Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT April 27, 2026

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

GALVESTON DIVISION

DONALD LYNN THOMPSON, JR., §

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Plaintiff. §

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V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-000253

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MATAGORDA COUNTY, et al., §

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Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before me is the Matagorda County Defendants’ motion to dismiss

the claims asserted against them by Plaintiff Donald Thompson.1 See Dkt. 29.

Having reviewed the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, I recommend that

the motion be granted. I also recommend that the court sua sponte dismiss the

remaining defendant, Buster Jackson d/b/a Jackson Towing Services. Before the

court enters final judgment, however, I recommend that Thompson be given 14

days from the adoption of this memorandum and recommendation to amend his

complaint.

BACKGROUND2

“On May 14, 2023, [Thompson] was operating a vehicle with expired

registration in Markham, Texas, when he was stopped [and arrested] by”

Defendant Deputy Raymond Gonzales. Dkt. 1 at 6. Gonzales handcuffed, arrested,

and transported Thompson to the Matagorda County Jail where he was detained

for approximately 18 hours.

1 The Matagorda County Defendants are Matagorda County, Texas; Jennifer Chau, the

Matagorda County Attorney; Judge Jason Sanders, Justice of the Peace Precinct 1; Judge

Mark Finlay, Justice of the Peace Precinct 4; Matagorda County Sheriff’s Deputy

Raymond Gonzales; Matagorda County Sheriff’s Department; Matagorda County

Attorney’s Office; Michaela Riley; and unknown John and Jane Does alleged to be

employed by the Matagorda County Sheriff’s Department.

2 These facts, which I accept as true, are taken from Thompson’s complaint. See Dkt. 1.

On May 15, 2023, Defendant Judge Jason Sanders, Justice of the Peace for

Precinct 1, conducted a magistration and entered a disposition of time served

against Thompson.

On June 22, 2023, a vehicle tow hearing was held before Defendant Judge

Mark Finlay, Justice of the Peace for Precinct 4.3 Defendant County Attorney

Jennifer Chau appeared at the hearing, as did a representative of Defendant Buster

Jackson d/b/a Jackson Services. During the hearing, Thompson’s wife requested

the body-worn and dash camera footage of Thompson’s arrest. Judge Finlay

denied the request and ruled that the tow was lawful. Michaela Riley, a records

clerk, denied Thompson’s request for access to body camera and dash camera

footage.

On July 2, 2025, Thompson instituted this lawsuit against Jackson and the

Matagorda County Defendants. Thompson asserts five causes of action:

(1) unlawful arrest and detention against Gonzales and Judge Sanders in their

individual capacities; (2) deprivation of due process against Chau, Riley, Judge

Finlay, and Judge Sanders in their individual capacities; (3) malicious prosecution

against Chau, Judge Finlay, and Judge Sanders in their individual capacities;

(4) civil conspiracy to violate constitutional rights against all defendants; and

(5) Monell liability against Matagorda County. The Matagorda County Defendants

have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails “to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

3 Thompson does not allege that his vehicle was towed in connection with his arrest.

Construing all facts in Thompson’s favor, however, I presume that to be the case.

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Conversely, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a

claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point

of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the

court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (cleaned up).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as

true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings

v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation

omitted). I “do not, however, accept as true legal conclusions, conclusory

statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield

v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Fifth Circuit “hold[s] pro se plaintiffs to a

more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing complaints, but pro se

plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the

speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir.

2016); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

ANALYSIS

The central dispute in this case is whether it was lawful for Gonzales to arrest

Thompson for an expired registration. Thompson concedes in his complaint that

his registration was expired. See Dkt. 1 at 4. There is ample authority, from the

United States Supreme Court down to the lowest courts, stating that: “If an officer

has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor

criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment,

arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); see

also State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“[A]n arrest for a

minor traffic offense is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth

Amendment.”); Jaycox v. Pyle, No. 6:18-cv-00016, 2021 WL 1140865, at *6 (S.D.

Tex. Mar. 25, 2021) (“The failure to display proper vehicle registration through a

valid registration sticker . . . [is] lawful grounds for arrest under Texas law.”);

Hodnett v. State, No. 05-01-01323-CR, 2002 WL 31845821, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Dec. 20, 2002, pet. ref’d) (“When an officer has probable cause to believe a

person is committing an offense, even a traffic offense, an officer can reasonably

arrest that person.”).

Against this mountain of authority, Thompson argues that “courts in those

cases were not presented with the argument that the Legislature’s specific remedial

provision for expired registration [in Texas Transportation Code § 502.407]

supersedes general arrest authority.”4 Dkt. 33 at 7. I appreciate Thompson’s

creativity, but Thompson overlooks that, under Texas law, speeding, use of a

wireless communication device, or a violation of the open container law “are the

only offenses for which issuance of a written notice to appear is mandatory.” Tex.

Transp. Code § 543.004(c) (emphasis added). Whatever prohibition against arrest

Thompson believes is implied by § 502.407 cannot stand in the face of the plain

language of § 543.004, which articulates exactly three offenses for which officers

may not make an arrest, none of which is an expired registration. Accordingly,

Gonzales committed no constitutional violation by arresting Thompson.

In any event, Gonzales is “shielded from liability for civil damages [under

the qualified immunity doctrine] if [his] actions did not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation omitted). “A right is

clearly established only if the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was

4 Under § 502.407 a justice of the peace may “dismiss a charge of driving with an expired

motor vehicle registration if the defendant . . . remedies the defect not later than the 20th

working day after the date of the offense or before the defendant’s first court appearance

date, whichever is later.” Tex. Transp. Code § 502.407(b)(1)(A).

violating it.” Mote v. Walthall, 902 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation

omitted). “[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law” at the time of

the incident provided Gonzales with “fair warning that [his] alleged treatment of

[Thompson] was unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. Thompson bears a

heavy burden because a right is clearly established only if relevant precedent has

“placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Accordingly, even if Thompson’s theory is correct

(it is not), his argument is so novel that Gonzales would be entitled to qualified

immunity anyway.

As for Judges Sanders and Finlay, they are unquestionably entitled to

absolute judicial immunity for their actions as judges. See Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because

the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his

authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction.” (cleaned up)). Despite the crystal-clear law on this

point, Thompson contends that “[t]he imposition of criminal punishment for an

administrative infraction that was never formally charged, never pled to, and never

adjudicated on the merits raises a serious question as to whether Judge Sanders

acted within any cognizable jurisdiction.” Dkt. 33 at 13. Not so. The Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure clearly states that justices and judges of the justice and

municipal courts “shall credit the defendant for time served in jail.” Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 45A.251(d). Thus, Judge Sanders acted well within his

jurisdiction when he credited Thompson’s time served toward the fine for an

expired registration. As for Judge Finlay, Thompson contends only that his actions

were wrong, not that they were outside Judge Finlay’s jurisdiction.5 Accordingly,

both judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

5 To the extent that Thompson seeks to relitigate the proceedings before either Judge

Sanders or Judge Finlay, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from

exercising jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

Likewise, County Attorney Chau is entitled to immunity. Defendants

contend that Chau is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Dkt. 29 at 6.

Thompson argues that she is not entitled to prosecutorial immunity because she

appeared at a purely administrative tow hearing, not a criminal hearing. I need not

decide whether Chau is entitled to prosecutorial immunity because, in any event,

she is entitled to qualified immunity. No reasonable attorney would think that she

is violating any constitutional right simply by participating in a tow hearing,

objecting to evidence, and soliciting testimony. See Mote, 902 F.3d at 505.6

The records clerk, Riley, is also entitled to qualified immunity. No

reasonable official would think that simply refusing to waive fees for accessing

bodycam footage, directing someone to another office, and citing technical issues

are violations of any constitutional right. See Dkt. 1 at 10. Indeed, Thompson does

not seriously contest Riley’s qualified immunity in his response brief, arguing only

that “the qualified immunity analysis is premature at this stage.” Dkt. 33 at 16. It

is not; Riley is entitled to qualified immunity.

As for the Matagorda County Attorney’s Office and Sheriff’s Department,

Thompson “acknowledges the legal principle that sub-entities of a county” are non-

jural entities, and that his claims against the County Attorney’s Office and the

Sheriff’s Department “are effectively claims against the County.” Id. at 26.

As for Matagorda County, Thompson cannot establish a constitutional

violation that would give rise to Monell liability. Gonzales acted lawfully when he

arrested Thompson for an expired registration; Sanders acted lawfully when he

credited Thompson’s time served toward the fine for an expired registration; and

Chau did nothing more than appear at a tow hearing on the County’s behalf.

Because Thompson cannot establish a constitutional violation, his claims against

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

6 In addition to Chau’s immunity, her conduct, made during the course of representing

Matagorda County, is “exempt[] from a conspiracy charge under section 1985.” Heffernan

v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 1999).

Matagorda County must be dismissed. See Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d

170, 178 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that claims against a municipality “cannot

survive” where the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate” a constitutional violation);

Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 648 (5th Cir. 2013) (“All of Whitley’s inadequate

supervision, failure to train, and policy, practice, or custom claims fail without an

underlying constitutional violation.”).

Lastly, I must address Jackson. There are only two references to Jackson in

the complaint: (1) “Defendant JACKSON TOWING SERVICES is a private towing

company operating in Matagorda County and may be served through its registered

agent”; and (2) “Chau . . . permitted testimony from a Jackson Towing

representative who lacked any firsthand knowledge of the towing circumstances or

vehicle location.” Dkt. 1 at 3, 5. These are not factual allegations that allow me to

draw the reasonable inference that Jackson is liable for any misconduct. See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Thus, I recommend that the court sua sponte dismiss Thompson’s

claims against Jackson. See Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1177 (5th

Cir. 2006) (“As a general rule, a district court may dismiss a complaint on its own

for failure to state a claim.”).

* * *

Although I am recommending dismissal of all Thompson’s claims, Fifth

Circuit precedent requires that Thompson be given leave to amend. See Ass’n of

Am. Physicians & Surgeons Educ. Found. v. Am. Bd. of Internal Med., 103 F.4th

383, 394 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Normally, plaintiffs facing a motion to dismiss go

through a process of receiving briefing from the movant, conducting research and

submitting opposing briefing to the district court, and finally receiving a ruling

identifying potential flaws in their original complaint.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that the Matagorda County

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 29) be granted. I also recommend that the

court sua sponte dismiss Thompson’s claims against Jackson. Before the court

enters final judgment, however, I recommend that Thompson be given two weeks

from the adoption of this memorandum and recommendation to file an amended

complaint.

The parties have 14 days from service of this Memorandum and

Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of

factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.

SIGNED this day of April 2026.

______________________________

ANDREW M. EDISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE