The opinion
06/17/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
VERCHAUNT JOSHUA WILLIAMS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
No. 63CC1-2012-CR-457
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No. M2026-00545-CCA-R28-PC
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ORDER
The pro se Petitioner, Verchaunt Joshua Williams, has filed an application for
permission to appeal the trial court’s order denying his motion to reopen his prior post-
conviction petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117; Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, Sec. 10(B). For
the reasons stated below, the Court hereby denies the Petitioner’s application.
Background
The Petitioner was convicted on one count each of first degree murder, tampering
with evidence, and abuse of a corpse for the January 2012 death of the victim, and he
received an effective sentence of life plus five years. State v. Williams, No. M2014-02049-
CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5032051 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2015). This Court affirmed
the convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Id. The Petitioner was unsuccessful in his
subsequent pursuit of post-conviction relief. Williams v. State, No. M2020-00512-CCA-
R3-PC, 2022 WL 2282717 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2022). The Petitioner was also
unsuccessful in his recent pursuit of another attempt to reopen his prior post-conviction
petition. Williams v. State, No. M2025-00837-CCA-R28-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. July 16,
2025) (Order), rehear and perm. app. denied. The Petitioner currently has an appeal
pending from the trial court’s order denying his petition seeking error coram nobis relief.
State v. Williams, No. M2025-00832-CCA-R3-ECN.
The Petitioner states he filed the instant motion to reopen his prior post-conviction
petition on February 24, 2026. He did not attach a file-stamped copy of that motion to the
instant application, however. The trial court denied the motion by written order on March
10, 2026. Therein, that court stated the Petitioner filed his motion to reopen on March 2,
2026. As noted in the court’s order, the Petitioner alleged in his motion that Glossip v.
Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226 (2025) established a constitutional right that did not exist at the
time of trial and that right should be applied retroactively to his case. As the trial court
observed, the Supreme Court relied upon established precedent in Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) in ordering a new trial
for Glossip. 604 U.S. at 246-252. Nevertheless, the trial court held:
Petitioner relies upon the contention that trial counsel represented a
witness in Petitioner’s trial, Eric Ferrer, on a misdemeanor prior to the
commencement of trial counsel undertaking representation of the Petitioner.
At the hearing on the original Petition for Post Conviction Relief, trial
counsel testified that such representation was disclosed to Petitioner and that
Petitioner had no objection. No evidence was presented at that hearing that
such was not the case, or that the Petitioner ever objected to trial counsel
representing Eric Ferrer. Trial counsel died a short time following that
hearing. No evidence has been presented at any point that the State possessed
any evidence which would have affected the credibility of any witnesses
which testified at trial, to such an extent so as to change or affect the jury's
verdict.
The trial court thus held the Petitioner is not entitled to reopen his prior post-conviction
petition.
Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Petition
A petitioner may seek post-conviction relief from a conviction or sentence that is
void or voidable due to the violation of any constitutional right. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
103. The Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“the Act”) limits a petitioner to a single petition
for relief. § 40-30-102(c). However, a petitioner may seek relief on claims that arise after
the disposition of the initial petition by filing a motion to reopen the post-conviction
proceedings “under the limited circumstances set out in § 40-30-117.” Id. Relief will only
be granted on a motion to reopen if the claim presented is based upon a final ruling of an
appellate court establishing a constitutional right not previously recognized at the time of
trial and retrospective application is required, if the claim is based upon new scientific
evidence establishing the appellant is actually innocent of the crime, or if the claim
presented seeks relief from a sentence that was enhanced because of a previous conviction
which has subsequently been invalidated. § 40-30-117(a). A motion filed pursuant to a
new ruling must be filed within one year thereof. Id. Furthermore, the facts underlying
the claim, if true, must establish by clear and convincing evidence that a petitioner is
entitled to have his or her conviction set aside or his or her sentence reduced. Id.
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“If the motion is denied, the petitioner shall have thirty (30) days to file an
application in the court of criminal appeals seeking permission to appeal.” Tenn. Code.
Ann. § 40-30-117(c). The application must contain copies of all documents filed by both
parties in the trial court as well as the order denying the motion. Id. This Court will grant
an application for permission to appeal only if it concludes the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to reopen. § 40-30-117(c).
Discussion
To begin, the Petitioner’s application, although timely, is incomplete. As noted
above, the Petitioner did not attach to his application a copy of the motion to reopen he
filed in the trial court. To that end, and as highlighted above, it is unclear whether he filed
that motion within one year of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Glossip, filed on February
25, 2025, upon which he relies for relief. Based on that defect alone, this Court is bound
to deny the Petitioner’s application. See Bonds v. State, No. W2025-01467-CC-R28-PC,
2025 WL 3022562 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2025). However, even assuming the
Petitioner timely filed his motion to reopen, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion to reopen. As discussed above, Glossip is not a final ruling of an
appellate court establishing a constitutional right not previously recognized at the time of
the Petitioner’s trial. § 40-30-117(a). Thus, the Petitioner’s reliance on that opinion offers
him no relief in this instance.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal is denied.
Because it appears the incarcerated Petitioner remains indigent, costs are taxed to the State.
Pursuant to statute, though, the State has the authority to recoup the costs associated with
this appeal from the Petitioner’s trust fund account at the conclusion of the appeal, if
appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143.
Holloway, Easter, Ayers, JJ.
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