Hamilton and Hamilton

No. 565 June 17, 2026 759

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion

pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited

except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Marriage of

Brigitte Doris HAMILTON,

Petitioner-Respondent,

and

Brody Lance HAMILTON,

Respondent-Appellant.

Marion County Circuit Court

21DR21405; A179632

Audrey J. Broyles, Judge.

Submitted December 5, 2024.

Chelsea D. Armstrong and Armstrong Chai, LLC filed

the brief for appellant.

Lauren Saucy filed the brief for respondent.

Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Pagán,

Judge.

PAGÁN, J.

Affirmed.

760 Hamilton and Hamilton

PAGÁN, J.

Husband appeals from a judgment of dissolution

of marriage. He asserts two assignments of error, arguing

that the trial court erred by (1) denying him any mainte-

nance spousal support, and (2) awarding wife attorney fees.

Husband requests de novo review. He argues that the trial

court abused its discretion because it did not use the proper

statutory analysis for determining the amount of his spou-

sal support award, and that considerations of equity did not

support requiring him to pay $35,000 of wife’s attorney fees.

We decline to review de novo and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Standard of Review

As a preliminary matter, ORS 19.415(3)(b) grants

us discretion to review an equitable proceeding such as this

one de novo. We conclude that this is not an “exceptional

case” that overcomes the “presumption against the exercise

of discretion.” ORAP 5.40(8)(c).

The determination of what amount of spousal sup-

port is just and equitable is discretionary. Berg and Berg,

250 Or App 1, 2, 279 P3d 286 (2012). We review the trial

court’s factual findings for any evidence in the record and

its discretionary determinations for abuse of discretion. Id.

A trial court abuses its discretion in determining a spou-

sal support award if the court misapplies the statutory and

equitable considerations in ORS 107.105(1)(d). Id.

B. Facts

The parties agree on the material facts regarding

their marriage. Husband and wife were married in 2002.

They had two children, one born in 2007, the other in 2010.

Both husband and wife had the same employment for most

of the marriage. Wife had been employed at SAIF since

2001, beginning as an administrative assistant and working

her way up to her current position as Director of Business

and Software Solutions. Husband had been employed by

Suburban Water District since 2007 and had remained

in the same position during his time there. At the time of

dissolution, wife’s gross salary was $15,258.79 per month,

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 759 (2026) 761

with a net pay of $9,078.31 per month, and husband’s gross

wages averaged $5,676.33 per month, with a net pay in the

range of $3,900-$4,250 per month. The court also found that

husband made additional income from gambling and crypto

currency investments, although it did not assign a mone-

tary value to that additional income because it determined

it did not have sufficient records to ascertain an average

monthly amount. The court did not consider that additional

income when calculating child support but did consider it

when assessing husband’s earning potential for calculating

spousal support. The court ultimately ordered husband to

pay wife $629 a month in child support and for husband to

receive no spousal support.

In its order deciding spousal support, the trial court

made the following relevant findings:

“Regarding his request for maintenance spousal support,

while this is a long term marriage and Wife may at this

time have a higher monthly income than Husband, the

court finds no other criteria weigh in favor of Husband’s

requested award. Husband did not function as a home-

maker at any time during the marriage, Husband worked

through the entirety of the marriage and was not out of the

job market for any significant period of time, and Husband

did not defer any opportunity to advance his own career

to support either Wife or the family. At this time Husband

has income from his current employment that alone would

make him fully self supporting. The court has articulated

repeatedly that the goal in an award of spousal support is

not to equalize the parties’ income. More importantly in

this case, the court finds that Husband has historically gen-

erated income from his investing that adds to his available

resources. Husband will continue to do so moving forward.

While the court has not added a specific dollar amount to

that figure in setting Husband’s income for child support

calculation purposes, the court finds that such invest-

ment income is significant and adds to Husband’s avail-

able resources. In addition, Husband is currently qualified

for higher paying jobs with no further training. Husband,

through these other opportunities, could add even more to

resources available to his monthly discretionary spending.

The fact that Husband has made no efforts to pursue bet-

ter paying employment opportunities is Husband’s choice,

but it would be inappropriate to require Wife to supplement

762 Hamilton and Hamilton

Husband’s current income. Finally, the court finds that

Wife will have significant custodial and parenting respon-

sibilities post-divorce, which will limit or eliminate any

ability for Wife to pay a spousal support award. An award

of spousal maintenance is therefore inappropriate in this

case.”

In the court’s subsequent finding, which determined parent-

ing time and distribution of marital assets, it stated, “The

court adopts the facts, reasoning, and legal argument set

out in Wife’s trial memorandum as if more fully set forth

as the court’s ruling herein, other than Wife’s proposal to

allow Husband immediate alternating weekend parenting

time” and expressed that it was “concerned that Husband

purposefully manipulated valuation of various accounts

through not providing documents (his recent savings state-

ments), and providing evidence of account balances (crypto)

that showed no documented dates * * *.”

Shortly after the general judgment was entered,

wife requested attorney fees, claiming she was entitled to

an award of reasonable attorney fees under ORS 20.075 and

ORS 107.105. Husband objected to her statement of attorney

fees. The court considered the parties’ arguments and exhib-

its and concluded that husband had taken unreasonable posi-

tions, adopting the statements in affidavits attached to wife’s

statement of attorney fees as its findings, and awarding wife

$35,000 in attorney fees. Husband timely appealed both the

dissolution judgment and the award of attorney fees.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Spousal Support

Husband argues that the trial court abused its dis-

cretion when it awarded him no spousal support despite the

difference in income between him and wife. We disagree.

Our standard of review requires us to accept the

trial court’s factual findings as true if there is any evidence

to support them and review its discretionary determinations

with deference. See Berg, 250 Or App at 2. Furthermore, “[i]f

the trial court did not make express findings on a particular

issue in dispute, we assume that the trial court found the

facts in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusion.”

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 759 (2026) 763

Varro and Varro, 300 Or App 716, 717, 454 P3d 35 (2019)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Based on that standard,

we conclude that the trial court did not misapply the statu-

tory and equitable framework of ORS 107.105.

ORS 107.105(1)(d) designates three categories of

spousal support: transitional support, which is intended to

help a spouse attain education and training to prepare for

reentry into the job market; compensatory support, which

is awarded when one spouse has made a significant finan-

cial or other contribution to the education, career, or earn-

ing capacity of the other party; and maintenance support,

which is intended “to enable the parties to live separately

at a standard of living not overly disproportionate to that

enjoyed by them during the marriage, to the extent possi-

ble.” Hendgen and Hendgen, 242 Or App 242, 250, 255 P3d

551 (2011) (internal citations omitted). ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C)

provides the following factors for the court to consider when

determining an award of maintenance spousal support:

“(i) The duration of the marriage;

“(ii) The age of the parties;

“(iii) The health of the parties, including their physi-

cal, mental and emotional condition;

“(iv) The standard of living established during the

marriage;

“(v) The relative income and earning capacity of the

parties, recognizing that the wage earner’s continuing

income may be a basis for support distinct from the income

that the supported spouse may receive from the distribu-

tion of marital property;

“(vi) A party’s training and employment skills;

“(vii)–A party’s work experience;

“(viii)–The financial needs and resources of each party;

“(ix) The tax consequences to each party;

“(x) A party’s custodial and child support responsibil-

ities; and

“(xi) Any other factors the court deems just and

equitable.”

764 Hamilton and Hamilton

Here, the trial court expressly or implicitly tracked

those factors in making its determination. In Finding 15,

the court stated, “Regarding his request for maintenance

spousal support, while this is a long term marriage and

Wife may at this time have a higher monthly income than

Husband, the court finds no other criteria weigh in favor of

Husband’s requested award.” The trial court’s oral remarks

and wife’s trial memo—parts of which the trial court incor-

porated by reference into its findings—support the specific

findings for the equitable factors. Husband and wife were

46 at the time of dissolution, meaning they both had many

years of earning capacity ahead of them. While the court did

express concern for husband’s mental health, those concerns

were focused on the impact on husband’s relationship with

his children and the court gave no indication that it found

that those concerns impacted husband’s ability to support

himself. There was evidence that the family’s standard of

living was comfortable and included modest vacations, ath-

letic pursuits, and entertainment, however the family had

also incurred substantial credit card and tax debt, even with

their combined incomes. With regards to earning capacity,

the court noted that husband had at times made significant

additional income with his crypto currency investments,

and the court found that husband was manipulative in his

testimony and potentially hiding cash, crypto currency, or

other marital assets. The court specifically expressed frus-

tration with the quality of the documentation of husband’s

investment accounts, finding that some of those documents

had no dates or were not provided at all, which impeded the

court’s ability to accurately determine how much money to

attribute to husband’s investment income. The court also

found that husband would need no further training or edu-

cation to pursue higher paying employment opportunities in

his field, and moreover, that husband’s current employment

was enough to keep him fully self-supporting. We can fur-

ther infer that the court considered the tax implications of

wife having to pay the tax on spousal support payments at

her higher tax bracket as argued in wife’s trial memoran-

dum and found that that factor favored no spousal support

award. Last, the court gave husband no parenting time with

the children and found that wife would have significant

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 759 (2026) 765

custodial and parenting responsibilities post-divorce, which

reduced her ability to pay spousal support.

Given that the record supports the trial court’s

express and implicit findings regarding the ORS 107.105

(1)(d)(C) factors to determine maintenance support, the

court did not abuse its discretion in awarding husband no

spousal support.

Husband nevertheless argues that the court did

abuse its discretion because it did not adequately analyze the

statutory factors, focused on factors that were either unre-

lated to spousal support or were factors that were appro-

priate considerations to other categories of support, and

made unsupported findings regarding husband’s earning

potential. As discussed above, we determine that the court

expressly or implicitly made findings on the statutory fac-

tors for maintenance support. Husband’s second argument

is a closer question; however, we conclude that the court did

not abuse its discretion by considering additional factors.

Husband argues that the trial court misapplied the statu-

tory and equitable factors of ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C) because

the court’s order and oral rulings repeatedly focused on

factors more related to compensatory spousal support and

what the court felt husband “deserved.” Some of the trial

court’s oral statements focused on how wife had “earned” her

money and was entitled to spend it. Additionally, the court

stated that it believed husband did not meet the “thresh-

olds” to qualify under the law for spousal support, despite

the governing statute, ORS 107.105(1)(d), having no thresh-

old requirements. The trial court further reasoned that that

husband did not function as a homemaker, never deferred

any opportunity to advance his own career to support wife

or his family, and that wife worked her way from an entry-

level position to a director while husband’s career has been

largely static—factors that are more relevant to an award of

compensatory spousal support under ORS 107.105(1)(d)(B).

While we agree with husband that those factors are

not among the enumerated statutory factors for determining

maintenance support, ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C)(xi) provides that

the court may consider “[a]ny other factors the court deems

just and equitable.” Moreover, the court’s consideration of

766 Hamilton and Hamilton

those additional factors did not undermine its analysis of

the enumerated statutory factors which, as discussed above,

supported its exercise of discretion to award no spousal sup-

port to husband.

Last, husband’s argument that the court improp-

erly determined that his earning potential was higher than

his salary due to his crypto currency investments presents

a close question but we conclude that the court did not err

because (1) the court clearly stated that while it did believe

husband had access to more funds, he was self-supporting on

his salary alone and (2) the trial court’s inability to identify

a specific amount of additional funds was due in large part

to insufficient documentation of husband’s investments.

First, irrespective of its other findings, the court’s

finding that husband could be self-supporting based on his

current salary was supported by evidence in the record.

While husband’s uniform support declaration showed that

his costs outweighed his income, that was also true of wife’s

uniform support declaration, essentially showing that both

parties had been living outside their means and would likely

have to make sacrifices to their standard of living. The court

concluded that, based on husband’s salary and wife reliev-

ing husband of many expenses related to their marital debt

and their children, he would be able to maintain a propor-

tional standard of living.

Second, we have concluded in prior cases that a

court may determine that a party’s “earning potential” is

higher than the party’s income at the time of dissolution,

so long as the assessment of earning potential is based on

more than mere speculation. For example, in Hendgen, we

reversed the trial court’s assessment of spousal support

that was based on the likelihood that the husband would

have additional income in the future. 242 Or App at 250-

51. There, the husband’s income at the time of the dissolu-

tion was entirely passive income from property he owned.

Id. at 249. We determined that the husband did have an

earning capacity above his current income because he could

(and was likely to) start working again, but we nevertheless

reversed, concluding that “it would be pure speculation to

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 759 (2026) 767

place a dollar figure on what that additional income might

be.” Id. at 250.

Husband’s situation, at first glance, appears similar

to the one in Hendgen; however, unlike in that case, here,

husband was actively engaged in the income generating

activities (investing, gambling) at the time of dissolution. It

was not activity he might choose to do to supplement his

income in the future like the husband in Hendgen. Wife pro-

vided testimony and evidence in the form of the family’s tax

documents, which showed that husband’s investment and

gambling income contributed to their taxable income. That

the court struggled to identify a dollar amount that it could

properly attribute to husband’s investment income was due

to husband providing poor documentation of the investment

accounts. The court found that husband’s crypto currency

account statements lacked credibility because they were

undated and thus the court could not determine whether

husband had provided a full, accurate accounting of those

investments. The court also found that husband lacked cred-

ibility and that he was potentially hiding and manipulating

his cash, funds, and crypto currency resources. Husband’s

equivocal and evasive statements regarding his use of mar-

ital funds, the past profitability of his investments, and the

shortcomings in his documentation of his crypto currency

are sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding

that husband’s earning potential was higher than his salary.

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of spousal

support.

B. Attorney Fees

We review a trial court’s discretionary decision

to award attorney fees for abuse of discretion. See ORS

107.135(8); ORS 20.075(3). When a trial court’s discretion is

based on its determination of predicate questions of law and

fact, those predicate questions may implicate independent

standards of review. Callen and Callen, 307 Or App 714,

718, 479 P3d 313 (2020). We will accept the trial court’s fac-

tual findings if there is any evidence in the record to support

them. Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 359 Or 63, 116,

376 P3d 960 (2016). Whether a party’s conduct is objectively

768 Hamilton and Hamilton

unreasonable is a question of law, which we review for legal

error. Callen, 307 Or App at 718.

Husband argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by awarding wife $35,000 in attorney fees. We

disagree because the trial court’s factual findings that hus-

band knew his proposed parenting plan might further dam-

age his relationship with his children and that husband’s

manipulation and possible hiding of marital assets was

intended to mislead the court show that husband’s positions

were unreasonable.1 Subsequently, the trial court did not

err by finding that husband’s unreasonable positions pro-

tracted the litigation, increasing the amount of fees that

wife accrued, and that paying wife’s attorney fees would

appropriately deter husband from taking unreasonable

positions in the future. Finally, the trial court did not err

by finding that husband would be able to pay the attorney

fees from the equalizing payment he received. Because we

conclude that the trial court’s legal conclusions and factual

findings underpinning its award of fees were supported, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion. As a result, we affirm

the court’s attorney fee award.

Affirmed.

1

Husband argues his positions were reasonable by comparing his proposed

positions to wife’s settlement offers, stating that the fact that his proposals for

parenting time and spousal support were moderately higher does not make them

unreasonable based on his knowledge at the time. However, husband’s argument

does not address the court’s findings that underly our decision here.