Emrit

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

RONALD SATISH EMRIT,

a/k/a “Satish Dat Beast,”

a/k/a “Go Go Satish,”

Plaintiff,

Case No. 26-CV-00362-SEH-MTS

v.

SABRINA CARPENTER,

THE GRAMMYS/RECORDING

ACADEMY;

JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN-

JACKSON;

LADY GAGA;

VIVENDI UNIVERSAL;

UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP

(UMG);

NBC UNIVERSAL;

GENERAL ELECTRIC;

RCA;

COMCAST;

RECORDING INDUSTRY

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

(RIAA);

CARY SHERMAN,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit’s complaint [ECF No. 2]

and motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 3]. For the reasons set out

below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismisses his complaint without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings allegations of defamation, public

nuisance, industrial espionage, and tortious interference with business

relations/contracts against various music recording artists, recording

companies, and a Supreme Court Justice. [ECF No. 2]. Plaintiff seeks $500

billion dollars in money damages and a preliminary injunction prohibiting

Defendants “from advertising to the plaintiff on Cable TV broadcast.” [Id. at

8–9].

Plaintiff alleges that “the Grammys and its recording artists like Sabrina

Carpenter and Lady Gaga are committing defamation (libel and slander)

and/or the dignitary tort of the invasion of privacy by talking about President

Donald John trump [sic] in a negative manner ….” [ECF No. 2 at ¶ 30]. He

further avers that “the Grammys have become a public nuisance to everybody

in the worl [sic] who understands that neither Los Angeles nor network TV

(CBS) has any influence over a new music business ….” [Id. at ¶ 31]. Plaintiff

claims that “the Grammy Awards and network TV (ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox) are

committing industrial espionage by trying to compete with a new music

business with their outdated shows … which have a circus-like atmosphere

and from which nobody ever becomes a star.” [Id. at ¶ 32]. And finally,

Plaintiff contends that “larger companies like NFL and Toyota try to

interfere with smaller companies like Ditto Music by trying to monopolize

Amazon, Apple, and YouTube … to drive small companies like independent

musicians out of the market so that it would benefit major record labels ….”

[Id. at ¶ 33]. Notably, Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations against

Justice Ketanji Brown-Jackson, Vivendi Universal, Universal Music Group,

NBC Universal, General Electric, RCA, Comcast, Recording Industry

Association of America, or Cary Sherman.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff moves to file his action in forma pauperis. [ECF No. 3]. He states

that he has a net income of approximately $250 per month and essentially no

savings or assets. [ECF No. 3]. Based on the representations set forth in

Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. Plaintiff is

permitted to file and maintain this action to conclusion without prepayment

of fees and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, because authorization to

proceed in forma pauperis excuses only prepayment of the fee, Plaintiff

remains obligated to pay the full $350 filing fee when he is able. See Brown v.

Eppler, 725 F.3d 1221, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that authorization to

proceed in forma pauperis only excuses prepayment of the filing fee). Because

the Court authorizes Plaintiff to proceed without prepayment, he is not

required to pay the $55 administrative fee.

As Plaintiff has obtained leave to file in forma pauperis, his complaint is

subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 408

F.3d 1309, 1311 (10th Cir. 2005). Section 1915(e)(2) requires a district court

to dismiss a case if at any time the court determines that “the action … (i) is

frivolous or malicious [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted.” The Court construes Plaintiff’s pro se filings liberally. Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Frivolous

“[D]istrict courts have the authority and responsibility to ensure frivolous

cases are dissuaded.” Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 575 U.S. 632, 647

(2015). “[T]he right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor

unconditional … and there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to

prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious.” Tripati v. Beaman, 878

F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). “[A] complaint … is

frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The term “frivolous” also “embraces not

only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”

Id. However, a claim is not necessarily frivolous because it fails to state a

claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. at 327–330.

Plaintiff’s complaint is plainly frivolous. It names 12 defendants but fails

to allege any factual allegation against nine. Plaintiff states that he “is a

musician who conducts business with Amazon through Ditto Music of

England.” [ECF No. 2 at ¶ 33]. He alleges that the Grammys, Sabrina

Carpenter, and Lady Gaga have committed libel and slander by talking about

the President “in a negative manner,” that the Grammys are a public

nuisance, the Grammy Awards and network television have committed

“industrial espionage” by trying to compete with an internet-based music

business like Ditto, and that “larger companies … try to interfere with

smaller companies ….” [Id. at ¶¶ 30–33]. Because Plaintiff’s claims have no

basis “either in law or in fact,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, the complaint is

frivolous and should be dismissed.

B. Venue is not Proper in the Northern District of Oklahoma

Venue is also not proper in this district. Venue ordinarily exists in a

district (1) where any defendant resides (if all defendants are residents of the

state in which the district is located); (2) where a substantial part of the

events occurred; or (3) where any defendant is subject to personal

jurisdiction, if the action could not otherwise be brought elsewhere. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b). Under § 1915, a “district court may consider personal jurisdiction

and venue sua sponte only when the defense is obvious from the face of the

complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed.” Trujillo

v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, dismissal for improper venue under § 1915

is appropriate only “if it is clear that the plaintiff can allege no set of facts …

to support personal jurisdiction or venue.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, Plaintiff states that venue is proper in this district “pursuant to 28

U.S.C.A. Sections 1391 and 1400.” [ECF No. 2 at ¶ 22]. But he has not

alleged that the Northern District of Oklahoma is where any defendant

resides, where any of the events occurred, or where any of the defendants are

subject to personal jurisdiction. Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1400 relates to civil

actions pertaining to patent infringement, copyrights, or exclusive rights in

mask works or designs —none of which apply to this matter. Therefore,

Plaintiff has identified no arguable basis to sue in the Northern District of

Oklahoma.

As this district is an improper venue for Plaintiff’s action, the Court may

dismiss the action or transfer it to a different venue if the transfer is in the

interest of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in

which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall

dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district

or division in which it could have been brought.”). The Court finds that

transferring Plaintiff’s action to another district would not serve the interests

of justice. As explained above, Plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous. Plaintiff also

has a history of filing frivolous suits across the nation, and has been

subjected to filing restrictions in multiple other courts. See Emrit v. Grammy

Awards, No. 3:23-CV-00304-MPM-RP, 2023 WL 8654924, at *1 (N.D. Miss.

Dec. 14, 2023) (placing Plaintiff on filing restrictions when he “filed four

similarly frivolous cases in this district … and over 300 lawsuits

nationwide.”); Emrit v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, No. 2:22-CV-00110, 2022 WL

4287659, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2022) (collecting cases), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-00110, 2022 WL 3594518 (S.D.W. Va.

Aug. 23, 2022); Emrit v. Musk, No. 3:25-cv-00007-RRB, 2025 WL 1105176, at

*1 (D. Alaska Apr. 14, 2025) (“As a result of his litigation tactics, Plaintiff has

been determined to be a vexatious litigant in at least six district courts, and

the Ninth Circuit also has entered a pre-filing review order against

Plaintiff.”).

In this district, Plaintiff has been warned at least twice that filing another

frivolous complaint may subject him to filing restrictions. See Emrit v. Musk,

No. 25-CV-0016-CVE-MTS, 2025 WL 221990, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 16,

2025), aff’d, No. 25-5015, 2025 WL 1202111 (10th Cir. Apr. 25, 2025); Emrit

v. Obama, No. 26-CV-00136-JDR-CDL, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 11, 2026).

Plaintiff is warned once more that if he continues to file frivolous complaints

in this district, he may be subjected to filing restrictions.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed without

prejudice, pursuant to § 1406(a) and § 1915(e). The complaint is dismissed

without leave to amend, because any amendment would be futile.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set out above, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma

pauperis [ECF No. 3] is GRANTED and his complaint [ECF No. 2] is

DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of June, 2026.

Sara E. Hill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE