The opinion
No. 517 June 10, 2026 415
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Don L. Beamon,
Don L. BEAMON,
Petitioner,
v.
SAIF CORPORATION
and MMNW Holding Co - Metro Metals Northwest,
Respondents.
Workers’ Compensation Board
2203993;
A182876
Argued and submitted January 6, 2026.
Jodie Anne Phillips Polich argued the cause for petitioner.
Also on the opening brief were Law Offices of Jodie Anne
Phillips Polich, P.C.; Bailey Oswald and Bottini, Bottini, &
Oswald, PC. Also on the reply brief was Law Offices of Jodie
Anne Phillips Polich, P.C.
Daniel Walker argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondents.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
KAMINS, J.
Reversed and remanded.
Tookey, P. J., dissenting.
416 Beamon v. SAIF
Cite as 350 Or App 415 (2026) 417
KAMINS, J.
At issue in this petition for judicial review of an
order from the Workers’ Compensation Board (board) is
which party bears the burden of proof to demonstrate
whether a compensable condition is the major contribut-
ing cause of the need for treatment of a combined condition
under ORS 656.266(2)(a). Claimant had an on-the-job injury
of a disc herniation, which was accepted as compensable. He
later sought treatment for a combined claim of both the disc
herniation and his preexisting lumbar spondylosis, which
SAIF, and then the board, denied. Claimant raises two
assignments of error: (1) the board erroneously interpreted
claimant’s initial burden of proof under ORS 656.266(2)(a);
and (2) the board’s order is not based on substantial evi-
dence because, after failing to properly shift the burden to
SAIF after claimant proved the existence of a combined con-
dition, the board did not require SAIF to produce evidence
that the accepted condition was not the major contributing
cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition.
We reverse and remand.
The facts are not in dispute. While squatting at
work, clamant injured his lower back, developing leg pain
and weakness. Claimant was eventually diagnosed with a
disc herniation in his lumbar spine as well as lumbar radic-
ulopathy and foraminal stenosis (disc herniation), a condi-
tion SAIF accepted as being caused by his work. Despite
exhausting conservative nonsurgical approaches, claimant
continued to experience pain and weakness in his left leg.
He then sought the acceptance of a claim for a “combined
condition” of his already accepted disc herniation with a
preexisting arthritic condition of lumbar spondylosis. SAIF
denied the request, and claimant appealed to the board.
The board evaluated the record and upheld SAIF’s
denial. Relying in large part on the report and testimony
of Dr. Button, the board acknowledged that the spondy-
losis was a preexisting condition that combined with the
accepted condition of disc herniation to contribute to the
disability or need for treatment of that herniation. The
board reasoned that Button’s opinion supported the con-
clusion that “the disc herniation itself was a compensable
418 Beamon v. SAIF
combined condition, * * * not that the work event [disc her-
niation] was a material contributing cause of claimant’s dis-
ability or need for treatment of the spondylosis condition.”
In the board’s view, that opinion did not suggest that the
work accident was a material contributing cause of claim-
ant’s disability or need for treatment of spondylosis. Thus,
the board reasoned “claimant has not carried his initial
burden to show that the work accident [disc herniation] was
a material contributing cause of his disability or need for
treatment of the lumbar spondylosis condition.” This peti-
tion for judicial review followed.
We review the board’s legal conclusions for errors of
law, ORS 183.482(8)(a); Curry Educational Service Dist. v.
Bengtson, 175 Or App 252, 254, 27 P3d 526 (2001), and its
factual findings for substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c);
Greenbriar Ag Management v. Lemus, 156 Or App 499, 505,
965 P2d 493 (1998), rev den, 328 Or 594 (1999).
Here, claimant sought to establish the compensa-
bility of a “combined condition,” arguing that the accepted
disc herniation combined with the preexisting arthritic con-
dition of spondylosis. A “combined condition” is a condition
that occurs “[i]f an otherwise compensable injury combines
at any time with a preexisting condition to cause or prolong
disability or a need for treatment.” Pedro v. SAIF, 313 Or
App 34, 39, 495 P3d 183 (2021) (citing ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B)).
The “otherwise compensable injury” refers to a medical con-
dition, not a work event or accident. Id. (citing Brown v.
SAIF, 361 Or 241, 272, 391 P3d 773 (2017)). Once the worker
establishes a combined condition, “the employer shall bear
the burden of proof to establish the otherwise compensable
injury is not, or is no longer, the major contributing cause
of the disability of the combined condition or * * * the need
for treatment[.]” ORS 656.266(2)(a). The shifting of the bur-
den to the employer is an “exception” to the “ordinary” course
where the claimant bears the burden to prove the compen-
sability of a claim. Keystone RV Co.-Thor Industries, Inc. v.
Erickson, 277 Or App 631, 633, 373 P3d 1122 (2016).
Here, claimant established the “compensable injury”
—i.e., medical condition—of a disc herniation. Claimant then
sought coverage for the combined condition of that accepted
Cite as 350 Or App 415 (2026) 419
herniation with his preexisting spondylosis. Resolving that
request requires a two-step determination: the board must
determine (1) whether claimant established a combined con-
dition, and, if so, (2) whether the employer met its burden
to establish that the accepted condition is not the major
contributing cause of the need for treatment or disabil-
ity of the combined condition. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) (“[T]he
combined condition is compensable only if, so long as and
to the extent that the otherwise compensable injury is the
major contributing cause of the disability of the combined
condition or the major contributing cause of the need for
treatment of the combined condition.”).
At the first step, claimant met his burden to estab-
lish a combined condition. As described above, claimant
was required to demonstrate that the accepted disc herni-
ation combined with the preexisting spondylosis to cause
the need for treatment. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B). In the record
before the board, Button opined that “the spondylosis was
a portion of the reason that his disc herniated and led to
his need for treatment.” Indeed, as the board determined,
that “opinion supports the conclusion that the spondylosis
was a preexisting condition that combined with the work
event [disc herniation] to contribute to claimant’s disability
or need for treatment of the disc herniation.” That is suf-
ficient to meet claimant’s burden to establish a combined
condition.1
1
The dissent asserts that claimant sought compensability only for the spon-
dylosis “component” of the combined condition and faults our analysis because
it does not require claimant to demonstrate the need for treatment “of the spon-
dylosis.” 350 Or App at 423 (emphasis in original) (Tookey, P. J., dissenting). In
the dissent’s view, a “claimant’s initial burden in a combined condition claim is to
establish that an ‘otherwise compensable condition’ combined with a preexisting
condition ‘to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment’ of the claimed
combined condition.” Id. at 422 (emphasis in original) (quoting ORS 656.005
(7)(a)(B) (citing Keystone RV Co.-Thor Industries, Inc. v. Erickson, 277 Or App 631,
373 P3d 1122 (2016); Giffin v. Dish Network Services, 296 Or App 233, 437 P3d
252 (2019)), and here, claimant only provided evidence of a need for treatment of
disc herniation and not spondylosis. But nowhere in the statute, or the cases cited
by the dissent, does that emphasized language appear. Claimant does not need to
prove causation separately as to each component of the combined condition once
he has already proven that the otherwise separate conditions combined to cause a
need for treatment. Ultimately, the dissent’s analysis suffers from the same flaw
as the board’s, in that it requires a claimant to prove more than the fact that a
work injury combined with a preexisting condition to cause a disability or need for
treatment.
420 Beamon v. SAIF
The board, however, did not proceed to step two.
Rather, it determined that, despite demonstrating that a
compensable injury combined with a preexisting condition
to cause the need for treatment, claimant nevertheless
failed to meet his burden. That is so, according to the board,
because Button’s opinion “supports the conclusion that the
disc herniation itself was a compensable combined condi-
tion” separate and apart from the spondylosis. As such, the
board required claimant to show, as part of his initial bur-
den to establish a combined condition, that the spondylosis
was separately, materially caused by the disc herniation.
Because the disc herniation did not cause the need for treat-
ment of the “disputed lumbar spondylosis condition,” the
board denied the compensability of the claim.
The board’s reasoning veered off course in two
respects. First, the herniation itself could not have been a
“compensable combined condition;” rather, a combined con-
dition is “two separate conditions that combine.” Carrillo v.
SAIF, 310 Or App 8, 11, 484 P3d 398, rev den, 368 Or 560
(2021) (emphasis in original). Second, the board appears to
have conflated steps (1) and (2) of the combined condition
analysis. Once it determined that claimant had established
a combined condition, the board’s next task was to deter-
mine whether the employer met its burden to show that the
accepted condition was not the major contributing cause of
the need for treatment. Rather than do that, the board deter-
mined that claimant failed to prove that the accepted por-
tion of the condition was the material cause of the need for
treatment.
SAIF concedes that the board determined that
“claimant did not meet his initial burden under ORS
656.005(7)(a)(B) to prove the existence of a combined condi-
tion because the work accident was not a material contrib-
uting cause of claimant’s disability or need for treatment
[of spondylosis].” According to SAIF, that analysis is cor-
rect because it is claimant’s burden to demonstrate that the
spondylosis qualifies as “the ‘otherwise compensable injury’
component of the combined condition.” That analysis misses
the mark; the disc herniation is the otherwise compensa-
ble injury, not the spondylosis. Under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B),
Cite as 350 Or App 415 (2026) 421
the two components of a combined condition are “an other-
wise compensable injury” and “a preexisting condition.”
The spondylosis is the preexisting condition, and claimant
is not required to demonstrate that that preexisting con-
dition of spondylosis itself is compensable on its own. As
noted, claimant needs only to establish that the hernia-
tion (a compensable injury) combined with the spondylosis
(a preexisting condition) to cause the disability or need for
treatment. Under the board’s own findings, claimant did
that. Now the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate
that the herniation is not the “major contributing cause of
the need for the treatment.” SAIF’s remaining arguments
support the conclusion that the disc herniation is, in fact,
not the major contributing cause of the need for treatment,
a point that it will be free to make—and support—to meet
its burden on remand.
We cannot be sure, on this record, that the board’s
shifting of the burden of proof would not have made a dif-
ference in the outcome. We therefore reverse and remand for
the board to apply the correct burden of proof.
Reversed and remanded.
TOOKEY, P. J., dissenting.
As the majority correctly points out, there is medical
evidence that claimant’s preexisting spondylosis combined
with his work injury to cause a need for treatment of the
accepted herniated disc condition. But the majority incor-
rectly concludes that that evidence was sufficient to meet
claimant’s initial burden to establish the existence of a com-
bined condition for treatment of the preexisting spondylosis.
That conclusion is the result of a misconception of claimant’s
statutory burden to establish a combined condition.
As I describe below, under a proper application of
claimant’s statutory burden, the board correctly held that
claimant had not established a combined condition. I there-
fore dissent.
A combined condition arises when “an otherwise
compensable injury” combines with a preexisting condition
“to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment.”
422 Beamon v. SAIF
ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).1 Thus, a cognizable combined condi-
tion is one that causes or prolongs disability or a need for
treatment. Generally, the claimant bears the burden to prove
the compensability of an injury or disease. ORS 656.266(1).2
That means, as the parties agree, that a claimant seeking
compensation for disability or treatment of a combined con-
dition has the initial burden to establish the existence of the
combined condition for which benefits are sought.
Here, claimant seeks compensation for treatment of
his preexisting spondylosis as a component of a combined
condition. As the parties agree, claimant, as the party seek-
ing compensation for a combined condition, had the burden
to establish the existence of the claimed combined condi-
tion. The majority concludes that claimant met that burden
through Button’s opinion that claimant’s preexisting spon-
dylosis had combined with the mechanism of claimant’s
work injury to cause or prolong disability or a need for treat-
ment of the herniated disc. That was evidence of a combined
condition, but it was not evidence of the combined condition
for which claimant seeks compensation.
A claimant’s initial burden in a combined condition
claim is to establish that an “otherwise compensable con-
dition” combined with a preexisting condition “to cause or
prolong disability or a need for treatment” of the claimed
combined condition. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B); Keystone RV Co.-
Thor Industries, Inc. v. Erickson, 277 Or App 631, 373 P3d
1122 (2016); Giffin v. Dish Network Services, 296 Or App
233, 437 P3d 252 (2019). Here, the claimed combined con-
dition for which claimant seeks benefits is the preexisting
spondylosis.
1
ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) provides:
“If an otherwise compensable injury combines at any time with a pre-
existing condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the
combined condition is compensable only if, so long as and to the extent that
the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the dis-
ability of the combined condition or the major contributing cause of the need
for treatment of the combined condition.”
2
ORS 656.266(1) provides:
“The burden of proving that an injury or occupational disease is compensable
and of proving the nature and extent of any disability resulting therefrom is
upon the worker.”
Cite as 350 Or App 415 (2026) 423
Thus, to establish a cognizable combined condition,
claimant’s burden was to show that the compensable disc
injury (the otherwise compensable injury) combined with
the preexisting spondylosis to cause or prolong disability or
the need for treatment of the spondylosis. Although Button’s
opinion was evidence that the preexisting spondylosis com-
bined with the work injury to cause or prolong disability
or the need for treatment of the herniated disc, there is no
evidence of the converse—that the herniated disc combined
with the preexisting spondylosis to cause a need for treat-
ment of the spondylosis.
The board thus correctly held that Button’s opinion
was not sufficient to meet claimant’s burden to establish a
combined condition. For that reason, I would reject claim-
ant’s contention that the board misapplied the burden of
proof and would affirm.