Opinion

Brown

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Jun 3, 2026
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KENYATTA BROWN, #K79185, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 24-cv-02350-SMY

)

COREY LAUER, )

MARCELUS OTTENSMEIER, G. CURRY, )

JEROD SCHANZ, DEVIN McKINNEY, )

SPILLER, NATHAN McCARTHY, )

LUCAS BOHNERT, ROBBINS, )

JOSHUA SCHOENBECK, )

ANTHONY WILLS, SANDY WALKER, )

SHAMONEY, and )

JOHN DOES 1-4 (Menard Intel/Internal )

Affairs), )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Kenyatta Brown, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights that occurred while he was

confined at Menard Correctional Center. He claims he was the target of multiple incidents of

retaliation for filing lawsuits and complaints, and seeks injunctive relief as well as monetary

damages. (Doc. 1).1

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,

1 Plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunctive relief was denied on November 8, 2024 (Doc. 6).

fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff was

transferred to Menard in January 2020. Later that year, he filed a lawsuit alleging harassment by

multiple Menard officials, including a number of Intelligence/Internal Affairs officers

(“Intel/I.A.”), because he refused to cut his dreadlocks, Brown v. Childs, Case No. 20-cv-1348-

RJD (S.D. Ill. filed Dec. 17, 2020). (Doc. 1, p. 18). After the defendants in that case received

notice of its filing in May 2021, Plaintiff experienced retaliation including the filing of false

charges against him for conspiracy regarding drugs/drug paraphernalia and conspiracy to commit

staff assault. He was found guilty and served 90 days in restricted housing for each ticket; from

July 2021 through October 2021, and December 2021 through March 2022 (Doc. 1, p. 18).2

Plaintiff filed several grievances against Intel/I.A. officers over these charges and other acts of

retaliation.

Defendants Lauer, Ottensmeier, Curry, Bohnert, Schoenbeck, Wills, and John Doe

Intel/I.A. Officer #1 conspired to retaliate against Plaintiff by tampering with his mail, blocking

his electronic messages, sending him to restrictive housing, ransacking his cell, and filing petty

disciplinary charges on him. In response to Plaintiff’s punishment on the 2021 disciplinary

charges, Plaintiff’s friend Marcia Hatton carried out a peaceful online “awareness campaign” to

publicize the retaliation against Plaintiff. The campaign prompted phone calls to Menard and to

IDOC headquarters as well as peaceful protests and rallies. Plaintiff was on “mail watch” by

2 Plaintiff is pursuing retaliation and due process claims related to these disciplinary tickets and other alleged

misconduct that occurred between May 2021 and December 2021 in another lawsuit, Brown v. Ottensmeier, et al.,

Case No. 23-cv-04057-MAB (S.D. Ill. filed Dec. 28, 2023).

Intel/I.A. to monitor his correspondence. Plaintiff’s correspondence with Ms. Hatton focused on

obtaining lab reports to refute the drug charges against him.

In February and/or March 2022, Plaintiff asked Defendant Warden Wills to stop the

Intel/I.A. defendants’ retaliatory delays and non-delivery of his mail (Doc. 1, p. 20). Wills did not

intervene despite saying he would review the matter.

In May 2022, Ms. Hatton got a response to her Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)

request to the Illinois State Police for drug test results on the photos that prompted the false drug

charge. Plaintiff received Ms. Hatton’s electronic message that she got the FOIA information

(Doc. 1, p. 21; Doc. 1-1, pp. 7, 11-12). The same day, Plaintiff learned Intel/I.A. blocked a

message from his sister. Hours later, Defendant John Doe #1 ransacked Plaintiff’s cell. Defendant

Curry (Intel/I.A.) then moved Plaintiff to restricted housing under investigation. Plaintiff had a

nervous breakdown and suicidal thoughts, fearing more retaliation by the Intel/I.A. defendants

(Doc. 1, p. 22; Doc. 1-2, pp. 2-3).

About five days later, Defendants Ottensmeier and Lauer (Lead Intel/I.A. Officer)

interviewed Plaintiff for two hours, telling him he was under investigation because of an electronic

message he sent to a woman containing the phrase “on blast,” which they interpreted to mean

putting out a gang “hit.” Plaintiff denied this, explaining he used the phrase in reference to

“expos[ing] the person” referenced in the message (Doc. 1, p. 22; Doc. 1-2, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff said

he knew the investigation was about the FOIA message and he was seeking the lab reports to prove

the drug charge was false and remove it from his record. Lauer replied he knew the charge was

false and didn’t know why it remained on Plaintiff’s record. Lauer said if Plaintiff would “leave

things be” there would be no issues like petty or false charges. Id. Plaintiff understood the

statements to mean the officers would leave him alone if he discontinued the awareness campaign

and stopped filing complaints (Doc. 1, p. 23; Doc. 1-2, pp. 4-5). He was released from restricted

housing a few days later with no disciplinary charges filed.

Plaintiff told Ms. Hatton to quit the awareness campaign, but she continued it over his

objection. On June 11, 2022, she sent Plaintiff a message about a planned gathering with the IDOC

Director to expose the mistreatment and seek Plaintiff’s transfer to another prison (Doc. 1, p. 23;

Doc. 1-1, pp. 15-16; Doc. 1-2, p. 6). Plaintiff, knowing that Intel/I.A. was monitoring his

correspondence, messaged Ms. Hatton asking her to discontinue her efforts. The next day,

Defendant Bohnert (Intel/I.A.) issued Plaintiff a disciplinary report for the petty charge of using

another prisoner’s phone PIN number. Lauer and Ottensmeier had threatened such discipline if

Plaintiff did not cease his campaign/complaints. Plaintiff interpreted the charge as a “warning” to

get his supporters to quit their campaign. This was Plaintiff’s first charge for a PIN infraction even

though he had “continuously committed” this offense, which is rarely enforced (Doc. 1, p. 25;

Doc. 1-2, p. 6). Defendant Schoenbeck conducted the hearing on this ticket and gave Plaintiff a

verbal reprimand. Plaintiff again asked his loved ones to discontinue their campaign and stopped

filing grievances out of fear of retaliation.

During Plaintiff’s two-hour interview in May 2022 with Lauer and Ottensmeier,

Ottensmeier asked Plaintiff whether he had ever been accused of being a “snitch” (Doc. 1, pp. 25-

26; Doc. 1-2, pp. 7-8). Between the May 2022 interview and October 2023, I.A. called Plaintiff

for ten supposedly random interviews, mostly on incidents he had nothing to do with. This

frequency caused several prisoners to suspect him of being an informant and he became fearful for

his safety (Doc. 1, p. 26; Doc. 1-1, pp. 19-21; Doc. 1-2, p. 8). In his two-and-a-half years at

Menard, Plaintiff had only previously been interviewed by Intel/I.A. three or four times. He

believed the interviews were calculated to purposely endanger him.

After May 2022 and continuing through January 2023, Lauer, Ottensmeier, and Bohnert

continued to retaliate against Plaintiff for the awareness campaign and his previous complaints by

delaying his mail delivery for three or more weeks and blacklisting him from obtaining a prison

job (Doc. 1, pp. 27-28; Doc. 1-2, pp. 8-9). Wills failed to intervene to stop this retaliation.

On May 15, 2023, Plaintiff attended a settlement conference on the case he filed against

several Intel/I.A. officers in Brown v. Childs, No. 20-cv-1348-RJD (Doc. 1, p. 29). Plaintiff did

not want money and agreed with his attorney to settle the case only if the 2021 false drug charges

brought by Intel/I.A. Frazier were dropped and Plaintiff was removed from “mail watch.” When

Plaintiff arrived at the conference room, Ottensmeier asked him “what’s up?” Id. Plaintiff

explained he planned to end the case if the false charges were dropped and the mail restrictions

lifted (Doc. 1, p. 30). Ottensmeier replied the charges had been expunged and he was no longer

on mail watch. Plaintiff told his attorney, who relayed the information to presiding Judge Reona

J. Daly. Judge Daly paused the proceeding to verify the expungement. She spoke with Defendant

John Doe #2, who stated the drug charges had not been expunged, were not false, and Plaintiff was

still on mail watch because he had received drugs in the mail at a prior institution. Doe #2 knew

the drug charges were false and knew Plaintiff was not on mail watch for that reason because of

the relevant dates (Doc. 1, p. 30; Doc. 1-1, pp. 11-12, 22-23). After this exchange, Plaintiff no

longer wanted to settle the case but did so for fear of retaliation after seeing that Defendants were

bold enough to lie to a judge. Plaintiff became depressed, anxious, fearful, and hopeless.

Ottensmeier and John Doe #2 conspired to intimidate and lie to force him to settle that case. Wills

failed to intervene (Doc. 1, p. 31).

In late May 2023, Plaintiff’s friend was stabbed on the prison yard. Intel/I.A. held a white

prisoner responsible (Doc. 1, p. 31). About a month later, Plaintiff was called for another “baseless

interview.” Id. Defendant Lauer (Head of Intel) asked Plaintiff if he was staying out of trouble.

In response, Plaintiff asked Lauer why he was stuck in the East House high aggression unit (Doc.

1, p. 32). Lauer said Plaintiff should be able to move if his aggression score was low enough, but

he should “leave them white boys alone.” Id. Plaintiff understood Lauer to mean that Plaintiff

would be held accountable if anyone in his former gang (the Black Disciples) harmed a white

prisoner.

Plaintiff’s relatives contacted his counselor about reducing his aggression score and the

counselor agreed to do so. However, the counselor never lowered Plaintiff’s score and refused to

answer Plaintiff’s inquiries about the matter. In August 2023, Plaintiff again asked his counselor

about the matter. The counselor “acted dumbfounded” and agreed to look into it but never did.

Because Intel/I.A. reviews all Plaintiff’s messages, he assumed they interfered with his request to

lower his aggression score (Doc. 1, p. 32; Doc. 1-2, pp. 12-13). Plaintiff filed a grievance over the

issue in approximately August 2023 (Doc. 1, p. 33).

In October 2023, Defendant Robbins, who was a target of Plaintiff’s complaints, solicited

false information from another prisoner to justify a gang leadership charge against Plaintiff (Doc.

1, p. 33; Doc. 1-1, pp. 25-26). The prisoner refused to give false information. Defendant Schanz

charged that prisoner with a drug offense and offered to dismiss the charge in exchange for false

information on Plaintiff. Schanz improperly found the inmate guilty and told him to “Tell Plaintiff

to show you how good he is with lawsuits” (Doc. 1, p. 33; Doc. 1-1, p. 26).

On November 6, 2023, a fight broke out on the yard among alleged Black Disciples.

Plaintiff was not present, but the next day, Defendant McKinney took him to restricted housing

under investigation (Doc. 1, pp. 33-34; Doc. 1-1, p. 27). Officers failed to get false information

against Plaintiff but still refused to release him. On November 14, 2023 Ottensmeier charged

Plaintiff with “conspiracy to commit violent assault” and “security threat group” for an unrelated

incident even though Plaintiff was never interviewed about the matter, in violation of prison rules

(Doc. 1, p. 34; Doc. 1-1, pp. 29-31). Ottensmeier blocked Plaintiff’s message to Ms. Hatton about

the charges. Plaintiff mailed his written defense to the charges to the adjustment committee,

counselor, Warden, and the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) (Doc. 1, p. 34). However,

John Doe #3 removed the postage voucher so the document could not reach the counselor (Doc.

1-1, pp. 33-34). Defendant Walker conducted the disciplinary hearing and found Plaintiff guilty

even though Plaintiff explained he couldn’t present a real defense because the disciplinary report

did not identify the victim, co-conspirator, date, time, or location of the incident (Doc. 1, p. 35).

Walker and Ottensmeier conspired to find Plaintiff guilty (Doc. 1-1, pp. 36-37). Plaintiff was

punished with three months segregation as well as other restrictions.

In November and December 2023, Plaintiff was the target of further retaliation after he

filed a grievance on November 28, 2023 over the guilty finding on Ottensmeier’s false charges

(Doc. 1, pp. 37-38; Doc. 1-1, p. 38). Ottensmeier blocked Plaintiff’s outgoing electronic messages

to his loved ones on November 29, 2023. John Doe #4 tampered with Plaintiff’s incoming mail

and failed to deliver it. Ottensmeier changed Plaintiff’s phone access code, preventing him from

calling home. John Doe #3 damaged Plaintiff’s property (which he confiscated when Plaintiff was

moved to restricted housing in early November), returning it in early December with shampoo

poured over Plaintiff’s mail and photos. On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff was moved from

restricted housing into administrative detention based on a report by Ottensmeier (Doc. 1, p. 38;

Doc. 1-1, p. 42). Wills failed to intervene to stop these retaliatory acts (Doc. 1 p. 39).

Ottensmeier’s December 15, 2023 administrative detention report contained misleading

and false information on Plaintiff’s past disciplinary history (Doc. 1, p. 39). Plaintiff prepared a

written defense for the hearing on his placement in administrative detention, which Ottensmeier

initially refused to collect. When Ottensmeier picked up Plaintiff’s written defense, he told

Plaintiff it wouldn’t matter since “we [are] everywhere” and any grievances would go through him

(Doc. 1, p. 40). Ottensmeier personally handled all the mail for those housed in administrative

detention and told Plaintiff he was barred from outgoing electronic messages even though that did

not comply with prison rules, and admitted he singled out Plaintiff to change his phone access code

(Doc. 1, pp. 40-41).

Lauer, who had been promoted to a position in Springfield, sat on the review panel for

Plaintiff’s administrative detention placement at a December 20, 2023 video hearing. Ottensmeier

and Shamoney were in the room with Plaintiff during the hearing (Doc. 1, p. 42). Lauer agreed to

Plaintiff’s request for a polygraph test regarding the three previous false charges relied on in the

administrative detention placement report. Plaintiff reminded Lauer that he and Ottensmeier had

agreed in May 2022 not to file petty or false charges on Plaintiff if he stopped filing complaints.

Lauer acknowledged that discussion but said nobody was filing false charges.

The next day, December 21, 2023, Plaintiff signed the consent for the polygraph test in the

presence of Ottensmeier and Shamoney, who gloated about placing Lauer on the hearing panel.

That evening, Plaintiff discovered Ottensmeier had changed/invalidated three of his phone access

codes. Plaintiff used the last of his codes on December 25, 2023 to call his family. On December

28, 2023, Ottensmeier wrote Plaintiff a ticket for using the phone. Ottensmeier then yelled to

another prisoner that he had to write up that individual too because he wrote up Plaintiff, and it

would be like this “as long as attorney Brown is here” (Doc. 1, p. 43). Ottensmeier told Plaintiff

that Spiller, the former head of Menard Intel who was promoted to Springfield, had denied

Plaintiff’s polygraph test, remarking, “Nice try” (Doc. 1 p. 44).

The committee approved Plaintiff’s administrative detention placement. He continued to

be held in “extreme isolation” nearly 24 hours per day, with no yard, religious services, no contact

visits, and no way to know how long he would remain there or how to earn his way out. He became

depressed, suicidal, and feared for his life due to rumors that other inmates believed Ottensmeier’s

false reports blaming Plaintiff for assaults on members of his former gang (Doc. 1, p. 44).

In early January 2024, Plaintiff learned Ottensmeier had offered to release another prisoner

from administrative detention and transfer him to a prison of his choice if that prisoner could get

proof that Plaintiff was a drug dealer and gang leader (Doc. 1, p. 45). Ottensmeier told the prisoner

his plan was supported by McCarthy, Lauer, and Spiller, who were promoted to Springfield from

Menard. When the other prisoner stated he had no such information on Plaintiff, Ottensmeier

asked him to pretend to have that knowledge (Doc. 1, p. 46). The prisoner declined, but

Ottensmeier reminded him of the offer whenever he later complained about being in administrative

detention.

On approximately January 11, 2024, another prisoner, who was facing a drug charge filed

by Ottensmeier, told Plaintiff that Ottensmeier said he could get drugs from Plaintiff (Doc. 1, p.

47). This comment fueled the rumors that Plaintiff was a drug dealer, which began with the earlier

false drug charges against Plaintiff and continued the pattern of retaliation for Plaintiff’s

grievances against Intel/I.A. officers.

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in

this pro se action:

Count 1: First Amendment claim against Ottensmeier, Lauer, Curry, Bohnert,

and Schoenbeck for sending Plaintiff to restricted housing and

bringing petty disciplinary charges, and against Doe #1 for

ransacking Plaintiff’s cell, all in May 2022, as retaliation for

Plaintiff’s grievances and awareness campaign and to deter him

from continuing it; and against Wills for failing to intervene to stop

the retaliation.

Count 2: First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims against

Ottensmeier and Lauer for causing Plaintiff to be labeled as a snitch

by repeatedly calling him for Intel/I.A. interviews between May

2022 and October 2023, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints, and

against Wills for failing to intervene.

Count 3: First Amendment claim against Lauer, Ottensmeier, and Bohnert for

delaying Plaintiff’s mail and preventing him from obtaining a prison

job from May 2022 through January 2023 in retaliation for

Plaintiff’s earlier complaints and the awareness campaign, and

against Wills for failing to stop the retaliation.

Count 4: First Amendment retaliation claim and Eighth Amendment claim

against Ottensmeier and John Doe #2 for intimidating Plaintiff into

settling his claims in Brown v. Childs, No. 20-cv-1348-RJD, and

against Wills for failing to intervene.

Count 5: First Amendment retaliation claims prompted by Plaintiff’s August

2023 grievance, and Eighth Amendment claims, against Lauer for

verbal harassment, against Robbins and Schanz for soliciting false

information against Plaintiff, against McKinney for placing Plaintiff

in restricted housing, against Ottensmeier for refusing to interview

Plaintiff before bringing false charges and for blocking his

electronic message, against John Doe #3 for tampering with

Plaintiff’s mail, against Walker and Ottensmeier for finding Plaintiff

guilty on false charges after a sham hearing, and against Wills for

failing to intervene to stop the retaliatory acts.

Count 6: First Amendment retaliation claims prompted by Plaintiff’s

November 28, 2023 grievance and earlier complaints, against

Ottensmeier for blocking Plaintiff’s messages, restricting his phone

access, and sending him to administrative detention, against John

Doe #3 for damaging Plaintiff’s property, against John Doe #4 for

tampering with Plaintiff’s mail, and against Wills for failing to

intervene.

Count 7: First Amendment retaliation claim and Fourteenth Amendment

claims against Ottensmeier for falsifying the December 15, 2023

administrative detention report, restricting Plaintiff’s phone access,

and filing a petty disciplinary charge; against Ottensmeier,

Shamoney, and Lauer for denying Plaintiff a fair and impartial

administrative detention hearing; Eighth Amendment claim against

Ottensmeier for endangering Plaintiff; and claims against Wills for

failing to intervene.

Count 8: First Amendment retaliation claim and Monell claim against

Ottensmeier, Lauer, McCarthy, Spiller, Wills, and the Intel/I.A.

Supervisor for practicing the unofficial custom of soliciting false

information from prisoner in exchange for favors, falsifying charges

in retaliation and as a tool to obtain promotions.

Count 9: First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims against

Ottensmeier for defaming Plaintiff by falsely telling another

prisoner that Plaintiff is a drug dealer, and against Wills for failing

to intervene to stop the retaliation.

Count 10: State law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

against Ottensmeier, Lauer, Bohnert, Curry, John Doe #1,

Schoenbeck, and Wills based on the allegations in Count 1; against

Ottensmeier and John Doe #2 based on the allegations in Count 4;

against Lauer based on the allegations in Count 5; against

Ottensmeier and John Doe #3 based on the allegations in Count 6;

and against Ottensmeier based on the allegations in Count 7.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is

plausible on its face.”).

Discussion

Count 1

Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, lawsuits, or

otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680

F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002). “A complaint

states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events from which retaliation may

plausibly be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation

omitted).

Here, Plaintiff describes several adverse actions he claims were taken against him after he

filed grievances and sought information to challenge the allegedly false 2021 disciplinary charges

and ensuing punishment. He further alleges retaliatory acts were prompted by his friend’s public

awareness campaign and their correspondence regarding the FOIA request. Plaintiff’s First

Amendment activity allegedly triggered the May 2022 blocking of his sister’s electronic message,

John Doe #1’s ransacking of his cell, Curry’s placement of Plaintiff under investigation in

restricted housing, Bohnert’s disciplinary report (filed after Ottensmeier and Lauer indicated

Plaintiff would be left alone if he discontinued the awareness campaign, but it did not end), and

Schoenbeck’s verbal reprimand on the ticket. This chronology of events supports the retaliation

claims against John Doe #1, Curry, Bohnert, Ottensmeier, Lauer, and Schoenbeck in Count 1.

However, Plaintiff fails to state a viable retaliation claim against Defendant Wills. Plaintiff

alleges he asked Wills to stop the Intel/I.A. officers’ retaliatory delays and non-delivery of his mail

in February and/or March 2022, but Wills did nothing. That alleged conversation predated the

retaliatory actions Plaintiff claims occurred in May 2022, and Plaintiff does not claim that Wills

participated in or was aware of the other defendants’ actions described above. “[T]o be held

individually liable, a defendant must be ‘personally responsible for the deprivation of a

constitutional right.’” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez

v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, Wills will be dismissed from

Count 1.

Count 2

Plaintiff may proceed on the First Amendment claim against Lauer and Ottensmeier for

their frequent interviews of him between May 2022 and October 2023, allegedly in retaliation for

Plaintiff’s grievances and complaints. Plaintiff also asserts these interviews violated the Eighth

Amendment by creating suspicion among other inmates that he was an informant, placing him in

danger of physical harm. To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must plead facts

suggesting he is incarcerated under conditions that create an excessive risk to his health or safety,

and the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 833 (1994). The reckless exposure of a prisoner to a substantial risk of serious physical injury

may amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir.

2011) (citation omitted); see also Wright v. Miller, 561 F. App’x 551, 555 (7th Cir. 2014).

Here, Plaintiff alleges Ottensmeier and Lauer, after asking him in May 2022 whether he

had ever been accused of being a “snitch,” intentionally placed him at heightened risk by

repeatedly calling him for interviews during the next year and a half. As a result, some inmates

suspected Plaintiff was a snitch. Given these allegations, Plaintiff may also proceed with his

Eighth Amendment claim against Lauer and Ottensmeier in Count 2. However, Plaintiff fails to

state a claim in Count 2 against Wills because he pleads no factual allegations suggesting Wills

participated in Ottensmeier’s or Lauer’s conduct. Therefore, Wills will be dismissed from Count

2.

Count 3

This First Amendment claim may proceed on Plaintiff’s allegations that Lauer,

Ottensmeier, and Bohnert delayed his mail and blacklisted him from prison employment from May

2022 through January 2023, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievances, complaints, and the awareness

campaign. However, because Plaintiff’s factual allegations fail to connect Wills to this activity,

Wills will be dismissed from the claim. Count 3 will proceed only against Lauer, Ottensmeier,

and Bohnert.

Count 4

Ottensmeier’s alleged retaliatory act was falsely telling Plaintiff that his drug-related

disciplinary charge had been dropped and he was no longer on “mail watch.” Plaintiff was willing

to settle his case (Brown v. Childs) if this information was true. During Plaintiff’s settlement

conference, the judge spoke to John Doe #2, who stated the drug charges had not been dropped

and the mail watch was still in effect. Plaintiff asserts he did not want to settle the case, but

ultimately did settle because he feared more retaliation and because he believed Ottensmeier and

Doe #2 conspired to intimidate and lie to him to force a settlement.

A colorable retaliation claim requires allegations indicating that Plaintiff “suffered a

deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future[.]” Bridges v. Gilbert,

557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). The allegations in Count 4 do not describe a deprivation or

adverse action likely to deter future First Amendment activity. While Ottensmeier and John Doe

#2 allegedly lied to Plaintiff and/or created confusion about the status of his disciplinary record

and mail restriction, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to receive truthful information

from prison officials. Plaintiff’s assertion that he felt intimidated and feared future retaliation does

not elevate the defendants’ speech to an adverse retaliatory action that violated his First

Amendment rights. Nor did the defendants’ private remarks place Plaintiff in danger that could

implicate the Eighth Amendment. For these reasons, Count 4 will be dismissed.

Count 5

Plaintiff claims his August 2023 grievance over officials’ refusal to lower his aggression

score prompted another round of retaliatory actions which violated the Eighth Amendment.

Lauer’s alleged comment in approximately June 2023, indicating Plaintiff might be held

accountable if another attack occurred by a Black Disciple against a white prisoner, took place

before Plaintiff filed the August 2023 grievance. Because these facts do not support a retaliation

claim or an Eighth Amendment violation, Lauer will be dismissed from Count 5.

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges retaliation for the August 2023 grievance by Robbins and

Schanz for soliciting false information in an attempt to file gang-related disciplinary charge(s)

against him; by McKinney for transferring Plaintiff to restricted housing after the November 6,

2023 fight among other inmates; by Ottensmeier for filing allegedly false charges against Plaintiff

on November 14, 2023 and for blocking Plaintiff’s message about the matter (Plaintiff’s allegation

that Ottensmeier violated prison rules by failing to interview him before filing the charges does

not amount to a constitutional violation. Courtney v. Butler, 66 F.4th 1043, 1052-53 (7th Cir.

2023)); against Walker and Ottensmeier for holding an allegedly sham hearing and finding

Plaintiff guilty on those false charges; and against John Doe #3 for tampering with Plaintiff’s mail.

These retaliation claims will proceed in Count 5. However, these allegations do not rise to the

level of cruel or unusual punishment. Consequently, the Eighth Amendment portion of Count 5

will be dismissed. Likewise, Wills will be dismissed from Count 5 because no factual allegations

suggest he was personally involved in the conduct Plaintiff complains of.

Count 6

Plaintiff alleges that his grievance of November 28, 2023, after he was found guilty on the

charges filed by Ottensmeier, led to more retaliation including Ottensmeier’s adverse actions of

allegedly blocking Plaintiff’s electronic messages, restricting his phone access, and authoring a

report that sent Plaintiff to administrative detention. Additionally, John Doe #3 allegedly damaged

Plaintiff’s personal property by pouring shampoo over it, and John Doe #4 tampered with and

failed to deliver Plaintiff’s mail. Based on these allegations, the retaliation claims in Count 6 may

proceed. However, because Plaintiff fails to allege that Wills was aware of this conduct or

participated in it, he will be dismissed from Count 6.

Count 7

Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a First Amendment claim against Ottensmeier for allegedly

sending him to administrative segregation based on false information, restricting his telephone

access, and issuing him a ticket for using the phone, in retaliation for his grievance activity.

However, the allegations fail to support a claim that Ottensmeier’s conduct endangered Plaintiff

in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Further, these allegations and Plaintiff’s assertion that he was denied a fair and impartial

administrative detention hearing do not state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. To

maintain a due process claim, a protected liberty interest must be at stake – and there is no such

interest in avoiding placement in administrative or discretionary segregation. Townsend v. Fuchs,

522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases).

The Fourteenth Amendment portion of Count 7 against Ottensmeier, Shamoney, and Lauer

will therefore be dismissed. Wills will also be dismissed from Count 7 because no factual

allegations connect him to Ottensmeier’s alleged retaliation. Count 7 will proceed only on the

First Amendment retaliation claim against Ottensmeier.

Count 8

Plaintiff invokes Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) for his claim that

defendants practiced an “unofficial custom of soliciting false information from prisoners in

exchange for favors/relief” (Doc. 1, p. 46). However, a § 1983 policy/practice/custom claim

brought pursuant to Monell may only proceed against a local government unit, not against a state

agency such as the Illinois Department of Corrections. As such, Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails;

Lauer, McCarthy, Spiller, Wills, and the Intel/I.A. Supervisor will be dismissed from Count 8.

However, Plaintiff may proceed on a First Amendment retaliation claim in Count 8 against

Ottensmeier for allegedly soliciting false information in approximately January 2024 from another

prisoner in administrative detention, in an attempt to charge Plaintiff with drug and gang offenses.

Count 9

The allegation that Ottensmeier falsely told another prisoner that Plaintiff deals drugs, in

retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievance activity, survives § 1915A review as a First Amendment

retaliation claim. However, the Complaint allegations do not support an Eighth Amendment claim

for this conduct, nor do they state a claim against Wills. Therefore, those portions of Count 9 will

be dismissed.

Count 10

Under Illinois law, a plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress must

plead facts suggesting the defendant(s) intentionally or recklessly engaged in “extreme and

outrageous conduct” that resulted in severe emotional distress. Somberger v. City of Knoxville,

Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1030 (7th Cir. 2006); see Lopez v. City of Chi., 464 F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir.

2006). The tort has three components: (1) the conduct involved must be truly extreme and

outrageous; (2) the actor must either intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or

know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress;

and (3) the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d

806, 809 (Ill. 1988).

Plaintiff’s allegations against Lauer, Ottensmeier, Curry, Bohnert, Schoenbeck, and John

Doe #1 in Count 1; against Ottensmeier and John Doe #3 in Count 6; and against Ottensmeier in

Count 7 satisfy this pleading standard. Because the emotional distress claims derive from the same

facts underlying the surviving federal claims in Counts 1, 6, and 7, they may be brought in this

case. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, Count 10 will proceed against Lauer, Ottensmeier, Curry, Bohnert, Schoenbeck,

John Doe #1, and John Doe #3, based on the conduct described in Counts 1, 6, and 7.

Unknown/John/Jane Doe Defendants

Plaintiff is responsible for securing information aimed at identifying the Unknown/John

Doe Defendants #1, #3, and #4, in accordance with the John/Jane Doe Identification Order that

will be entered separately. Once the names of the unknown defendants are obtained, Plaintiff must

file a motion to substitute the newly identified defendants in place of the generic designations in

the case caption and throughout the Complaint. Anthony Wills, Warden of Menard Correctional

Center, will remain as a defendant in his official capacity only, for the purpose of responding to

Plaintiff’s requests for information regarding the identity of the Unknown Defendants.

Disposition

The Complaint states colorable claims as described above: in Count 1 against Lauer,

Ottensmeier, Curry, Bohnert, Schoenbeck, and John Doe #1; in Count 2 against Lauer and

Ottensmeier; in Count 3 against Lauer, Ottensmeier, and Bohnert; in Count 5 against Ottensmeier,

Schanz, McKinney, Robbins, Walker, and John Doe #3; in Count 6 against Ottensmeier, John Doe

#3, and John Doe #4; in Counts 7, 8, and 9 against Ottensmeier for retaliation; and in Count 10

against Lauer, Ottensmeier, Curry, Bohnert, Schoenbeck, John Doe #1, and John Doe #3.

Count 4 and Defendants Spiller, McCarthy, Shamoney, John Doe #2, and all individual

capacity claims against Anthony Wills, are DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Clerk shall prepare for Corey Lauer, Marcelus Ottensmeier, G. Curry, Jerod Schanz,

Devin McKinney, Lucas Bohnert, Robbins, Joshua Schoenbeck, Sandy Walker, and Menard

Warden Anthony Wills (official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to

Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is

DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to

each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and

return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the

forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant,

and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the

Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as

directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be

retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 244 and Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merit Review Order. Menard Warden Wills need only appear in this matter and

need not answer the Complaint.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes

the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the

costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of

Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 3, 2026

_____________________

STACI M. YANDLE

Chief U.S. District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit and serve

them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, Defendants will enter an

appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date

of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days

or more. When Defendants have filed their Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order

containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any

evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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