Lopez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION

SANDRA LOPEZ, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 26-2143

)

GEORGE DUNCAN et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed by Plaintiff Sandra Lopez, an inmate

at Decatur Correctional Center. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5).

I. Complaint

A. Screening Standard

Plaintiff’s Complaint is before the Court for merit review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

which requires the Court to “screen” the pleading and identify and dismiss any legally

insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. A claim is defective if it “(1) is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

The Court accepts Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construes them liberally in his

favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements

and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that

is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted).

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff names Dr. George Duncan, the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”), Centurian Correctional Healthcare (Centurian), and Wexford Health Sources,

Incorporated (“Wexford”) as Defendants.

Plaintiff asserts that she initially saw Defendant Duncan in January 2024 for pain

she was experiencing in her hands and was told that she had arthritis. Based on that

diagnosis, Duncan issued Plaintiff a restriction order her physical activity. Plaintiff

explains that in May and July 2024, Duncan continued to issue restriction orders for her

continued hand pain. Plaintiff states she later filed grievances in an attempt to receive

medical care for her persistent hand pain. (Pl. Compl., Doc. 1 at 5.)

In July 2025, Plaintiff was referred to a specialist. Plaintiff notes that a magnetic

resonance imaging scan of her neck revealed deterioration of two spinal disks and

associated nerve compression damage. In February 2026, Plaintiff underwent surgery on

her neck, which removed two spinal disks. Plaintiff surmises that “if I had proper medical

care when I first saw [Defendant] Duncan back in 2024[,] the damage might not have been

so severe.” (Id. at 6.)

C. Analysis

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and

unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an

objective and subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Under

the objective component, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical condition is

sufficiently serious. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective

component, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id. In the medical care context, a “deliberate indifference” standard is used. Estelle,

429 U.S. at 104. A plaintiff may establish deliberate indifference by showing that a

defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.”

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). A defendant “must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Treatment decisions made by medical professionals are presumptively valid.

Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th Cir. 1998). “A medical professional

is entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally competent

professional would have so responded under those circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512

F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989

(7th Cir. 1998)). Thus, to be deliberately indifferent, a medical professional’s decision

must be “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or

standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the

decision on such a judgment.” Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th Cir.

1998) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim against Defendant Duncan. However, Plaintiff does not state plausible

claims against the remaining Defendants.

Defendants Centurian and Wexford can be held liable under § 1983 if an

unconstitutional act is caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its

officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is

widespread and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas

v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Woodward v. Corr. Med.

Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard for

municipal liability in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), applies to

corporations as well). “The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts

of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear

that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually

responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphases in original).

Plaintiff does not allege facts that establish or permit the Court to infer an official

policy or custom under any of the three conditions mentioned above. Thus, Plaintiff fails

to state a Monell claim against Centurian and Wexford. Plaintiff also does not state a

plausible claim against IDOC. A building, such as a jail or correctional facility, cannot be

sued under § 1983. Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012); see also White

v. Knight, 710 F. App’x 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he fact that a building is owned by a

corporate entity or a government agency does not make the building a suable person

under § 1983.”).

II. Counsel

Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court cannot require an

attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask

for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)

(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a

district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in

certain circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask

two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel

or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case,

does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654

(7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) is denied because she has not satisfied her

threshold burden of demonstrating that she attempted to hire counsel, which typically

requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) is DENIED.

2) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs claim against Defendant Duncan. Plaintiff’s claim proceeds in

Duncan’s individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be included in the

case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown

or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until

counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of service.

Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not filed

an Answer within ninety days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendant’s counsel has filed a responsive

pleading, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and dispositive motion

deadlines.

5) If Defendant Duncan no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the

entity for which Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

said Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s

forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and

shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

6) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days. A motion to dismiss is not an

answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal

Rules. The Answer and subsequent pleadings shall address the issues and claims

stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The

Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant

files a motion. Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or will be

considered.

7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive electronic

notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Therefore,

Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents that

Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not

apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are

not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and

responses directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to

the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a

motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel files an

appearance and the Court enters a scheduling order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

8) Defendant’s counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at her place of

confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in her

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a

change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this

lawsuit with prejudice.

10) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within thirty

days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal

service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will require that

Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

11) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

12) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendant under the standard

procedures.

ENTERED June 23, 2026.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE