BROWN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAYMOND C. BROWN, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

:

v. : NO. 25-CV-6781

:

DETECTIVE JOHN DOE 1, et al., :

Defendants :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9th day of March 2026, upon consideration of Plaintiff Raymond C.

Brown’s pro se Complaint (ECF No. 1), it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, the Complaint is

DISMISSED, in part, with prejudice and, in part, without prejudice, as follows:

a. Brown’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims are DISMISSED, with

prejudice, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(i);

b. Brown’s malicious prosecution claims, and his official capacity claims are

DISMISSED, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(i);

c. Brown’s state law claims are DISMISSED, without prejudice, for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Brown may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this

Order. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended

complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and state the basis

for Brown’s claims against each defendant. The amended complaint must also provide as much

identifying information for the defendants as possible. Brown may refer to a defendant by last

name only if that is the only identifying information possessed. If Brown wishes to name

individuals for whom he does not have any identifying information, he may refer to those

individuals as John Doe #1, John Doe #2, etc.1 The amended complaint shall be a complete

document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a

claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Brown should be mindful of the Court’s reasons

for dismissing the claims in his initial Complaint as explained in the Court’s Memorandum. Upon

the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the

Court.

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Brown a blank copy of the Court’s form

complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number. Brown

may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.

4. If Brown does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his

Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date

of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case.

Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action

number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff

does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his

intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.”

(quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse

Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its

discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’

1 Without the name of at least one individual or entity, however, the Court may be unable to direct service

of any amended complaint that Brown may file.

decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that

failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).

5. If Brown fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Brown

intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.2 See Weber,

939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred

from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO

Judge, United States District Court

2 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984),

is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on her complaint. See Weber,

939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment

of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes

adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend her complaint, leaving the

case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per

curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or

where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing

of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175

(D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party

willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).