The opinion
Case: 25-50596 Document: 69-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-50596 June 23, 2026
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Branden Sanchez, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Jonathan Bates Nunemaker,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:25-CV-109
______________________________
Before Clement, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiff is a motorist who was detained by the defendant deputy
sheriff. The claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the officer used excessive
force during the plaintiff’s detention in the officer’s vehicle. The officer,
asserting qualified immunity, filed a motion to dismiss. The district court
denied the motion, and we AFFIRM.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2023, Jonathan Bates Nunemaker, a Medina County deputy
sheriff, was on routine patrol in Castroville, Texas. He saw an automobile
Case: 25-50596 Document: 69-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
No. 25-50596
with its emergency lights flashing, ran the license plates, and learned there
was a report that the vehicle had been stolen and used during an aggravated
robbery. Nunemaker initiated a stop, handcuffed the driver — the plaintiff
Branden Sanchez — and placed him in the back of Nunemaker’s cruiser.
Over approximately the next 50 minutes, Nunemaker searched the
vehicle and found drugs, a rifle-style pellet gun, and other items. Eventually,
four other law enforcement officers arrived on scene to assist. During this
time, Sanchez repeatedly yelled and kicked the inside of the cruiser’s doors,
demanding to be taken to jail. In response, Nunemaker and another officer
warned Sanchez several times that he would be pepper-sprayed or otherwise
subdued if he continued his behavior.
After being detained for about 45 minutes, Sanchez began sitting on
his knees and moving around in the back of the cruiser. Nunemaker told
Sanchez to sit with his back against the seat. Sanchez initially complied but
then resumed moving around. Nunemaker again ordered Sanchez to sit, but
Sanchez protested that his handcuffs were too tight. Nunemaker reiterated
his order that Sanchez sit and stated that if he did not do so, Nunemaker
would make him. Nunemaker grabbed Sanchez’s arm and sharply twisted
him, forcing him into the seat and causing his head to hit the cruiser’s hard
cage partition.
Once the door was closed, Sanchez began kicking it again, yelling, and
refusing to stay seated. Nunemaker walked to the other side of the cruiser
and opened the door, causing Sanchez to turn towards him. Nunemaker then
aimed a pepper-spray device called a Centurion Law Enforcement
Deployment System (“CLE”) at Sanchez’s face. He fired the device from
approximately 3.6 feet away from Sanchez, about half the seven-foot distance
the manufacturer’s instructions state to be safe. The CLE discharged a high-
2
Case: 25-50596 Document: 69-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
No. 25-50596
velocity jet of pepper spray into Sanchez’s left eye, permanently blinding that
eye.
Sanchez brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Nunemaker violated Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive
force. Nunemaker filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
judgment on the pleadings, in which he asserted that qualified immunity
barred Sanchez’s Section 1983 claim. The district court denied
Nunemaker’s motion, concluding that Sanchez had sufficiently pled that
Nunemaker used excessive force in violation of clearly established law.
Nunemaker appealed.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court’s denial of Nunemaker’s motion.
See Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120 (5th Cir. 1996). Dismissal of a complaint
is proper if it fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint is insufficient if it does not “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557, 570 (2007). We view all well-pled facts and video recordings
incorporated into the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1162–63 (5th Cir. 2021). Video
recordings, though, “should be adopted over the factual allegations in the
complaint if the video ‘blatantly contradict[s]’ those allegations” so that no
reasonable jury could believe those allegations. Id. at 1163 (alteration in
original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
When a “motion to dismiss raises the defense of qualified immunity,
the plaintiff must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm . . . alleged and
that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” McLin v.
Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quotation
3
Case: 25-50596 Document: 69-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
No. 25-50596
omitted). To do so, the plaintiff must “have alleged facts sufficient to
plausibly show that (1) the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right
and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged misconduct.” Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1163.
I. Constitutional Violation
“Section 1983 enables persons who have been ‘depriv[ed] of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the
United States by the actions of a person or entity operating under color of
state law to seek redress from those state actors responsible for the
deprivations.” Surratt v. McClarin, 851 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2017)
(alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Fourth Amendment
prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
An officer’s use of excessive force constitutes an unreasonable seizure. See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). To establish “a Fourth
Amendment excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show two things: (1) a
seizure occurred; and (2) the force used was unreasonable.” Estate of Parker
v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 140 F.4th 226, 238 (5th Cir. 2025).
It is undisputed that Nunemaker’s use of pepper spray was a seizure
that injured Sanchez. Thus, the “question is whether the officers’ actions
are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490
U.S. at 397 (quotation omitted). This analysis requires examining the totality
of the circumstances, with “careful attention to the facts and circumstances
of [the] particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,
4
Case: 25-50596 Document: 69-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
No. 25-50596
and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” 1 Id. at 396.
It is true that here the crimes at issue were quite severe, given that
Sanchez was suspected of armed robbery and was found driving a reportedly
stolen car with weapons inside. Nevertheless, at the time of the seizure,
Sanchez did not pose a threat to the safety of the officers or others. The
physically slight seventeen-year-old was handcuffed, seat-belted in the
cruiser, and surrounded by five officers. Of course, Sanchez was disruptive
and resisted Nunemaker’s commands to sit properly and face forward in the
seat. Earlier, Sanchez had complied with Nunemaker’s orders to exit the
BMW, lie on the ground, place his hands behind his back to be cuffed, and
enter the cruiser. Sanchez was making no attempt to flee and instead was
repeatedly demanding to be taken to jail rather than be required to wait while
Nunemaker searched the vehicle.
Viewing the complaint and the video recordings it incorporates in the
light most favorable to Sanchez, we conclude that Sanchez stated a plausible
claim that Nunemaker’s discharging high-velocity pepper spray directly into
Sanchez’s eye from half the manufacturer-provided minimum safe distance
constituted excessive force.
_____________________
1
The use of deadly force, when present in the facts, constrains our inquiry to focus
on whether “the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm
to the officer or to others.” Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2009). Here,
Sanchez asserts that the pepper spray was deadly force because discharging it at a person’s
face from less than the minimum safe distance of seven feet may result in death or other
serious injury. Nonetheless, we need not decide whether Sanchez has sufficiently pled this
fact because Nunemaker’s qualified immunity defense fails even if the use of pepper spray
here did not constitute deadly force.
5
Case: 25-50596 Document: 69-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
No. 25-50596
II. Clearly Established Law
We next address whether the constitutional right in question was
clearly established at the time of the violation. See Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1163.
A right is clearly established when “it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Jones v.
Lowndes County, 678 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). A
plaintiff may demonstrate a violation of clearly established law by identifying
a case that would have put a reasonable officer on notice that his specific
conduct was unlawful. Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2022).
Sanchez’s complaint cites Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir.
2013). There, after the suspect Ramirez resisted arrest by pulling his arm
away, the defendant officer Martinez tased Ramirez in the chest. Id. at 372.
Several officers then forced Ramirez to the ground and handcuffed him. Id.
at 373. Martinez next used a taser on the restrained Ramirez a second time.
Id. Holding that a constitutional violation occurred, this court stated that
Ramirez’s “[p]ulling his arm out of Martinez’s grasp, without more, [wa]s
insufficient to find an immediate threat to the safety of the officers.” Id. at
378.
Martinez’s conduct was unconstitutional because, after Ramirez
resisted arrest by pulling his arm away, Martinez twice tased Ramirez —
including once when he was handcuffed, on the ground, and surrounded by
several officers. See id. at 378–79. Here, after Sanchez resisted commands
by kicking the cruiser’s doors and refusing to sit properly, Nunemaker
pepper-sprayed Sanchez in the face when he was handcuffed, seat-belted,
and surrounded by several officers. Given the factual similarities, Ramirez
would have put a reasonable officer in Nunemaker’s position on notice that
it is unlawful to discharge pepper spray directly into the eye of a handcuffed,
6
Case: 25-50596 Document: 69-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
No. 25-50596
restrained, outnumbered suspect not posing an immediate threat or
attempting to flee.
Nunemaker, in contending that his conduct did not violate clearly
established law, analogizes to Brothers v. Zoss, 837 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2016).
There, police attempted to stop a heavily intoxicated man from driving his
truck. Id. at 516. The suspect repeatedly refused to comply with officers’
instructions to exit the truck. Id. Officers opened the driver’s-side door,
grabbed both of his arms, and pulled him out of the elevated truck. Id. The
suspect slammed hard into the ground, which broke his vertebrae and
rendered him quadriplegic. Id. at 515–16. This court held that the officers’
use of force was not excessive, reasoning “that the force they employed was
moderate” and that they “slowly escalated the amount of force until it was
enough to extract” the suspect. Id. at 519.
The distinctions from Brothers are obvious. There, officers were
attempting to remove the suspect from his truck and detain him. The force
used was reasonable given that the suspect “might have had access to a
weapon or could have tried to drive his huge, elevated truck into the police
car” blocking his truck. Id. at 520. Here, Nunemaker had already removed
Sanchez from the BMW, handcuffed him, and placed him in the cruiser.
The threat of harm posed by Sanchez, who was restrained and known to be
unarmed, was at most to the officer’s cruiser, not to any person. It was thus
a significantly less serious threat than in Brothers.
Nunemaker also cites Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 1998).
In that case, officers were transporting 19 inmates to a more restrictive
facility. Id. at 838. “After the inmates were loaded onto the bus, and while
it was parked in an unfenced area of the prison next to the armory, some of
the inmates . . . began jumping on the seats, spitting at the officers outside the
bus, rocking the bus, and otherwise causing a disturbance.” Id. After the
7
Case: 25-50596 Document: 69-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
No. 25-50596
inmates ignored three orders to stop, an officer discharged pepper spray
down the middle of the bus. Id. This court held that the officer’s use of force
was constitutionally permissible because it was “a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline in what he perceived to be a highly volatile and
potentially dangerous situation.” Id. at 840 (emphasis omitted).
A situation where 19 inmates pose a threat of escaping and obtaining
firearms is much more dangerous than one where five officers surround one
suspect who does not pose any significant threat of fleeing or acquiring a
weapon. The level of force used in Baldwin was also lower; although the
officer there faced a volatile situation, he fired the spray down the middle of
the bus — not into the inmates’ faces at close range. The facts of Baldwin
are therefore distinguishable from this case.
In sum, Nunemaker could be found to have violated clearly
established law by discharging high-velocity pepper spray from half the
manufacturer-provided minimum safe distance into the face of a suspect.
That suspect was handcuffed and restrained by his seat belt in a law
enforcement officer’s vehicle, not attempting to flee, and not posing an
immediate threat. Sanchez has sufficiently pled facts to support an excessive-
force claim, and those facts overcome Nunemaker’s qualified immunity
defense at the stage of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
AFFIRMED.
8