislature enacted R.C. 4123.59, which “governs
what benefits are to be paid to whom when an employee’s [work-related] injury or
occupational disease causes [the employee’s] death,” State ex rel. King v. Indus.
Comm., 2003-Ohio-2451, ¶ 5.
{¶ 4} Among other things, R.C. 4123.59 authorizes the payment of benefits
to persons who were wholly, partly, or prospectively dependent on an employee
who died as a result of a work-related injury. R.C. 4123.59(B) provides that if there
are “wholly dependent persons at the time of the death,” such persons are entitled
to receive weekly payments of a specified amount for a specified duration. R.C.
4123.59(C) provides that “partly dependent persons” are also entitled to receive
weekly payments; however, those benefits continue only “for such time as the
administrator [of workers’ compensation] in each case determines.”
{¶ 5} R.C. 4123.59(D)—which is the division at issue in this appeal—
identifies persons who are entitled to a presumption of whole dependency,
authorizes awards for “prospective dependency,” and specifies how to determine
the question of dependency “[i]n all other cases.” Specifically, R.C. 4123.59(D)(1)
and (2) identify persons who are “presumed to be wholly dependent for their
support upon a deceased employee.” For example, a deceased employee’s adult
child may be presumed to be wholly dependent if certain conditions are satisfied,
including the child’s being “physically or mentally incapacitated from earning” and
being dependent on only the deceased employee for “more than one-half of the
support for such child.” R.C. 4123.59(D)(2).
{¶ 6} R.C. 4123.59(D)(1) and (2) are followed by three unnumbered
paragraphs, which provide as follows:
It is presumed that there is sufficient dependency to entitle a
surviving natural parent or surviving natural parents, share and share
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alike, with whom the decedent was living at the time of the
decedent’s death, to a total minimum award of three thousand
dollars.
The administrator may take into consideration any
circumstances which, at the time of the death of the decedent, clearly
indicate prospective dependency on the part of the claimant and
potential support on the part of the decedent. No person shall be
considered a prospective dependent unless such person is a member
of the family of the deceased employee and bears to the deceased
employee the relation of surviving spouse, lineal descendant,
ancestor, or brother or sister. The total award for any or all
prospective dependency to all such claimants, except to a natural
parent or natural parents of the deceased, shall not exceed three
thousand dollars to be apportioned among them as the administrator
orders.
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in
part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each
particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death
of such employee, but no person shall be considered as dependent
unless such person is a member of the family of the deceased
employee, or bears to the deceased employee the relation of
surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister.
{¶ 7} We have previously explained that the third and final unnumbered
paragraph of R.C. 4123.59(D) “applies to claims for death benefits brought by
persons who are not entitled to a presumption of dependency.” State ex rel.
McDonald v. Indus. Comm., 2023-Ohio-1620, ¶ 9. That is, “the last paragraph of
R.C. 4123.59(D) instructs that actual dependency, in whole or in part, must be
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determined according to the facts that existed at the time of the injury that resulted
in the employee’s death.” Id.
{¶ 8} If a deceased employee had no dependents, R.C. 4123.59(A) limits
payments from the state insurance fund to reimbursement for expenses specified in
R.C. 4123.66, such as funeral expenses.
B. The Commission Denies Holderman Death Benefits as a Wholly or Partly
Dependent Person
{¶ 9} The decedent was shot and killed on June 1, 2022, while working as
a security officer. Holderman, the decedent’s only child, applied to the Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation for death benefits.
{¶ 10} In an affidavit submitted with the claim, Holderman averred the
following: that she was 39 years old when the decedent was killed; that she had
lived in the decedent’s home with him and her two minor children since 2018; that
the decedent was responsible for and made all mortgage payments for the home and
paid for the electric, trash, and sewer services, Holderman’s automobile insurance,
and her cellphone service; that on April 15, 2022, Holderman underwent back
surgery and was unable to work until the decedent died; and that the decedent had
provided all financial support for her and her two children while she was recovering
from surgery. Holderman later informed the bureau that she had worked at a school
cafeteria and that for two summers, she had worked at an ice-cream shop.
{¶ 11} Because the decedent’s death resulted from an injury sustained in the
course of his employment, the bureau allowed Holderman’s claim for death
benefits—but initially only for medical and funeral expenses. The bureau denied
Holderman’s request for dependency benefits, noting her age and that she was
capable of holding a job and generating her own earnings.
{¶ 12} Holderman appealed the bureau’s order administratively, arguing,
among other things, that when her father was killed, she was recovering from back
surgery and had no independent income, and she therefore was wholly or partly
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dependent on her father for support. After a hearing, a district hearing officer
(“DHO”) for the commission awarded Holderman $3,000 as a prospective
dependent based on her father’s pledge to support her while she was recovering
from back surgery but denied her request for death benefits as a wholly or partly
dependent person.
{¶ 13} It does not appear that any party contested the DHO’s determination
that Holderman was a prospective dependent or the amount of her award.
Holderman, however, appealed the denial of her request for death benefits as a
wholly or partly dependent person. A staff hearing officer (“SHO”) for the
commission affirmed the DHO’s order. The commission declined to accept
Holderman’s appeal of the SHO’s order and subsequently denied Holderman’s
request for reconsideration of the commission’s refusal to hear the appeal.
C. The Tenth District Grants a Limited Writ of Mandamus
{¶ 14} Holderman filed this mandamus action in the Tenth District, alleging
that the commission abused its discretion in ruling that she is not entitled to death
benefits as a wholly or partly dependent person.
{¶ 15} The case was assigned to a magistrate, who found that the
commission had not abused its discretion in finding that Holderman did not qualify
for the presumption of whole dependency under R.C. 4123.59(D)(2). 2025-Ohio-
4553, ¶ 61, 63 (10th Dist.). The magistrate reasoned that Holderman’s work history
was some evidence on which the commission could base its determination that she
was not physically or mentally incapacitated from earning. Id. However, the
magistrate concluded that the commission had improperly conflated the analysis
for determining whether Holderman was entitled to a presumption of dependency
under R.C. 4123.59(D)(2) with the analysis for determining dependency under R.C.
4123.59(D)’s final paragraph. Id. at ¶ 67-68. In the magistrate’s words, the SHO’s
analysis of the question of dependency under R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph
“appear[ed] to be based entirely on analysis of the factors pertaining to the
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January Term, 2026
presumption of dependency” and that “[b]y confining analysis of the issue of actual
dependency to the factors needed to establish the presumption instead of
determining the issue under the totality of facts and circumstances in the case, the
SHO erred as a matter of law.” Id at ¶ 67. Accordingly, the magistrate
recommended that the Tenth District issue a limited writ remanding the matter to
the commission to determine in the first instance the question of Holderman’s
dependency under R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph. Id. at ¶ 68, 70.
{¶ 16} Both Holderman and the commission filed objections to the
magistrate’s decision. The commission argued, among other things, that the award
of prospective-dependency benefits negated the need to consider dependency under
R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph. Holderman argued that she was entitled to the
presumption that she was wholly dependent on her father for support and that a
remand was unnecessary because the facts had clearly established that she was at
least partially dependent on her father. The Tenth District overruled both parties’
objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision, thereby granting a limited writ
and remanding the matter “for proper consideration of whether Holderman was
partly dependent-in-fact.”1 Id. at ¶ 29.
{¶ 17} The commission filed this direct appeal. Holderman did not file an
appeal or cross-appeal.
II. MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
{¶ 18} Holderman has moved for oral argument, asserting that this case
presents a matter of great public importance and involves complex issues of law
and fact. In a direct appeal, a request for oral argument is subject to this court’s
discretion. S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A). In exercising that discretion, we consider
“whether the case involves (1) a matter of great public importance, (2) complex
1. The Tenth District and Holderman refer to R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph as describing how
to determine whether a person is “dependent-in-fact,” 2025-Ohio-4553 at ¶ 23-24, 28-29 (10th
Dist.). The term “dependent-in-fact,” however, is not found in R.C. 4123.59(D).
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issues of law or fact, (3) a substantial constitutional issue, or (4) a conflict among
courts of appeals.” State ex rel. Walters v. Indus. Comm., 2024-Ohio-552, ¶ 40.
{¶ 19} We conclude that this case primarily presents an issue of statutory
interpretation that the parties’ briefs adequately address. Additionally, the case is
no more important than other workers’ compensation mandamus appeals in which
claimants have been denied benefits to which they believe they are entitled. We
therefore deny Holderman’s motion for oral argument.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 20} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the relator must show by clear
and convincing evidence that she has a clear legal right to the requested relief, that
the commission has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and that she has no
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Zarbana Industries,
Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2021-Ohio-3669, ¶ 10. “The commission’s denial of death
benefits based on its determination that the claimant was not a dependent of a
deceased employee does not ‘concern the causal connection between injury,
disease, or death and employment’ and, thus, is not appealable” to the court of
common pleas and may be challenged in mandamus. McDonald, 2023-Ohio-1620,
at ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm., 2000-Ohio-73, ¶ 18.
{¶ 21} In a workers’ compensation mandamus appeal, a writ of mandamus
may lie when there is a legal basis to compel the commission to perform its duties
under the law or when the commission has abused its discretion in carrying out its
duties. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2008-Ohio-1593, ¶ 9.
“Where a commission order is adequately explained and based on some evidence,
even evidence that may be persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record,
the order will not be disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel.
Mobley v. Indus. Comm., 1997-Ohio-181, ¶ 16. However, a writ of mandamus may
be issued against the commission if it “has incorrectly interpreted Ohio law.” State
ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 65 (1975).
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January Term, 2026
IV. ANALYSIS
{¶ 22} The commission raises two propositions of law. Because we find
that the commission’s first proposition has merit and resolves this appeal, it is not
necessary to consider the commission’s second proposition.
A. Having Granted Holderman an Award Based on Prospective
Dependency, the Commission Was Not Required to Consider Dependency
under R.C. 4123.59(D)’s Final Paragraph
{¶ 23} In support of its first proposition of law, the commission asserts that
the SHO’s determination of prospective dependency negated the need to determine
dependency under R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph. That is, because the
commission awarded Holderman $3,000 as a prospective dependent, the
commission contends, the Tenth District’s issuance of a limited writ ordering the
commission to apply R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph was contrary to the
statute’s plain language. We agree.
{¶ 24} The commission’s argument here hinges on the meaning of the
phrase “[i]n all other cases” that opens R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. State ex rel.
Dillon v. Indus. Comm., 2024-Ohio-744, ¶ 5; Ceccarelli v. Levin, 2010-Ohio-5681,
¶ 8. “To discern the meaning of a statute, ‘we first consider the statutory language,
reading all words and phrases in context and in accordance with the rules of
grammar and common usage.’ ” State ex rel. AutoZone Stores, Inc. v. Indus.
Comm., 2024-Ohio-5519, ¶ 23, quoting Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist.
Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-2067, ¶ 13. “‘When the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the
General Assembly has said’ and apply the statute as written.” Dillon at ¶ 5, quoting
Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 2003-Ohio-1099, ¶ 12.
{¶ 25} To discern the meaning of the phrase “[i]n all other cases” in R.C.
4123.59(D)’s final paragraph, it is first necessary to analyze the language preceding
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it. As noted above, R.C. 4123.59(D)(1) and (2) identify persons who are “presumed
to be wholly dependent for their support upon a deceased employee.” The first
unnumbered paragraph following R.C. 4123.59(D)(2) authorizes a minimum award
of $3,000 to a surviving parent or parents with whom the deceased employee was
living at the time of the employee’s death.
{¶ 26} The second unnumbered paragraph following R.C. 4123.59(D)(2)
authorizes the bureau’s administrator to issue an award for “prospective
dependency.” The administrator “may take into consideration any circumstances
which, at the time of the death of the decedent, clearly indicate prospective
dependency on the part of the claimant and potential support on the part of the
decedent.” Id. The statute does not define “prospective dependency”—although it
is clear that prospective dependency is forward-looking, because the administrator
may issue such an award only if the circumstances indicate “potential support on
the part of the decedent” at the time of the employee’s death, id. The last sentence
of this paragraph limits the total award “for any or all prospective dependency” to
$3,000, to be apportioned among all prospective dependents—which supports our
understanding that prospective dependency is a separate category of dependency
under the statute.
{¶ 27} The next paragraph—the third unnumbered paragraph and R.C.
4123.59(D)’s final paragraph—provides:
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or
in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each
particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death
of [the] employee, but no person shall be considered as dependent
unless such person is a member of the family of the deceased
employee, or bears to the deceased employee the relation of
surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister.
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(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 28} When reading R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph in context with the
paragraphs that precede it and in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning
of the phrase “[i]n all other cases,” we conclude that the final paragraph functions
as a residual or catchall provision for determining the question of dependency when
the specific situations previously identified in R.C. 4123.59(D) do not apply—i.e.,
when dependency is neither presumed nor prospective. Because the paragraph that
immediately precedes R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph pertains to an award
based on prospective dependency, the natural inference is that the final paragraph
of R.C. 4123.59(D), which begins with “[i]n all other cases,” applies to questions
of dependency that do not concern prospective dependency.
{¶ 29} Because the commission determined that Holderman was a
prospective dependent and it therefore awarded her $3,000 under the penultimate
paragraph in R.C. 4123.59(D), the commission was not required to determine
dependency under R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph. Accordingly, the Tenth
District misinterpreted R.C. 4123.59(D) and erred by issuing a limited writ
directing the commission to engage in such an analysis.
B. The Tenth District’s Rationale and Holderman’s Counterargument Fail
to Give Effect to the Statutory Language
{¶ 30} For the reasons explained below, we find neither the Tenth District’s
rationale for granting the limited writ nor Holderman’s appellate argument to be
persuasive.
{¶ 31} The Tenth District rejected the commission’s interpretation of R.C.
4123.59(D) for two reasons. First, the court said that the commission’s argument
relied on dicta from McDonald, 2023-Ohio-1620. In McDonald, we summarized
the operation of R.C. 4123.59(D) as follows:
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The statute identifies who is “presumed to be wholly dependent” . . .
and who may be considered a “prospective dependent” . . . . The
question of dependency in all other cases—i.e., cases in which
dependency is neither presumed nor prospective—“shall be
determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case . . . .”
McDonald at ¶ 3, quoting R.C. 4123.59(D). Because prospective dependency was
not at issue in McDonald, the Tenth District opined, McDonald should not be cited
as authority for the proposition that a finding of prospective dependency negates
any need to consider a claim for dependency under R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final
paragraph. 2025-Ohio-4553 at ¶ 23-25 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 32} The issue in McDonald was whether a deceased employee’s fiancée,
who was the mother of his children, qualified for death benefits as a member of the
employee’s family. McDonald at ¶ 1-2, 20. While McDonald did not involve a
determination relating to prospective dependency, that does not mean that
McDonald’s characterization of the operation of R.C. 4123.59(D) is incorrect.
Regardless, in this appeal, although the commission relies in part on McDonald,
the commission primarily argues that R.C. 4123.59(D)’s plain language—namely,
the phrase “[i]n all other cases” in R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph—controls the
outcome of this case. As explained above in Part IV(A) of this opinion, the
statutory language—not McDonald—controls.
{¶ 33} Second, the Tenth District opined that the commission’s
interpretation of R.C. 4123.59(D) failed to account “for the difference between
prospective dependency and other types of dependency.” 2025-Ohio-4553 at ¶ 26
(10th Dist.). According to the Tenth District, “[w]hether a person was dependent
at the time of an employee’s death is a different question from whether a person
was likely to be dependent at a future point after the employee’s death,” id., and the
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commission’s determination of Holderman’s prospective dependency therefore
“was not dispositive of her claim of partial dependency in fact,” id. at ¶ 27.
{¶ 34} The problem with that conclusion is that it does not account for the
limited amount of a prospective-dependency award or the explicit direction in R.C.
4123.59(D)’s final paragraph that it applies “[i]n all other cases.” As noted above,
the total award “for any or all prospective dependency” is limited to $3,000, to be
apportioned among all prospective dependents as ordered by the administrator. Id.
(penultimate paragraph). By contrast, a person determined to be dependent, in
whole or in part, is entitled to weekly benefits. See R.C. 4123.59(B) and (C). The
limitation of an award for prospective dependency signals a separate category of
dependency—distinct from the other types of dependency established in R.C.
4123.59.
{¶ 35} Moreover, the Tenth District did not discuss—and failed to give
independent effect to—the phrase “[i]n all other cases” in R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final
paragraph. “When interpreting statutes, we must ‘give effect to every term . . . and
avoid a construction that would render any provision meaningless, inoperative, or
superfluous.’ ” (Ellipsis in original.) State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm., 2025-Ohio-
2044, ¶ 33, quoting Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 2011-Ohio-3279, ¶ 23. This
surplusage canon “holds that it is no more the court’s function to revise by
subtraction than by addition.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts, 174 (2012). In the current version of R.C. 4123.59(D), the
paragraph relating to prospective dependency immediately precedes the paragraph
that begins with “[i]n all other cases.” The placement of the paragraphs—along
with the ordinary meaning of the phrase “[i]n all other cases”—tells us that the
commission determines dependency under R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final paragraph in
cases in which dependency is neither presumed nor prospective. By glossing over
the phrase “[i]n all other cases,” the Tenth District essentially made it mere
surplusage.
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{¶ 36} In her merit brief, Holderman addresses the phrase “[i]n all other
cases,” but her interpretation is inconsistent with R.C. 4123.59(D)’s current plain
language. Holderman argues that because the statute contained the paragraph that
begins with the phrase “[i]n all other cases” before the statute included any
reference to prospective dependency, the phrase necessarily applies only to
situations addressed by the statute before the reference to prospective dependency
was added. According to Holderman, “[e]ntitlement to prospective dependance has
nothing to do with the ‘other cases’ language.” (Italics deleted.)
{¶ 37} It is true that the statute included the phrase “[i]n all other cases”
before the statute included any reference to prospective dependency. Prior to 1937,
the precursor to R.C. 4123.59 provided:
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly
dependent for support upon a deceased employe[e]:
(A) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time
of his death.
(B) A child or children under the age of sixteen years (or
over said age if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning)
upon the parent with whom he is living at the time of the death of
such parent.
In all other cases, [the] question of dependency, in whole or
in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each
particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death
of such employe[e] . . . .
(Emphasis added.) G.C. 1465-82, Section 35, Am.S.B. No. 48, 103 Ohio Laws, 72,
86.
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{¶ 38} In 1937, the legislature amended former G.C. 1465-82 to add the
paragraph relating to prospective dependency and placed it immediately before the
paragraph that begins with “[i]n all other cases.” See G.C. 1465-82, Sub.H.B. No.
69, Section 1, 117 Ohio Laws 110, 112. But contrary to Holderman’s contention,
the sequence of enactments does not show that the legislature intended the phrase
“[i]n all other cases” to apply only to cases in which a person was not presumed to
be wholly dependent, without regard to prospective dependency. Had the General
Assembly intended to limit application of the phrase in the manner advanced by
Holderman, it could have easily done so in the text of the statute. Instead, when
the paragraph on prospective dependency was added, it immediately preceded the
paragraph starting with “[i]n all other cases,” and that is still true today. “‘The
intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ.’ ”
Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp., 2024-Ohio-1625, ¶ 13, quoting United States v.
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).
{¶ 39} Thus, Holderman’s reliance on a prior version of R.C. 4123.59(D) is
insufficient to defeat the meaning of the text of the current version of the statute.
“‘[I]f the text of a statute is unambiguous, it should be applied by its terms without
recourse to policy arguments, legislative history, or any other matter extraneous to
the text.’ ” In re Natl. Prescription Opiate Litigation, 2024-Ohio-5744, ¶ 32,
quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 436. Because R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final
paragraph is unambiguous, it should be applied as written.
{¶ 40} In sum, the phrase “[i]n all other cases” as used in R.C. 4123.59(D)’s
final paragraph has a clear and definite meaning. Because the commission awarded
Holderman a lump-sum payment as a prospective dependent, the commission was
not required to also determine whether she was a dependent under R.C.
4123.59(D)’s final paragraph. By granting a limited writ of mandamus ordering
the commission to engage in a dependency analysis under R.C. 4123.59(D)’s final
paragraph, the Tenth District misinterpreted the statute. Therefore, we vacate the
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Tenth District’s judgment granting the limited writ and deny Holderman’s request
for a writ of mandamus directing the commission to vacate its orders and award her
death benefits as a wholly or partly dependent person.
{¶ 41} Given our disposition of the commission’s first proposition of law,
it is not necessary to consider the commission’s second proposition of law.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 42} For the foregoing reasons, we deny Holderman’s motion for oral
argument, vacate the Tenth District’s judgment granting a limited writ of
mandamus, and deny the writ Holderman requested.
Judgment vacated
and writ denied.
__________________
Hochman & Plunkett Co., L.P.A., Gary D. Plunkett, and Shaun P. Omen,
for appellee.
D. Andrew Wilson, Attorney General, and Cindy Albrecht, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant.
_______________________
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