BROWN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIE DIVISION

JESSE BROWN, )

Plaintiff 1:24-CV-00317-RAL

VS. RICHARD A. LANZILLO

) Chief United States Magistrate Judge

LAUREL HARRY, SECRETARY OF )

CORRECTIONS, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION!

Defendants IN RE: ECF NO. 34

I. Background and Relevant Procedural History

Plaintiff Jesse Brown, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (“DOC”), brings this civil rights action against three DOC

officials: Patricia Thompson, Vandernoof, and Matthew Loreti, and Laurel Harry

(collectively, “Defendants”). Brown’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31) is his

operative pleading. It asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of Defendant

Loreti’s alleged use of excessive force against him, Defendant Vandernoof’s alleged

destruction of his legal papers and other personal property, and Defendants Harry

and Thompson’s alleged failure to properly supervise and discipline Loreti and

Vandernoof.

parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C.

c).

Defendants have moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Brown’s

Amended Complaint. For the reasons explained herein, the motion will be granted.

Il. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (8d Cir.

1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true the

facts alleged in the complaint and draws the reasonable inferences from those facts

in favor of the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir.

2008) (citing Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (8d Cir. 2003). To

survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must only present factual allegations

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (8d ed. 2004)).

While a complaint does not require detailed factual allegations to survive a

motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they

are unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual

allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania,

577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of

the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”)

(citation omitted).

Finally, because Brown is proceeding pro se, his Amended Complaint will be

held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the Court can reasonably read his pro se

pleading to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it will do so despite

his confusion of legal theories. See Mader v. Phamatech, Inc., 2026 WL 879173, at *3

(W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2026) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982)). But “any

pleading must still contain sufficient factual allegations that, when accepted as true,

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Heffley v. Steele, 2019 WL

5092127, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), aff'd, 826 Fed. Appx. 227 (8d Cir. 2020)

(citations omitted).

Ill. Factual Allegations and Claims

Consistent with the foregoing standard, the following factual allegations of

Brown’s Amended Complaint are accepted as true for purposes of the Defendants’

motion to dismiss. .

Brown was previously housed at the DOC’s State Correctional Institution at

Albion (“SCI-Albion”).2. ECF No. 31, p. 1. On December 20, 2028, Defendant Loreti,

a corrections officer at that prison, told another inmate that Brown was “a rat, snitch,

and a murderer.” Id., pp. 2-3, { 10. This exchange somehow prompted a physical

altercation during which Loreti “struck Plaintiff with close [sic] fist multiple times in

the face.” Id. Brown sustained bruises and swelling to his face and a swollen lip

during the altercation. Id. Brown was placed in the restrictive housing unit (“RHU”)

2 Brown is currently housed at the DOC’s State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill.

that same day. Defendant Vandernoof packed Brown’s belongings from his regular

cell due to his impending transfer to the RHU. Id., { 11. Vandernoof destroyed

Brown’s property, including legal materials, court documents, and his television. Id.

Neither Defendant Laurel Harry, the Secretary of the DOC, nor Defendant Patricia

Thompson, the Facility Manager at SCI-Albion, disciplined Defendants Loreti or

Vandernoof for their misconduct or otherwise took any corrective action despite

knowledge of their misconduct. Jd., { 12. Brown remained in the RHU at SCI-Albion

until his transfer to the State Correctional Institution at Rockview on January 9,

2024. Id., | 25.

Based on the foregoing allegations, Brown asserts the following claims: (1) an

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Loret, (2) a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim against Defendant Vandernoof based on the

destruction of his property, (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim against all

Defendants, and (4) a supervisory liability claim against Defendants Harry and

Thompson.

In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants assert: (1) Brown failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies as mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); (2) Brown’s damages claims against them in their

official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution; (3) the

Amended Complaint fails to support the personal involvement of Defendants Harry

and Thompson; (4) the Amended Complaint fails to state an Highth Amendment

excessive force claim against Defendant Loreti; and (5) the Amended Complaint fails

to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant Vandernoof

based on his destruction of Brown’s personal property. ECF No. 34.

IV. Discussion

A. Although the grievance records Brown attached to his Amended Complaint

evidence that he did not comply with grievance and appeal deadlines,

Brown has raised potential “unavailability” of administrative remedies,

which cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is “a_ □□□□

jurisdictional prerequisite to an inmate bringing suit and, for that reason, ... it

constitutes a ‘threshold issue that courts must address to determine whether

litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right time.” Small v. Camden

County, 728 F.3d 265, 270 (8d Cir. 20138) (cleaned up, citations omitted). As such, it

is an “issue that the District Court must address before it can reach the merits of a

prigoner’s complaint.” Brown v. Sprenkle, 827 Fed. Appx. 229, 231 (8d Cir. 2020).

Therefore, the Court will first assess Defendants’ exhaustion defense before reaching

their motion’s challenges to the merits of Brown’s claims.

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative

defense that defendants must plead and prove. See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295

(3d Cir. 2002). As such, it is rarely appropriate for determination on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss. The Court may grant a motion to dismiss based on this affirmative

defense only when a plaintiff essentially acknowledges his failure to exhaust on the

face of the complaint and it “present[s] an insuperable barrier to recovery by the

plaintiff.” Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 n.8 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Williams v.

Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997)). The PLRA requires only “exhaustion of

those administrative remedies that are ‘available.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904

F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006)). It

follows then that dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is appropriate only where the

complaint establishes “that there was an available administrative remedy, and that

[the plaintiff] did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162,

1172 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, even where the complaint demonstrates a plaintiffs

failure to complete the administrative remedies process, dismissal is inappropriate

where it is unclear “whether [the plaintiff] was thwarted in his attempts to do so.”

Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (“only in rare

cases will a district court be able to conclude from the face of the complaint that a

prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies and that he is without a valid

excuse’).

In this case, Brown has attached grievance records as exhibits to his Amended

Complaint. On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider documents the plaintiff

attaches to a complaint and upon which he relies or refers without converting the

motion to one for summary judgment. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,

114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). Such documents include “indisputably authentic”

grievance records. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (8d Cir. 2004). See also

Cooper v. Martucchi, 2015 WL 4773450, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2015) (noting that

“the district court in Spruill considered the grievance documents attached to the

defendants’ motion to dismiss only because ‘Spruill himself refer[ed] to the grievances

in his complaint to show exhaustion”).

Here, the records Brown attached to his Amended Complaint relate to the two

grievances relevant to his claims: Grievance 1089955 and Grievance 1086564.8

Grievance 1089955 relates to Defendant Loreti’s alleged use of excessive force against

Brown on December 20, 2023. See ECF No. 31-3, p. 2. The grievance, however, is

dated May 14, 2024. Id., p.1. As a first step in the grievance process, the DOC’s

general grievance policy, DC-ADM 804, requires an inmate to submit a written

grievance for review by the Facility Grievance Coordinator (““FGC”) “within 15

working days after the event upon which the claim is based.” DC-ADM 804, § 1.4.8

(emphasis supplied). Brown expressly bases his excessive force claim on Loreti’s use

of force on December 20, 2023. Therefore, under DC-ADM 804, § 1.4.8, Brown had

to submit any grievance based on that incident no later than January 12, 2024, fifteen

working days thereafter. On May 28, 2024, the FGC denied Grievance 1089955 as

untimely.4 ECF No. 31-3, p. 3. This decision was clearly correct unless some basis

existed to excuse Brown’s delay.

3 Defendants also submitted an affidavit from Michael Bell, an employee of the DOC Secretary’s Office

of Inmate Grievances and Appeals in support of their exhaustion defense. The Court will not consider

this document in connection with Defendants’ motion to dismiss because an affidavit is never

indisputably authentic. See Washington v. Link, 750 Fed. Appx. 84, 87 (8d Cir. 2018) (noting that

affidavits and declarations are neither “indisputably authentic for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes” nor

“conclusive even at the summary judgment stage if they are controverted by other evidence...”);

Escalera v. Harry, 2016 WL 6694502, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2016), report and recommendation

adopted, 2016 WL 6582065 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2016).

4 After denial of the grievance, Brown appealed to the Facility Manager. See ECF No. 31-3, p. 4. Although Brown

dated his appeal for June 13, 2024, it was not received by the Facility Manager until June 27, 2024. ECF No. 31-3,

pp. 4-5. DC-ADM 804 provides that “if the FGC has rejected the grievance or the inmate is otherwise dissatisfied

with the initial review response,” the inmate may appeal to the prison’s Facility Manager “within 15 working days

from the date” the inmate receives “the initial review response/rejection.” Jd. at § 2.A.1.a, b; see also Lewis v.

Sutherland, 2024 WL 6957719, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL

3618279 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2025). This appeal was also denied as untimely. Brown then filed his final appeal to the

Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”) on July 1, 2024. Id, p. 6. SOIGA denied his

grievance appeal on August 9, 2024, because “an appeal to final review is not permitted when you fail to comply with

submission procedures.” /d., p. 7.

Grievance 1086564 relates to his claim against Vandernoof based on the loss

or destruction of his personal property. ECF No. 31-3, p. 8. Brown dated the

grievance for April 8, 2024, but it was not received for initial review until May 3,

2024. Id. This grievance complained that Brown’s tablet was lost, his television was

inoperable, and that his pictures, legal papers, and other mail were also missing

“when [he] got to SCI Rockview on 1-11-24.” Id. It attributed the damaged and lost

property to Vandernoof, who inventoried and packed the property at SCI-Albion in

anticipation of his transfer to SCI-Rockview. Brown arrived at SCI-Rockview on

January 9, 2024, but the final items of his personal property arrived at SCI-Rockview

on April 6, 2024. Id. The grievance acknowledged receipt of his television remote

and photographs but complained that his tablet and trial transcripts remained

missing, and his cable cord was damaged. Id., pp. 8-9.

The FGC denied Brown’s grievance at initial review on May 17, 2024. Id.,

p. 10. In denying Brown’s grievance, the FGC noted Brown's acknowledgment that

most of the items he claimed were missing had now been accounted for. Id. Brown

had fifteen working days to file an appeal to the Facility Manager, that is, until

June 10, 2024. Although Brown submitted an appeal and dated it for June 13, 2024,

it was not received by the Facility Manager until June 27, 2024. See id., p. 13. The

Facility Manager dismissed the appeal as untimely that same day. Id. Brown

received the Facility Manager’s response on July 1, 2024, and appealed to SOIGA,

which dismissed his appeal as procedurally defaulted on August 9, 2024. Id., p.16.

Thus, Grievance 1086564 also presents timeliness and procedural default issues.

“An untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or

appeal results in a procedural default and does not satisfy the exhaustion

requirement, thereby precluding an action in federal court.” Watson v. Fisher, 558

Fed. Appx. 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91) (“Proper

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical □

procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”). But as noted, a

prisoner is only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are “available.”

Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268 (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93). An administrative remedy

is unavailable, and administrative exhaustion is therefore excused, in three

situations: “(1) when ‘it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or

consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates’; (2) when it 1s ‘so

opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use, such as when no

ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it; or (3) when ‘prison administrators

thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,

misrepresentation, or intimidation.’ ” Id. at 266-67 (quoting Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S.

643-44 (2016)). Apparently anticipating Defendants’ exhaustion argument,

Brown’s Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants prevented his access to

grievance forms and otherwise impeded his ability to pursue his grievances. See ECF

No. 31, 9 13-27. These allegations are somewhat vague and conclusory, but unlike

the factual allegations upon which he bases his substantive claims, Brown has no

pleading obligation with respect to Defendants’ exhaustion defense. The Court

therefore finds that Brown has raised unavailability of administrative remedies as a

potential excuse for the untimeliness of his grievance and appeal submissions.

Whether Brown’s grievance remedies were rendered unavailable, however,

involves issues of fact that cannot properly be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Therefore, if this case proceeds beyond the pleading stage, the Court will conduct an

evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes regarding possible unavailability.

See Small v. Camden County, 728 F.8d 265, 270-271 (3d Cir. 2013); Paladino v.

Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2018). A hearing pursuant to Small and

Paladino is used to resolve issues of fact where a defendant has produced a record to

support the plaintiffs procedural default, such as his failure to properly complete the

grievance process, and the plaintiff has responded that some action or omission by

the defendant rendered his or her grievance remedies “unavailable.” See Small, 728

F.3d at 271 (holding “that judges may resolve factual disputes relevant to the

exhaustion issue without the participation of a jury”). If this case proceeds beyond

the pleadings, this hearing will be scheduled by separate order. To the extent

Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss relies upon Brown’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, the motion will be denied without prejudice pending the

hearing.

Because the Court must necessarily defer a decision on Defendants’ exhaustion

defense until the evidentiary hearing, it has the discretion to address or defer

evaluation of the sufficiency of Brown’s claims in the meantime. See Hurst v. Snider,

530 Fed. Appx: 168, 169 n.38 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Given the uncertainty regarding

10

exhaustion, we have chosen to address the substance of Hurst’s claims.”); Watkins v.

Merriel, 2015 WL 5722819, at *1 (D.NJ. Sept. 29, 2015) (deferring issues of

exhaustion pending hearing and development of record). The Court chooses to reach

the sufficiency of Brown’s claims because doing so may ultimately render moot, in

whole or in part, the more complicated issues relating to exhaustion.

B. Any claims for money damages against the Defendants in their official

capacities will be dismissed.

Subject to certain narrow exceptions, the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution bars all lawsuits brought in federal court against states regardless of

the nature of the relief sought. U.S. Const. Amend. XI. This immunity extends to

state agencies and departments. See Clark v. Zaken, 2026 WL 1096368, at *3 (W.D.

Pa. Apr. 2, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1093464 (W.D. Pa.

Apr. 22, 2026). The Eleventh Amendment also “bars a suit [for monetary relief]

against state officials in their official capacity, because the state is the real party in

interest inasmuch as the plaintiff seeks recovery from the state treasury.”° Melo v.

Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (8d Cir. 1990), aff'd 502 U.S. 21 (1991). Therefore, the

Eleventh Amendment bars any claim for money damages to the extent Brown asserts

the claims against any Defendant in his or her official capacity.

5 Brown’s claims for money damages against the Defendants in their individual capacities are not

barred. The Eleventh Amendment also does not bar official capacity claims against state officials for

prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to address an ongoing violation of federal law. Id. (citing

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Pa. Fed’n of Sporismen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323

(3d Cir. 2002)). But the Amended Complaint includes no claims for prospective injunctive or

declaratory relief.

11

C. The Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support Brown’s Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Loreti.

A corrections officer’s use of excessive force against an inmate violates the

Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). Whether a particular use of force was excessive

depends on “whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id.

(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). In resolving this

question, a court must evaluate “(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the

relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent

of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to

them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity ofa forceful response.” Giles v.

Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 328 (3d Cir. 2009). “Force that exceeds that which is

"reasonable and necessary under the circumstances is actionable.” Id.

The Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to allow the Court to

evaluate whether Loreti’s use of force was reasonable and necessary. It alleges that

Loreti had told another inmate that Brown was a “rat, snitch[,] and a murderer” and

that these comments somehow put Brown “in a physical altercation which Loreti

struck [Brown] with close fist multiple times in the face,” causing Brown bruises to

his face and a swollen lip. ECF No. 31, § 10. The Amended Complaint does not

identify whether Brown or Loreti initiated the physical altercation or any other facts

upon which the Court can assess the need for force and the relationship between the

12

need and the amount of force that was used. The few facts alleged plausibly support

an inference that Brown initiated the altercation, albeit in response to improper

remarks by Loreti. This is further supported by grievance records Brown attached to

his Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 31-3, p. 6 “Officer Loreti provoked me into a

fight...”). But if Brown initiated the fight, then Loreti’s use of force may have been

reasonable under the circumstances. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, though

plaintiffs need only “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Jd. at 569. The factual allegations of Brown's Amended Complaint are far

too few and vague to raise his excessive force claim above the speculative level. This

claim will therefore be dismissed. .

D. Brown’s claims against Defendants Harry and Thompson will be

dismissed based on lack of personal involvement.

In an action under § 1983, the plaintiff “must show that each and every

defendant was ‘personall[ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan,

2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347,

353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have played an

“affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a

§ 1983 suit ... [aJbsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358

Fed. Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). Absent specific allegations that a defendant

participated in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is

appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F. Supp. 2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013)

13

(dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(6) where the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient

facts showing that certain defendants played an affirmative role in the alle ged Highth

Amendment violation). . □

Brown alleges that Harry and Thompson were somehow aware of Loreti’s

assault and Vandernoof’s destruction of his personal property and failed to discipline

them. See ECF No. 31, {{ 10, 25. Brown’s allegations of knowledge against Harry

and Thompson are conclusory and unsupported by any factual allegations of the

Amended Complaint. As such, the Court does not accept them as true when

evaluating the sufficiency of Brown’s claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. Supervisory officials such as Harry and Thompson are subject to

liability where it is shown that they “participated in violating the plaintiff's rights,

directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and

acquiesced” in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v.

Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (8d Cir. 2004) (citing Baker v.

Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)). “Allegations of participation or

actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate

particularity,” including the specifics of each defendant’s direct involvement in the

conduct that violated the plaintiffs rights or the source of each defendant's knowledge

of the violation and how his acquiescence contributed to it. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08.

See also Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354. The Amended Complaint alleges no facts to

support that Harry or Thompson participated in, authorized, or acquiesced in the

14

alleged misconduct of Harry or Thompson. It therefore fails to state a claim against

Harry or Thompson.

EK. Whether construed as a Fourth, Fourteenth, or First Amendment claim,

Brown’s loss-of-property claim against Vandernoof fails as a matter of law.

Brown frames his property destruction claim against Vandernoof as a violation

of the Fourth Amendment. So framed, the claim clearly fails because prisoners have

no reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells and no cognizable Fourth

Amendment right arising from the seizure or destruction of their property. See

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984). But the Court is obliged to construe

the factual allegations of a pro se plaintiffs complaint liberally and apply the law to

those allegations despite the plaintiffs confusion of legal theories. The Court will

therefore construe Brown’s claim against Vandernoof as a Fourteenth Amendment

due process claim, which more appropriately applies to a prisoner’s assertion that

state actors deprived him of personal property. So construed, however, the claim

fares no better.

‘Deprivation of inmate property by prison officials does not give rise to

cognizable due process claim if the prisoner has an adequate post-deprivation state

remedy.” Crosby v. Piazza, 465 Fed. Appx 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Hudson, 468

U.S. at 533). Adequate remedies were available here as Brown was afforded an

opportunity to file an administrative grievance. See Dip v. Brittain, 2026 WL

1362515, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2026). To the extent that Brown was dissatisfied

with the outcome of the administrative process, he could have filed a state court tort

15

action. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Fourteenth

Amendment claim for the loss of property with prejudice.

Brown also mentions the deprivation of his “legal papers” and “trial

transcripts” in connection with this claim. See, e.g., ECF No. 31-3, pp. 8-9. A

plaintiffs claim that prison officials misplaced or destroyed his legal material must

also be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. To state a cognizable

constitutional claim under § 1983 for the deprivation of legal property, a state

prisoner must proceed under one of two distinct legal theories: a First and Fourteenth

Amendment right of access to the courts, or a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due

process claim.

To the extent Brown asserts that the loss of his legal materials impeded his

ability to litigate, his claim is properly characterized as a denial of his constitutional

right of access to the courts. It is well-established that prisoners have a protected

right of access to the courts. See Bound v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). However,

to state a claim for a violation of this right, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he

suffered an “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 348, 349 (1996). To establish an

actual injury, a prisoner cannot merely allege that his papers were misplaced; he

must show that the loss of the materials directly frustrated or impeded his ability to

pursue a non-frivolous legal claim challenging his conviction or conditions of

confinement. Jd. at 354-55. Absent a showing that a pending appeal, habeas

petition, or civil rights action was dismissed or fundamentally compromised as a

direct result of the defendant’s actions, an access-to-the-courts claim cannot survive.

16

Brown's claim lacks such allegations. Although his grievance mentions an appeal in

state court and a “224 PCRA that was file[d] on 8-8-23,” Brown does not plead the

effect of his lost legal papers on those proceedings or the significance of that

deprivation to future proceedings. See, e.g., Shareef v. Moore, 844 Fed. Appx. 487,

488 (3d Cir. 2021) (alleged destruction of legal papers claim failed where plaintiff

failed to identify a nonfrivolous or arguable legal claim he lost, or what was contained

in his destroyed legal documents and how the destroyed documents would have led

to a different outcome). The Amended Complaint therefore fails to state an access-

to-courts claim against Vandernoof.

The Amended Complaint also references the First Amendment in connection

to Brown’s deprivation of property claim against Vandernoof. See ECF No. 31, § 29.

To the extent this reference can be construed as a First Amendment retaliation claim,

it also fails. A prisoner plaintiff asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim under

§ 1983, including one predicated on the destruction or deprivation of personal

property, must allege facts to support three elements. First, a plaintiff must allege

that he was engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment at the time of, or

in the period leading up to, the alleged retaliation. In the prison context, the most

commonly invoked protected activities are the filing of inmate grievances and the

pursuit of civil litigation, both of which are recognized as constitutionally protected.

See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (8d Cir. 2003). To support this element, the

plaintiff must factually identify the protected conduct. Conclusory allegations that

17

- the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct or exercised his First Amendment rights

are insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Second, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant took an adverse action

against him. In the retaliation context, an action is adverse if it would be “sufficient

to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights.”

Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229

F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)). This is an objective rather than subjective standard.

Courts have recognized that the deliberate destruction or confiscation of a prisoner’s

personal property, particularly property with legal, sentimental, or practical

significance, such as trial transcripts, legal papers, or personal correspondence, can

satisfy this element. However, a de minimis property deprivation will not.

Third, a plaintiff must allege facts to support a causal link between the

protected activity and the adverse action, specifically, that the protected conduct was

a “substantial or motivating factor” in the defendant’s decision to take the adverse

action. Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333-34. This is the element that most frequently proves

fatal to retaliation claims at the pleading stage, because a bare allegation that the

defendant “retaliated” against the plaintiff, without supporting facts from which

retaliatory motive can plausibly be inferred, is insufficient. Fantone, 780 F.3d at 191

(‘[A] prisoner's claim of retaliation fails if he cannot demonstrate that his

constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating factor in the defendants’

actions.”). A plausible inference of causation may be supported by temporal proximity

between the protected activity and the adverse action, see Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d

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417, 424 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that causation can be shown through “unusually

suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly

retaliatory action ...”), statements by the defendant indicating retaliatory animus, a

pattern of antagonism following the protected activity, or a combination of these

factors. Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267-68 (3d Cir. 2007).

“Because retaliation claims can be easily fabricated, district courts must view

prisoners’ retaliation claims with sufficient skepticism to avoid becoming entangled

in every disciplinary action taken against a prisoner.” Miskovitch v. Hostoffer, 721 □□

Supp. 2d 389, 396 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th

Cir.1996); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 USS.

1084 (1996); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995)). See also Adams v.

Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that retaliation claims are regarded with

some skepticism because “[e]very act of discipline by prison officials is by definition

‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it responds directly to prisoner misconduct). In this

case, the few facts alleged in Brown’s Amended Complaint are insufficient to support

the protected conduct and causation elements of a retaliation claim. Accordingly,

Brown’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Vandernoof will be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion □

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss

based on the Amended Complaint’s failure to allege facts to support any of Brown's

claims. Brown’s claim for money damages against the Defendants in their official

capacities and his due process claim based on destruction of his personal property

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will be dismissed with prejudice because any attempt to amend these claims would

be futile. All other claims will be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to file

a second amended complaint to allow Brown to attempt to cure the factual

insufficiencies identified in this Memorandum Opinion. If Brown fails to file a second

amended complaint by the deadline set by the Court’s dismissal order, the dismissal

of these claims will be converted to a dismissal with prejudice.

If this case proceeds beyond the pleading stage, the Court will schedule an

evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes regarding possible unavailability

of Brown’s administrative remedies in accordance with Small v. Camden County, 728

F.3d 265, 270-271 (3d Cir. 2013) and Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 208, 210 (3d Cir.

2018).

A separate order follows.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2026. □

ee Hk COURT:

RICHARD A. LANZILLO '

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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