Matteson v. LeafFilterNorth, LLC (A184754)

744 June 17, 2026 No. 562

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion

pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited

except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Thomas MATTESON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LEAFFILTER NORTH, LLC,

a foreign limited liability company,

and Sally Bloomstrom, individually,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

Zack HICKMAN,

individually;

Lumber Installation Group, LLC,

a domestic limited liability company;

and Jason Lumber,

individually and as the single member of

Lumber Installation Group, LLC,

Defendants.

Washington County Circuit Court

23CV27227; A184754

Andrew Erwin, Judge.

Submitted October 15, 2025.

Thomas Matteson filed the briefs pro se.

Melanie E. Rose, Duncan J. Campbell, and Smith Freed

Eberhard, PC, filed the brief for respondents.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and

Hellman, Judge.

ORTEGA, P. J.

Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 744 (2026) 745

ORTEGA, P. J.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendants LeafFilter

North, LLC, Lumber Installation Group, LLC, Jason

Lumber, Zack Hickman, and Sally Bloomstrom, seeking

declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages,

following a dispute that arose relating to his work install-

ing LeafFilter products.1 As relevant here, plaintiff alleged

statutory claims against Bloomstrom and LeafFilter based

on ORS chapters 652 and 653, (the wage claims) and ORS

chapter 658 (the licensing claims), as well as declaratory

and injunctive claims based on those statutes. The trial

court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment

under ORCP 47 and, following a hearing, dismissed plain-

tiff’s claims. Plaintiff now appeals from the general judg-

ment of dismissal, challenging the denial of his motion to

amend the complaint and the grant of summary judgment

to defendants, and raising other arguments about conduct of

the proceedings. Having reviewed plaintiff’s arguments on

appeal, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s

motion to amend was within its allowable discretion, that

it did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, and that there is no merit to any of plaintiff’s

other assignments of error. Therefore, we affirm.

Motion to amend. Plaintiff assigns error to the

denial of his motion to amend the complaint. “We review a

trial court’s ruling on a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint for abuse of discretion. In applying that standard,

we uphold the trial court’s decision unless it exercises its

discretion in a manner that is unjustified by, and clearly

against, reason and evidence.” Alexander v. State of Oregon,

283 Or App 582, 590, 390 P3d 1109 (2017) (citations omitted).

We consider the following factors in evaluating whether the

trial court abused its discretion: “(1) the proposed amend-

ment’s nature and its relationship to the existing pleadings;

(2) the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party; (3) the timing

1

The claims against Lumber Installation Group, LLC, and Jason Lumber

were voluntarily dismissed. The claims against Zack Hickman and the wage-

related claims against Sally Bloomstrom were dismissed under ORCP 21 A, and

we affirmed that dismissal in a nonprecedential memorandum opinion, also issu-

ing today. Matteson v. LeafFilter North, LLC, 350 Or App 736 (2026) (nonprec-

edential memorandum opinion).

746 Matteson v. LeafFilterNorth, LLC (A184754)

of the proposed amendment; and (4) the colorable merit of

the proposed amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s proposed amendments included, among

other things, adding three defendants associated with

LeafFilter’s parent company and additional claims regard-

ing those defendants, as well as unlawful employment dis-

crimination claims under ORS chapter 659A. The trial court

held a hearing and denied plaintiff’s motion to amend the

complaint, because plaintiff’s proposed amendments were

dependent on facts that were at issue in defendants’ pending

motion for summary judgment. As to the proposed amend-

ment to include additional defendants and licensing claims,

the trial court determined that if plaintiff is unable to estab-

lish that Bloomstrom or her employer received compensa-

tion for supplying labor—which was at issue on summary

judgment—they would not qualify as a construction labor con-

tractor for the purpose of the licensing claims regardless of

which named entity employed Bloomstrom. As to the discrim-

ination claims, those claims would be predicated on proof of

an employer-employee relationship between the corporation

and plaintiff—also at issue on summary judgment—and the

claims appeared to be time-barred. On the basis of the record

before it, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its dis-

cretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.

Summary Judgment. Plaintiff assigns error to the

grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The mov-

ing party is entitled to summary judgment if “the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, declarations, and admissions on file

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter

of law.” ORCP 47 C. “No genuine issue as to a material fact

exists if, based on the record before the court viewed in a

manner most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively

reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party

on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary

judgment.” ORCP 47 C. We conclude that the trial court

did not err in dismissing the wage claims and the licensing

claims.

Plaintiff’s wage claims against LeafFilter were based

on ORS chapter 652, relating to payment and collection of

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 744 (2026) 747

wages, and ORS chapter 653 as it relates to minimum wage.

Both of those categories of claims are predicated on the

existence of an employer-employee relationship. See ORS

652.320(7) (a “wage claim” is “an employee’s claim against

an employer for compensation for the employee’s own per-

sonal services”); ORS 652.310(2) (an “employee” is “any indi-

vidual who * * * renders personal services wholly or partly

in this state to an employer who pays or agrees to pay such

individual at a fixed rate”); ORS 653.055 (specifying that

an “employer who pays an employee less than the wages to

which the employee is entitled * * * is liable to the employee

affected” (emphases added)).

Plaintiff therefore had the burden to produce

admissible evidence that created a genuine issue of material

fact regarding whether LeafFilter was plaintiff’s employer.

Plaintiff’s pay stubs are in the record showing that plaintiff

was paid by a subcontractor, and not by LeafFilter. In sup-

port of his claim, plaintiff points to text messages that show

that there was a gap in time between the time he met with

a LeafFilter representative, submitted employment forms,

and participated in training, and his first day of work as an

installer under the subcontractor who ultimately employed

plaintiff and processed his pay. He also argues the contract

between LeafFilter and its subcontractors is invalid, unen-

forceable, and a “ruse.” Those arguments and the evidence

plaintiff points to in support of those claims do not establish

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LeafFilter

was plaintiff’s employer. Having reviewed the pertinent

portions of the record, we conclude that the trial court did

not err in dismissing plaintiff’s wage claims on the basis

that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether LeafFilter was plaintiff’s employer.

Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s determination

that plaintiff’s licensing claims were precluded on the basis

that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to

whether Bloomstrom and LeafFilter acted as construction

labor contractors. In order to qualify as a construction labor

contractor, a person must both engage in specified conduct—

recruiting, soliciting, supplying or employing workers to per-

form construction labor for another person or entity—and

748 Matteson v. LeafFilterNorth, LLC (A184754)

also do so at an “agreed remuneration or rate of pay.” ORS

658.405(2). Having reviewed the pertinent parts of the record,

the trial court did not err in determining that Bloomstrom

and LeafFilter did not receive payment for providing plain-

tiff to another entity to perform construction work, and that

there was no genuine issue of material fact on that issue.

Plaintiff did not otherwise produce evidence showing that

defendants engaged in qualifying activities under the stat-

ute. Absent any genuine issues of material fact that those

defendants did not receive any “agreed remuneration” for

supplying labor, the trial court did not err in dismissing the

licensing claims. Plaintiff’s related claims for declaratory

and injunctive relief were predicated on the applicability of

those statutes to defendants’ activities; consequently, it was

not error to dismiss those claims as well. Further, the trial

court did not err in determining that LeafFilter’s corporate

structure—i.e., that its parent company was Leaf Home,

LLC, and that Bloomstrom may have been employed by

the parent company—would not alter the analysis for the

purpose of summary judgment absent any indication that

Bloomstrom or the corporate entities were themselves paid

by the subcontractors for the service of providing labor to

them.

We have reviewed plaintiff’s additional assignments

of error, including (but not limited to) arguments that he

was denied procedurally fair and impartial hearings, that

he was subject to disparate treatment as a pro se plaintiff,

and his assignments of error regarding proceedings prior to

the dismissal, and conclude that they do not present a basis

for reversal. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.