Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ANDREW BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2777-VMC-LSG

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,

Defendant.

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ORDER

This matter is before the Court on consideration of

Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc.’s Motion in Limine (Doc.

# 188), and Plaintiff Andrew Brown’s Motion in Limine (Doc.

# 189), both filed on January 8, 2026. Each side has responded

to the other’s Motion. (Doc. ## 191, 192). For the reasons

that follow, CSX’s Motion is granted in part and denied in

part, and Mr. Brown’s Motion is denied.

I. Legal Standard

“A motion in limine presents a pretrial issue of

admissibility of evidence that is likely to arise at trial,

and as such, the order, like any other interlocutory order,

remains subject to reconsideration by the court throughout

the trial.” In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 6:06–

md–1769–ACC-DAB, 6:07–cv–15733–ACC-DAB, 2009 WL 260989, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009). “The real purpose of a motion in

limine is to give the trial judge notice of the movant’s

position so as to avoid the introduction of damaging evidence

which may irretrievably effect the fairness of the trial.”

Id. (internal quotation omitted). “A court has the power to

exclude evidence in limine only when evidence is clearly

inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Id. (internal

quotation omitted).

“A motion in limine is not the proper vehicle to resolve

substantive issues, to test issues of law, or to address or

narrow the issues to be tried.” LSQ Funding Grp. v. EDS Field

Servs., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (citing

Royal Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 07–80172–

CIV, 2008 WL 2323900, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2008)). “Denial

of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all

evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at

trial.” In re Seroquel, 2009 WL 260989, at *1 (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Instead, denial of the motion

means the court cannot determine whether the evidence in

question should be excluded outside the trial context.” Id.

“The court will entertain objections on individual proffers

as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls within

the scope of a denied motion in limine.” Id.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 401 defines “relevant

evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. All

relevant evidence is admissible unless “its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.

402, 403; United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1524 (11th

Cir. 1994). Use of Rule 403 to exclude relevant evidence is

an “extraordinary remedy” whose “major function . . . is

limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative

force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial

effect.” United States v. Grant, 256 F.3d 1146, 1155 (11th

Cir. 2001).

This Court has broad discretion to determine the

admissibility of evidence, and the appellate court will not

disturb this Court’s judgment absent a clear abuse of

discretion. United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th

Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273,

1285 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Inherent in this standard is the firm

recognition that there are difficult evidentiary rulings that

turn on matters uniquely within the purview of the district

court, which has first-hand access to documentary evidence

and is physically proximate to testifying witnesses and the

jury.”).

II. Discussion

A. CSX’s Motion

CSX’s Motion seeks to exclude four categories of

evidence:

(1) Evidence from Mr. Brown’s treating physicians;

(2) Evidence about the emotional effects of Mr.

Brown’s dismissal;

(3) Evidence regarding the merits of other CSX

employees’ discipline for suspected FMLA abuse; and

(4) Evidence regarding Mr. Brown’s child.

(Doc. # 188).

1. Evidence from Mr. Brown’s Treating Physicians

As CSX notes, “[t]he issue in this case is not whether

[Mr. Brown] actually misused FMLA leave over Christmas and on

New Year’s Eve 2017, but whether CSX honestly believed he did

and truly disciplined h im on that basis.” (Id. at 7-8).

However, testimony relating to Mr. Brown’s medical condition

“is appropriate to provide relevant background information

and to put other facts in context.” Lawson v. Plantation Gen.

Hosp., L.P., No. 08-61826-CIV, 2010 WL 11504715, at *3 (S.D.

Fla. May 7, 2010) (finding that evidence of plaintiff’s sickle

cell disease was admissible to provide relevant background

information and context related to her FMLA retaliation

claim). Because the Court cannot determine now that lay

witness testimony from Mr. Brown’s treating physicians is

inadmissible on all potential grounds, exclusion under Rule

403 is inappropriate. The Motion is denied to the extent CSX

seeks to preclude Mr. Brown’s treating physicians from

testifying as lay witnesses.

CSX argues that to the extent any of Mr. Brown’s treating

physicians “would be testifying that, in their opinion, [Mr.]

Brown’s use of FMLA leave over Christmas and on New Year’s

Eve 2017 was legitimate or otherwise consistent with his

condition, such testimony should also be excluded” because:

(1) “[Mr.] Brown did not disclose Dr. Lopez or any of his

other doctors as expert witnesses, and so they can only

testify as lay witnesses,” and (2) “such testimony is an

improper attempt to bolster [Mr.] Brown’s credibility.” (Doc.

# 188 at 9-10). The Court agrees that Mr. Brown’s treating

physicians should be limited to offering lay witness

testimony as Mr. Brown made no Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures

with respect to such witnesses and “has not shown that their

absence is justified or harmless.” Ortega-Guzman v. Sam’s

East, Inc, D/B/A Sam’s Club, No. 16-81977-CIV, 2018 WL

11343940, at *2-4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2018) (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(c)(1)) (precluding plaintiff’s treating physicians

from offering expert testimony where plaintiff did not

provide required Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures); see also

United States v. An Easement & Right-of-way Over 1.58 Acres

of Land, 343 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2018)

(“Defendant made no Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures at all here,

and he certainly did not put the Government on notice of the

facts and opinions upon which he expected to testify

sufficiently early in the litigation to allow the Government

to test those facts and opinions. As such, the opinions are

subject to exclusion.”).

“The testimony of treating physicians presents special

evidentiary problems that require great care and

circumspection by the trial court.” Williams v. Mast

Biosurgery USA, Inc., 644 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011).

“Much of the testimony proffered by treating physicians is an

account of their experience in the course of providing care

to their patients.” Id. at 1316-17. “Often, however, their

proffered testimony can go beyond that sphere and purport to

provide explanations of scientific and technical information

not grounded in their own observations and technical

experience.” Id. at 1317. “When such a situation presents

itself, the trial court must determine whether testimony not

grounded in the physician’s own experience meets the standard

for admission as expert testimony.” Id. “[W]hen a treating

physician’s testimony is based on a hypothesis, not the

experience of treating the patient, it crosses the line from

lay to expert testimony. Id. at 1317-18.

In response to CSX’s Motion, Mr. Brown argues that his

treating physicians “are uniquely positioned to explain,”

among other things, whether Mr. Brown’s alleged pattern of

using FMLA leave “is medically consistent with the diagnosis

for which intermittent leave was certified.” (Doc. # 191 at

6). This is the type of hypothetical situation that crosses

the line into expert testimony. See United States v.

Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he

ability to answer hypothetical questions is [t]he essential

difference between expert and lay witnesses.” (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the

Motion is granted to the extent that Mr. Brown’s treating

physicians are precluded from offering expert testimony at

trial.

2. Evidence of Emotional Distress Caused by Mr.

Brown’s Termination

“[T]he FMLA does not allow recovery for mental

distress.” Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274,

1284 (11th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, evidence of the emotional

effects of Mr. Brown’s dismissal has minimal, if any,

relevance and is unfairly prejudicial. Such evidence is

excluded under Rule 403. See Admore v. Hospice of Palm Beach

Cnty. Inc., No. 22-12280, 2024 WL 371948, at *4 n.5 (11th

Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (finding that district court did not

“commit plain error when it excluded evidence regarding

emotional distress or other non-pecuniary damages because

Admore was not entitled to such damages under the FMLA as a

matter of law.”); Harley v. Health Ctr. of Coconut Creek,

Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1370–71 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (granting

defendants’ motion to exclude evidence of non-pecuniary

damages at trial on FMLA retaliation claims).

The Court grants the Motion as to category 2.

3. Evidence of the Merits of Other CSX Employees’

Discipline for Suspected FMLA Abuse

“In cases alleging employment discrimination and

retaliation, ‘me too’ evidence involving claims made by other

employees may be properly admitted pursuant to Federal Rule

of Evidence 404(b) ‘to prove the defendant’s motive, . . .

intent, . . . [or] plan’ to discriminate against the

plaintiff.” Hausburg v. McDonough, No. 8:20-cv-2300-JSS, 2024

WL 111994, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2024) (quoting Goldsmith

v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008)).

“Determining whether Rule 404(b) or corroborative evidence is

admissible is a ‘fact-intensive, context-specific inquiry’

that ‘rests within the sound discretion of the district

court[.]’” Hausburg, 2024 WL 111994, at *2 (quoting Adams v.

Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014)).

“Courts generally admit only that corroborative evidence that

closely compares with the circumstances alleged by the

plaintiff.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted).

Here, CSX makes clear that it “does not move to exclude

[Mr.] Brown from presenting evidence of disparate treatment

— proof that other similarly situated employees were treated

better than he was treated.” (Doc. # 188 at 12). Rather, CSX

seeks to preclude “evidence regarding the reasonableness or

unreasonableness of other disciplinary decisions involving

FMLA abuse.” (Id. at 12-13). In response, Mr. Brown represents

that he “does not need, and does not seek, a series of mini-

trials about each employee’s medical condition” and asserts

that “[w]hat matters is the framework CSX applied — how it

defined ‘suspicion,’ how it screened employees, what it

treated as exculpatory or inculpatory, and whether the

process was meaningfully individualized.” (Doc. # 191 at 15).

At this point, the Court cannot determine that

unspecified evidence regarding “the merits” of CSX’s

discipline of other employees suspected of FMLA abuse is

inadmissible on all potential grounds. At trial, when it

becomes clear what evidence Mr. Brown intends to introduce,

CSX may raise its objection again. The Motion is denied as to

category 3.

4. Evidence of Mr. Brown’s Daughter

It is undisputed that Mr. Brown never disclosed to CSX

the fact that his daughter is not his biological child. (Doc.

# 191 at 17-18). Therefore, evidence that Mr. Brown learned

this information in or around September 2016 has no relevance

to whether CSX terminated Mr. Brown based on its good faith

belief that he dishonestly took FMLA leave or whether, as Mr.

Brown contends, CSX retaliated against him for taking FMLA

leave on days when the company had high FMLA usage. In any

event, even if the evidence has any minimal relevance, it

would be substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair

prejudice to CSX.

The Motion is granted as to category 4.

B. Mr. Brown’s Motion

Mr. Brown’s Motion seeks to exclude three categories of

evidence:

(1) Evidence “outside the disciplinary-hearing

transcript and exhibits”;

(2) References to the appeal/arbitration process

and the arbitration decisions; and

(3) Opinion testimony from CSX witnesses other than

William Blanchetti regarding whether Mr. Brown

misused FMLA leave or deserved discipline.

(Doc. # 189).

1. Evidence Outside the Record of the

Disciplinary Hearings

Mr. Brown argues that “CSX should not be permitted to

expand” the record from the hearings on Mr. Brown’s

disciplinary charges “by offering new, extra-record evidence

as substantive proof that [Mr.] Brown misused FMLA or as a

post-hoc justification for discipline that the [collective

bargaining agreement] required be grounded in the hearing

record.” (Doc. # 189 at 7). In response, CSX represents that

it “does not intend to rely on any ‘post-hoc’ justifications”

to defend its disciplinary decision. (Doc. # 192 at 6).

However, CSX argues that “evidence outside the investigatory

record could be relevant for other purposes – to credibility,

for example – and the sweeping order [Mr.] Brown seeks could

tie CSX’s hands unnecessarily and prematurely.” (Id.).

The Court agrees with CSX that “whether evidence outside

of the investigatory record is relevant and admissible should

be decided on a case-by-case basis, as those issues arise” at

trial. (Id. at 7); see Robbins v. Robertson, No. 7:15-cv-

00124 (WLS), 2022 WL 2987890, at *5 (M.D. Ga. July 28, 2022)

(“Motions in limine that are broad, vague, and include

speculative categories of evidence and argument of which the

Court cannot predetermine the admissibility are due to be

denied, as the real purpose of a motion in limine is to avoid

the introduction of evidence at trial that is clearly

inadmissible on all potential grounds and could irretrievably

impact the fairness of the trial.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

The Motion is denied as to category 1.

2. References to the Arbitration Process and the

Arbitration Decisions

Mr. Brown argues that the Court should exclude

references to the arbitration process by which CSX employees

may challenge disciplinary decisions, as well as the

arbitration decisions issued regarding Mr. Brown. (Doc. # 189

at 9-11). Mr. Brown contends that “line of proof carries

outsized risk and minimal legitimate probative value in an

FMLA case because it invites the jury to defer to a contract-

based arbitration determination rather than decide the

statutory claims before it, and it would sidetrack [the] trial

into collateral disputes over arbitration procedures,

standards of review, and contractual issues.” (Id. at 9-10).

In response, CSX argues that such evidence is relevant because

Mr. Brown has placed the fairness of CSX’s disciplinary

process and the legitimacy of its disciplinary decisions at

issue. (Doc. # 192 at 8-9). CSX contends that evidence of the

arbitration process and the arbitration decisions is not

unduly prejudicial or confusing to the jury. (Id. at 9-10).

The Court agrees with CSX.

An employee may challenge CSX’s disciplinary

determination by filing a grievance pursuant to the CBA. (Doc.

# 15-11 at ¶ 17). The CBA establishes a “multi-step grievance

process culminating in final and binding arbitration,” in

which the “arbitrator can reduce or overturn the discipline.”

(Id.). Mr. Brown’s union challenged CSX’s disciplinary

decisions, which were upheld at arbitration before the Public

Law Board. (Doc. # 91-3 at 37-38, 40-44). Regarding the

Christmas holiday charge, the arbitrator determined that Mr.

Brown “was afforded a fair and impartial hearing” and that

there was “sufficient evidence in the record to support the

finding that [Mr. Brown] violated [CSX’s] Operating Rule

[104.2(a)].” (Id. at 38). Regarding the New Year’s charge and

dismissal, the arbitration panel found that the

“circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inference to be

drawn there from would lead a reasonable person to deduce

that the claimant’s mark-off history exhibited a pattern that

he used FMLA leave solely to avoid working on holidays and to

extend his time off, and not for legitimate medical reasons.”

(Id. at 43).

The arbitration decisions are relevant to the disputed

issue of whether CSX terminated Mr. Brown based on a good

faith belief that he misused FMLA leave. See Lloyd v. Greater

Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., No. 1:18-CV-01557, 2021 WL

4914203, at *1, 3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2021) (holding that an

arbitration decision was “relevant because it addresses

several key issues” in a case involving an FMLA retaliation

claim, “including whether GCRTA terminated Lloyd for just

cause”); Muflihi v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 22-CV-12609, 2025

WL 2656035, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2025) (finding that

“arbitrator’s opinion that there was no proper cause to

discharge Plaintiff” and that “USS violated its policies and

conducted an inappropriate investigation” is relevant

evidence in an employment discrimination trial as “the

finding that USS terminated Plaintiff without proper cause is

highly probative on the issue of whether USS had a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s discharge”).

The Court further finds that the probative value of the

arbitration decisions is not substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice or confusing the issues. To the

extent Mr. Brown is concerned there is “a substantial danger

that jurors will uncritically defer to another tribunal’s

conclusions rendered under different standards and for

different purposes” (Doc. # 189 at 10) (citing Beyer v. Miami-

Dade Cnty., No. 20-11279, 2024 WL 1358448, at *3 (11th Cir.

Apr. 1, 2024)), if this evidence is introduced, the Court

will consider issuing a limiting instruction.

The Motion is denied as to category 2.

3. Opinion Testimony from CSX Witnesses Other

Than Mr. Blanchetti Regarding Whether Mr.

Brown Misused FMLA Leave or Deserved

Discipline

Mr. Brown argues that CSX should be precluded from

calling witnesses other than the ultimate decisionmaker, Mr.

Blanchetti, “who participated in the disciplinary apparatus

— particularly Labor Relations personnel — and elicit[ing]

their opinions that [Mr.] Brown’s FMLA usage was ‘misuse,’

that he was ‘dishonest,’ or that he ‘should have been’

disciplined.” (Doc. # 189 at 12). Such evidence is highly

probative of CSX’s defense that it had a good faith belief

that Mr. Brown dishonestly took FMLA leave over the 2017-2018

end-of-year holidays. Contrary to Mr. Brown’s contention,

such testimony is not a legal conclusion and does not “merely

tell the jury what conclusion to reach.” (Id.). If any of

CSX’s witnesses attempt to offer a legal conclusion or usurp

the jury’s role by telling it what result to reach, the Court

will entertain specific objections by Mr. Brown at that time.

The Motion is denied as to category 3.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc.’s Motion in Limine

(Doc. # 188) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part to

the extent explained in this order.

(2) Plaintiff Andrew Brown’s Motion in Limine (Doc. # 189)

is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

24th day of February, 2026.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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