Jones

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

HERLANKA B. JONES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:24-CV-00506-BL-CWB

)

ALABAMA BEVERAGE )

CONTROL BOARD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER1

Plaintiff Herlanka B. Jones filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on July 9, 2025.

(Doc. 39). On October 9, 2025, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court dismiss

this action with prejudice because the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint ignores the

court’s repeated instructions and remains a shotgun pleading. (Doc. 45). The Plaintiff

filed objections to the recommendation. (Doc. 48).

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A district

judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s]

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine

de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.”).

A district court’s obligation to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the

1 The above-styled case was reassigned to the undersigned District Judge on November 12, 2025.

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made”

requires a district judge to “give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific

objection has been made by a party.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 675

(1980) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in Raddatz).

In her objections, the Plaintiff states that this action “should not be dismissed on the

basis of its alleged status as a ‘shotgun pleading.’” (Doc. 48 at 1). In the recommendation,

the Magistrate Judge, relying on prior orders of the court, states

Although the court was clear that “[Jones] should eliminate the

incorporation of factual averments by reference” (Doc. 38 at p. 5) and stated

unequivocally that “each count must include the factual allegations upon

which the claim is based without incorporating any paragraphs from other

sections” (id. at p. 6) (emphasis added), each count in the Fourth Amend[ed]

Complaint nonetheless continues the same offending practice in defiance of

those instructions[.]

(Doc. 45 at 5) (emphasis in original). The Plaintiff asserts that the court “should reject

Magistrate Judge Bryan’s finding that the complaint impermissibly incorporates prior

factual allegations.” (Doc. 48 at 2). However, the Magistrate Judge did not explicitly make

such a finding in his recommendation. Alternatively, the court finds that the Magistrate

Judge’s reliance on the prior order of the court is akin to a finding that the Plaintiff failed

to comply with court orders. The court notes that the Magistrate Judge has repeatedly

instructed the Plaintiff to cure her deficient pleadings by noting that the prior amended

complaints either “incorporate[d] by reference all of the preceding paragraphs” (doc. 33)

or “incorporate[d] multiple paragraphs set out in a separate section” (doc. 38).

Nevertheless, the court agrees that the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint does not

impermissibly incorporate prior factual allegations such that it can be construed as a

shotgun pleading.2 While the Plaintiff’s prior amended complaints would be considered

shotgun pleadings due to referencing preceding paragraphs, the court finds that the Plaintiff

has seemingly corrected that particular deficiency by making reference to certain

paragraphs in her “factual allegations” section in each count rather than adopting the

allegations of all preceding counts. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321.

In her objections, the Plaintiff states that “Magistrate Judge Bryan overly and

erroneously relied on Plaintiff allegedly not clearly identifying the legal theory upon which

each separate cause of action is based” and that “[a]ny additional mentions of other

potential causes of action or sources of liability that are contained in the discussions of the

complaint’s counts should be ignored.” (Doc. 48 at 4). In the recommendation, the

Magistrate Judge states that “Count Two combines allegations of ‘racial discrimination,’

‘age discrimination,’ ‘harassment,’ and ‘violation of [Jones’] right to freedom of speech.’”

(Doc. 45 at 6). Further, the Magistrate Judge states that “Count Four similarly purports to

assert claims based upon ‘race and age,’ ‘suppression of Plaintiff’s right to free speech,’

and ‘retaliation for exercising her right to free speech’—again despite the court’s plain

instructions against so combining allegations.” (Id.). The Eleventh Circuit has held that

the “third type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not separating into a

2 The Eleventh Circuit has held that the most common type of shotgun pleading “is a complaint

containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing

each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the

entire complaint.” Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir.

2015). Further, the Eleventh Circuit has “condemned the incorporation of preceding paragraphs

where a complaint ‘contains several counts, each one incorporating by reference the allegations of

its predecessors [i.e., predecessor counts], leading to a situation where most of the counts (i.e., all

but the first) contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.” Id. at 1324. (Emphasis

in original).

different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322-23. As

such, the court agrees that, due to the Plaintiff combining allegations in at least two of her

counts, the Fourth Amended Complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading.

The Plaintiff argues that “Magistrate Judge Bryan’s criticism of Plaintiff bringing

the age discrimination count and Title VII counts (Counts 3 and 4) against individual

defendants, which is not legally viable … hardly makes Plaintiff’s complaint a ‘shotgun’

pleading.” (Doc. 48 at 5). However, the Magistrate Judge was merely citing his prior

caution to the Plaintiff that such claims could not be asserted against an individual to show

the Plaintiff’s failure to comply with court orders. In his recommendation, the Magistrate

Judge cites to his May 8, 2025, order in which he cautioned the Plaintiff as follows:

With respect to claims arising under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act and Title VII, Jones is reminded that the

Eleventh Circuit “has held that neither of those Acts

countenance individual liability.” See Albra v. Advan, Inc.,

490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Mason v. Stallings,

82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996)); see also Smith v. Lomax,

45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that

individuals “cannot be held liable under the ADEA or Title

VII”). Such claims instead lie only against an employer. See

Mason, 82 F.3d at 1009.

(Doc. 45 at 7) (citing doc. 33 at p. 6, n.4) (emphasis in original). The court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge’s finding. Count 3 of the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint is a

claim of age discrimination in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 621 against Defendants Bibb and

Stewart. However, as alleged by the Plaintiff, Defendant Bibb is the Superintendent of the

facility where the Plaintiff was employed, and Defendant Stewart is the Administrator of

the Alabama Alcohol Beverage Control Board. (See Doc. 39 at 2-3). As such, the Plaintiff

cannot bring a claim against Defendants Bibb and Stewart because they are individual

employees rather than the Plaintiff’s former employer—Defendant Alabama Alcohol

Beverage Control Board. Similarly, Count 4 of the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint

is a Title VII claim asserted against “all defendants,” which, as the Magistrate Judge

cautioned, is a claim that cannot be brought against individuals. In her objections, the

Plaintiff states that “[i]f [the claims are not legally viable], the individual defendants are

not subject to liability and could be dismissed.” (Doc. 48 at 5). However, while true, the

Plaintiff has been afforded four opportunities to amend her pleading since the court

cautioned her on November 18, 2024, that individuals cannot be held liable under Title

VII. (See Doc. 11 at 5). Thus, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that “[s]uch

blatant disregard for the court’s directives, standing alone, is sufficient to support a

dismissal considering the clear instructions given, the multiple opportunities to cure, and

the express notice that ‘the Magistrate Judge will recommend dismissal—either in whole

or part—if any pleading deficiencies remain.’” (Doc. 45 at 8) (citing doc. 38 at 6).

Therefore, because the Plaintiff has failed to identify an error in the Magistrate Judge’s

factual findings or legal conclusions, the court OVERRULES the Plaintiff’s objections,

(doc. 48).

After careful review of the file and upon consideration of the recommendation of

the Magistrate Judge, the court ADOPTS the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and

DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE? because the Plaintiff's Fourth Amended

Complaint ignores the court’s repeated instructions and remains a shotgun pleading.

All pending motions are hereby DENIED AS MOOT.

The court will enter a separate final judgment.

DONE and ORDERED on this the 4th day of May, 2026.

JOO

BILL LEWIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

> Rule 41(b), FED. R. Civ. P., “authorizes the dismissal with prejudice of an action for failure to

obey a court order or a federal rule.” Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d

1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). “The legal standard to be applied under Rule 41(b) is whether there

is aclear record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.”

Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). Based on the foregoing, the court agrees

with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that “Jones’ repeated failure to comply with very specific and

detailed instructions regarding her amendments constitutes a clear record of delay and/or willful

contempt” and that “any lesser sanction than dismissal would not be appropriate under the

circumstances.” (Doc. 45 at 8 n.1).