WILDERNESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

LAVONTE WILDERNESS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00624-JRS-MG

)

LEFTLER, )

RANDELL VANVLEET, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

The Plaintiff, Lavonte Wilderness, is currently incarcerated at Wabash Valley Correctional

Facility ("Wabash Valley"). On March 16, 2026, this Court's screening order allowed Eighth

Amendment claims to proceed against the Defendants, Lt. Timothy Leffler and Investigator Randy

VanVleet, based on allegations that Lt. Leffler used excessive force against Mr. Wilderness and

both Defendants subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Dkt. 10.1 The Court

also directed the Defendants to respond to Mr. Wilderness's emergency motion for temporary

restraining order,2 which requested immediate transfer to another prison based on the allegations

that the Defendants tampered with Mr. Wilderness's food and that he was being threatened in

segregated housing and experiencing mental distress. See dkt. 3.

For the reasons explained below, the court DENIES Mr. Wilderness's motion, dkt. [3].

1 The clerk is directed to update the spelling of the Defendants' names on the docket.

2 As will be explained below, the Court construes Mr. Wilderness's motion as a motion for preliminary

injunction since the relief requested would necessarily exceed 14 days.

I. Legal Standard

Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes district courts to issue two forms

of temporary injunctive relief: preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining

orders. Courts generally apply the same equitable standards to a motion for a temporary

restraining order as they do to a motion for a preliminary injunction. See International Profit

Associates, Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (collecting cases). Mr.

Wilderness has filed a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking transfer to another facility.

Given the substance of the relief sought, the motion for a temporary restraining order is better

understood as a motion for preliminary injunction. This is because "[a] temporary restraining order

may not exceed 14 days without good cause." Decker v. Lammer, 2022 WL 135429, *2 (7th Cir.

Jan. 14, 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2)).

"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that is available only when

the movant shows clear need." Turnell v. Centimark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). To

obtain a preliminary injunction Mr. Wilderness first must show that: "(1) without this relief, [he]

will suffer irreparable harm; (2) traditional legal remedies would be inadequate; and (3) [he] has

some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of [his] claims." Speech First, Inc. v. Killen, 968 F.3d

628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020). If Mr. Wilderness meets these threshold requirements, "the court then

must weigh the harm the denial of the preliminary injunction would cause the plaintiff against the

harm to the defendant if the court were to grant it." Id. "[A] preliminary injunction is an exercise

of a very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it." Orr

v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2020).

In addition to these requirements, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") provides that

"[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to

correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means

necessary to correct that harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). "This section of the PLRA enforces a

point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: '[P]rison

officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.'"

Westerfer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467

(1983)); see also Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2020)). Therefore, courts have been

hesitant to order a prisoner's transfer to a different institution. See Shaw v. Rozmarynoski, 2025

WL 1869659, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 4, 2025) ("Prison officials are uniquely qualified to decide

where a particular prisoner should be housed, how to manage the staffing at each institution, and

how to preserve safety and security at the institution. It is not this Court's job to second-guess those

decisions."); Felton v. Matushak, 2025 WL 1454971, at *9 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2025) (The court

has no authority to order the plaintiff's transfer to another institution.). In general, "[m]andatory

preliminary injunctions" requiring affirmative acts, such as transferring a plaintiff to a different

facility, are viewed with particular caution and have been "sparingly issued[.]" Mays v. Dart, 974

F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).

II. Discussion

A. Irreparable Harm

"[H]arm is considered irreparable if it "cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the final

judgment after trial." Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 Board of

Education, 858 F.3d 1034, 1045 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). "'The mere possibility

of irreparable injury is not enough' to prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction." Boykins v.

Simmerman, 2023 WL 6461002, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 3, 2023) (quoting Orr, 953 F.3d at 501).

"'[T]he moving party must demonstrate he will likely suffer irreparable harm absent obtaining

preliminary injunctive relief.'" Id. (quoting Orr, 953 F.3d at 503). Here, the Defendants are correct

to argue that Mr. Wilderness has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive

relief. Instead, he speculates that he faces "immediat[e] and irreparable harm" because he is already

in imminent danger due to the food contamination and to the medical department not responding

to his requests. Dkt. 3 at 2. He also claims that he is contemplating self-harm due to the conditions

in segregation. Id. Although these allegations are serious, Mr. Wilderness has not provided any

evidence showing that future injuries are likely to occur and are not just hypothetical. See East St.

Louis Laborers' Local 100 v. Bellon Wrecking & Salvage Co., 414 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2005)

("[A] plaintiff cannot obtain a preliminary injunction by speculating about hypothetical future

injuries.").

Furthermore, the Defendants cite Mr. Wilderness's recent medical records, which do not

provide evidence that his food is contaminated or that he is currently experiencing a mental health

crisis due to his placement in segregated housing. Mr. Wilderness has been seen by medical

providers several times since filing his complaint, but he has not complained about issues with his

food or symptoms of being poisoned. See dkt. 17-1 at 209–11; 260–63; 307–14. Even though Mr.

Wilderness was placed on suicide watch in October 2025, the medical records do not show that

Mr. Wilderness has recently reported suicidal ideation, as expressed in his complaint and his

motion. See id. at 87–88; 94–95; 161–64; 264–306. Moreover, the records show that Mr.

Wilderness is receiving ongoing treatment for his mental health. In sum, based on the evidence in

the current record, Mr. Wilderness has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not

transferred.3

3 See Minocqua Brewing Co. LLC v. Hess, 160 F.4th 849, 852 (7th Cir. 2025) ("[T]he district court's fact

finding for purposes of the denial of the preliminary injunction is not controlling at a later hearing on the

merits.").

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Even if Mr. Wilderness could establish irreparable harm, he has not established that he is

likely to succeed on the merits. "A movant's showing of likelihood of success on the merits must

be strong." Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). A "better

than negligible" likelihood of success is not enough. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d

760, 762−63 (7th Cir. 2020). "A 'strong' showing . . . does not mean proof by a preponderance . . .

[b]ut it normally includes a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements

of its case." Id.

In this case, Mr. Wilderness proceeds on Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement

claims against the Defendants based on allegations that they have contaminated his food and kept

him in segregated housing where he is being threatened and suffering from mental distress.4 Under

the Eighth Amendment, "prisoners cannot be confined in inhumane conditions." Thomas v.

Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 720 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).

A conditions-of-confinement claim includes both an objective and subjective component. Giles v.

Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019). Under the objective component, a prisoner must

show that the conditions were objectively serious and created "an excessive risk to his health and

safety." Id. (cleaned up). Under the subjective component, a prisoner must establish that the

defendants had a culpable state of mind — that they "were subjectively aware of these conditions

and refused to take steps to correct them, showing deliberate indifference." Thomas, 2 F.4th at 720.

Proving the subjective component is a "high hurdle" that "requires something approaching a total

unconcern for the prisoner's welfare in the face of serious risks." Donald v. Wexford Health

4 Mr. Wilderness also proceeds on Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Lt. Leffler. However,

based on the substance of Mr. Wilderness's motion, which requests transfer because Defendants are

tampering with his food, these claims do not appear to be relevant to his request for injunctive relief.

Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). Neither "negligence

[n]or even gross negligence is enough[.]" Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008).

The current record does not show that Mr. Wilderness is suffering from objectively serious

conditions that create an excessive risk of danger to his health and safety. As seen above, Mr.

Wilderness's medical records do not mention any issues with his food or Mr. Wilderness's

complained-about symptoms even though he has seen medical providers several times since filing

his complaint. See id.; dkt. 17-1 at 209–11; 260–63; 307–14. They also do not show any reported

mental health issues since Mr. Wilderness initiated this lawsuit even though Mr. Wilderness has

been receiving ongoing mental healthcare. See id. at 87–88; 94–95; 161–64; 264–306. Mr.

Wilderness did not file a reply disputing the Defendants' representation of the facts supporting his

claims. Accordingly, because the record does not support the objective component of Mr.

Wilderness's Eighth Amendment claims, he has not established a likelihood of success on the

merits.

Importantly, the Court's decision today is limited to the question of injunctive relief and

does not reflect any judgment on the merits of Mr. Wilderness's claims for damages. As the

Supreme Court explained in Farmer, when reviewing a plaintiff's request for "injunctive relief to

prevent a substantial risk of serious injury from ripening into actual harm, the subjective factor,

deliberate indifference, should be determined in light of the prison authorities' current attitudes and

conduct, . . . their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought and persisting thereafter." 511

U.S. at 845–46 (internal citations and quotations omitted). "[T]o establish eligibility for an

injunction, the inmate must demonstrate the continuance of that disregard during the remainder of

the litigation and into the future." Id. Here, the record does not reveal a likelihood of showing that

the Defendants are continuously subjecting Mr. Wilderness to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement.

Because Mr. Wilderness has not shown that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm or that

he will likely succeed on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim against the Defendants, the

Court does not discuss the inadequacy of legal remedies.

HI. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the court DENIES Mr. Wilderness's motion for preliminary

injunction, dkt. [3].

IT IS SO ORDERED. +"

JAMES R. SWEENEY II, CHIEF JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

LAVONTE WILDERNESS

257088

WABASH VALLEY - CF

Wabash Valley Correctional Facility

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