“Rule 60(b)(6) should apply ‘only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the five numbered clauses of the Rule.’” (quoting Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989))
How later courts described this case
- “Rule 60(b)(6) should apply ‘only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the five numbered clauses of the Rule.’” (quoting Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
JOSEPH DEION PAGE, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 3:25-cv-134
)
v. ) Judge Atchley
)
ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL ) Magistrate Judge Poplin
SERVICES, LLC, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is a prisoner’s pro se complaint for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Court
dismissed at screening because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. [Docs.
12, 13]. Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint [Doc. 14]. For the
following reasons, this motion is DENIED.
Regarding post-judgment motions to amend the complaint, the Sixth Circuit has held:
Rule 15 requests to amend the complaint are frequently filed and, generally
speaking, freely allowed. But when a Rule 15 motion comes after a judgment
against the plaintiff, that is a different story. Courts in that setting must consider the
competing interest of protecting the finality of judgments and the expeditious
termination of litigation. If a permissive amendment policy applied after adverse
judgments, plaintiffs could use the court as a sounding board to discover holes in
their arguments, then reopen the case by amending their complaint to take account
of the court’s decision. That would sidestep the narrow grounds for obtaining
postjudgment relief under Rules 59 and 60, make the finality of judgments an
interim concept and risk turning Rules 59 and 60 into nullities.
Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildfire Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2010). Therefore,
“[w]hen a party seeks to amend a complaint after an adverse judgment . . . . the claimant must meet
the requirements for reopening a case established by Rules 59 or 60.” Id.
Accordingly, the Court must determine whether to construe Plaintiff’s motion to amend
his complaint as filed under Rule 59 or 60. A post-judgment motion “filed within 28 days [after
judgment] can be construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), and one
that is filed after 28 days can be construed as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule
60(b).” In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 728 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2013). Because Plaintiff
filed his motion to amend his complaint approximately four months after entry of judgment, the
Court considers it under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 60(b) provides:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). As nothing in Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint or the attachments
thereto [Docs. 14-1, 14-2] appears to rely on newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation,
misconduct, or any argument regarding the prior judgment, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s motion
to amend his complaint to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(1) and/or (6).
Rule 60(b)(1) “is intended to provide relief in only two situations: (1) when a party has
made an excusable mistake or an attorney has acted without authority, or (2) when the judge has
made a substantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment or order.” United States v. Reyes,
307 F.3d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 2002). As to Rule 60(b)(6), while courts have broad discretion to grant
relief under this subsection, district courts only do so in “unusual and extreme situations where
principles of equity mandate relief.” Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir.
1990) (“Rule 60(b)(6) should apply ‘only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are
not addressed by the five numbered clauses of the Rule.’” (quoting Hopper v. Euclid Manor
Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989))); Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited,
Inc., 487 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2007).
Nothing in Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint [Doc. 14] or his proposed amended
complaint filings [Docs. 14-1, 14-2] indicate that Plaintiff made an excusable mistake or the Court
made a substantive mistake regarding the law or facts of this case, such that Plaintiff may be
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Nor does anything in these filings indicate that this is an
exceptional case where Plaintiff may be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint [Doc. 14] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Charles E. Atchley, Jr. c
CHARLES E. ATCHLEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE