Givand

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

TERRENCE LEARNEST GIVAND, )

#244124, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:23-cv-487-BL

)

CHADWICK CRABTREE and )

ALABAMA BUREAU OF )

PARDONS AND PAROLES,1 )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Terrence Learnest Givand, a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the revocation of

his parole in June of 2021 by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles (“the Parole

Board”). (See docs. 1 & 5). Thereafter, the Respondents filed an Answer (doc. 13),

which contends that Givand’s claims are time-barred by the applicable one-year

statute of limitations as well as meritless. The court then gave Givand an opportunity

to file a reply (see doc. 14), but Givand did not do so. Upon review of the Petition

1 Although Givand names the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles as a Respondent (see Doc.

1 at 1), the Bureau is not a legal entity capable of being sued, and only the Alabama Board of

Pardons and Paroles has legal authority over parole-related matters. See Ala. Code §§ 15-22-20

et seq. Accordingly, the clerk of court is DIRECTED to (1) terminate the Alabama Bureau of

Pardons and Paroles as a respondent and (2) add the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles as a

respondent.

and Answer, and for the reasons explained below, Givand’s § 2254 Petition will be

DENIED without an evidentiary hearing as time-barred2 and this case will be

DISMISSED with prejudice.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March of 2017, the Parole Board granted Givand parole. (Doc. 13-1 at 22).

Upon his release in April of 2017, Givand received and signed the conditions of his

parole, which included a condition that he would not violate any law. (Id. at 23–24).

On May 2, 2021, the Montgomery Police Department arrested and charged

Givand with Domestic Violence III – Harassment and Domestic Violence III –

Criminal Mischief II. (Id. at 26–27). On May 4, 2021, upon learning of these

criminal charges, Givand’s supervising parole officer prepared a Report of Parole

Violation charging Givand with violating his parole conditions by committing two

new offenses. (Id. at 25–28).

On May 19, 2021, Givand received a Notice of Parole Court Hearing set for

May 25, 2021, as well as a copy of the Report of Parole Violation, which detailed

the parole violation charges against him. (Id. at 29).

On May 25, 2021, Hearing Officer Greg Lee conducted a parole court hearing

on the charges. (Id. at 30). Based on the evidence presented therein, including the

2 Although Respondents also argue that Givand’s claims lack merit, because the statute of

limitations is dispositive of the Petition, the court need not address any additional deficiencies.

alleged victim’s testimony, Hearing Officer Lee found sufficient evidence that

Givand had violated the conditions of his parole. (Id. at 34). He recommended that

Givand’s parole be revoked, that Givand complete anger management training, and

that Givand be reconsidered for parole in 12 months. (Id.).

On June 8, 2021, upon review of Hearing Officer Lee’s recommendations, the

Parole Board revoked Givand’s parole and ordered that he be reconsidered for parole

in 2026. (Id. at 36). The Parole Board served Givand with notice of the revocation.

(Id.).

On May 2, 2022, Givand filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Circuit

Court of Montgomery County. (Id. at 4–9). Thereafter, the Parole Board filed a

motion to dismiss (id. at 16–21), which the circuit court granted on June 30, 2022

(id. at 38). On August 7, 2022, Givand appealed the circuit court’s decision to the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Id. at 48–52). On February 3, 2023, the Court

of Criminal Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. (Doc. 13-4). The Court

of Criminal Appeals subsequently denied Givand’s application for a rehearing (Doc.

13-6) and, on June 9, 2023, the Alabama Supreme Court denied his petition for writ

of certiorari and issued a certificate of judgment (Doc. 13-8). The Court of Criminal

Appeals issued a certificate of judgment that same day. (Doc. 13-9).

On August 9, 2023, Givand filed the instant § 2254 Petition, arguing that the

Parole Board “used false evidence/information to revoke [his] parole.” (Doc. 1). On

October 12, 2023, he filed an amendment to his § 2254 Petition, arguing that his

parole revocation violates due process. (Doc. 5). As relief, he seeks reinstatement

of his parole. (Doc. 1 at 15; Doc. 5 at 3). The § 2254 Petition is now ripe for

consideration.

II. DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

contains the following time limitations for federal habeas petitions:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-

conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The state judgment Givand challenges in this case became final on June 8,

2021, the date on which his parole was revoked, and the AEDPA’s one-year

limitations period began to run from that time. See Ray v. Mitchem, 272 F. App’x

807, 809–10 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “subsection (D), not subsection (A),

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), is the applicable subsection for cases of habeas petitioners

who are in custody pursuant to a parole revocation”). Thus, absent a tolling event,

Givand had until June 8, 2022—one year later—to file a timely § 2254 petition as to

that judgment.

Because Alabama does not have a direct appeal procedure through which the

Parole Board’s decision to revoke parole can be challenged, a prisoner must instead

challenge his parole revocation by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the state

trial court. Id. at 809 (citing Gholston v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 627 So.2d 945,

947 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993)). Givand first filed a petition for a writ of certiorari

regarding his parole revocation on May 2, 2022—328 days after the date on which

the Parole Board revoked his parole. (Doc. 13-1 at 4–9). The limitations period

remained tolled from that date until June 9, 2023, the date on which the Alabama

Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari and issued a certificate of

judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also, e.g., Siebert v. Campbell, 334 F.3d

1018, 1022 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that “the federal limitations period would have

been tolled . . . until . . . the date on which the Alabama Supreme Court denied

review”); Butler v. Estes, No. 6:15-cv-0162-WMA-JEO, 2015 WL 3626649, at *3

(N.D. Ala. June 10, 2015) (explaining that “the limitations period would have

resumed running after the Alabama Supreme Court issued an order denying [the

petitioner’s] petition for certiorari review . . . and a certificate of judgment was

issued”).

When the limitations period began running again on June 9, 2023, Givand had

37 days remaining to file a timely § 2254 petition—that is, until July 17, 2023.

However, as noted above, Givand did not file the instant Petition until at least August

9, 2023, more than three weeks later. (See doc. 1 at 15). Accordingly, Givand’s

§ 2254 Petition is due to be dismissed as time-barred.3 See Baldwin Cnty. Welcome

Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (“Procedural requirements established by

Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts

out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.”).

3 The AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably tolled on grounds other than those in the

habeas statute when a petitioner submits an untimely filing “because of extraordinary

circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik v.

United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). However, “equitable

tolling is an extraordinary remedy . . . limited to rare and exceptional circumstances and typically

applied sparingly.” Hunter v. Ferrell, 587 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations

and citation omitted). “The petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to equitable

tolling; his supporting allegations must be specific and not conclusory.” Cole v. Warden, Georgia

State Prison, 768 F.3d 1150, 1158 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Despite the opportunity to

do so in both his Petition and a reply to the Answer, Givand has failed to provide any allegations

or evidence that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

Hl. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Givand’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) is DENIED without an

evidentiary hearing as time-barred and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Final Judgment will be entered separately.

DONE and ORDERED on this the 6th day of May, 2026.

Loe

BILL LEWIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE